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•    *  •  ••  •     •  • 

AMERICAISlALiPOi- 


DI  i^LOMATIC     QUESTION 


BY 

JOHN    B.    HENDERSON,   J  ' 


5^£iB  gork 
THE    MA  ;MILLAN    COMPANY 

LONDOr       MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  LTD. 
I9OI 

All  rights  reserved 


CONTENTS 

I 

THL  FUR  SEALS   AND  BERING   SEA  AWARI: 

I 

PAGE 

Russian  and  American  Claims  in  Bering  Sea        ...        3 

II 
The  Life  History  of  the  Fur  Seal  .        .        .        .        .        .10 

III 
The  Beginning  of  Pelagic  Sealing 13 

I^ 
/     Protests  and  Diplomatic  CoRRE?;pt>i^^DENCE       .        .        .        .14 

V 
The  Paris  Award  and  Regulations 34 

VI 
Efforts  for  Modification  of  Regulations     .        .        .        .42 

VII 
The  Present  Situation 61 

II 

THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM 

I 
History  of  Canal  Schemes  . 65 

II 
The  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty      .        .  .        .        .        ,    104 

V 


vi  CONTENTS 

III 

PAOB 

1850-1860— A  Decade  of  Discussion  .        .        .        .        .        .123. 

IV  \ 

The  Blaine  F  elinghuysen-Granville  Debates      .        .       \    137 

\ 

V  \ 
The  Mosquit     Troubles 169 

VI 
The  Hay-I    jncefote  Treaty      . 167 

VII 
The  Three  Problems.    Neutralization 176 


III 

THE   UNITED  STATES  AND  SAMOA 

I 

The  Islands  —  People  —  Government 209 

II 
Earlier  History 215 

III 
Social  Conditions  in  Apia  ^  1884-1889       .        .  .        .    219 

German  Aggressiveness 222 

V 

The  Washington  Conferences }^ 

VI 
IE  Reign  of  Dissensions .        .    232 


CONTENTS  Vll 

vri 

•»  PAOR 

IE  Berlin  Conference  and  Convention         ....    242 

VIII 
HUMPH  OF  Malietoa 257 

IX 
he  Trial  for  the  Kingship  — Partition  of  Samoa      .        .    262 


IV 

THE   MONEOE   DOCTRINE 

'\troduction 289 

I 

1   )REiGN  Relations  of  the  United  States  from  1783  to  1823    294 

II 
T  IE  Revolting  Spanish  Colonies 299 

HI 

:  jE  Holy  Alliance       . •        •    ^^^' 

IV 


lAMING   the 


Monroe  Doctrine 316 


V 

:ception  of  the  "Doctrine"     .        .        .        .        •        •        •    336 

VI        ' 
j    nama  Congress    .....•••••    342 

vn 

'    ANisH  America  and  Cuba 359 


viii  CONTENTS 

VIII 
Texas  and  Oregon 3 

IX 
Yucatan    3 

X  ! 

French  Intervention  in  Mexico 3 

XI 

From  1866  to  1896  .        .        . 4  7 

xn 

Great  Britain  and  Venezuela 4 

XIII 
Conclusion 4 

V 

THE  NORTHEAST  COAST  FISHERIES 
Introduction 41 

I 

The  Industry 4i  I 

II 

The  Early  English  and  French  Fisheries     .       .       .       .4) 

III  ! 

The  Early  American  Fisheries 4 

IV 

From  the  American  Revolution  to  1812.        .       .       .        .    4i 


CONTENTS  IX 

V      , 

PAGE 

The  Convention  of  1818 488 

VI 
1818  TO  1854 497 

VII 
Reciprocity  and  Treaty  of  1854 508 

VIII 
The  Treaty  of  Washington 513 

IX 

Return  to  Conditions  of  1818— Modus  Vivendi    .        .        .519 

X 

Situation  in  1901 526 


THE   FUR-SEALS  AND   THE   BERING 
SEA  AWARD 


n 


I 


THE  FUR-SEALS  AND  THE  BERING  SEA  AWARD 

By  treaty  of  March  30,  1867,  in  consideration  of  the  sum 
of  i7,200,000,  Russia  ceded  to  the  United  States  all  her  pos- 
sessions in  North  America.  These  included  the  present  ter- 
ritory of  Alaska,  the  Aleutian  chain,  and  some  isolated 
groups  of  islands  in  the  Bering  Sea.  The  western  boun- 
dary of  the  territory  so  transferred  to  the  United  States  was 
described  in  the  first  article  of  the  treaty  as  follows :  — 

The  western  limit  within  which  the  territories  and  dominion 
conveyed,  are  contained,  passes  through  a  point  in  Bering's 
Straits  on  the  parallel  of  sixty-five  degrees  thirty  minutes  north 
latitude,  at  its  intersection  by  the  meridian  which  passes  niid\^ay 
between  the  islands  of  Krusenstern,  or  Ignalook,  and  the  island  of 
Ratmanoff,  or  Noonarbook,  and  proceeds  due  north,  without  limi- 
tation, into  the  same  Frozen  Ocean.  The  same  western  limit,  be- 
ginning at  the  same  initial  point,  proceeds  thence  in  a  course 
nearly  southwest,  through  Behring's  Straits  and  Behring's  Sea,  so 
as  to  pass  midway  between  the  northwest  point  of  the  island  of 
St.  Lawrence  and  the  southeast  point  of  Cape  Choukotski,.  to  the 
meridian  of  one  hundred  and  seventy-two  west  longitude ;  thence, 
from  the  intersection  of  that  meridian,  in  a  southwesterly  di- 
rection, so  as  to  pass  midway  between  the  island  of  Attou  and 
the  Copper  island  of  the  Komondorski  couplet  or  group,  in  the 
North  Pacific  Ocean,  to  the  meridian  of  one  hundred  and  ninety- 
three  degrees  west  longitude,  so  as  to  include  in  the  territory  con- 
veyed the  whole  of  the  Aleutian  Islands  east  of  that  meridian. 

An  unusual  example  was  here  presented  of  a  divisional 
line  between  two  empires  passing  almost  midway  through  a 
great  ocean.      The  boundary  in  question  marks  the  western 

3 

?  6  1-  ^  r 


4  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

limit  within  which  the  territories  and  dominion  conveyed  are 
contained.  This  terse  description  may  be  regarded  as  a 
shorter  and  more  convenient  mode  of  expression  than  the 
separate  enumeration  of  a  bewildering  number  of  islands, 
yet  it  involved  a  confusing  implication  —  that  Russia 
intended  by  these  words  to  convey  to  the  United  States,  not 
only  all  the  islands  lying  east  of  the  imaginary  line  so  desig- 
nated, but,  indeed,  the  actual  sea  itself,  with  full  and  exclu- 
sive dominion  over  the  same.  ^  This  construction  of  the 
intent  and  purpose  of  this  clause  of  the  treaty,  however 
novel  or  in  ill  accord  with  the  usages  of  nations,  gained 
apparent  weight  from  the  fact  that  through  a  period  of 
many  years  Russia  had  persistently  claimed  extraordinary 
rights  of  navigation  and  fisheries  in  Bering  Sea,  —  rights 
which  even  at  that  time  were  regarded  by  civilized  nations 
as  beyond  the  sanction  of  international  law.  The  impor- 
tant question  —  had  Russia,  by  her  assertions,  gained  a  valid 
title  to  the  waters  of  Bering  Sea,  and  then,  had  the  United 
States  really  acquired  by  purchase  a  dominion  over  this  ex- 
tensive body  of  water,  or  even  greater  privileges  of  naviga- 
tion therein  than  are  enjoyed  in  common  by  all  nations  ?  — 
formed  one  of  the  issues  in  the  Bering  Sea  arbitration  trial, 
held  in  Paris,  in  the  spring  and  summer  of  1893. 

As  early  as  the  year  1800,  Russia  had  established  in 
Alaska  a  chartered  company,  with  exclusive  rights  of  hunt- 
ing and  fishing  in  its  waters  and  of  trading  with  its  native 
population.  In  order  better  to  protect  the  interests  of  this 
flourishing  business  organization,  the  Emperor  Alexander 
the  First,  in  1821,  issued  an. ukase,  or  proclamation,  in  the 
following  words:  — 

Section  I.  The  transaction  of  commerce,  and  the  pursuit  of 
whaling  and  fishing,  or  any  other  industry  on  the  islands,  in  the 
harbors  and  inlets,  and,  in  general,  all  along  the  northwestern 
coast  of  America  from  Behring  Strait  to  the  fifty-first  parallel  of 
northern  latitude,  and  likewise  on  the  Aleutian  Islands  and  along 
the  eastern  coast  of  Siberia,  and  on  the  Kurile  Islands ;  that  is, 
from  Behring  Strait  to  the  southern  promontory  of  the  Island  of 
Urup,  viz.,  as  far  south  as  latitude  forty-five  degrees  and  fifty 


THE   FUR-SEALS   AND   THE   BERING   SEA   AWARD  5 

minutes  north,  are  exclusively  reserved  to  subjects  of  the  Rus- 
sian Empire. 

Section  II.  Accordingly,  no  foreign  vessel  shall  be  allowed 
either  to  put  to  shore  at  any  of  the  coasts  and  islands  under  Rus- 
sian dominion  as  specified  in  the  preceding  section,  or  even  to 
approach  the  same  to  within  a  distance  of  less  than  one  hundred 
Italian  miles.  Any  vessel  contravening  this  provision  shall  be 
subject  to  confiscation  with  her  whole  cargo. 

At  the  time  of  the  promulgation  of  this  law  (1821),  the 
principle  of  absolute  freedom  of  navigation  in  the  open  sea 
was  generally  recognized,  and  no  nation  could  rightfully     ^ 
assert  her  sovereignty  over  the  ocean  further  than  three 
marine  leagues  from  her  own  shores.      This  distance  was         ^ 
considered  the  average  range  of  a  cannon  shot,  and,  there- 
fore, the  limit  within  which  a  people  could  protect  their  marine 
jurisdiction  from  the  land.      Seven  years  before  that  time 
the  American  commissioners  at  Ghent  had  made  the  attitude  | 
of  the  United  States  Government  in  this  matter  quite  clear  Iv/ 
by   their   determined   opposition    to   England's    threatened]     / 
assertion    of    jurisdiction   over    the   Ne_^foundland   banks.  p^> 
Alexander  the   First  either  considered  himself  superior  to'V^/ 
the  operation  of  international  law,  or  he  may  have  regarded 
the  entire  Bering  Sea  as  a  closed  sea,  or  mare  clausum^  over 
which  he  could  properly  exercise  sole  control,  even  to  the 
total  exclusion  of  all  foreign  vessels.      The  fact  that  in  1821 
the  waters  of  the  Bering  Sea  washed  only  Russian  shores, 
v^hich,  in  some  respects,  suggested  a  closed  sea,  probably  led 
the  Emperor  Alexander  to  regard  his  assertions  of  enlarged 
dominion  over  the  whole  or  any  part  of  it  as  not  only  just 
and  right,  but  fully  in  keeping  with  the  principles  of  inter- 
national law.      Bering  Sea  is  in  reality  a  vast  ocean,  com- 
municating with   the   larger    Pacific  Ocean  through  many 
channels  of  great  width.     It  is,  indeed,  a  part  of  the  greater 
ocean,  and  should  properly  be  so  considered,  being  separated 
from  it  only  by  a  line  of  islands  that  often  lie  many  miles 
apart. 

The  violation  of  legal  principles  concerning  the  extent  of 
marine  jurisdiction,  made  by  the  Russian  Emperor's  ukase  of 


V 


6  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

1821,  might  have  gone  unchallenged  by  the  world  for  many 
years ;  for,  in  those  early  times,  very  few  merchant  vessels 
had  occasion  to  visit  those  distant  waters,  and  in  general 
little  interest  attached  to  their  inhospitable  shores;  never- 
theless, fleets  of  American  whalers  had  even  before  that 
time  found  their  way  north  of  the  Aleutian  Islands,  follow- 
ing the  custom  of  making  annual  summer  cruises  there- 
abouts in  pursuit  of  whales,  which  were  abundant  in  the 
cold  waters  of  the  Bering  Sea.  The  Russian  restrictions 
upon  navigation  in  the  northern  Pacific  Ocean  seriously  em- 
barrassed those  hardy  sea-rovers  from  New  Bedford  and 
Nantucket.  Through  their  complaints  to  the  State  De- 
partment in  Washington,  an  American  protest  appeared 
against  these  Russian  assertions  of  sovereignty  over  so  large 
an  expanse  of  ocean.  Secretary  of  State  John  Quincy  Adams, 
in  a  communication  of  February  25,  1822,  to  Mr.  Poletica, 
then  Russian  Minister  at  Washington,  said:  — 

Lam  directed  by  the  President  of  the  United  States  to  inform 
you  that  he  has  seen  with  surprise,  in  this  edict,  the  assertion  of 
a  territorial  claim  on  the  part  of  Russia,  extending  to  the  fifty- 
first  degree  of  north  latitude  on  this  continent,  and  a  regulation 
interdicting  to  all  commercial  vessels  other  than  Russian,  upon 
the  penalty  of  seizure  and  confiscation,  the  approach  upon  the 
high  seas  within  one  hundred  Italian  miles  of  the  shores  to 
which  that  claim  is  made  to  apply.  ...  It  was  expected  before 
any  act  which  should  define  the  boundaries  between  the  United 
States  and  Russia  on  this  continent,  that  the  same  would  have 
been  arranged  by  treaty  between  the  parties.  To  exclude  the 
vessels  of  our  citizens  from  the  shore,  beyond  the  ordinary  dis- 
tance to  which  the  territorial  jurisdiction  extends,  has  excited 
still  greater  surprise. 

Mr.  Poletica  replied  February  28,  only  three  days  after 
the  receipt  of  Mr.  Adams'  communication :  — 

...  I  ought,  in  the  last  place,  to  request  you  to  consider,  sir, 
that  the  Russian  possessions  in  the  Pacific  Ocean  extend,  on  the 
northwest  coast  of  America,  from  Behring  Strait  to  the  fifty-first 
degree  of  north  latitude,  and  on  the  opposite  side  of  Asia,  and 
the  islands  adjacent,  from  the  same  Strait  to  the  forty-fifth 
degree.     The  extent  of  sea,  of  which  these  possessions  form  the 


THE   FUR-SEALS   AND   THE   BERING   SEA   AWARD  7 

limits,  comprehends  all  the  conditions  which  are  ordinarily 
attached  to  shut  seas  {mers  ferm^es),  and  the  Russian  Government 
might  consequently  judge  itself  authorized  to  exercise  upon  this 
sea  the  right  of  sovereignty,  and  especially  that  of  entirely  inter- 
dicting the  entrance  of  foreigners.  But  it  preferred  only  assert- 
ing its  essential  rights,  without  taking  any  advantage  of  localities. 

It  thus  became  evident  that  the  Emperor  considered  as 
belonging  to  him  alone,  not  only  the  Bering  Sea,  but  also, 
as  a  closed  sea,  all  that  portion  of  the  Pacific  Ocean  which 
lies  north  of  latitude  51°;  and  that  he  further  considered  it 
a  generous  act  on  his  part  to  leave  all  his  imperial  domain  of 
sea,  except  a  mere  hundred-mile  belt  about  its  shores,  free 
to  the  world  for  its  commerce  and  navigation.  Mr.  Adams 
replied  to  Mr.  Poletica's  note  on  March  30:  — 

This  pretension  is  to  be  considered  not  only  with  reference  to 
the  question  of  territorial  right,  but  also  to  that  prohibition  to  the 
vessels  of  other  nations,  including  those  of  the  United  States,  to 
approach  within  one  hundred  Italian  miles  of  the  coasts.  From 
the  period  of  the  existence  of  the  United  States  as  an  indepen- 
dent nation,  their  vessels  have  freely  navigated  those  seas,  and  the 
right  to  navigate  them  is  a  part  of  that  independence.  .  .  . 

The  Russian  Emperor's  position,  in  asserting  mare  clausum 
over  the  Pacific  Ocean  as  bounded  by  his  own  possessions  on 
either  side,  was  made  absurd  by  Mr.  Adams'  simple  state- 
ment that  "  the  distance  from  shore  to  shore  on  this  sea  in 
latitude  51°  north  is  not  less  than  90  degrees  of  longitude,  or 
four  thousand  miles." 

England  had  no  important  interests  directly  violated  by 
the  Russian  ukase  of  1821,  but  she  possessed  territory 
vaguely  and  indefinitely  bounded  in  the  northwest  part  of 
North  America,  and  she  detected  in  Russian  claims  of  en- 
larged jurisdiction  over  so  great  an  extent  of  sea  a  precedent 
that  might  in  the  future  operate  adversely  to  her  own  inter- 
ests. Her  protest,  which  was  quite  as  vigorous  as  the  one 
from  Washington,  is  found  in  the  Duke  of  Wellington's 
letter  of  November  28,  1822,  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at 
London : —  . 


8  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

.  .  .  The  second  ground  on  which  we  object  to  the  ukase  is 
that  His  Imperial  Majesty  thereby  excludes  from  a  certain  con- 
siderable extent  of  the  open  sea  vessels  of  other  nations.  We 
contend  that  the  assumption  of  this  power  is  contrary  to  the  law 
of  nations ;  and  we  cannot  found  a  negotiation  upon  a  paper  in 
which  it  is  again  broadly  asserted.  We  contend  that  no  power 
whatever  can  exclude  another  from  the  use  of  the  open  sea;  a 
power  can  exclude  itself  from  the  navigation  of  a  certain  coast, 
sea,  etc.,  by  its  own  act  or  engagement,  but  it  cannot  by  right  be 
excluded  by  another.     This  we  consider  as  the  law  of  nations.  .  .  . 

These  protests  from  the  eagle  and  the  lion  succeeded  in 
enlightening  the  bear,  for  Russia  immediately  began  to  recog- 
nize the  feebleness  of  her  asserted  right  to  control  the  North 
Pacific  Ocean.  After  a  short  period  of  correspondence,  Rus- 
sia yielded  all  these  exaggerated  pretensions  and  made  a 
treaty  with  the  United  States  (April  17,  1824),  in  which  it 
was  agreed :  — 

.  .  .  that,  in  any  part  of  the  Great  Ocean,  commonly  called  the 
Pacific  Ocean,  or  South  Sea,  the  respective  citizens  or  subjects 
of  the  high  contracting  powers  shall  be  neither  disturbed  nor  re- 
strained, either  in  navigation  or  in  fishing,  or  in  the  powder  of 
resorting  to  the  coasts,  upon  points  which  may  not  already  have 
been  occupied,  for  the  purpose  of  trading  with  the  natives,  saving 
always  the  restrictions  and  conditions  determined  by  the  follow- 
ing articles. 

The  "  conditions  and  restrictions  "  referred  to  illicit  trading 
and  the  formation  of  settlements. 

By  the  fourth  article  of  this  convention  Russia  granted  to 
United  States  vessels,  for  a  period  of  ten  years,  the  privilege 
of  frequenting  "  without  any  hindrance  whatever  the  interior 
seas,  gulfs,  harbors,  and  creeks  upon  the  coasts  mentioned  in 
the  preceding  article  for  the  purpose  of  fishing  and  trading 
with  the  natives  of  the  country."  By  this  treaty  also  Rus- 
sian possessions  in  North  America  were  limited  on  the  south 
by  the  54°  40'  parallel  of  latitude. 

When  the  stipulated  period  of  ten  years  had  elapsed,  the 
United  States  sought  to  renew  the  privilege  of  trading  with 
the  natives  of  Alaska  and  of  navigating  the  inner  waters  of 


THE   FUR-SEALS   AND  THE   BERING   SEA   AWARD  9 

the  coast  north  of  latitude  54°  40'.  This  favor  Russia  obsti- 
nately refused  to  grant,  although  the  remaining  articles  of 
the  treaty  continued  always  in  force.  It  seems  to  have  been 
suspected  in  the  United  States  that  Russia  would  consider 
her  jurisdiction  over  a  hundred-mile  marine  belt  reestablished 
by  the  expiration  of  the  fourth  article  of  her  treaty,  notwith- 
standing the  fact  that  that  part  of  the  treaty  surrendering  all 
claims  to  exclusive  navigation  of  the  Great  Ocean  or  South 
Sea  remained  operative.     John  Adams  at  the  time  expressed  <^^^^^ 

himself  in  his  diary  as  able  to  down  Russian  argument,  but, 

unable  to  silence  Russian  cannon.  American  vessels  con  tin-  "^ 
ued,  however,  to  navigate  the  Bering  Sea  with  perfect  free- 
dom, and  Russia  never  again  actually  asserted  the  right  of 
mare  clausum  over  that  body  of  water,  nor  apparently  con- 
sidered it  otherwise  than  as  a  part  of  the  great  Pacific  Ocean, 
or  "  South  Sea." 

Such,  then,  was  the  situation  in  1867,  when  the  United 
States  purchased  the  territory  of  Alaska  and  came  into  pos- 
session of  all  Russian  rights  of  trade  and  navigation  in 
Bering  Sea.  Beyond  its  several  thousand  miles  of  coast  line, 
this  great  territory  was  practically  a  terra  incognita  to  all  but 
a  few  adventurous  explorers  and  trappers  who  had  pene- 
trated its  vast  wilderness.  Its  purchase  was  largely  brought 
about  through  a  friendly  feeling  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States  to  meet  half-way  Russia's  desire  to  dispose  of  her 
American  possessions,  while  at  the  same  time  she  hoped 
rather  than  expected  that  the  future  might  develop  valuable 
natural  resources  in  this  far-away  region,  when  civilization, 
in  its  westward  progress,  should  gain  its  shores  and  ascend 
its  great  river. 

The  description  of  the  western  boundary  of  the  cession, 
already  referred  to,  led  to  some  ambiguity,  even  at  that  day, 
as  to  what  extent  of  jurisdiction  the  United  States  might 
rightfully  claim  over  the  waters  of  Bering  Sea.  The  ques- 
tion whether  Russia  intended  to  convey,  or  even  could  convey, 
within  the  limits  of  law,  dominion  over  the  waters  of  Bering 
Sea,  outside  the  ordinarily  recognized  three-mile  limit  of  ma- 
rine jurisdiction,  did  not  at  once  assume  great  importance. 


10  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

In  framing  laws  for  the  territory  the  following  year  (1868), 
Congress  did  not  clearly  signify  the  extent  to  which  the 
United  States  claimed  jurisdiction  in  Bering  Sea,  but  simply 
enacted  that  the  "  laws  of  the  United  States  relating  to  cus- 
toms, commerce,  and  navigation,  are  extended  to  and  over 
all  the  mainland,  islands,  and  waters  of  the  territory  ceded 
to  the  United  States  by  the  Emperor  of  Russia  .  .  .  ",  and 
further  enacted  that,  "  no  person  shall  kill  any  otter,  mink, 
martin,  sable,  or  fur-seal,  or  other  fur-bearing  animals  within 
the  limits  of  Alaska  territory,  or  in  the  waters  thereof.  ..." 
Thus  the  United  States  asserted  its  dominion  over  Alaska 
and  the  waters  thereof  the  phrase  "waters  thereof"  unfortu- 
nately being  left  to  the  various  interpretations  of  public 
opinion,  as  shaped  or  fashioned  by  future  national  interests. 
This  ambiguity  of  expression  was  destined  finally  to  play  an 
important  part  in  a  serious  international  complication. 

Two  great  industries  at  once  developed  in  Alaska,  —  the 
salmon  fisheries  and  the  capture  of  fur-bearing  animals.  Of 
these  by  far  the  most  important  was  the  pursuit  of  sealing. 
The  fur  of  seals  is  exceptionally  fine,  and  being  always  in  de- 
mand, has  commanded  high  prices  in  the  markets  of  the  world. 

The  fur-seal,  known  to  zoologists  as  Callorhinus  ursinus^ 
resembles  biologically  a  form  of  marine  bear,  and  should 
not  be  confounded  witli  the  true  seal  of  our  Pacific  coast, 
from  which  it  differs  in  several  respects. 

There  are  three  herds  of  these  marine  creatures  that  annu- 
ally visit  the  islands  of  the  North  Pacific.  These  herds  do 
not  mingle,  but  have  each  their  own  particular  breeding- 
ground,  to  which  they  annually  repair.  One  herd  inhabits 
Robin  Island,  in  the  Okhotsk  Sea;  one  the  Commander 
Islands  which  lie  on  the  Russian  side  of  Bering  Sea ;  and  the 
third  (in  point  of  numbers  the  most  important,  and  known 
as  the  "  American  herd "  in  contradistinction  to  the  other 
two,  or  "Asiatic  h^xds"),  inhabits  the  Pribyloff  Islands  —  a 
group  of  small  islands  on  the  American  side  of  Bering  Sea. 
To  these  islands  the  seals  resort  in  great  numbers  during  the 
latter  part  of  May  or  the  first  part  of   June.     The  males 


THE   FUR-SEALS    AND   THE   BERING   SEA   AWARD  11 

arrive  first,  and  taking  positions  along  the  shore,  each  pre- 
empts, so  to  speak,  a  certain  space  sacred  to  himself,  and 
there  awaits  the  coming  of  the  females.  As  they  appear, 
arriving  day  by  day  from  the  sea,  great  confusion  reigns 
along  the  shores  of  the  rookeries.  Desperate  struggles  for 
the  females  follow,  and  when  a  degree  of  peace  is  restored  in 
the  course  of  a  few  days,  there  results  an  establishment  of 
many  approximately  permanent  polygamous  family  groups 
more  or  less  densely  crowded  along  the  littoral  of  the  islands. 
The  younger  male  seals,  known  as  "bachelors,"  are  unable 
to  cope  with  the  older  and  stronger  ones  in  their  fierce  con- 
tests for  possession  of  the  females.  They  retire  and  herd 
together,  a  discontented  throng,  at  some  distance  from  their 
jealous  elders.  The  old  males  keep  constantly  on  the  alert 
to  protect  their  homesteads  from  the  intrusion  of  other  males, 
or  to  prevent  the  members  of  their  own  households  from 
deserting  them.  So  jealous  are  they  of  their  "  wives  "  that  they 
dare  not  venture  away  from  their  positions  on  shore  during 
the  entire  breeding  season,  not  even  in  search  of  food.  Tlie 
females,  soon  after  landing,  give  birth  to  their  young,  each 
bearing  a  single  "  pup."  These  helpless  little  creatures  are 
carefully  nurtured  by  their  mothers  until  they  learn  to  swim 
and  can  shift  for  themselves.  The  females  in  search  of  food 
make  frequent  excursions  to  sea  during  the  breeding  season, 
often  going  as  far  as  two  hundred  miles  from  the  island  rook- 
eries, at  which  distance  they  have  been  frequently  observed 
disporting  themselves,  or  quietly  sleeping  upon  the  surface 
of  the  water.  They  always  return  to  the  care  of  their  young 
and  to  the  protection  of  their  watchful  lords  and  masters. 

Thus  the  seals  constituting  the  "  American  herd "  live 
upon  the  Pribyloff  rookeries  from  the  time  of  their  annual 
coming  in  May  and  June  until  the  late  autumn,  when  the 
forces  of  Boreas  besiege  the  islands  and  the  northern  seas 
become  tempestuous.  The  seals  then  slip  into  the  surf  for 
their  long  annual  swim  to  the  south.  They  migrate  leisurely 
through  various  passes  between  the  Aleutian  Islands,  thence 
southward  in  the  open  Pacific  to  about  latitude  ,35°  (oppo- 
site San  Francisco),  then  making  a  long  sweep  inland  they 


12  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

follow  a  northerly  course  along  the  American  coast.  No 
landing  is  made  until  the  following  May  or  June,  when,  in 
obedience  to  their  instincts,  they  once  more  return  to  their 
common  rendezvous  on  the  Pribyloff  Islands.  The  life  habits 
of  the  seals  of  the  Asiatic  herds  are  in  all  respects  identical, 
their  winter  migrations  being  south  along  the  Asiatic  coast 
to  the  neighborhood  of  Japan. 

Under  the  organized  sealing  industry  of  the  chartered 
American  Company,  a  fixed  number  of  "  bachelors  "  only  were 
killed,  the  female  seals  being  left  unmolested  along  with 
old  males,  the  pelts  of  the  latter  being  quite  useless  for  com- 
mercial purposes. 

Shortly  after  the  discovery  of  the  Pribyloff  Islands  in 
1786,  the  number  of  fur-seals  annually  captured  at  the 
rookeries  has  been  variously  estimated  among  the  millions. 
The  unlimited  slaughter  of  the  seals  and  the  consequent 
danger  of  their  extinction  obliged  the  Russian  Government 
to  enact  prohibitory  laws  from  time  to  time  for  their  protec- 
tion. At  the  time  of  the  American  acquisition  of  Alaska,  the 
Russian-American  Company  (chartered  by  Russia  and  which 
enjoyed  the  monopoly  of  the  Alaskan  trade)  was  shipping 
annually  to  New  York  and  London  upon  an  average  forty 
thousand  skins.  Notwithstanding  this  seemingly  large  yearly 
capture,  seals  were  vastly  increasing  in  numbers. 

In  1868-69  attention  at  Washington  was  especially  directed 
to  the  great  value  of  the  sealing  industry,  and  also  to  the 
wisdom  of  taking  active  measures  to  prevent  a  wholesale 
slaughter  of  seals  by  rival  companies  that  quickly  occupied 
the  field  when  the  Russian  company  went  out  of  existence. 
Unmindful  of  the  future  and  eager  for  immediate  gain,  these 
irresponsible  hunters  sought  to  kill  the  goose  for  her  golden 
eggs.  Accordingly  the  islands  of  the  Pribyloff  group  were 
declared  to  be  a  governmental  reserve,  and  by  virtue  of  an  Act 
of  Congress,  July  1,  1870,  the  killing  of  "any  fur-seal  upon 
the  islands  of  St.  Paul  and  St.  George  or  in  the  waters  adja- 
cent thereto,  excepting  during  the  months  of  June,  July, 
September,  and  October  in  each  year  "  was  prohibited.  It  was 
also  declared  unlawful  to  kill  such  seals  at  any  time  by  the 


THE   FUR-SEALS   AND   THE   BERING    SEA   AWARD         13 

use  of  fire-arms,  or  by  any  means  which  tended  to  drive  them 
away  from  those  islands.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  was 
further  empowered  to  lease  to  proper  and  responsible  parties, 
for  a  period  of  twenty  years,  "  the  right  to  engage  in  the  bus- 
iness of  taking  fur-seals  on  the  islands  of  St.  George  and 
St.  Paul "  ;  Secretary  Boutwell  thereupon  granted  to  the 
Alaska  Commercial  Company  the  sole  privilege  of  capturing 
seals  upon  those  islands.  The  company  according  to  the 
terms  of  this  lease  was  obliged  to  pay  annually  into  the  Treas- 
ury of  the  United  States  the  sum  of  155,000,  besides  the 
sum  of  62|  cents  for  each  skin  taken.  Under  proper  restric- 
tions such  care  was  taken  by  the  company  in  killing  only  the 
"  bachelors,"  —  the  two  to  four  year  old  males,  —  that  the 
number  of  seals  sojourning  upon  the  islands  each  year  showed 
no  signs  of  diminution,  despite  the  fact  that  the  company 
was  authorized  to  take  annually  one  hundred  thousand  pelts. 
During  the  twenty  years'  operations  of  the  Alaska  Commer- 
cial Company  in  the  Pribyloff  Islands,  the  prices  of  sealskins 
advanced  from  12.50  in  1868  to  |30  in  1890.  At  the  expira- 
tion of  its  lease,  the  company  had  paid  into  the  Treasury  of 
the  United  States  the  large  sum  of  $5,956,065.67. 

The  contract  proved  to  be  an  exceedingly  profitable  one  for 
the  company  as  well,  and  the  reports  of  its  success  soon 
spread  far  and  wide.  Expeditions  were  fitted  out  by  ship- 
owners in  British  Columbia,  in  Hawaii,  and  even  in  Australia, 
to  engage  in  the  hunt  for  seals.  As  the  Alaska  Company 
was  protected  in  its  monopoly  of  seal  catching  on  the  islands 
of  St.  Paul  and  St.  George  of  the  Pribyloff  group,  and  as  the 
few  Russian  islands,  to  which  the  other  seal  herds  repaired, 
were  similarly  protected  by  Russian  laws,  the  method  fol- 
lowed by  these  free  rovers  was  to  drift  about  in  the  open 
waters  of  the  sea,  often  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  passes 
between  the  Aleutian  Islands,  and  thus  intercepting  the  seals 
in  their  annual  migration  north  or  south,  capture  them 
in  the  water.  This  method  of  attack  was  exceedingly  de- 
structive to  the  herd.  It  was  impossible  that  a  discrimination 
could  be  made  between  the  males  and  females,  and  in  killing 
the  females  a  double  slaughter  was  effected.     Besides  this, 


\ 

14  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

many  of  the  animals  were  wounded  and  lost,  and  it  was  ap- 
prehended by  the  American  sealers  that  the  continuation  of 
the  practice  of  pelagic  sealing  would  soon  result  in  the  exter- 
mination of  the  species. 

The  Collector  of  the  port  at  San  Francisco,  Mr.  Phelps, 
having  been  apprised  of  the  dangers  threatening  the  industry 
so  comfortably  prospering  in  St.  Paul  and  St.  George,  wrote 
to  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  in  1872,  asking  permission  to 
despatch  a  revenue  cutter  to  the  scene  of  action  for  the  pur- 
pose of  preventing  pelagic  sealing.  Mr.  Boutwell,  the  Secre- 
tary of  the  Treasury,  in  reply  said,  "  I  do  not  see  that  the 
United  States  would  have  the  jurisdiction  or  power  to  drive 
off  parties  going  up  there  for  that  purpose  unless  they  made 
such  attempts  within  a  marine  league  of  the  shores."  This 
was  the  first  official  expression  touching  upon  the  doubtful 
words,  "or  in  the  waters  thereof."  It  clearly  indicated 
that  the  government  in  Washington  at  that  date  interpreted 
those  words  of  the  Act  of  Congress  of  1868  to  mean  the  ordi- 
nary three  miles  of  marine  jurisdiction.  Destructive  to  Ameri- 
can interests  as  pelagic  sealing  might  prove  to  be,  the  United 
States  in  1872  did  not  see  its  way  clear  in  preventing  it  by 
force ;  accordingly  no  revenue  cutter  was  sent  to  Bering  Sea. 

Each  succeeding  year  witnessed  an  increase  in  pelagic 
sealing.  New  vessels  were  being  fitted  out  every  season  to 
engage  in  the  exceedingly  profitable  occupation  of  seal  hunt- 
ing in  and  about  the  passes  of  the  Aleutian  Islands,  and  fre- 
quent incursions  were  made  for  the  same  purpose  into  Bering 
Sea.  Continued  protests  from  the  Alaska  Company  found 
their  way  to  Washington,  and  evidence  of  the  gradual  dimi- 
nution of  the  herd  through  the  wanton  slaughter  of  seals  by 
the  pelagic  hunters  was  repeatedly  furnished  to  the  authori- 
ties of  the  Treasury  Department.  It  soon  became  distress- 
ingly apparent  that  unless  seal  hunting  in  the  open  sea  could 
be  prevented,  the  total  extinction  of  the  animals  was  a  question 
of  only  a  few  years. 

Now  if  the  United  States  could  establish  a  claim  of  mare 
clausum  over  Bering  Sea,  the  problem  of  ways  and  means 
of  preventing  pelagic  sealing  in  Bering  Sea  would  be  solved. 


THE   FUR-SEALS   AND   THE   BERING   SEA   AWARD         15 

Could  the  same  exclusive  dominion  be  established  over  that 
sea  that  the  United  States  exercised  over  Chesapeake  Bay 
or  Long  Island  Sound,  her  right  to  control  its  waters  would 
be  complete.  Then,  with  Revenue  cutters  on  guard  during 
the  season  of  the  migration  of  the  seals,  marauders  could 
be  warned  away  or  their  vessels  seized  and  condemned  under 
the  statute  laws  of  1868  and  1870  (^Supra).  The  temptation 
to  set  up  a  claim  of  mare  clausum  was  great. 

In  1881,  D.  A.  d'Ancona,  Collector  of  the  Port  at  San 
Francisco,  disturbed  by  reports  of  sealing  expeditions  which 
were  being  fitted  out  in  British  Columbia,  wrote  to  the  Treas- 
ury Department  (as  had  his  predecessor,  Mr.  Phelps,  in 
1872),  asking  for  more  definite  information  regarding  the 
extent  of  American  dominion  in  Bering  Sea.  The  reply  of 
Mr.  French,  Acting  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  March  12, 
1881,  marks  a  complete  reversal  of  the  position  assumed  by 
the  government  in  1872,  as  expressed  in  Mr.  Boutwell's  letter 
already  referred  to.     Mr.  French  wrote  as  follows :  — 

You  inquire  into  the  interpretation  of  the  terms  "  waters 
thereof"  and  "waters  adjacent  thereto,"  as  used  in  the  law, 
and  how  far  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States  is  to  be  under- 
stood as  extending. 

Presuming  your  inquiry  to  relate  more  especially  to  the  waters 
of  western  Alaska,  you  are  informed  that  the  treaty  with  Russia 
of  March  30,  1870,  by  which  the  territory  of  Alaska  was  ceded  to 
the  United  States,  defines  the  boundary  of  the  territory  so  ceded. 
The  treaty  is  found  on  pages  671  to  673  of  the  volume  of  treaties 
of  the  Revised  Statutes.  It  will  be  seen  therefrom  that  the  limit 
of  the  cession  extends  from  a  line  starting  from  the  Arctic  ocean 
and  running  through  Behring  Strait  to  the  north  of  St.  Lawrence 
Islands.  The  line  runs  then  in  a  southwesterly  direction,  so  as  to 
pass  midway  between  the  island  of  Attou  and  Copper  island  of 
the  Komondorski  couplet  or  group  in  the  North  Pacific  Ocean,  to 
meridian  of  193  of  west  longitude.  All  the  waters  within  that 
boundary  to  the  icestern  end  of  the  Aleutian  Archipelago  and  chain 
of  islands  are  considered  as  comprised  within  the  waters  of  Alaska 
territory.^' 

Thus  it  will  be  seen  that  in  order  to  gain  the  right  to  pro- 
tect seals  while  in  Bering  Sea,  the  United  States  yielded  to 


16  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

the  temptation  and  assumed  jurisdiction  over  the  entire 
stretch  of  its  waters  (east  of  the  imaginary  line  designated  as 
the  boundary  line  of  Alaska),  claiming  it  to  be  a  mer  fermSe^ 
or  closed  sea,  in  the  same  category  indeed  as  any  coastwise 
harbor,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  Bering  Sea  is  of  vastly 
greater  geographical  extent  than  any  harbor.  While  believ- 
ing herself  justified  in  so  doing,  the  United  States  made  no 
actual  captures  of  sealing  vessels  at  that  time.  Pelagic  sealing 
nevertheless  continued.  In  1886  Mr.,  Manning,  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury,  addressed  a  letter  to  Collector  Hagan  of 
the  port  of  San  Francisco,  affirming  the  ruling  of  Acting 
Secretary  French,  as  follows  :  — 

I  transmit  herewith  for  your  information  a  copy  of  a  letter 
addressed  by  the  Department  on  the  12th  of  March,  1881,  to  D.  A. 
d'Ancona,  concerning  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States  in  the 
waters  of  the  territory  of  Alaska  and  the  prevention  of  the  killing 
of  fur-seals  and  other  fur-bearing  animals  within  such  areas  as 
prescribed  by  chapter  3,  title  23,  of  the  Revised  Statutes.  The 
attention  of  your  predecessor  in  office  was  called  to  the  subject  on 
the  4th  of  April,  1881.  This  communication  is"  addressed  to  you, 
inasmuch  as  it  is  understood  that  certain  parties  at  your  port  con- 
template the  fitting  out  of  expeditions  to  kill  fur-seals  in  these 
waters.  You  are  requested  to  give  due  publicity  to  such  letters, 
in  order  that  such  parties  may  be  informed  of  the  construction 
placed  by  this  Department  upon  the  provision  of  law  referred  to." 

Fortified  by  this  further  statement  of  the  government's 
position  regarding  United  States  control  of  the  waters  of 
Bering  Sea,  the  Treasury  officials  on  the  Pacific  coast  deter- 
mined to  take  a  stand  against  further  poaching  in  what  had 
been  declared  by  their  chief  to  be  American  waters.  Accord- 
ingly the  United  States  revenue  cutter  Corivin  proceeded  to 
Bering  Sea,  and  in  August  of  that  year  (1886)  seized  three 
British  vessels,  —  the  Omvard,  Carolina,  and  Thornton,  —  all 
being  at  the  time  of  their  seizure  considerably  more  than 
three  miles  from  shore.  They  were  engaged  as  alleged,  in 
capturing  seals  in  violation  of  Section  1956  of  the  Revised 
Statutes  of  the  United  States,  which  made  it  unlawful  to  kill 
seals  "  within  the  limits  of  Alaska  territory  or  in  the  waters 
thereof.''^      These  three  vessels  were  taken   to   Sitka,  tried 


THE   FUR-SEALS   AND   THE   BERING   SEA  AWARD         17 

before  the  District  Court  of  Alaska,  their  masters  found  guilty, 
and  the  vessels  were  accordingly  confiscated  and  condemned 
to  be  sold.  In  the  trial  of  these  vessels  their  owners  advanced 
the  following  argument  in  defence  of  their  rights:  — 

The  first  question  then  to  be  decided  is  what  is  meant  by  the 
"waters  thereof."  If  the  defendants  are  bound  by  the  treaty  between 
the  United  States  and  Russia  ceding  Alaska  to  the  United  States, 
then  it  appears  that  Russia  in  1822  claimed  absolute  territorial 
sovereignty  over  the  Behring  Sea,  and  purported  to  convey  practi- 
cally one-half  of  that  sea  to  the  United  States.  But  are  the  defend- 
ants, as  men  belonging  to  a  country  on  friendly  terms  with  the 
United  States,  bound  by  this  assertion  of  Russia  ?  And  can  the 
United  States  claim  that  the  treaty  conveys  to  them  any  greater 
right  than  Russia  herself  possessed  in  these  w^aters  ?  In  other 
words,  the  mere  assertion  of  a  right  contrary  to  the  comity  of 
nations  can  confer  on  the  grantees  no  rights  in  excess  of  those 
recognized  by  the  laws  of  nations. 

It  also  appears  that  the  United  States  in  claiming  sovereignty/ 
over  the  Behring  Sea  is  claiming  something  beyond  the  well-recog-l 
nized  law  of  nations,  and  bases  her  claim  upon  the  pretensions  of  I 
Russia,  which  were  successfully  repudiated  by  both  Great  Britain  I 
and  the  United  States.  A  treaty  is  valid  and  binding  between! 
the  parties  to  it,  but  it  cannot  affect  others  who  are  not  parties  to  1  ^ 
it.  It  is  an  agreement  between  nations,  and  would  be  construed! 
in  law  like  an  agreement  between  individuals.  Great  Britain  was/ 
no  party  to  it  and  therefore  is  not  bound  by  its  terms.  J 

The  American  position,  on  the  other  hand,  may  well  be 
presented  in  the  following  words  taken  from  the  charge  to 
the  jury,  made  by  Judge  Dawson  of  the  District  Court  of 
Alaska  in  the  libel  proceeding  against  these  vessels :  — 

All  the  waters  within  the  boundary  set  forth  in  this  treaty  to 
the  western  end  of  the  Aleutian  archipelago  and  chain  of  islands 
are  to  be  considered  as  comprised  within  the  waters  of  Alaska, 
and  all  the  penalties  prescribed  by  law  against  the  killing  of  fur- 
bearing  animals  must,  therefore,  attach  against  any  violation  of 
law  within  the  limits  heretofore  described. 

If,  therefore,  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defend- 
ants by  themselves  or  in  conjunction  with  others  did,  on  or  about 
the  time  charged  in  the  information,  kill  any  otter,  mink,  marten, 
sable,  or  fur-seal,  or  other  fur-bearing  animal  or  animals,  on  the 


18  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

shores  of  Alaska  or  in  the  Behring  Sea,  east  of  the  one  hundred 
and  ninety-third  degree  of  west  longitude,  the  jury  should  find 
the  defendants  guilty. 

TiwjelivRring-  this  charg-e  to  the  jury,  Judge  Dawson  acted 

under  the  advice  of  the  Attorney  General  in  Washington, 

and  the  United  States  was  now  fully  coramitttjd-to  the  policy 

of  maintaining  at  any  cost  its  position  of  absolute  ownership 

of  the  Bering  Sea  east  of  the  line  described  in  the  treaty  for 

the  cession  of  Alaska  as  marking  the  western  boundary  of 

that  dominion.     The  seizure  and  condemnation  of  these  three 

British  vessels  were  immediately  followed  by  a  formal  protest 

from  the  British  Minister  in  Washington,  Sir  Lionel  Sackville- 

West  (letter  of  October  21,  1886). 

"^n  issue,  accordingly,  was  squarely  presented  for  future 

/  diplomatic  negotiations.     Pending  further  discussion,  Presi- 

I  dent  Cleveland  very  properly  ordered  all  proceedings  against 

I  the  three  vessels  stopped.     The  following  summer,  however, 

P  the   United    States   revenue   cutter  Rutlmrd  Jiush  arrested 

J   more  British  sealing  vessel^,  —  the  W.  P.  Sawyard^  the  Bol- 

"pMn^  the    Grace^  the  Anna  Beck^  and  the  Alfred  Adains. 

These,  like  the  vessels  captured  the  year  before,  were  all 

taken  outside  the  ordinary  zone  of  marine  jurisdiction,  and 

their  seizure  intensified  the  feelings  of  resentment  against  the 

United  States  that  had  already  been  manifested  in  Canada 

after  the  condemnation   proceedings  of  the  previous  year. 

Another  British  protest  quickly  followed  (Sackville-West  to 

Bayard,  October  12  and  19,  1887),  and  the  question,  now 

fairly  launched  into  the  sea  of  diplomatic  discussion,  became 

the  subject  of  a  spirited  correspondence. 

In  the  meantime,  however.  Secretary  of  State  Bayard  had 
made  an  attempt  to  find  a  settlement  of  the  difficulty  in  an 
international  agreement  for  the  regulation  of  the  fur-seal 
industry.  Notes  were  addressed  to  Great  Britain,  France, 
Germany,  Russia,  Japan,  Norway  and  Sweden,  inviting  those 
powers  to  "enter  into  such  arrangement  with  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  as  will  prevent  the  citizens  of  either 
country  from  killing  the  seals  in  Bering  Sea  at  such  times  and 
places  and  by  such  methods  as  at  present  are  pursued,  and 


THE   FUR-SEALS   AND   THE    BERING   SEA   AWARD  19 

which  threaten  the  speedy  extermination  of  those  animals 
and  consequent  loss  to  mankind."  It  was  ordered  that  no 
seizures  of  sealing  vessels  be  made  during  the  season  of  1888, 
and  the  negotiations  for  international  agreement  seemed 
promising  for  a  successful  issue,  when,  in  June  of  that  year, 
the  Marquis  of  Salisbury  announced  his  intention  of  with- 
drawing from  the  proceeding.  This  was  owing  to  a  request 
received  by  him  from  the  Canadian  government  to  await  the 
completion  of  a  memorandum  it  was  preparing  upon  the  sub- 
ject of  American  and  Canadian  interests  in  Bering  Sea.  As 
England's  cooperation  in  any  scheme  of  settlement  of  the 
difficulty  was  absolutely  necessary,  the  negotiations  for  an 
international  agreement,  so  happily  begun,  were  unfortu- 
nately abandoned. 

During  the  autumn  of  1888,  a  careful  examination  of  the 
"  Bering  Sea  Question  "  was  undertaken  by  a  House  commit- 
tee, and  an  attempt  was  also  made  to  obtain  from  Congress 
a  revision  of  the  laws  of  1868  and  1870  relating  to  Alaskan 
fisheries,  that  should  define  more  strictly  the  meaning  of  the 
phrase  employed  in  the  old  statutes,  —  "Alaska  and  the  waters 
thereof."  There  was  lacking  an  unanimity  of  opinion  in 
Congress  regarding  the  right  of  the  United  States  to  prevent 
pelagic  sealing  by  making  captures  of  offending  foreign 
vessels  when  operating  outside  the  ordinarily  accepted  three- 
mile  limit  of  marine  jurisdiction.  The  press  of  the  country, 
and  perhaps  the  greater  weight  of  popular  sentiment,  inclined 
toward  the  belief  that  a  legal  sanction  could  be  found  to  justify 
the  seizures  of  these  British  vessels  and  Judge  Dawson's  deci- 
sion was  generally  indorsed.  Nevertheless,  an  irritating  doubt 
as  to  the  authority  of  the  United  States  to  maintain  jurisdic- 
tional claims  in  the  Bering  Sea  haunted  the  Senate  corridors. 
The  extent  and  general  configuration  of  that  body  of  water 
seemed  to  preclude  the  idea  of  a  closed  sea,  —  especially  in 
the  light  of  the  well-known  fact  that  the  modern  tendency  of 
international  usage  was  to  restrict  the  scope  of  marine  juris- 
diction. All  agreed  that  pelagic  sealing  was  a  pernicious 
practice  and  highly  detrimental  to  American  interests,  and 
although  the  attempt  to  stop  it  by  force  seemed  to  many  a 


20  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

questionable  proceeding,  yet  the  policy,  —  "when  in  doubt,  err 
on  the  side  of  your  country's  cause,"  —  prevailed.  At  all 
events,  any  definite  expression  of  Congress  defining  the  vague 
words,  "or  in  the  waters  thereof,"  was  most  desirable. 

The  House  passed  a  bill  declaring  that :  "  That  section 
1956  of  the  Revised  Statutes  of  the  United  States  was 
intended  to  include  and  apply,  and  is  hereby  declared  to  apply 
to  all  the  waters  of  Bering  Sea  and  Alaska  embraced  within 
the  boundary  lines  mentioned  and  described  in  the  Treaty 
with  Russia,  dated  March  30,  1867,  by  which  the  territory 
of  Alaska  was  ceded  to  the  United  States.  .  .  ."  Senator 
Sherman,  Chairman  of  the  Committee  of  Foreign  Relations, 
objected  to  the  measure  on  the  grounds  that  it  "involved 
serious  matters  of  international  law  .  .  .  and  ought  to  be  dis- 
agreed to  and  abandoned,  and  considered  more  carefully  here- 
after." The  House  resolution  was,  however,  amended  and 
passed  the  Senate  March  22,  ISSV^s  follows:  — 

."That  Section  1956  of  the  Revised  Statutes  of  the  United 
States  is  hereby  declared  to  include,  and  apply  to,  aj|^the 
Dominion  of  the  United  States  in  the  waters  of  Bering  Sea." 

The  measure  then,  as  finally  passed,  was  no  more  exi)licit 
in  its  object  of  determining  the  extent  of  United  States  juris- 
diction in  Bering  Sea  waters  than  was  the  law  of  1868,  for 
what  the  State  Department  had  especially  called  for  and 
desired  was  a  definition  by  Congress  of  the  very  words 
"Dominion  of  the  United  States  in  the  waters  of  Bering  Sea." 

In  March,  1889,  the  Harrison  administration  fell  heir  to  the 
responsibilities  of  maintaining  the  American  position  in  this 
controversy.  Ex-Secretary  Foster,  in  the  North  American 
Review  of  December,  1895,  thus  clearly  states  the  situation  as 
it  existed  at  that  time :  — 

Three  courses  were  open  to  President  Harrison,  and  one  of 
them  must  be  chosen  without  further  delay.  First:  He  could 
abandon  the  claim  of  exclusive  jurisdiction  over  Bering  Sea  or 
protection  of  the  seals  beyond  the  three-mile  limit,  recede  from  the 
action  of  his  predecessor  as  to  seizure  of  British  vessels  and  pay 
the  damages  claimed  therefor.  Such  a  course  would  have  met 
with  the  general  disapproval  of  the  nation,  and  would  have  been 


THE   FUR-SEALS   AND   THE   BERING   SEA  AWARD         21 

denounced  by  his  political  opponents  as  a  base  betrayal  of  the 
country's  interests.  Second:  He  could  have  rejected  the  argu- 
ments and  protests  of  the  British  Government,  and  continued  the 
policy  initiated  by  his  predecessor  in  the  seizure  of  all  British 
vessels  engaged  in  pelagic  sealing  in  Bering  Sea.  But  this  course 
had  already  been  proposed  to  President  Cleveland  and  decided  to 
be  improper.  The  Hon.  E.  J.  Phelps,  who,  as  Minister  to  Great 
Britain,  had  conducted  the  negotiations  with  Lord  Salisbury 
growing  out  of  the  seizures  of  1886  and  1887,  in  a  lengthy  de- 
spatch to  Secretary  Bayard,  reviewing  the  conduct  of  Canada 
which  had  prevented  an  adjustment  once  accepted  by  Lord  Salis- 
bury, made  the  following  recommendation  :  "  Under  these  circum- 
stances, the  Government  of  the  United  States  must,  in  my  opinion, 
either  submit  to  have  these  valuable  fisheries  destroyed  or  must 
take  measures  to  prevent  their  destruction  by  capturing  the  ves- 
sels employed  in  it.  Between  these  two  alternatives  it  does  not 
appear  to  me  there  should  be  the  slightest  hesitation.  ...  I 
earnestly  recommend,  therefore,  that  the  vessels  that  have  been 
seized  while  engaged  in  this  business  be  firmly  held,  and  that 
measures  be  taken  to  capture  and  hold  every  one  hereafter  found 
concerned  in  it.  .  .  .  There  need  be  no  fear  that  a  resolute 
stand  on  this  subject  will  at  once  put  an  end  to  the  mischief 
complained  of."  But  this  recommendation  of  Mr.  Phelps  was  not 
approved  by  Mr.  Bayard,  who  was  unwilling  to  adopt  a  course 
which  might  bring  about  a  rupture  with  Great  Britain,  the  prob- 
able outcome  of  which  would  have  been  an  armed  conflict.  In 
view  of  this  decision  and  the  state  of  public  sentiment,  with  a 
prevailing  opinion  in  a  large  part  of  the  press  and  with  public  men 
that  the  attitude  of  the  government  was  legally  unsound,  and  that 
the  interests  involved  did  not  under  the  circumstances  stated  jus- 
tify the  hazard  of  a  great  war  between  these  two  English-speaking 
nations,  the  adoption, of  this  second  alternative  by  President  Har- 
rison would  have  been  the  height  of  madness.  The  only  remain- 
ing alternative  was  arbitration.  

The  idea  of  arbitration  came  only  after  a  desperate  attempt 
through  a  diplomatic  correspondence  with  the  British  foreign 
office  to  establish  the  legality  of  the  American  position  and  to 
justify  United  States  seizures  of  the  British  vessels  that  had 
already  been  made  on  the  high  seas. 

No  arrangements  having  been  made  to  abandon  the  sealing 
operations  pending  a  final  settlement  of  the  question,  several 
captures  of  British  schooners  were  effected  in  the  summer 


22  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

season  of  1889,  and  the  friendly  relations  between  England 
and  the  United  States  became  very  much  strained.  The 
British  Government  resolved  to  take  a  firmer  stand  against 
further  molestation  of  their  subjects  engaged  in  catching 
seals  upon  what  they  contended  were  the  high  seas,  and  before 
the  summer  of  1890  opened,  it  presented  through  the  note  of 
Sir  Julian  Pauncefote  of  June  14, 1890,  the  following  vigorous 
protest :  — 

The  undersigned,  Her  Britannic  Majesty's  envoy  extraordinary 
and  minister  plenipotentiary  to  the  United  States  of  America,  has 
the  honor,  by  instruction  of  his  government,  to  make  to  the  Hon. 
James  G.  Blaine,  Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States,  the  fol- 
lowing communication :  — 

Her  Britannic  Majesty's  Government  have  learned  with  great 
concern,  from  notices  which  have  appeared  in  the  press,  and  the 
general  accuracy  of  which  has  been  confirmed  by  Mr.  Blaine's 
statements  to  the  undersigned,  that  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  have  issued  instructions  to  their  revenue  cruisers 
about  to  be  despatched  to  Behring  Sea,  under  which  the  vessels  of 
British  subjects  will  again  be  exposed,  in  the  prosecution  of  their 
legitimate  industry  on  the  high  seas,  to  unlawful  interference  at 
the  hands  of  American  officers. 

Her  Britannic  Majesty's  Government  are  anxious  to  cooperate 
to  the  fullest  extent  of  their  power  with  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  in  such  measures  as  may  be  found  to  be  expedient 
for  the  protection  of  the  seal  fisheries.  They  are  at  the  present 
moment  engaged  in  examining,  in  concert  with  the  Government 
of  the  United  States,  the  best  method  of  arriving  at  an  agreement 
upon  this  point.  But  they  cannot  admit  the  right  of  the  United 
States  of  their  own  sole  motion  to  restrict  for  this  purpose  the 
freedom  of  navigation  of  Behring  Sea,  which  the  United  States 
have  themselves  in  former  years  convincingly  and  successfully 
vindicated,  nor  to  enforce  their  municipal  legislation  against  Brit- 
ish vessels  on  the  high  seas  beyond  the  limits  of  their  territorial 
jurisdiction. 

Her  Britannic  Majesty's  Government  are  therefore  unable  to 
pass  over  without  notice  the  public  announcement  of  an  intention 
on  the  part  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  to  renew  the 
acts  of  interference  with  British  vessels  navigating  outside  the 
territorial  waters  of  the  United  States,  of  which  they  have  pre- 
viously had  to  complain. 


THE   FUR-SEALS  AND  THE   BERING   SEA  AWARD  23 

The  undersigned  is  in  consequence  instructed  formally  to  pro- 
test against  such  interference,  and  to  declare  that  Her  Britannic 
Majesty's  Government  must  hold  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  responsible  for  the  consequences  that  may  ensue  from  acts 
which  are  contrary  to  the  established  principles  of  international 
law. 

Mr.  Blaine,  the  Secretary  of  State,  had  in  the  meanwhile 
entered  upon  a  lively  correspondence  with  Lord  Salisbury 
in  defence  of  the  American  case.  Every  argument  that 
could  be  brought  to  bear  upon  the  subject  in  support  of  the 
American  position  was  marshalled  by  this  brilliant  states- 
man in  opposition  to  the  English  contention  of  a  full  legal 
right  to  catch  seals  in  the  Bering  Sea,  or  indeed  in  any 
other  sea  not  mer  fermee  outside  of  the  three-mile  limit  from 
shore. 

Casting  aside  for  the  time  all  claims  to  mare  clausum^  Mr. 
Blaine  urged  that,  "  In  the  opinion  of  the  President,  the 
Canadian  vessels  arrested  and  detained  in  the  Behring  Sea 
were  engaged  in  a  pursuit  that  was  in  itself  contra  bonos 
mores,  a  pursuit  which  of  necessity  involves  a  serious  and 
permanent  injury  to  the  rights  of  the  Government  and  people 
of  the  United  States."  In  support  of  this  argument  he  re- 
viewed the  history  of  sealing,  alleging  that  "  Those  fisheries 
had  been  exclusively  controlled  by  the  Government  of  Russia, 
without  interference  and  without  question,  from  their  origi- 
nal discovery  until  the  cession  of  Alaska  to  the  United  States 
in  1867.  From  1867  to  1886  the  possession  in  which  Russia 
had  been  undisturbed  was  enjoyed  by  this  government  also. 
There  was  no  interruption  and  no  intrusion  from  any  source. 
Vessels  from  other  nations  passing  from  time  to  time  through 
Behring  Sea  to  the  Arctic  Ocean  in  pursuit  of  whales  had 
always  abstained  from  taking  part  in  the  capture  of  seals. 
This  uniform  avoidance  of  all  attempts  to  take  fur-seal  in 
those  waters  had  been  a  constant  recognition  of  the  right 
held  and  exercised  first  by  Russia  and  subsequently  by  this 
Government."  He  dwelt  with  particular  emphasis  upon  the 
destructive  character  of  pelagic  sealing.  "  The  killing  of 
seals  in  the  open  sea  involves  the  destruction  of  the  female 

jf     ^  &r   THK  f^     \ 

|f  UNIVERSITY  ' 


24  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

in  common  with  the  male.  The  slaughter  of  the  female  seal 
is  reckoned  as  an  immediate  loss  of  three  seals,  besides  the 
future  loss  of  the  whole  number  which  the  bearing  seal  may- 
produce  in  the  successive  years  of  life.  The  destruction 
which  results  from  killing  seals  in  the  open  sea  proceeds, 
therefore,  by  a  ratio  which  constantly  and  rapidly  increases, 
and  insures  the  total  extermination  of  the  species  within  a 
very  brief  period.  It  has  thus  become  known  that  the  only 
proper  time  for  the  slaughter  of  seals  is  at  the  season  when 
they  betake  themselves  to  the  land,  because  the  land  is  the 
only  place  where  the  necessary  discrimination  can  be  made 
as  to  the  age  and  sex  of  the  seal.  It  would  seem,  then,  by 
fair  reasoning,  that  nations  not  possessing  the  territory  upon 
which  seals  can  increase  their  numbers  by  natural  growth, 
and  thus  afford  an  annual  supply  of  skins  for  the  use  of  man- 
kind, should  refrain  from  the  slaughter  in  open  sea,  where 
the  destruction  of  the  species  is  sure  and  swift." 

"The  entire  business,"  he  continued,  "was  then  (before 
1889)  conducted  peacefully,  lawfully,  and  profitably  —  profita- 
bly to  the  United  States,  for  the  rental  was  yielding  a  moder- 
ate interest  on  the  large  sum  which  this  government  had 
paid  for  Alaska,  including  the  rights  now  at  issue ;  profitably 
to  the  Alaskan  Company,  which,  under  governmental  direc- 
tion and  restriction,  had  given  unwearied  pains  to  the  care 
and  development  of  the  fisheries ;  profitably  to  the  Aleuts, 
who  were  receiving  a  fair  pecuniary  reward  for  their  labors, 
and  were  elevated  from  semi-savagery  to  civilization  and  to 
the  enjoyment  of  schools  and  churches  provided  for  their 
benefit  by  the  government  of  the  United  States ;  and,  last  of 
all,  profitably  to  a  large  body  of  English  laborers  who  had 
constant  employment  and  received  good  wages."  Led  on  by 
the  impetus  of  his  own  reasoning,  he  attempted  to  set  up  a 
prescriptive  right  acquired  by  Russia  through  the  acquiescence 
of  all  nations  in  her  large  claim  of  jurisdiction  over  Bering 
Sea.  He  asked,  "Whence  did  the  ships  of  Canada  derive  the 
right  to  do  in  1886  that  which  they  had  refrained  from  doing 
for  more  than  ninety  years  ?  Upon  what  grounds  did  Her 
Majesty's  Government  defend  in  the  year  1886  a  course  of 


THE   FUR-SEALS   AND   THE   BERING   SEA   AWARD         25 

conduct  in  the  Behring  Sea  which  she  had  carefully  avoided 
ever  since  the  discovery  of  that  sea?  By  what  reasoning  did 
Her  Majesty's  Government  conclude  that  an  act  may  be  com- 
mitted with  impunity  against  the  rights  of  the  United  States 
which  had  never  been  attempted  against  the  same  rights  when 
held  by  the  Russian  Empire  ?  "  To  justify  further  the  Ameri- 
can assertion  of  right  in  this  case  to  seize  foreign  vessels,  when 
outside  the  three-mile  limit  and  engaged  in  the  pernicious  prac- 
tice of  pelagic  sealing,  he  called  Lord  Salisbury's  attention  to 
parallel  cases  where  England  asserted  the  same  privileges. 
^'  It  is  doubtful  whether  Her  Majesty's  Government  would 
abide  by  this  rule  if  the  attempt  were  made  to  interfere  with 
the  pearl  fisheries  of  Ceylon,  which  extend  more  than  twenty 
miles  from  the  shore  line,  and  have  been  enjoyed  by  England 
without  molestation  ever  since  their  acquisition.  .  .  .  Nor  is 
it  creditable  that  modes  of  fishing  on  the  Grand  Banks,  alto- 
gether practicable  but  highly  destructive,  would  be  justified 
or  even  permitted  by  Great  Britain  on  the  plea  that  the 
vicious  acts  were  committed  more  than  three  miles  from 
shore."  No  laws  of  the  sea  or  land,  however  supported  by 
the  approval  of  nations,  should  be  used  to  protect  acts  in 
themselves  vicious  or  harmful  to  the  world's  best  interest.  To 
quote  again:  "In  the  judgment  of  this  government  the  law 
of  the  sea  is  not  lawlessness.  Nor  can  the  law  of  the  sea  and 
the  liberty  which  it  confers  and  which  it  protects,  be  per- 
verted to  justify  acts  which  are  immoral  in  themselves,  which 
inevitably  tend  to  results  against  the  interests  and  against 
the  welfare  of  mankind.  One  step  beyond  that  which  Her 
Majesty's  Government  has  taken  in  this  contention,  and  piracy 
finds  its  justification." 

In  reply  to  Mr.  Blaine's  argument,  Lord  Salisbury,  in  be- 
half of  England's  position,  stoutly  maintained  that  in  times 
of  peace  no  nation  was  privileged  to  seize  and  search  upon 
the  high  seas  the  private  vessel  of  a  friendly  nation,  save 
upon  the  suspicion  of  piracy,  or  in  pursuance  of  some  special 
agreement.  Continuing :  ''But  Her  Majesty's  Government 
must  question  whether  this  pursuit  can  of  itself  be  regarded 
as  contra  bonos  mores,  unless  and  until,  for  special  reasons,  it 


26  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

has  been  agreed  by  international  arrangement  to  forbid  it. 
Fnr-seals  are  indisputably  animals  ferce.  naturce^  and  these 
have  universally  been  regarded  by  jurists  as  res  nullius  until 
they  are  caught ;  no  person,  therefore,  can  have  property  in 
them  until  he  has  actually  reduced  them  into  possession  by 
capture.  It  requires  something  more  than  a  mere  declara- 
tion that  the  government  or  citizens  of  the  United  States,  or 
even  other  countries  interested  in  the  seal  trade,  are  losers 
by  a  certain  course  of  proceeding,  to  render  that  course  an 
immoral  one.  Her  Majesty's  Government  would  deeply  re- 
gret that  the  pursuit  of  fur-seals  on  the  high  seas  by  British 
vessels  should  involve  even  the  slightest  injury  to  the  people 
of  the  United  States.  If  the  case  be  proved,  they  will  be 
ready  to  consider  what  measures  can  be  properly  taken  for 
the  remedy  of  such  injury,  but  they  would  be  unable  on  that 
ground  to  depart  from  a  principle  on  which  free  commerce 
on  the  high  seas  depends." 

.  In  answer  to  Mr.  Blaine's  contention  that  Russia  had 
gained  a  prescriptive  right,  through  her  exclusive  control  of 
the  Bering  Sea  fisheries,  from  the  discovery  of  Alaska  until 
1867,  and  that  the  United  States  had  since  that  date  come 
into  possession  of,  and  had  continued  to  enjoy,  these  same  ex- 
clusive rights  (thereby  estabUshing  more  firmly  her  own  pre- 
scriptive title).  Lord  Salisbury  referred  to  the  numerous 
American  and  English  official  protests  (already  mentioned 
supra),  against  the  early  Russian  assumptions  in  Bering  Sea. 
He  quoted  as  well  the  words  of  many  prominent  Ameri- 
can statesmen,  that  had  been  uttered  in  condemnation  of 
Russia's  illegal  claims  over  the  high  seas  in  excess  of  the 
ordinary  three-mile  limit  of  marine  jurisdiction.  In  further 
refutation  of  Mr.  Blaine's  argument,  he  furnished  a  long 
list  of  British  vessels  that  had  been  engaged  in  the  pursuit 
of  sealing  in  Bering  Sea  since  the  acquisition  of  Alaska  by 
the  United  States.  To  Mr.  Blaine's  assertion  that  "The 
President  is  persuaded  that  all  friendly  nations  will  concede 
to  the  United  States  the  same  rights  and  privileges  on  the 
lands  arid  in  the  waters  of  Alaska  which  the  same  friendly  na- 
tions always  conceded  to  the  Empire  of  Russia"  —  he  frankly 


UNIVERSITY   ] 

OF  \J 

ii^uk-.«^LS  AND   THE   BERING   SEA   AWARD         27 

replied :  "  Her  Majesty's  Government  have  no  difficulty  in 
making  such  a  concession.  In  strict  accord  with  the  views 
which,  previous  to  the  present  controversy,  were  consistently 
and  successfully  maintained  by  the  United  States,  they  have, 
whenever  occasion  arose,  opposed  all  claims  to  exclusive  privi- 
leges in  the  non-territorial  waters  of  Behring  Sea.  The  rights 
they  have  demanded  have  been  those  of  free  navigation  and 
fishing  in  waters  which,  previous  to  their  own  acquisition  of 
Alaska,  the  United  States  declared  to  be  free  and  open  to  all 
foreign  vessels." 

"  That  is  the  extent  of  their  present  contention  and  they 
trust  that,  on  consideration  of  the  arguments  now  presented 
to  them,  the  United  States  will  recognize  its  justice  and 
moderation." 

Not  in  the  least  disconcerted  by  these  arguments  from  Lon- 
don, nor  by  Lord  Salisbury's  seemingly  clear  exposition  of  the 
principles  of  international  law  touching  the  case,  Mr.  Blaine 
again  entered  the  lists  with  his  adroit  pen.  He  critically  re- 
viewed the  history  of  Russian  and  American  claims  in  the 
Bering  Sea,  and  by  an  ingenious  argument  to  substantiate 
his  contention  of  a  prescriptive  right  in  the  United  States  to 
control  the  waters  of  Bering  Sea,  he  endeavored  to  prove 
that  the  protests  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  and  of  other  American 
statesmen  referred  to  by  Lord  Salisbury,  against  the  Russian 
claims  of  the  ukase  of  1821,  were  directed,  not  against  Rus- 
sian claims  in  Bering  Sea  proper,  but  only  against  the  Russian 
assertions  to  exclusive  jurisdiction  from  Bering  Strait  along 
the  entire  northwest  coast  of  America  to  the  fifty  first  parallel  of 
latitude.  "  Against  this  larger  claim  of  authority,"  he  urged, 
(viz.,  extending  farther  south  on  the  American  coast  to 
the  51°  north  latitude),  "Mr.  Adams  vigorously  protested." 
Mr.  Blaine,  therefore,  drew  a  distinction  between  the 
"Bering  Sea,"  as  such,  and  the  "Pacific  Ocean,"  main- 
taining that  the  United  States  had  never  opposed  by  word  or 
deed  Russia's  claim  to  exclusive  jurisdiction  north  of  the 
Aleutian  Islands,  i.e.  the  Bering  Sea,  but  had  only  denied 
Russia's  right  to  exercise  such  control  of  the  waters  south  of 
the  Aleutian  Islands,  i.e.  the  Pacific  Ocean,  and  as  expressed 


V. 


28  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

in  the  ukase  of  1821  by  the  words,  "  All  along  the  north- 
west coast  of  America,  from  Bering  Strait  to  the  51st  parallel 
of  latitude."  He  endeavored  further  to  show  that  the  Eng- 
lish protests  against  Russian  sovereignty  over  the  Pacific 
Ocean  were  made  with  a  similar  intention  and  meaning,  and 
therefore  concluded,  —  Why  should  not  the  United  States 
enjoy  the  same  exclusive  jurisdiction  over  the  waters  of 
Bering  Sea,  that  Russia  had  asserted  and  maintained  without 
opposition  during  so  long  a  period  of  years  ? 

Lord  Salisbury  denied  the  correctness  of  Mr.  Blaine's  inter- 
pretation of  the  words  "  Pacific  Ocean,"  and  insisted  that  by 
the  terms  of  the  ukase  the  "  Pacific  Ocean "  extended  to 
Bering  Strait,  and  included  the  Bering  Sea,  and  that,  there- 
fore, the  American  and  English  protests  before  referred  to 
were  actually  directed  against  Russian  claims  in  the  Bering 
Sea,  as  well  as  against  her  claims  over  the  ocean  south  of  the 
Bering  Sea.  He  attacked  the  implied  American  contention 
of  mare  clausum  as  applied  to  the  Bering  Sea,  and  offered  in 
the  end  to  arbitrate  the  whole  matter. 

The  drift  of  these  arguments  had  brought  the  American 
and  English  contentions  to  a  single  issue,  —  the  question 
whether  the  protests  of  both  the  United  States  and  England 
against  the  hundred-mile  limit  of  Russian  sovereignty  in  the 
Pacific  Ocean  from  Bering  Strait  down  the  northwest  coast  of 
America  to  51°  latitude,  and  down  the  Siberian  coast  to  the 
45°  50'  latitude,  were  directed  against  those  Russian  claims  in 
the  Bering  Sea,  or  only  in  the  Pacific^  Ocean  exclusive  of  the 
Bering  Sea.  Had  Russia  really  been  unmolested  in  her  extra- 
ordinary assumption  of  sovereignty  in  the  waters  of  Bering 
Sea,  or  had  her  claims  been  met  and  opposed  by  foreign  pro- 
test? Obviously,  the  discussion  hinged  upon  the  meaning  of 
the  words  ''  Pacific  Ocean."  Mr.  Blaine,  accepting  this  issue, 
went  so  far  as  to  say:  "If  Great  Britain  can  maintain  her 
position  that  the  Behring  Sea  at  the  time  of  the  treaties  with 
Russia  of  1824  and  1825  was  included  in  the  Pacific  Ocean, 
the  government  of  the  United  States  has  no  well-grounded 
complaint  against  her.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  this  govern- 
ment can  prove  beyond  all  doubt  that  the  Behring  Sea,  at 


THE   FUR-SEALS  AND   THE   BERING   SEA  AWARD         29 

the  date  of  the  treaties,  was  understood  by  the  three  signa- 
tory powers  to  be  a  separate  body  of  water,  and  was  not 
included  in  the  phrase  *  Pacific  Ocean,'  then  the  American 
case  against  Great  Britain  is  complete  and  undeniable." 

Further  argument  was  useless.  Both  powers  stood  firmly 
by  their  respective  positions,  and  the  case,  stripped  of  non- 
essentials by  the  exhaustive  pleadings  of  the  English  pre- 
mier and  the  American  Secretary  of  State,  had  been 
narrowed  down  to  comparatively  simple  issues.  The  ques- 
tion called  for  an  immediate  settlement.  That  same  year, 
1890,  the  twenty-year  lease  of  the  Alaska  Commercial  Com- 
pany expired,  and  the  North  American  Commercial  Company 
succeeded  with  a  fresh  twenty-year  lease.  The  seal  herd 
had  by  this  time  become  greatly  reduced  in  numbers,  and 
ample  evidence  was  furnished  by  the  alarming  annual  de- 
crease of  the  size  of  the  herd  to  demonstrate  that  the  total 
extinction  of  the  species  was  already  a  promise  of  the  near 
future,  unless  some  arrangement  with  England  could  be 
made  to  prevent  pelagic  sealing.  Canadians  were  deter- 
mined to  exercise  their  right  of  catching  seals  upon  the  high 
seas,  and  the  United  States  Government  had  become  equally 
determined  to  seize  and  condemn  any  vessel  found  "  poach- 
ing "  in  Bering  Sea.  It  was  feared  that  the  following  sea- 
son's operation  in  Alaskan  waters  might  bring  the  dreaded 
clash  between  the  two  great  powers.  Their  interests  in  the 
North  Pacific  seemed  hopelessly  to  conflict ;  their  determina- 
tions to  protect  their  own  subjects  in  the  exercise  of  their 
so-believed  respective  rights  were  firmly  fixed,  and  their 
patience  and  good  will  were  already  sorely  tried.  It  was 
at  this  critical  stage  of  the  controversy  the  two  nations 
happily  agreed  to  submit  the  matter  to  a  tribunal  of  arbi- 
tration. 

Owing  to  this  rapid  decline  in  numbers  of  seals  resorting- 
to  the  islands,  the  North  American  Company  was  restricted 
by  a  Treasury  order  to  a  catch  of  only  20,000  pelts  for  the 
year  1890,  and  pending  the  negotiation  of  a  treaty  of  arbi- 
tration, the  following  agreement  with  England  was  effected 
June  15,  1891 :  — 


30  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

Modus  Vivendi. 

1.  Her  Majesty's  Government  will  prohibit,  until  May  next, 
seal  killing  in  that  part  of  Behring  Sea  lying  eastward  of  the  line 
of  demarkation  described  in  Article  No.  1  of  the  treaty  of  1867 
between  the  United  States  and  Russia,  "  and  will  promptly  use 
its  best  efforts  to  insure  the  observance  of  this  prohibition  by 
British  subjects  and  vessels." 

2.  The  United  States  Government  will  prohibit  seal  killin^for 
the  same  period  in  the  same  part  of  Behring  Sea,  and  on  the 
shores  and  islands  thereof,  the  property  of  the  United  States  (in 
excess  of  7,500  to  be  taken  on  the  islands  for  the  subsistence  and 
care  of  the  natives),  and  will  promptly  use  its  best  efforts  to 
insure  the  observance  of  this  prohibition  by  United  States  citi- 
zens and  vessels. 

3.  Every  vessel  or  person  offending  against  this  prohibition  in 
the  said  waters  of  Behring  Sea  outside  of  the  ordinary  territorial 
limits  of  the  United  States,  may  be  seized  and  detained  by  the 
Naval  or  other  duly  commissioned  officers  of  either  of  the  High 
Contracting  Parties,  but  they  shall  be  handed  over  as  soon  as 
practicable  to  the  authorities  of  the  nation  to  which  they  respec- 
tively belong,  who  shall  alone  have  jurisdiction  to  try  the  offence 
and  impose  the  penalties  for  the  same.  The  witnesses  and  proofs 
necessary  to  establish  the  offence  shall  also  be  sent  with  them. 

4.  In  order  to  facilitate  such  proper  inquiries  as  Her  Majesty's 
Government  may  desire  to  make,  with  a  view  to  the  presentation  of 
the  case  to  that  government  before  arbitrators,  and  in  expectation 
that  an  agreement  for  arbitration  may  be  arrived  at,  it  is  agreed 
that  suitable  persons  designated  by  Great  Britain  will  be  per- 
mitted at  any  time,  upon  application,  to  visit  or  to  remain  upon  the 
seal  islands  during  the  present  sealing  season  for  that  purpose. 

Signed  and  sealed  in  duplicate  at  Washington,  etc. 

The  adoption  of  the  modus  Vivendi  put  off,  for  a  time  at 
least,  all  danger  of  collision  in  Bering  Sea,  and  the  diplomatic 
agents  of  England  and  the  United  States  set  about  framing  a 
treaty  and  preparing  a  way  for  the  trial  of  the  cause.  In  the 
meantime  English  and  American  vessels  were  sent  to 
Bering  Sea  to  control  the  waters  wherein  seals  were  to  be 
found  and  to  enforce  the  modus  vivendi.  The  commanders 
of  these  vessels  were  given  full  liberty  to  search  suspected 
ships  under  either  flag,  and  to  arrest  all  offenders. 

In  accordance  with  the  agreement  in  the  modus  vivendi^ 


THE   FUR-SEALS   AND   THE   BERING   SEA   AWARD         31 

Great  Britain  appointed  Sir  George  Baden-Powell,  M.P., 
and  Professor  George  Mercer  Dawson  commissioners  to  pro- 
ceed to  the  Pribyloff  Islands  for  the  purpose  of  examining 
into  the  fur-seal  fisheries.  On  the  part  of  the  United  States, 
Dr.  C.  Hart  Merriam  and  Professor  Mendenhall  were  se- 
lected in  like  capacity  the  following  February. 

Diplomatic  efforts  were  immediately  directed  to  shaping 
the  "disputed  questions  for  inclusion  in  the  proposed  treaty, 
and  to  preparing  the  issues  in  succinct  form  for  presentation 
to  a  tribunal  of  arbitration.  In  this  matter  some  slight  diffi- 
culty was  experienced  by  Sir  Julian  Pauncefote,  Mr.  Whar- 
ton, and  Mr.  Blaine,  especially  in  reference  to  questions 
touching  the  liabilities  of  each  for  injuries  alleged  to  have 
been  sustained  by  the  other  by  reason  of  killing  seals  in 
Bering  Sea,  or  through  arrests,  etc.  In  November  a  com- 
promise agreement  was  reached  upon  the  phraseology  of  this 
troublesome  count ;  having  framed  all  the  issues,  the  nego- 
tiators were  finally  able  to  sign  a  treaty  at  Washington  on 
February  29,  1892.^ 

The  instrument  opens  with  an  expression  that  "The 
United  States  of  America  and  Her  Majesty  the  Queen  of 
the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ii-eland,  being 
desirous  to  provide  for  an  amicable  settlement  of  the  ques- 
tions which  have  arisen  between  their  respective  governments 
concerning  the  jurisdictional  rights  of  the  United  States  in 
the  waters  of  Behring  Sea,  and  concerning  also  the  preser- 
vation of  the  fur-seal  in,  or  habitually  resorting  to,  the  said 
sea,  and  the  rights  of  the  citizens  and  subjects  of  either  coun- 
try as  regards  the  taking  of  fur-seal  in,  or  habitually  resorting 
to,  the  said  waters,  have  resolved  to  submit  to  arbitration  the 
questions  involved.  ..." 

The  parties  then  determined  upon  a  tribunal  to  be  composed 
of  seven  arbitrators,  two  to  be  appointed  by  the  President  of 
the  United  States,  two  to  be  named  by  her  Britannic  Majesty, 
one  to  be  named  by  the  President  of.  the  French  Republic, 
and  one  each  by  the  King  of  Italy  and  the  King  of  Sweden 
and  Norway.  The  arbitrators  were  to  meet  in  Paris  withiu 
a  stipulated  time. 


32  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

The  following  five  points,  conceived  to  be  the  real  issues  in 
the  case,  were  expressed  as  follows,  the  award  to  embrace  a 
separate  decision  upon  each  :  — 

1.  What  exclusive  jurisdiction  in  the  sea  now  known  as 
the  Behring's  Sea,  and  what  exclusive  rights  in  the  seal  fish- 
eries therein,  did  Russia  assert  and  exercise  prior  and  up  to 
the  time  of  the  cession  of  Alaska  to  the  United  States  ? 

2.  How  far  were  these  claims  of  jurisdiction  as  to  the  seal 
fisheries  recognized  and  conceded  by  Great  Britain  ? 

3.  Was  the  body  of  water  now  known  as  the  Behring's  Sea 
included  in  the  phrase  "  Pacific  Ocean,"  as  used  in  the  treaty 
of  1825  between  Great  Britain  and  Russia  ;  and  what  rights, 
if  an}^,  in  the  Bering's  Sea  were  held  and  exclusively  exercised 
by  Russia  after  said  treaty  ? 

4.  Did  not  all  the  rights  of  Russia  as  to  jurisdiction,  and  as 
to  the  seal  fisheries  in  Behring's  Sea  east  of  the  water  bound- 
ary, in  the  treaty  between  the  United  States  and  Russia  of 
the  30th  March,  1867,  pass  unimpaired  to  the  United  States 
under  that  treaty? 

5.  Has  the  United  States  any  right,  and  if  so,  what  right 
of  protection  or  property  in  the  fur  seals  frequenting  the 
islands  of  the  United  States  in  the  Behring's  Sea  when  such 
seals  are  found  outside  the  ordinary  three-mile  limit  ? 

The  question  of  regulations  was  treated  in  the  seventh 
article  of  the  convention  as  follows :  — 

If  the  determination  of  the  foregoing  questions  as  to  the  exclu- 
sive jurisdiction  of  the  United  States  shall  leave  the  subject  in 
such  position  that  the  concurrence  of  Great  Britain  is  necessary 
to  the  establishment  of  regulations  for  the  proper  protection  and 
preservation  of  the  fur-seal  in,  or  habitually  resorting  to,  the 
Behring  Sea,  the  arbitrators  shall  then  determine  what  concurrent 
regulations  outside  the  jurisdictional  limits  of  the  respective  Gov- 
ernments are  necessary,  and  over  what  waters  such  regulations 
should  extend,  and  to  aid  them  in  that  determination  the  report 
of  a  joint  commission  to  be  appointed  by  the  respective  Govern- 
ments shall  be  laid  before  them,  with  such  other  evidence  as 
either  Government  may  submit. 

The  high  contracting  parties  furthermore  agree  to  cooperate  in 
securing  the  adhesion  of  other  powers  to  such  regulations. 


THE   EUR-SEALS   AND   THE   BERING   SEA   AWARD         33 

The  eighth  article  of  the  treaty  left  the  question  of  liabilities 
for  injuries  alleged  to  have  been  sustained  by  the  citizens  of 
either  country  in  connection  with  the  arrests  and  condemna- 
tion of  the  English  sealing  vessels  to  be  determined  by  the 
arbitrators  upon  the  submission  to  them  of  all  the  facts. 

Agreeably  to  the  terms  of  the  ninth  article  of  the  treaty, 
by  which  ''  Each  government  shall  appoint  two  commissioners 
to  investigate  conjointly  with  the  commissioners  of  the  other 
government  all  the  facts  relating  to  seal  life  in  Bering  Sea, 
and  the  measures  necessary  for  its  proper  protection  and  pres- 
ervation," Sir  George  Baden-Powell,  Member  of  Parliament, 
and  Dr.  Dawson  were  retained  by  Great  Britain,  as  were  Dr. 
Merriam  and  Professor  Mendenhall  by  the  United  States,  to 
act  as  such  commissioners.  With  full  instructions  to  investigate 
thoroughly  the  conditions  of  seal  life  and  to  ascertain  what 
permanent  measures  were  necessary  for  the  preservation  of 
the  fur-seal  species  in  the  North  Pacific  Ocean,  the  joint  com- 
mission proceeded  to  Bering  Sea  and  set  to  work  gath- 
ering material  for  the  use  of  their  respective  governments  in 
the  arbitration  trial  to  be  held  in  Paris.  It  is  not  a  little  ] 
remarkable  that  side  by  side  four  scientists  prosecuting  the 
same  line  of  inquiry,  considering  together  the  same  evidence, ,'" 
and  reading  together  the  same  incontrovertible  facts,  should  \ 
have  arrived  at  such  widely  different  conclusions.  The] 
impartial  observer  must  yield  to  the  suspicion  that  the  con- 
clusions of  the  commissioners  were  colored  by  a  desire  to  fur- 
ther the  interests  of  their  countries,  and  that  their  scientific 
investigation  had  not  been  wholly  free  from  a  trace  of  diplo- 
macy. The  American  commissioners  found  overwhelming 
evidence  to  establish  in  their  minds  beyond  all  questions  of 
doubt  the  fact  that  the  seal  herd  had  greatly  diminished  in 
size,  and  that  such  condition  had  been  chiefly  brought  about 
by  the  destructive  practice  of  pelagic  sealingv  They  conse- 
quently recommended  its  entire  suppression.  Subsequent 
history  has  proved  the  correctness  of  these  conclusions,  and 
it  is  to  be  regretted  that  the  case  in  Paris  was  complicated  by 
the  radically  differing  report  of  the  British  commissioners. 
They,  on  the  other  hand,  somewhat  begrudgingly  admitted  a 


34  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

falling  off  in  seal  life,  for  which  circumstance  they  insisted 
that  the  killing  on  the  islands  by  the  American  company  was 
the  main  cause,  and  they  also  discovered  that  pelagic  sealing 
in  itself  was  not  necessarily  destructive  to  the  herd.  As  a 
remedy,  if  indeed  a  remedy  were  called  for  by  existing  condi- 
tions, they  proposed  severe  restrictions  in  relation  to  the  num- 
ber of  seals  annually  taken  upon  the  islands,  and  as  an  area  of 
protection  to  the  seals,  recommended  a  marine  belt  of  ten 
miles  about  the  Pribyloff  Islands,  within  which  no  pelagic 
sealing  should  be  permitted. 

These  two  very  contradictory  reports  necessarily  formed 
the  basis  for  the  consideration  of  tlie  Paris  tribunal,  whose 
office  it  was  to  determine  a  future  course  of  action  looking  to 
the  preservation  of  seals  in  Bering  Sea. 


The  tribunal  met  in  Paris  in  the  spring  of  1893,  and  con- 
tinued its  sessions  well  into  the  summer.  The  arbitrators 
chosen  were  Baron  de  Courcel  (France),  Marquis  Emilio 
Visconti-Venosti  (Italy),  M.  Gregario  W.  W.  Gram  (Sweden 
and  Norway),  Lord  Hannan  and  Sir  John  S.  D.  Thomp- 
son (England),  and  Justice  John  M.  Harlan  and  Senator 
John  T.  Morgan  (United  States).  The  American  case  was 
conducted  through  the  agency  of  the  Hon.  John  W.  Foster 
(who  had  succeeded  Mr.  Blaine  as  Secretary  of  State),  to- 
gether with  Editawl-JL-Elielps,  James  C.  Carter,  Frederick 
R.  Coudert,  and  Henry  Blodget  as  counsel. 

Although  it  had  been  expressly  disavowed  by  Mr.  Blaine 
that  the  United  States  put  forth  any  claim  to  mare  clausum 
over  the  Bering  Sea,  it  is  nevertheless  impossible  to  consider 
the  American  position  before  the  tribunal  in  Paris  as  other- 
wise than  an  attempt  to  justify  such  a  contention.  While  no 
direct  and  formal  allegation  of  the  applicability  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  mare  clausum  appear  in  the  proceedings,  the  United 
States  nevertheless  sought  to  make  good  its  position  in  Bering 
Sea  by  maintaining  the  propriety  of  early  Russian  assertions 
of  dominion  over  those  waters,  —  or  over  at  least  a  hundred- 
mile  belt  about  their  shores.     These  Russian  claims  in  Bering 


THE   FUR-SEALS   AND   THE   BERING   SEA   AWARD         35 

Sea  cannot  well  be  regarded  other  than  assertions  of  mare 
clausum  ;  and  the  attitude  of  the  United  States,  taking  shelter 
behind  these  early  Russian  assumptions,  necessarily  committed 
her  in  defence  of  those  claims  and  principles.  Again,  the 
United  States,  in  attempting  to  justify  herself  for  having  ex- 
ercised an  alleged  right  of  search  upon  vessels  of  a  friendly 
nation  outside  of  her  own  legally  recognized  territorial  waters, 
and  in  the  absence  of  treaty  stipulations  authorizing  her  to  do 
so,  necessarily  claimed  sovereignty  over  the  sea  wherein  the 
acts  of  visit  and  search  had  been  committed.  There  can  be 
no  right  of  police  over  the  high  seas  in  times  of  peace  other 
than  as  directed  against  suspected  common  enemies  or  pirates, 
and  its  exercise  m ust  assume  proprietorship. 

In  the  early  days  of  Spanish  and  Portuguese  exploration  and 
conquest,  vast  oceans  were  demanded  as  the  property  of  the 
State.  With  the  growth  of  the  British  navy,  certain  exag- 
gerated claims  to  marine  proprietary  rights  were,  for  a  period, 
advanced  by  England ;  but  the  spirit  of  modern  times  has 
been  so  decidedly  hostile  to  all  attempts  to  establish  dominion 
over  the  sea  that  to-day  civilized  nations  are  disposed  to  tol- 
erate no  infraction,  however  slight,  of  the  broad  principle  of 
mare  liberum.  The  ultimate  extent  to  which  "territorial 
waters  "  may  be  urged  in  accordance  with  the  present  law  of 
nations,  includes  only  a  marine  belt  of  three  miles  along  the 
open  coast,  and  all  harbors  and  bays  whose  openings  to  the 
sea  do  not  exceed  in  width  ten  to  twenty  miles,  or  in  general, 
such  inland  bodies  of  water,  the  narrowness  of  whose  entrances 
from  the  sea  and  whose  configuration  clearly  indicate  them 
to  be  enclosed  seas.  The  United  States  has  always  been  con- 
spicuously foremost  in  the  advocacy  of  freedom  of  the  high 
seas ;  she  was  indeed  the  first  to  protest  against  Russian  un- 
willingness to  accept  these  enlightened  principles  in  the  Pa- 
cific. It  is  to  be  regretted  that  in  this  matter  the  United 
States  should  have  appeared  before  the  tribunal  and  the  civ- 
ilized world  in  the  unfortunate  light  of  taking  a  step  backward 
in  order  to  resuscitate  and  reclothe  a  defunct  mediaeval  doctrine. 

The  American  case  supported  the  contention  that  Russia 
had  acquired  dominion  over  Bering  Sea  by  prescription,  —  a 


36  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

right  or  title  gained  by  immemorial  use.  Alexander  I.  had 
made  formal  proclamation  of  this  title  in  his  ukase  of  1821, 
and  counsel  contended  that  Russia  had  ever  after  enjoyed  full 
and  undisturbed  possession  of  her  asserted  proprietary  right 
over  Bering  Sea  until  by  treaty  of  1867  she  had  parted  with 
such  rights  to  the  United  States.  And  it  was  urged  that  the 
long  period  of  time  that  Russia  had  remained  in  open  adverse 
possession  of  those  waters,  exercising  all  the  privileges  a 
nation  enjoys  over  a  territorial  expanse  of  sea  without  protest 
or  hindrance,  had  given  her  a  full  and  complete  prescriptive 
title,  —  which  title  passed  unimpaired  to  the  United  States. 

The  question  of  Russia's  undisputed  exercise  of  her  alleged 
rights  in  Bering  Sea  came  before  the  tribunal  as  an  issue  of 
fact  to  be  proved  or  disproved  by  weight  of  evidence,  and 
the  legal  aspect  of  the  question  oi prescription^  its  applicability 
to  the  present  case,  and  its  scope  and  force  as  a  principle  of  the 
law  of  nations,  were  not  touched  upon  by  the  arbitratoi*s.  It 
may  well  be  doubted  that  even  had  Russia  really  been  left 
undisturbed,  as  alleged,  in  her  occupation  of  Bering  Sea  for  a 
century  or  more,  a  prescriptive  right  to  its  waters  would  conse- 
quently ensue.  There  is  abundant  authority  in  international 
law  to  demonstrate  that  rights  gained  through  immemorial 
usage  do  not  appertain  to  the  sea.  All  rights  of  navigation,  fish- 
ing, etc.,  upon  the  high  seas  are  of  a  nature  that  do  not  depend 
upon  constant  use  for  their  validity.  They  may  be  used  at 
will,  or  never  used  at  all,  —  for  non-use  cannot  imply  relin- 
quishment. Because  a  nation  never  sailed  a  vessel  across 
the  sea  may  she  forever  be  denied  the  privilege  ?  Because  a 
nation  has  alone  fished  in  a  distant  sea  may  she  forever  bar 
her  neighbor  from  fishing  there  as  well  ?  Again,  it  is  con- 
ceived that  prescriptive  titles  may  be  acquired  only  in  such 
things  as  are  inherently  capable  of  acquisition,  always  imply- 
ing an  original  o.r  prior  grant  constituting  at  least  a  color  of 
title.  It  is  incompatible  with  the  doctrine  of  the  freedom  of 
the  high  seas  to  suppose  any  one'  nation  is  capable  of  acquir- 
ing rights  therein  above,  or  greater  than,  the  common  rights 
of  all  nations.  Few  in  time  past,  and  no  one  to-day,  ventures 
to  assert  that  Bering  Sea  falls  within  that  class  of  enclosed 


THE   FUR-SEALS   AND   THE    BERING   SEA   AWARD  37 

waters  which  form  an  exception  to  the  general  rule  of  mare 
liherum^  or  open  free  sea.  Such  then  being  the  case,  it  is 
almost  certain  that,  even  had  the  fact  of  universal  acquiescence 
in  Russia's  claims  of  dominion  north  of  the  Aleutian  Islands 
been  satisfactorily  proved,  a  resulting  prescriptive  title  would 
not  have  been  accorded  by  any  impartial  tribunal. 

It  appeared  at  once  that  the  American  contention  of  Russia's 
exclusive  sovereignty  could  not  be  maintained.  Reliance  had 
been  placed  in  evidence  afforded  by  certain  Russian  documents 
to  establish  Russia's  prescriptive  right  to  jurisdiction  over 
those  waters,  and  as  a  natural  sequitur  the  similar  American 
rights  acquired  by  purchase.  The  testimony  in  question,  upon 
closer  scrutiny,  was  found  to  be  false,  and  the  American  case, 
unsupported  by  proof,  failed  upon  the  first  and  second  points. 

The  third  point  in  the  case,  involving  the  true  meaning  of 
the  term  "  Pacific  Ocean,"  as  employed  by  Russia  and  Eng- 
land in  a  treaty  of  1825,  and  which  in  the  full  comprehensive- 
ness of  its  meaning  included  the  Bering  Sea,  was  decided 
unanimously  in  favor  of  the  English  contention.  This 
refuted  Mr.  Blaine's  argument  that  English  and  American 
expressions  of  protest  against  Russian  assumptions  in  the 
North  Pacific  had  never  been  directed  against  Russian  oper- 
ations north  of  the  Aleutian  Islands  or  in  Bering  Sea.  The 
object  of  this  count  was  to  strengthen  the  American  prescrip- 
tive title  to  the  waters  of  the  Bering  Sea  in  the  event  of  deci- 
sion favorable  to  the  United  States.  But  this  issue  having 
already  been  disposed  of  adversely  to  the  United  States  in 
the  first  two  counts,  its  value  and  importance  were  conse- 
quently lost. 

Failing,  then,  in  the  first  three  points  in  the  case,  the  fourth 
one  became  meaningless  to  the  United  States  and  was  dropped 
without  comment.  This  left  the  fifth  and  last  issue  in  the 
case,  the  only  one  upon  which  the  American  commissioners 
could  take  a  firm  stand;  the  main  force  of  the  American 
argument  was  brought  to  bear  upon  it  in  an  endeavor  to 
establish  a  right  of  property  in,  or  actual  ownership  of,  the 
seals,  and  a  consequent  right  of  the  United  States  to  protect 
its  own  property  upon  the  high  seas.  ^ 


^ 


-H^ 


38  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

The  right  of  property  in  animals  fercB  naturce  ordinarily- 
held  or  capable  of  acquisition  by  individuals  or  communities 
was  discussed  at  great  length  in  an  exhaustive  argument  by 
Mr.  Carter  who  endeavored  to  demonstrate  the  rightful  Ameri- 
can ownership  of  the  seals.  On  this  question,  he  urged: 
"The  United  States  hold  that  the  ownership  of  the  islands 
upon  which  the  seals  breed;  that  the  habit  of  the  seals  in 
regularly  resorting  thereto  and  rearing  their  young  thereon ; 
that  their  going  out  in  search  of  food  and  regularly  returning 
thereto,  all  the  facts  and  incidents  of  their  relations  to  the 
islands,  —  give  to  the  United  States  a  property  interest 
therein.  .  .  ." 

The  common  and  civil  law  was  ransacked  for  cases  to  sup- 
port this  claim,  and  a  remarkably  ingenious  argument  was 
presented.  The  question  was  practically  a  unique  one  in 
the  field  of  international  law,  and  no  precedent  could  be 
quoted  either  to  sustain  or  defeat  the  American  contention. 
The  common  and  civil  laws  recognized  twD  classes  of  ani- 
mals,— first,  those  that  are  domesticated  and  tame,  such  as 
cattle,  horses,  dogs,  etc.,  and  in  which  man  may  possess  abso- 
lute ownership;  and  secondly,  those  animal^  which  wander 
about  at  free  will  and  are  of  a  wild  disposition,  designated  as 
ferce  naturce.  In  this  latter  class,  man  might  enjoy,  under 
certain  conditions,  qualified  property  rights.  When  such 
creatures  are  captured  and  detained,  they  become  personal 
property  so  long  as  they  may  be  kept  in  actual  possession ; 
but  the  moment  they  escape  and  gain  their  liberty,  property 
right  in  them  instantly  ceases,  unless,  indeed,  they  wander 
away  animo  revertendi,  an  intention  according  to  habit  of 
returning,  in  which  case  a  certain  qualified  ownership  may 
still  exist.  But  the  exact  extent  and  scope  of  this  property 
right  in  animals  ferce  naturce  that  have  left  their  confines 
but  purpose  eventually  to  return  are  not  altogether  clear. 
The  particular  and  peculiar  natures  of  the  many  species  of 
animals  that  may  serve  man  and  still  be  considered  under  the 
head  of  animals  ferce  naturce^  are  questions  well  calculated 
to  confuse  jurists  and  tend  to  make  generalization  upon  the 
subject   impossible.      Thus,  the  owner  of  a  swarm  of  bees 


THE  FUR-SEALS   AND  THE   BERING   SEA  AWARD         39 

loses  no  property  rights  in  the  bees  when  the}^  fly  away  to 
gather  honey  in  fields  other  than  his  own ;  but,  upon  the 
same  principle,  it  might  be  pertinently  asked  could  Canada 
claim  in  the  United  States  the  flocks  of  wild  geese  and  ducks 
that  are  hatched  and  bred  about  the  northern  Canadian 
lakes  but  pass  the  winter  seasons  in  the  United  States ;  or, 
could  the  United  States  claim  in  Canada  the  deer,  elk,  or 
buffalo  that  cross  for  a  day  the  northern  frontier? 

The  seals  could  be  considered  domestic  animals  only  by  a 
strain  of  the  imagination,  and  as  animals  ferce  naturce  they 
are  born  and  live  for  a  period  of  time  each  year  on  American 
soil,  and  when  they  take  their  departure  it  is  always  with  the 
intention  of  returning.  By  analogous  arguments,  therefore, 
from  common  law  sources,  the  United  States  might  have  been 
shown  to  possess  a  qualified  property  right  in  these  animals, 
suflieient  even  to  warrant  their  protection  when  outside  of 
American  jurisdiction  upon  the  high  seas.  But  to  have 
established  such  a  right  in  the  United  States  would  have 
been  to  recognize  and  to  tolerate  a  violation  of  much  better 
established  principles  of  international  law,  —  the  absolute 
freedom  of  the  high  seas. 

The  arbitrators  (the  American  commissioners  dissenting) 
decided  against  the  American  contention,  holding,  "That 
the  United  States  have  no  right  to  protection  of,  or  property 
in,  the  seals  frequenting  the  islands  of  the  United  States  in 
Bering  Sea,  when  the  same  are  found  outside  the  ordinary 
three-mile  limit." 

Thus  the  American  case  was  lost  upon  each  and  every  legal 
point  involved.  Th^  United  States  was  held  to  possess  no 
greater  right  in  Bering  Sea  than  was  possessed  in  common  by 
all  nations.  The  seals  were  considered  to  be  animals  strictly 
ferce  naturce^  and  consequently,  res  nullius,  or  incapable  of 
ownership  when  outside  of  national  jurisdiction,  or  upon  the 
high  seas. 

Therefore  all  nations  had  a  natural  and  perfect  right  to 
catch  these  animals  in  any  open  sea,  and  consequently  if  any 
restrictions  upon  these  rights,  or  any  regulations  of  sealing, 
were  to  be  effected,  such  could  properly  be  made  only  through 


40  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

mutual  consent  and  agreement  of  the  parties  concerned  arid 
by  treaty  stipulation. 

Having  thus  disposed  of  the  legal  question  involved  in  the 
dispute  in  a  manner  adversely  to  American  interests,  the  com- 
missioners took  up  the  report  of  the  scientific  experts  upon 
the  conditions  of  seal  life  in  the  North  Pacific  and  upon  the 
Pribyloff  Islands.  They  sought  diligently  through  the  laby- 
rinth of  conflicting  testimony  for  a  solution  of  the  practical 
question  which  was  to  preserve  the  seal  herds. 

Their  deliberations  finally  took  form  in  a  set  of  regulations 
which,  by  the  terms  of  the  treaty  authorizing  the  tribunal, 
should  be  binding  equally  upon  the  United^tates  and  Eng- 
land. Briefly,  the  regulations  were,  first,  there  shall  be  no 
killing  of  seals  at  any  time  or  season  within  a  zone  of  sixty 
miles  around  the  Pribyloff  Islands ;  second^'  from  May  1  to 
July  31  shall  be  considered  a  closed  season,  within  which 
time  subjects  or  citizens  of  neither  power  shall  engage  in 
pelagic  sealing  in  Bering  Sea  and  the  North  Pacific  Ocean 
within  the  area  described  as  "  the  high  part  of  the  sea  in  that 
part  of  the  Pacific  Ocean,  inclusive  of  Behring  Sea,  situated 
nortja  of  the  35th  degree  of  north  latitude,  or  eastward  of  the 
180th  degree  of  longitude  from  Greenwich  until  it  strikes 
the  water  boundary  described  in  Article  1  of  the  treaty  of 
1867  between  the  United  States  and  Russia,  following  that 
line  up  to  Behring  Straits ; "  third,  at  other  times,  or  during 
the  open  season,  only  sailing  vessels  shall  be  permitted  to  take 
part  in  sealing  operations  within  such  area ;  fourth,  these  ves- 
sels shall  be  provided  with  a  proper  license,  etc. ;  fifth,  mas- 
ters will  record  all  catches  in  a  log ;  sixth,  the  use  of  nets, 
fire-arms,  or  explosives  are  positively  forbidden,  though  the 
use  of  shotguns  in  the  Pacific  Ocean  south  of  Bering  Sea  is 
permissible.  The  regulations  were  to  remain  in  force  until 
wholly  or  in  part  abolished  through  common  consent  of  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain,  —  and  "Said  concurrent 
regulations  shall  be  submitted  every  jive  years  to  a  new  ex- 
amination  in  order  to  enable  both  governments  to  consider 
whether  in  the  light  of  past  experience  there  is  occasion  to 
make  any  modification  thereof."     The  method  of  enforcing 


THE   FUR-SEALS  AND   THE   BERING   SEA   AWARD         41 

these  regulations  was  left  to  the  respective  governments,  with 
the  obligation  of  enacting  each  succeeding  year  such  legisla- 
tion as  might  be  necessary  to  the  proper  enforcement  of  the 
award.  A  recommendation  was  also  made,  in  view  of  the 
"critical  condition  to  which  it  appears  certain  that  the  race 
of  fur-seals  is  now  reduced,"  that  the  two  governments 
should  agree  to  abstain  from  all  killing  of  seals,  either  on  sea 
or  on  land,  for  a  period  of  two  or  three  years.  ^'This  excel- 
lent suggestion,  to  be  acted  upon  only  by  the  will  of  the  two 
powers,  unfortunately  was  not  accepted.^ 

Despite  all  adverse  criticism,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that 
the  arbitrators,  in  thus  framing  a  series  of  regulations  for  the 
protection  and  preservation  of  the  fur-seals,  acted  conscien- 
tiously and  to  the  best  of  their  knowledge.  In  performing 
their  duty  of  establishing  a  code  of  laws  for  the  protection  of 
the  fur-seal  species,  the  task  of  the  commissioners  was  a  pecu- 
liarly difficult  one,  far  more  so  indeed  than  had  been  the  bur- 
den of  adjudicating  upon  the  purely  legal  questions  involved 
in  the  controversy.  The  arbitrators  were  at  once  confronted 
and  overwhelmed  with  a  hopeless  mass  of  variable  and  con- 
flicting testimony  concerning  every  feature  of  seal  life,  and 
as  jurists  their  steps  were  uncertain  in  the  provinces  of  natu- 
ral science.  They  desire  first  and  foremost  to  provide  a 
system  of  laws  that  should  be  effective  in  protecting  the  seals 
from  extermination,  and  they  wished  as  well,  in  accordance 
with  the  natural  impulse  of  a  judicial  body,  to  place  the 
deprivations  of  enforced  abandonment  of  a  profitable  indus- 
try equally  and  equitably  upon  the  subjects  of  both  nations, 
so  far  as  proper  and  consistent  with  the  primary  and  main 
objects  of  the  regulations. 

The  award  and  regulations  were  accepted  with  becoming 
grace  by  both  countries.  For  a  time  murmurs  of  discontent 
were  heard  from  the  Canadian  sealers,  who  at  first  believed 
that  the  restrictions  on  pelagic  sealing  would  forever  ruin 
their  industry.  A  certain  amount  of  bitterness  against  the 
award  and  the  legal  conclusion  of  the  arbitrators  was  also 
apparent  for  a  season  in  many  American  newspapers,  con- 
tributed by  those  who  could  not  recover  too  suddenly  from 


42  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

their  mare  clausum  convictions  regarding  Bering  Sea,  and 
who  perhaps  regarded  all  boards  of  international  arbitration 
as  but  sorry  exponents  of  justice. 

^An  Act  of  Congress  was  passed  April  5, 1894,  enforcing  the 
award  as  to  American  citizens,Xnd  some  slight  friction  be- 
tween the  two  powers  was  caused  by  the  delay  of  the  British 
government  in  effecting  concurrent  legislation  in  relation 
to  British  subjects.  Orders  in  Council  were  shortly  after 
enacted  (April  18,  1894),  and  the  sealing  season  of  1894,  the 
first  under  the  new  regime,  opened. 

Notwithstanding  the  general  feeling  of  satisfaction  with 
the  award  that  soon  succeeded  a  period  of  doubts  concerning 
its  justice,  it  became  apparent,  at  the  close  of  the  sealing  season 
the  following  autumn  (1894),  that  the  regulations  were  inade- 
quate, and  that  they  had  evidently  been  made  without  that 
accurate  and  scientific  knowledge  of  seal  life  and  conditions 
which  the  authors  of  the  articles  should  have  possessed.  The 
pelagic  catch  was  unusually  and  alarmingly  large.  Including 
the  captures  made  on  the  Asiatic  side  during  the  closed  season 
of  May,  June,  and  July,  the  number  of  skins  taken  at  sea 
amounted  altogether  to  about  142,000  —  a  figure  greatly  in 
excess  of  any  previous  year's  catch. 

Actual  operations  in  Bering  Sea  soon  developed  the  fact 
that  the  sixty-mile  inhibitive  zone  about  the  Pribyloff  Islands 
was  entirely  insufficient  in  extent  to  protect  the  seals.  The 
females,  and  occasionally  the  young  males  or  bachelors,  as 
already  shown,  are  in  the  habit,  during  the  breeding  season, 
from  May  until  December,  of  wandering  away  in  search  of 
food,  even  to  a  distance  of  200  miles  at  sea;  they  do  not, 
as  the  commissioners  evidently  presumed,  remain  on  or  near 
the  shores  of  the  islands.  They  are  driven  to  make  these  long 
excursions  on  account  of  the  scarcity  of  food  near  the  shore, 
a  result  naturally  arising  from  the  presence  of  so  great  a 
number  of  animals  subsisting  entirely  upon  fish  and  other 
forms  of  marine  life.  On  the  first  of  August,  and  the  end  of 
the  closed  season,  the  sealing  schooners  appeared  in  force  in 
the  Bering  Sea  and  reaped  a  rich  harvest  just  without  the 
protective  zone  of  sixty  miles  that  had  been  established  by 


THE  FUR-SEALS  AND  THE   BERING  SEA  AWARD         43 

the  regulations  about  the  Pribyloff  Islands.  A  majority  of 
the  animals  thus  taken  were  females,  and  at  that  particular 
time  every  female  has  dependent  upon  her  a  young  seal.  The 
death  of  the  mother  invariably  results  in  the  death  of  the 
"pup"  who  awaits  her  return  on  shore.  The  unusually 
high  mortality  of  the  young  seals  on  the  rookeries  during 
the  season  of  1894  gave  silent  testimony  to  the  destructive 
character  of  pelagic  sealing  in  Bering  Sea,  for  having  de- 
ducted from  the  total  of  dead  "  pups  "  found  on  the  breeding- 
ground  whose  deaths  had  resulted  from  overcrowding  and 
accident,  an  alarming  proportion  remained  to  indicate  starva- 
tion as  the  principal  cause.  The  difficulty  also  of  enforcing 
the  observance  of  a  line  of  demarcation  between  protected 
and  unprotected  waters,  sixty  miles  at  sea  and  entirely  out  of 
sight  of  land,  became  apparent,  and  especially  in  this  region 
of  dense  and  almost  perpetual  fog. 

The  main  objection  to  the  regulations,  however,  was  dis- 
covered to  be  in  the  shortness  of  the  closed  season  (May  1 
to  July  31),  during  which  time  no  seals  were  to  be  captured 
within  the  geographical  limits  already  given.  The  fleet  of 
sealing  vessels  ordinarily  begins  its  operations  in  January, 
when  the  seals  are  at  the  southern  extreme  of  their  annual 
migration,  and  follows  the  herd  in  a  northerly  direction  along 
the  coast,  during  the  early  spring  months.  Stationing  them- 
selves in  and  about  the  passes  of  the  Aleutian  Islands,  to 
which  points  the  seals  converge  on  their  long  swim  to  the 
Bering  Sea,  the  hunters  were  enabled  vastly  to  increase  their 
catch.  At  the  beginning  of  the  closed  season,  the  sealing 
captains  crossed  over  to  the  Asiatic  side  of  Bering  sea  and 
preyed  upon  the  unprotected  herds  of  the  Commander  and 
Robin  islands,  to  return  again  about  August  1  to  the  vicinity 
of  the  Pribyloff  rookeries,  where  they  hovered  about,  causing 
great  destruction  to  the  herd,  until  the  approaching  storms 
of  autumn  warned  all  sailing  craft  to  leave  those  open 
waters.  ;^The  statistical  results  of  the  first  season's  operations 
in  Bering  Sea  and  the  North  Pacific  furnished  ample  grounds 
for  belief  that  the  regulations  had  fallen  far  short  of  accom- 
plishing the  object  for  which  they  had  been  made^  Secretary 


44  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

of  the  Treasury  Carlisle,  in  answer  to  a  House  resolution, 
said  that  from  the  statistics  of  the  pelagic  catch  of  1894,  "it 
becomes  evident  that  during  the  present  season  there  has 
been  an  unprecedented  increase  over  preceding  years  in  the 
number  of  seals  killed  by  pelagic  sealers,  both  in  American 
and  Asiatic  waters.  This  increase  has  caused  an  alarming 
decrease  in  the  number  of  seals  on  the  islands.  .  .  . 
The  alarming  increase  in  the  number  of  seals  killed  by  the 
pelagic  sealers  .  .  .  emphasizes  the  conclusion  expressed 
in  my  annual  report  to  Congress  that  long  before  the 
expiration  of  the  five  years,  when  the  regulations  enacted 
by  the  tribunal  of  arbitration  are  to  be  submitted  to  the 
respective  governments  for  reexamination,  the  fur  seal  will 
have  been  practically  exterminated."  Mr.  Gresham,  Secre- 
tary of  State,  expressed  to  the  British  Ambassador  his  anxiety 
concerning  the  future  welfare  of  the  seals  in  his  letter  of 
January  23,  1895 :  "...  It  would  appear  that  there  were 
l^inded  in  the  United  States  and  Victoria  121,143  skins, 
(operation  of  season  1891),  and  that  the  total  pelagic  catch, 
as  shown  by  the  London  trade  sales  and  careful  estimates  of 
skins  transshipped  in  Jaj^anese  and  Russian  ports,  amounts 
to  about  142,000,  a  result  unprecedented  in  the  history  of 
pelagic  sealing.  .  .  .  This  startling  increase  in  the  pe- 
lagic slaughter  of  both  the  American  and  Asiatic  herds  has 
convinced  the  President,  and  it  is  respectfully  submitted 
cannot  fail  to  convince  Her  Majesty's  Government,  tliat 
the  regulations  enacted  by  the  Paris  Tribunal  have  not  oper- 
ated to  protect  the  seal  herd  from  that  destruction  which 
they  were  designed  to  prevent,  and  that,  unless  a  speedy 
change  in  the  regulation  be  brought  about,  extermination  of 
the  herd  must  follow." 

Further  cause  for  American  dissatisfaction  in  the  matter 
was  found  in  the  alleged  indifference  manifested  by  the 
English  Government  in  assuming  its  full  share  of  obliga- 
tion in  the  enforcement  of  the  regulations.  In  the  Act  of 
Congress  (April  5,  1894),  enforcing  the  Paris  award  for 
that  season,  a  section  had  been  introduced  to  the  effect  that 
if  any  licensed  sealing  vessel  should  be  found  within   the 


THE  FUR-SEALS  AND   THE   BERING   SEA   AWARD         45 

waters  covered  by  the  award  "  having  on  board  apparatus  or 
implements  suitable  for  taking  seals,  but  forbidden  then  and 
there  to  be  used  (fire-arms),  it  shall  be  presumed  that  the  .  .  . 
app.aratus  or  implements  .  .  .  were  used  in  violation  of  this 
act  until  it  is  otherwise  sufficiently  proved."  Thus  the  burden 
of  proof  was  placed  upon  all  masters  of  American  sealing 
craft,  when  arms  were  forbidden,  to  show  when  found  in  their 
possession,  that  the  same  had  not  been  used  for  the  purpose 
of  killing  seals.  When  enacting  laws  for  the  enforcement 
of  a  Russian  vivendi  in  1891,  the  British  Government  had 
deemed  it  proper  to  adopt  this  rule  of  evidence,  ^  but  in 
1894,  in  the  Orders  in  Council  carrying  into  effect  the  Paris 
award  as  to  British  subjects,  this  important  provision  was 
omitted.  In  the  absence  of  such  equivalent  legislation  on 
the  part  of  Great  Britian,  the  American  sealing  captains 
were  placed  upon  an  unequal  footing  with  their  Canadian 
brethren,  and  manifestly  at  a  great  disadvantage  when 
brought  before  the  court  charged  with  violation  of  the  law 
forbidding  the  use  of  fire-arms  in  the  capture  of  seals.  In 
his  letter  of  May  10,  1895,  to  Sir  Julian  Pauncefote,  Mr. 
Uhl,  then  Acting  Secretary  of  State,  said  in  reference  to  this 
question  of  evidence  :  — 

"...  Experience  has  shown  it  to  be  almost  a  practical 
impossibility  to  detect  a  sealing  vessel  in  the  act  of  using 
firearms  for  this  one  prohibited  purpose.  Although  the  search- 
ing officer  may  be  morally  certain  that  firearms  have  been 
used,  and  may  properly  consider  the  mere  presence  of  fire- 
arms on  the  vessel,  if  accompanied  with  bodies  of  seals,  seal- 
skins, or  other  suspicious  evidence,  sufficient  justification 
(even  apart  from  the  provisions  of  Section  10  of  the  Act  of 
Congress  of  April  6,  1894,  which  is  applicable  only  to  Amer- 
ican vessels)  for  the  seizure  of  such  a  vessel,  it  must  be 
apparent  that  in  proceedings  for  condemnation  brought  in  a 
court  thousands  of  miles  away  from  the  place  of  seizure  it 

1  "  If  a  British  ship  is  found  within  Bering  Sea  having  on  board  thereof  fish- 
ing or  shooting  implements  or  sealskins,  or  bodies  of  seals,  it  shall  lie  on  the 
owner  or  master  of  such  ship  to  prove  that  the  ship  was  not  used  or  employed  . 
in  contravention  of  this  Act."  — (June  15, 1891, 53  and  54  Victoria,  Chapter  19.) 


46  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

would  be  almost  impossible  to  secure  conviction  and  forfeiture 
on  the  ground  of  illegal  use  of  weapons.  Furthermore,  under 
the  procedure  necessarily  following  the  seizure  of  a  British 
vessel  the  United  States  officer  delivers  the  vessel,  with  such 
witnesses  and  proof  as  he  can  procure,  to  the  senior  British 
naval  officer  at  Unalaska.  At  the  trial  no  representative  of 
our  Government  is  present,  and  the  British  Government  must 
conduct  the  prosecution  and  must  trust  to  such  proofs  and 
witnesses  as  the  American  officer  could  collect  and  furnish  at 
the  time.  Under  such  circumstances  forfeiture  of  the  vessel 
could  not  be  secured  except  in  the  clearest  cases  of  guilt." 

Suspicion  also  arose  that  England  did  not  fully  meet  the 
United  States  in  the  desire  and  determination  to  protect  the 
seals,  because  she  had  deemed  a  single  war  vessel  sufficient  for 
the  purpose  of  patrolling  the  North  Pacific  and  Bering  Sea 
during  the  closed  season  of  1894,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that 
the  Canadian  fleet  of  sealing  schooners  was  almost  twice  as 
large  as  the  American  fleet.  The  United  States,  on  the  other 
hand,  had  despatched  twelve  armed  vessels  to  the  scene  of 
action,  and  so  zealous  had  been  their  commanders  in  the  per- 
formance of  their  duties,  that  a  score  or  more  of  complaints 
from  outraged  shipowners  for  the  too  frequent,  needless, 
and  fussy  overhauling  of  their  schooners  were  filed  in 
Washington. 

At  the  close,  then,  of  the  first  season's  sealing  operations 
under  the  regulations  of  the  Paris  award,  the  "  Bering  Sea 
question  "  again  became  acute.  The  most  noticeable  effect 
of  the  enforcement  of  a  closed  season  upon  the  American 
side  of  the  Pacific  had  been  to  drive  the  entire  American  and 
Canadian  sealing  fleets  across  the  ocean  during  the  months  of 
May,  June,  and  July,  to  take  advantage  of  that  favorable 
period  in  attacking  the  Asiatic  herds  in  and  about  Japanese 
and  Sil)erian  waters.  The  resulting  increase  in  the  slaughter 
of  the  Asiatic  herds  startled  Japan  and  Russia.  They  imme- 
diately expressed  a  desire  to  have  the  restrictive  measures  of 
the  Paris  award  extended  to  their  side  of  the  Pacific,  and  a 
correspondence  ensued  with  that  end  in  view. 

Thoroughly   convinced   of    the   inadequacy   of   the   laws 


THE   FUR-SEALS   AND   THE   BERING   SEA  AWARD         47 

which  had  been  framed  to  protect  the  seals  from  threatened 
extermination,  fa  strong  appeal  was  made  by  Secretary 
Gresham  for  English  assent  to  a  revision  of  the  regulations. 
His  desire  was  to  enlarge  the  closed  season  and  also  to 
prohibit  all  pelagic  sealing  in  Bering  Se^ 

The  statistics  of  the  year's  catch,  gathered  from  Canadian 
sources,  differed  from  the  American  estimates,  making  the 
total  somewhat  less;  the  English  Government,  seeing  no 
immediate  cause  for  alarm  for  the  future  welfare  of  the 
herd,  were  not  favorably  inclined  to  making  any  changes  in 
the  existing  laws  governing  sealing  operations.  While  still 
engaged,  however,  in  discussing  the  situation,  (the  spring 
months  advanced,  the  sealing  fleets  cleared  from  their  winter 
ports,  and  the  season  of  1895  opened  without  any  modifica- 
tion of  the  regulations^) 

The  statistical  returns  from  the  North  Pacific  and  Bering 
Sea  at  the  end  of  the  season  of  1895  (the  second  under  the 
award),  were  not  of  a  character  to  relieve  apprehension ;  they 
served  only  the  more  firmly  to  convince  the  American  Gov- 
ernment that  its  fears  for  the  future  of  the  seal  herds  were 
well  grounded,  and  that  appeals  for  British  consent  to  a 
modification  of  the  regulations  were  reasonable  and  proper. 
Mr.  Olney  wrote  Sir  Julian  Pauncefote,  March  11,  1896. 

...  I  desire  also  to  call  your  attention  to  the  unprecedentedly 
large  catch  of  seals  in  Bering  Sea  during  the  past  season.  The 
total  was  44,169,  as  compared  with  31,585  during  the  season  of 
1894.  This  is  by  far  the  largest  catch  ever  made  in  Bering  Sea,  and 
it  is  believed  that  another  catch  of  similar  size  for  the  coming  sea- 
son will  almost  completely  exterminate  the  fur-seal  herd.  I  am 
advised  that  the  greater  portion  of  the  seals  killed  at  sea  were 
females. 

The  total  catch  during  the  last  season  in  the  North  Pacific 
and  Bering  Sea  from  the  American  herd  was  56,291,  as  compared 
with  total  for  1894  of  61,838,  the  small  falling  off  being  due  to 
the  inclemency  of  the  weather  between  January  and  May  along 
the  northwestern  coast,  and  also  to  the  diminution  of  the  seal 
herd.  .  .  . 

In  the  spring  of  1896  Russia  again  displayed  some  anxiety 
for  the  welfare  of  her  own  sealing  industry  on  the  Asiatic 


48  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

side  of  Bering  Sea,  and  broached  the  subject  of  an  agreement 
to  extend  the  provisions  of  the  Paris  award  to  her  side  of  the 
Pacific  Ocean.  The  Secretary  of  State  eagerly  seized  this 
opportunity  to  gain  an  ally,  and  Mr.  Bayard,  the  American 
Ambassador  to  Great  Britain,  was  instructed  to  cooperate 
with  and  aid  the  Russian  representative  in  London  in  his 
endeavors  to  secure  England's  consent  to  such  legislation. 
These  laudable  efforts  on  the  part  of  Russia  were  not  destined 
to  meet  the  success  they  deserved.  Lord  Salisbury  received 
the  overtures  with  indifference  and  proposed  to  send  two  scien- 
tific experts  to  the  Bering  Sea  to  make  further  investigations 
into  the  conditions  of  seal  life  as  affected  by  the  regulations 
and  award,  and  incidentally  to  extend  their  researches  to  the 
Commander  and  Robin  islands.  Accordingly  Mr.  D'Arcy 
Thompson  and  Mr.  Macoun,  on  the  parts  of  England  and 
Canada,  proceeded  to  Bering  Sea,  to  remain  throughout  the 
season  of  1^96.  Professor  David  Starr  Jordan,  a  biologist  of 
great  ability,  was  sent  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  to 
cooperate  with  these  English  scientists  and  to  make  with 
them  a  thorough  and  exhaustive  study  of  the  subject. 

It  was  sincerely  hoped  in  Washington  that^this  sci^tific 
commission^  unlike  the  former  one  of  1892,  would  be  enabled 
to  agree  upon  findings  of  fact,  and  that  it  might  also  reach 
harmonious  conclusions  in  relation  to  proper  remedial  legis- 
lation. By  proofs  furnished  through  her  own  experts  it  was 
expected,  as  it  was  greatly  desired,  to  convince  the  English 
Government  of  the  necessity  of  a  revision  of  the  rules  gov- 
erning pelagic  sealing,  and  to  overcome,  if  possible,  their  stolid 
determination  to  stand  for  the  full  five  years  on  the  letter 
of  the  law  regardless  of  consequences. 

The  season  of  1896  opened  with  no  changes  in  the  regula- 
tions; the  mixed  Canadian  and  American  scientific  commis- 
sion were  at  the  Pribyloff  Islands,  and  several  American  and 
British  armed  vessels  patrolled  the  seas  in  search  of  violators 
of  the  sealing  laws. 

Professor  Jordan's  report  appeared  early  the  following  win- 
ter, disclosing  facts  truly  alarming  to  the  government  that  had 
struggled  so  earnestly  to  protect  the   herd.     After   noting 


THE  FUR-SEALS   AND  THE   BERING   SEA   AWARD  49 

carefully  the  gradual  decrease  in  the  size  of  the  American 
herd  from  the  beginning  of  pelagic  sealing  in  1880  to 
about  the  year  1886,  then  showing  that  since  that  period 
the  steadily  increasing  rate  of  diminution  of  the  number  of 
seals  was  in  a  direct  ratio  to  the  increasing  size  of  the  sealing 
fleets,  and  further  calling  attention  to  the  continuous  and 
rapid  decline  of  seal  herds  in  the  last  few  years,  —  Dr.  Jordan 
was  forced  to  the  conclusion  that  "  pegalic  sealing  .  .  . 
has  been  the  sole  cause  of  the  continued  decline  of  the  fur- 
seal  herds.  It  is  at  present  the  sole  obstacle  to  their  restora- 
tion and  the  sole  limit  of  their  indefinite  increase.  It  is 
therefore  evident  that  no  settlement  of  the  fur-seal  question 
as  regards  either  the  American  or  Russian  islands  can  be  per- 
manent unless  it  shall  provide  for  the  cessation  of  the  indis- 
criminate killing  of  fur-seals,  both  on  the  sealing  grounds  and 
on  their  migrations.  There  can  be  no  open  season  for  the  kill- 
ing of  females  if  the  herd  is  to  be  kept  intact." 

Dr.  Jordan  recommended  that  Congress  should  enact  laws 
absolutely  prohibiting  Americans  from  engaging  in  pelagic 
sealing  at  any  time  or  season.  Such  legislation,  he  believed, 
vi^ould  furnish  an  excellent  example  to  England,  and  would 
place  the  United  States  in  a  strong  position  for  pressing  her 
arguments  against  the  capture  of  seals  at  sea.  As  a  final  resort, 
in  case  no  understanding  could  be  effected  with  Great  Britain 
looking  to  the  prevention  of  all  pelagic  sealing,  he  recom- 
mended the  expediency  of  branding  v^ith  hot  irons  all  the 
female  seals  upon  the  Pribyloff  Islands,  thereby  rendering 
their  pelts  commercially  worthless,  but  in  no  manner  injuring 
"the  seals.  This,  he  thought,  w^ould  protect  them  from  the 
onslaughts  of  the  pelagic  hunters  and  enable  the  Pribyloff 
herd  to  maintain  itself  by  keeping  up  the  yearly  average 
birth-rate. 

The  President  was  much  concerned  by  the  seriousness  of  the 
situation  as  depicted  by  Dr.  Jordan.  He  was  again  moved  to 
make  strenuous  efforts  to  induce  Lord  Salisbury  immediately 
to  enter  upon  negotiations  for  a  revision  of  the  existing  regula- 
tions. The  latter,  however,  would  not  accede  to  the  Presi- 
Kient's  wish.     Professor  D'Arcy  Thompson,  in  his  report  soon 


50  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

after  made  public  in  England,  found  substantially  the  same- 
facts  and  conditions  as  were  reported  by  Dr.  Jordan,  but  he 
deduced  therefrom  a  less  startling  conclusion.  He  saw  no  im- 
mediate cause  for  alarm  in  the  continuation  of  pelagic  sealing,, 
but  believed  the  killing  of  young  males,  —  the  "bach- 
elors," —  on  the  islands,  as  practised  by  the  chartered  Amer- 
ican Company,  to  be  highly  destructive  to  the  herd  and 
altogether  a  pernicious  method.  Basing  its  action  upon  these 
findings  and  conclusions,  the(  British  Government  failed  to 
see  any  urgent  necessity  for  a  modification  of  the  regulations 
before  the  end  of  the  stipulated  five  years  ;  it  declined  flatly 
to  consider  the  matter  at  that  time.^ 

This  refusal  of  the  British  Government  to  heed  the  warn- 
ings so  plainly  written  in  all  the  statistical  reports  of  sealing 
operations  since  1894,  and  their  stubborn  determination  not  to 
yield  to  the  solicitations  of  the  United  States  for  a  revision 
of  the  laws,  caused  much  disappointment  at  Washington. 
Being  thoroughly  convinced  that  the  Paris  regulations 
were  ineffectual,  —  indeed,  that  they  utterly  failed  to  fulfil 
the  expressed  object  of  their  creation,  —  the  United  States 
received  with  less  grace  each  year  the  refusal  of  Great  Britain 
to  consent  to  their  revision.  There  was  little  consolation  in 
the  reflection  that  Great  Britain,  in  thus  declining  to  act,, 
stood  squarely  upon  her  rights  under  the  Paris  rules.  These 
only  called  upon  the  parties  to  submit  the  regulations  "  every 
five  years  to  a  new  examination  in  order  to  enable  both 
governments  to  consider  in  the  light  of  past  experience  if 
there  is  any  occasion  to  make  any  modification  thereof." 
England  was  consequently  under  no  legal  obligation  what- 
ever to  reopen  the  question  before  the  close  of  the  season  of 
1898,  and  by  that  time  it  was  feared  in  the  United  States 
there  would  be  no  seals  left  to  consider  in  any  light  whatso- 
ever. 

Apart  from  her  legal  exemption,  it  was  felt  in  Washington 
that  Great  Britain  was  at  least  under  a  moral  obligation  to- 
consent  to  an  immediate  reexamination  of  rules  that  were 
manifestly  so  defective.  It  was  urged  that  the  rules  were 
created  for  a  definite  purpose ;  they  had  since  been  proven  to 


THE   FUR-SEALS  AND   THE   BERING   SEA  AWARD         51 

be  not  only  useless,  but  positively  harmful,  in  that  they 
served  to  protect  a  nefarious  practice.  Hence  the  duty  was 
plain  to  alter  them  as  soon  as  possible.  England's  reply,  to 
the  effect  that  in  her  estimation  the  laws  were  not  defective 
and  could  well  await  the  proper  time  for  revision,  seemed  to 
the  American  officials  an  extraordinary  conclusion  to  draw 
from  the  facts,  —  a  conclusion  so  little  in  accord  with  all  rea- 
sonable deductions  that  it  seemed  unaccountable.  The  ad- 
ministration was  perplexed  and  annoyed.  With  some  show 
of  feeling,  the  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Sherman,  wrote  to  Mr. 
Hay,  the  American  Ambassador  in  London  (May  10, 1897)  :  — 

.  .  .  On  the  other  hand,  I  think  I  have  shown  that  the  British 
Government  has  from  the  beginning  and  continuously  failed  to 
respect  the  real  intent  and  spirit  of  the  Tribunal  or  the  obliga- 
tions imposed  by  it.  This  is  shown  by  the  refusal  to  extend  the 
regulations  to  the  Asiatic  waters ;  by  the  failure  to  put  in  opera- 
tion the  recommendation  for  a  suspension  of  the  killing  of  the 
seals  for  three,  for  two,  or  even  for  one  year ;  by  the  neglect  to 
put  the  regulations  in  force  until  long  after  the  first  sealing  season 
had  been  entered  on;  by  the  almost  total  evasion  of  the  patrol 
duty ;  by  the  opposition  to  suitable  measures  for  the  enforcement 
of  the  prohibition  against  firearms ;  by  the  omission  to  enact  legis- 
lation necessary  to  secure  conviction  of  the  guilty;  and  by  the 
refusal  to  allow  or  provide  for  an  inspection  of  skins  in  the  inter- 
est of  an  honest  observance  of  the  regulations.  ...  A  course  so 
persistently  followed  for  the  past  three  years  has  practically  accom- 
plished the  commercial  extermination  of  the  fur-seals  and  brought 
to  naught  the  patient  labors  and  well-meant  conclusions  of  the 
Tribunal  of  Arbitration.  .  .  . 

Congress  displayed  a  similar  feeling  of  resentment  by  con- 
sidering a  bill  providing  for  the  slaughter  of  the  entire 
American  herd  on  the  Pribyloff  Islands  the  following  season. 
This  very  radical  suggestion  might  be  regarded  as  the  flourish 
of  a  trump  card.  It  probably  was  intended  to  demonstrate 
in  a  striking  manner  the  fact  that  the  United  States  could 
speedily  end  the  controversy  over  the  heads  of  all  concerned, 
and  it  was  thereby  hoped  to  arouse  the  London  foreign  office 
from  its  attitude  of  indifference  toward  the  question  of  the 
seals.     The  measure  seems,  nevertheless,  to  have  been  seri- 


52  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

ously  considered ;  it  actually  passed  the  Lower  House,  though 
it  failed  to  reach  a  vote  in  the  Senate. 

However  discouraging  the  failure  to  gain  English  consent 
to  modify  the  sealing  regulations  for  the  season  of  1897,  a 
hope  still  lingered  that  some  form  of  action  might  yet  be 
taken  by  the  two  governments  during  the  summer  and  au- 
tumn of  1897,  which  would  anticipate  b}'^  one  year  the  revision 
of  the  sealing  laws,  and  spare  the  diminishing  herds  the  last  or 
fifth  season's  (1898)  slaughter.  Mr.  John  W.  Foster  and 
Mr.  Charles  S.  Hamlin,  whose  familiarity  with  the  Bering 
Sea  questions  especially  fitted  them  for  the  duties  involved, 
were  appointed  in  April,  1897,  —  "Seal  Commissioners";  they 
were  instructed  to  bring  about,  if  possible,  and  at  an  early 
date,  a  general  conference  of  delegates  from  the  various 
powers  interested,  to  meet  in  Washington  for  the  purpose  of 
coming  to  some  understanding  and  settlement  of  the  seal 
question.  Russia  and  Japan  promptly  accepted  the  invita- 
tion to  participate  at  such  a  conference,  but  Great  Britain 
demurred.  The  foreign  office  granted  a  willing  consent  to 
a  joint  meeting  of  scientific  experts  to  take  place  in  the 
autumn,  "  in  order  by  due  consideration  of  the  reports  drawn 
up  by  the  said  experts  to  arrive  at  correct  conclusions  respect- 
ing the  condition  of  the  seal  herd  frequenting  the  Pribyloff 
Islands."  It  will  be  remembered  that  Professor  Thomp- 
son and  Dr.  Jordan  were  again  in  the  field  making  final 
observations  upon  the  conditions  of  seal  life,  and  their  return 
to  their  respective  countries  was  expected  in  the  autumn. 
The  British  Government,  however,  was  decidedly  opposed  to 
a  meeting  at  that  time  of  regularly  appointed  diplomatic 
agents  with  plenary  powers  to  make  a  treaty  —  as  it  objected 
to  a  convention  of  agents  whose  admissions  would  be  in  any 
manner  binding  upon  their  governments.  Even  at  such  a 
meeting  of  experts.  Lord  Salisbury  objected  to  the  presence 
of  delegates  from  Russia  or  Japan,  which  nations  he  declared 
had  no  experts  "in  a  position  corresponding  to  that  of  the 
commissioners  who  have  been  carrying  on  their  investiga- 
tions upon  the  Pribyloff  Islands  during  the  past  two  years." 
He   further   asserted  as  a  sufficient   reason   for   the   exclu- 


THE   FUR-SEALS  AND   THE   BERING   SEA  AWARD         53 

sion  of  their  delegates  from  the  proposed  technical  confer- 
ence, that  "  neither  of  the  two  countries  in  question  possess 
any  direct  interest  in  the  herd  frequenting  those  islands " 
(Pribyloff). 

The  folly  .of  seeking  a  settlement  of  the  sealing  ques- 
tion, without  England's  cooperation  was  at  once  recognized. 
The  sympathy  of  third  parties  might  be  grateful,  but  what 
the  United  States  really  desired  was  England's  consent 
to  amend  or  alter  the  conditions  of  a  bad  contract.  The 
British  Government  were  especially  unwilling  to  discuss  the 
merits  or  faults  of  the  regulations  with  Japan  or  Russia,  for 
the  simple  reason  that  neither  of  these  powers  was  in  any 
manner  bound  by  them.  Great  Britain  very  properly  declined, 
furthermore,  to  confer  upon  an  equal  footing  with  parties  out- 
side the  compact.  The  English  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs 
no  doubt  shrewdly  suspected  that  England  would  be  outvoted 
in  the  conferences  where  Russian,  Japanese,  and  American 
interests  would  be  identical  and  likely  opposed  to  those  of 
Great  Britain. 

Upon  the  failure  to  secure  English  cooperation,  the  first 
impulse  of  the  American  commissioners  was  to  abandon  the 
projected  conferences  altogether,  and  to  recall  their  invitations 
from  St.  Petersburg  and  Tokio;  but  the  enthusiasm  which 
was  displayed  by  Russia  and  Japan  in  the  cordial  responses 
of  those  powers  to  the  American  invitation  made  the  with- 
drawal of  the  United  States  from  the  negotiations  extremely 
awkward,  if  not  impossible.  It  was  also  hoped  by  Mr.  Foster 
and  Mr.  Hamlin  that  England  might  yield  at  the  last  moment 
and  send  a  diplomatic  representative  to  the  proposed  conven- 
tion. This  hope  proved  a  disappointment,  fo^the  conference 
opened  in  Washington  (October,  l^^)*  with  the  vacant 
chair  of  the  English  delegate  foreboding  an  impotent  conclu- 
sion to  the  meetings.} 

The  agents  of  the  three  powers  (Russia,  Japan,  and  the 
United  States),  soon  came  to  unanimous  conclusion  that 
under  existing  regulations  the  fur-seals  inhabiting  the  North 
Pacific  Ocean  and  Bering  Sea  were  "  threatened  with  extinc- 
tion, and  that  an  international  agreement  of  all  the  interested 


64  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

powers  is  necessary  for  their  adequate  protection."  To  make 
these  conclusions  more  effective,  the  three  powers  entered  into 
a  written  agreement,  calling  for  an  international  conference 
to  devise  a  new  system  of  laws  for  the  protection  of  the  seals. 
The  agreement  also  prohibited  pelagic  sealing,  so  far  as  their 
own  subjects  were  concerned,  until  such  prospective  regula- 
tions could  be  brought  into  force.  This  convention,  signed 
November  6,  1897,  was  of  course  made  conditional  upon 
the  adherence*of  Great  Britain ;  accordingly  the  instrument 
was  at  once  presented  to  the  British  Government,  with  an 
urgent  plea  for  its  consent  to  become  a  party  thereto. 
(^Without  awaiting  a  reply  from  Great  Britain,  Congress 
passed  a  bill  in  December,  1897,  prohibiting  the  killing  of 
seals  by  American  citizens  in  the  North  Pacific  Ocean,  except 
as  they  may  be  taken  by  the  North  American  Commercial 
Company  on  the  Pribyloff  Islands.^  The  act  also  prohib- 
ited the  importation  of  sealskins  into  the  United  States, 
whether  *'raw,  dressed,  dyed,  or  manufactured,"  except 
under  most  burdensome  conditions.  The  object  of  this  legis- 
lation was  not  only  to  prevent  Americans  from  engaging  in 
pelagic  sealing,  but  also  to  discourage  this  practice  in  others 
by  destroying  the  American  market  for  the  skins.  Its  authors 
no  doubt  hoped  to  force  Great  Britain  into  a  treaty  prohibit- 
ing pelagic  sealing. 

Lord  Salisbury  declined  to  give  his  sanction  to  the  provi- 
sional treaty  of  Russia,  Japan,  and  the  United  States.  He 
wrote  to  Mr.  Hay  (December  23, 1897)  "...  in  the  opinion 
of  Her  Majesty's  Government,  no  useful  purpose  could  be 
served  by  their  taking  into  consideration  at  the  present 
moment  the  question  of  their  adhesion  to  this  convention  "  ; 
and  again  (January  12,  1898),  "It  has  been  the  wish  of 
Her  Majesty's  Government  tliat  an  agreement  should  be 
arrived  at  on  the  seal  fishery  question  as  well  as  on  other 
matters  pending  between  the  United  States  and  Canada,  but 
they  cannot  in  the  present  circumstances  adhere  to  the  con- 
vention, which  would  inflict  a  serious  injury  on  Her  Majesty's 
Canadian  subjects,  and  which  in  their  opinion  is  not  required 
for  the  protection  of  the  seals  in  the  open  sea,  while  it  makes 


THE  FUR-SEALS  AND  THE   BERING   SEA   AWARD         55 

no  provision  for  restricting  the  destruction  of  the  seals  on  the 
Pribilof  Islands  by  the  American  Company." 

The  provisional  treaty,  therefore,  found  an  early  grave  in 
the  waste  basket.  In  the  meanwhile,  however,  events  of 
seemingly  greater  importance  toward  a  final  settlement  of  the 
troublesome  questions  were  transpiring  in  Washington.  Im- 
mediately following  the  conclusion  of  the  convention  between 
the  United  States,  Russia,  and  Japan,  the  proposed  joint  meet- 
ing of  the  English,  Canadian,  and  American  scientific  experts 
took  place  (November  18,  1897).  At  this  auspicious  meet- 
ing, the  scientists  were  enabled  to  agree,  and  the  resulting 
joint  statement  of  their  conclusions  in  regard  to  sealing  con- 
ditions promised  well  for  future  successful  negotiations  with 
Great  Britain.  At  last  there  was  a  common  basis  of  fact 
upon  which  the  two  nations  could  stand  in  their  deliberations 
for  a  new  set  of  regulations.  Most  important  of  all  for  Amer- 
ican interests,  these  conclusions  of  the  experts  virtually  sus- 
tained the  American  position,  calling  for  the  very  remedial 
measures  which  the  United  States  Government  had  been 
striving  to  bring  about  for  four  years.  The  commissioners 
agreed  that  there  was  ample  evidence  since  the  year  1884 
vhat  the  fur-seal  herd  of  the  Pribyloff  Islands  had  declined 
I  -eatly  in  numbers,  but  at  a  varying  rate  from  year  to  year  ; 
>  t  from  given  data,  the  former  yield  of  the  islands  was 
from  three  to  five  times  as  great  as  in  1896  and  1897  ;  that 
the  death  among  the  young  fur-seals  was  very  great ;  that 
actual  count  of  these  and  of  the  females  upon  the  islands  con- 
firms the  belief  in  the  diminution  of  the  herd  ;  that  a  marked 
decrease  was  to  be  noted  in  the  twelve  months  from  1896  to 
1897  ;  that  the  method  of  driving  and  killing  practised  on 
the  islands  by  the  American  Chartered  Company  calls  for  no 
criticism  or  objection  ;  that  pelagic  sealing  involves  the  kill- 
ing of  males  and  females  alike  ;  that  the  reduction  of  males 
effected  on  the  islands  causes  an  enhanced  proportion  of  fe- 
males to  be  found  in  the  pelagic  catch  (62  to  84  per  cent)  ; 
that  a  large  proportion  of  females  in  the  pelagic  catch  includes 
not  only  adult  females,  both  nursing  and  pregnant,  but  also 
young  seals  ;  that  the  polygamous  habit  of  the  animal  coupled 


56  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

with  an  equal  birth-rate  of  the  two  sexes  permits  a  large  num- 
ber of  males  to  be  removed  with  impunity  from  the  herd  ; 
that  the  killing  of  females  far  in  excess  of  the  natural  yearly- 
increment  is  the  cause  of  the  reduction  of  the  herd  ;  that 
actual  extermination  of  the  herd  is  not  threatened  so  long  as 
the  seals  are  protected  on  the  island  ;  that  the  diminution  of 
the  herd  had  already  reached  the  point  when  the  sealing  in- 
dustry either  at  sea  or  on  the  islands  had  become  unprofitable. 

Sir  Wilfred  Laurier,  the  Canadian  Premier,  and  Sir  Louis 
Davies,  Minister  of  Marine  from  Ottawa,  happened  in  Wash- 
ington during  the  course  of  the  meetings  of  the  seal  experts. 
Negotiations  of  an  informal  character  were  then  and  there 
entered  upon  with  them  for  the  purpose  of  temporarily  set- 
tling the  sealing  question  upon  the  basis  of  the  joint  findings 
of  the  scientific  commission,  the  object  being  to  bring  about 
as  soon  as  possible  a  formal  consideration  of  the  question  by 
the  British  and  the  United  States  Governments.  Mr.  Foster's 
proposal,  however,  for  a  modus  vivendi  "  providing  for  a  com- 
plete suspension  of  the  killing  of  seals  in  all  the  waters  of  the 
Pacific  Ocean  and  Bering  Sea  for  one  year  from  December,  1 897, 
and  for  a  suspension  of  all  killing  of  seals  on  the  Pribyloff  Islands 
for  the  same  period,"  was  not  favorably  received  by  the  Cana- 
dians. "  There  are  difficulties  in  agreeing  to  that  proposition 
which  I  fear  will  be  found  insuperable,"  wrote  Sir  Wilfred  Lau- 
rier to  Mr.  Foster.  "  The  fleet  is  preparing  as  usual ;  the  pro- 
hibition of  pelagic  sealing  for  a  year  would  practically  destroy 
the  business  for  several  years,  because  the  mastei-s,  the  mates, 
and  the  crews,  for  the  larger  part  belonging  to  other  parts 
of  Canada,  would  leave  British  Columbia.  The  sum  which 
would  likely  be  demanded  as  compensation  is  far  beyond 
what  it  would  be  possible  for  us  to  induce  Parliament  to  vote, 
even  if  we  could  recommend  it.  .  .  .  I  am  in  hopes  that 
you  will  not  press  for  the  immediate  suspension  of  pelagic 
sealing."  So  these  efforts  toward  a  preliminary  discussion 
of  the  regulation  proved  after  all  to  be  fruitless. 

This  last  attempt,  like  the  many  others  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States  to  induce  Great  Britain  to  modify  the  Paris 
sealing  regulations  of  1893  before  the  end  of  the  stipulated 


THE   FUR-SEALS   AND   THE   BERING  SEA  AWARD         57 

five  years,  having  failed,  the  Secretary  of  State  had  no  alterna- 
tive but  to  fall  back  upon  the  five-year  clause  in  the  award. 
(^The  sealing  season  of  1898,  the  fiftli  and  last  under  the  Paris 
regulations,  was  entered  upon  with  no  change  in  the  laws.  :■ 

Mr.  Sherman  wrote  to  Sir  Julian  Pauncefote  February  1, 
1898:  "The  President  has  learned  with  deep  regret  that 
the  British  Government  has  declined  to  adhere  to  the  pro- 
visional convention  and  has  shown  an  indisposition  to  agree 
to  any  appropriate  measures  for  the  suspension  of  the  killing 
of  seals  for  the  current  season.  He  has  therefore  directed 
me  to  bring  to  your  attention  the  provision  of  the  award  of 
the  Paris  Tribunal  of  1893,  which  fixes  the  period  when  the 
regulations  adopted  by  that  tribunal  should  be  subjected  to  a 
revision,  and  to  ask  that  an  arrangement  be  agreed  upon  with 
as  little  delay  as  possible  for  such  revision." 

The  sealing  season  of  1898  being  the  fifth  and  last  under 
the  regulations.  Great  Britain  at  length  consented  to  a  review 
of  the  laws,  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  award. 
Instead,  however,  of  conducting  the  negotiations  directly 
between  the  two  powers,  it  was  determined  by  mutual  agree-  l/^ 
ment  to  carry  on  proceedings  between  Washington  and 
Ottawa,  Canada  assuming  the  responsibility  of  protecting  her 
own  interests. 

As  an  outgrowth  of  the  visit  of  the  Canadian  Premier  to 
Washington  in  the  autumn  of  1897,  a  plan  was  discussed  for 
a  joint  Canadian  and  American  commission  whose  members 
should  be  appointed  by  the  executive  branches  of  the  two 
governments.  It  was  proposed  to  place  before  this  com- 
mission the  numerous  subjects  of  controversy  which  had 
arisen  between  the  Dominion  and  the  United  States.  One 
of  the  most  important  subjects  was  the  sealing  question,  in- 
volving the  adoption  of  a  new  set  of  regulations.  The 
scheme  was  favorably  received  by  both  parties,  and  an  agree- 
ment was  signed  in  Washington  on  May  30,  1898,  for  the 
creation  of  the  commission ;  its  members  were  announced  in 
July,  and  the  first  meetings  were  held  in  Quebec  the  follow- 
ing August.  In  October  the  commission  adjourned  to  reas- 
semble  in  Washington  on  November  1 ;  sessions  were  then 


58  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

continued,  with  some  slight  interruptions,  into  the  early- 
spring  of  1899,  when  a  further  adjournment  was  made  to 
the  following  summer.  The  meetings,  however,  were  never 
resumed. 

Unfortunately,  the  subject  of  pelagic  sealing  soon  became 
involved  in  the  adjustment  of  other  important  questions  be- 
fore the  commission.  An  idea  was  at  first  entertained  that 
the  United  States  might  do  well  to  purchase  from  the  Cana- 
dian sealers  their  entire  outfits,  and  thus  nullify  the  very 
pertinent  argument  of  the  Canadians  that  complete  cessation 
of  pelagic  sealing  would  bring  financial  ruin  to  a  number  of 
British  subjects  who  had  already  invested  their  capital  in 
vessels  and  in  the  paraphernalia  needed  for  catching  seals 
in  the  open  sea.  This  plan,  however,  was  rejected,  and 
another  method  of  settlement  had  to  be  sought. 

The  most  important  question  before  the  commission,  and 
the  one  which  presented  the  most  stubborn  difficulties,  was 
that  of  commercial  reciprocity.  The  Canadian  agents  were 
quick  to  seize  upon  the  opportunity  of  securing  a  good  bar- 
gain through  the  eagerness  of  the  United  States  to  secure  laws 
absolutely  prohibiting  pelagic  sealing.  Accordingly,  they 
valued  their  "  concession  "  in  this  respect  the  more  highly, 
and  demanded  in  return  what  appeared  to  the  Americans 
to  be  an  unreasonably  large  price  in  the  shape  of  a  free  list 
of  American  importations  from  Canada.  The  more  this 
question  was  discussed,  the  more  hopeless  of  solution  it  ap- 
peared to  be.  Finally  the  commission  encountered  an  unsur-i 
mountable  obstacle  to  all  negotiations  in  the  Alaska  boundary' 
dispute;  when  adjournment  took  place  (February,  1899),  the 
Bering  Sea  question  —  as,  indeed,  all  the  other  issues  before 
the  board  —  were  left  entirely  unsettled. 

It  will  be  recalled  that  one  of  the  points  of  disagreement 
between  the  two  powers  in  framing  the  Washington  conven- 
tion of  February  29,  1892,  had  been  in  the  matter  of  British 
claims  against  the  United  States  for  the  seizure  and  con- 
demnation of  Canadian  vessels  in  Bering  Sea.  In  1886-87, 
when  the  evils  of  pelagic  sealing  were  first  noticed  by  the 
United  States  Government,  a  number  of  vessels  hailing  from 


THE  FUR-SEALS  AND   THE   BERING   SEA  AWARD         59 

British  Columbian  ports  were  seized,  through  orders  from 
Washington,  by  American  revenue  cutters,  and  afterward 
condemned  in  libel  proceedings  at  Sitka.  These  captures 
had  been  made  in  what  their  masters  maintained  to  be  the 
open  high  seas,  —  i.e.  outside  the  ordinary  three-mile  limit 
of  marine  jurisdiction.  The  case  of  the  sealing  schooner 
W.  P.  Sayward  was  appealed  by  her  owners,  and  eventually 
reached  the  United  States  Supreme  Court,  where,  as  a  test  case 
for  all  the  other  vessels  similarly  libelled,  it  was  expected  to 
obtain  a  definition  of  the  term,  "high  seas."  The  case  was 
dismissed  in  Washington  upon  a  technicality,  and  no  decision 
upon  its  merits  was  rendered.  The  owners  of  the  condemned 
vessels  were,  nevertheless,  determined  to  obtain  redress,  and 
the  matter  of  damages  for  wrongful  seizure  and  confiscation 
by  the  United  States  authorities  having  been  taken  up  by 
the  British  Government,  the  question  drifted  into  diplomatic 
channels  and  became  a  part  of  the  greater  "  Bering  Sea  con- 
troversy." 

When  it  was  finally  agreed  to  arbitrate  the  whole  ques- 
tion, the  claims  of  these  Canadian  shipowners  naturally 
came  forward  for  recognition  by  the  tribunal.  In  the  con- 
vention of  February  29, 1892,  with  Great  Britain,  —  in  which 
the  jurisdictional  rights  of  the  United  States  in  Bering  Sea. 
waters  were  submitted  to  a  tribunal  of  arbitration,  —  it  was 
stipulated  that  either  party  might  submit  to  the  arbitrators 
any  question  of  fact  "  involved  in  said  claims  and  ask  for  a 
finding  thereon."  The  question  of  the  amount  of  liability 
of  either  government  on  the  facts  found  was,  however,  left 
subject  to  further  negotiations. 

The  British  agents  accordingly  presented  to  the  arbitrators 
at  Paris  all  the  facts  in  connection  with  the  confiscation  by 
the  United  States  of  the  Canadian  sealing  vessels.  These 
facts,  which  gave  the  exact  locality  of  each  vessel  when 
captured,  its  distance  from  shore,  the  number  of  skins 
on  board,  etc.,  were  agreed  to  by  the  United  States  agents, 
and  the  arbitrators  unanimously  found  the  same  to  be  true. 
With  the  facts  in  each  particular  case  thus  accepted  by  both 
the  British  and  the  American  agents,  and  the  jurisdiction  of 

^         OF  TMr     ^P^ 


60  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

the  United  States  in  Bering  Sea  having  been  limited  by  de- 
cision of  the  tribunal  to  the  ordinary  zone  of  territorial 
waters,  the  seizure  of  these  vessels  outside  of  such  territorial 
waters  stood  acknowledged  as  illegal;  the  United  States 
could  therefore  no  longer  evade  the  liability  for  damages  to 
their  owners.  The  only  question  left  to  decide  was  the 
amount  of  compensation  (iue. 

The  following  year  (1894),  the  Secretarj^  of  State,  Mr. 
Gresham,  signed  an  agreement  with  the  Canadian  authorities 
to  pay  to  them  the  lump  sum  of  f  425,000  in  satisfaction  of 
these  claims,  but  Congress  refused  to  appropriate  the  money, 
notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  full  British  claim  amounted 
to  about  1850,000. 

During  1895-96  efforts  were  continued  to  fix  the  amount  of 
compensation  due  satisfactorily  to  both  sides.  A  treaty 
between  Great  Britian  and  the  United  States  was  finally 
signed  in  February  of  the  latter  year,  providing  for  the 
appointment  of  a  tribunal  to  adjudicate  upon  all  these  claims. 
It  was  to  be  composed  of  two  members,  —  a  Canadian  and  an 
American,  and,  in  case  of  disagreement,  a  third  and  neutral 
member  was  to  be  called  in  as  umpire.  William  L.  Putnam 
of  Portland,  Maine,  Judge  of  the  First  Judicial  Circuit  of 
the  United  States,  was  chosen  by  the  President  as  commis- 
sioner on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  and  George  E.  King, 
a  Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Canada,  was  likewise 
selected  at  Ottawa. 

The  commission  met  in  Victoria,  B.  C,  and  later  in  San 
Francisco,  where  testimony  was  received  orally  as  in  open 
court.  No  umpire  was  found  necessary,  and  in  December, 
1897,  the  commissioners  submitted  their  joint  report  to  their 
respective  governments,  their  award  being  final.  The  total 
amount  of  damages  to  be  paid  by  the  United  States  to  the 
injured  shipowners  was  placed  at  $473,151.26.  In  finding 
this  sum,  the  commissioners  included  not  only  the  value 
of  the  vessels,  their  outfits  and  the  skins  confiscated,  but 
also  the  value  of  the  probable  catch  which  would  have  been 
made  had  not  the  vessels  been  prevented  from  continuing 
their  operations  throughout  the  sealing  season.     Each  vessel 


THE   FUR-SEALS  AND  THE   BERING   SEA  AWARD         61 

estimated  a  prospective  catch  of  3500  to  5000  skins  at  a  value 
from  $3.50  to  $12.50  each.  On  June  14, 1898,  a  joint  reso- 
lution of  Congress  appropriated  the  sum  of  $473,151.26  to 
pay  the  award,  and  two  days  later,  the  Assistant  Secretary 
of  State,  Judge  Day,  delivered  a  check  upon  the  Treasury 
to  Sir  Julian  Pauncefote.  Thus  closed  in  amity  the  question 
of  the  Bering  Sea  claims. 

Deep  regret  was  felt  that  the  Joint  High  Commission  had 
been  unable  to  frame  a  new  set  of  regulations.  Under  the 
five  years'  regulations  of  the  Paris  award,  the  seals  were 
to  a  certain  extent  protected,  although  that  protection  was 
admittedly  inadequate  to  preserve  the  herd;  but  since  the 
termination  of  those  laws  and  the  failure  of  the  Canadian 
commission  to  create  new  ones,  the  seals  have  been  left 
wholly  and  absolutely  without  protection  while  in  the  sea ; 
the  same  distressing  conditions  which  existed  in  Bering 
Sea  before  1894  prevail  once  more.  During  *  the  season 
of  1899  and  the  season  of  1900  pelagic  sealing  was  and  is 
to-day  free  to  all  without  let  or  hindrance. 

If  the  seals  were  in  danger  of  extermination,  even  under 
the  protecting  laws  of  the  Paris  award,  as  is  generally 
believed  to  have  been  the  case,  that  danger  must  now  be 
vastly  increased  since  all  restrictions  have  been  removed. 
Now,  still  further  to  aggravate  the  situation,  while  Canadian 
vessels  are  accorded  perfect  freedom  to  kill  seals  in  Bering 
Sea  waters,  American  vessels  are  barred  from  all  partici- 
pation in  pelagic  sealing.  The  laws  to  this  effect  passed  by 
Congress  in  the  winter  of  1897  remain  in  force,  and  thus,  in 
the  final  slaughter  which  is  promised,  the  Canadians  will  reap 
all  the  profits. 

The  herd  had  become  so  diminished  in  numbers  in  1898 
that  the  industry  for  that  year  was  quite  unprofitable.  The 
Canadian  sealing  fleet  of  1899  ^  was  smaller  than  that  of  the 
previous  season,  but  considering  the  depletion  of  the  herd,  an 
alarmingly  large  catch  of  seals  was  made.^  A  larger  fleet 
sailed  last  year,^  and  the  outlook  for  the  present  season  is  a 

1  Twenty-six  British  vessels.  2  35,346  ;  55%  females. 

8  33  British  vessels.     Catch  35,191,  with  a  large  excess  of  females. 


62  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

discouraging  one.  Apparently  nothing  can  be  done  to  save 
the  animals  from  total  extinction.  Could  the  industry 
be  properly  regulated,  there  is  said  to  be  no  doubt  that  it 
might  flourish  for  all  time.  But  the  seals  belong  to  no  one 
when  outside  the  ordinary  limits  of  marine  jurisdiction,  and 
the  high  seas  must  be  free  to  all.  There  is  no  legal  remedy. 
Possibly  a  balance  will  be  found,  and  the  yearly  diminution 
of  seals  will  cause  a  corresponding  falling  off  of  hunters, 
as  pelagic  operations  become  less  renumerative.  But  the 
chances  are  strongly  in  favor  of  a  total  destruction  of  the 
herd  within  a  few  years,  unless  some  immediate  understand- 
ing can  be  had  with  Great  Britain  to  check  the  onslaught. 

The  American  company  on  the  Pribyloff  Islands  took  in 
1899  and  1900,  16,812  and  22,470  skins  respectively,  the  in- 
crease in  1900  indicating  a  desire  to  gain  as  much  as  possible 
from  a  dying  industry. 

In  consequence  of  the  unequal  laws  governing  their  opera- 
tions, American  pelagic  sealing  vessels  have  been  driven 
from  the  field.  Danger  of  further  conflicts  in  Bering  Sea  is 
lessened,  but  the  unjust  conditions  which  are  imposed  upon 
the  Americans  remain  as  a  sequel  to  the  closing  of  a  diplo- 
matic incident  which  from  first  to  last  has  been  disastrous  to 
American  interests. 


II 

THE  INTEEOCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM 


r' 


II 

THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM 

The  problem  of  interoceanic  communication  at  some  Cen- 
tral American  point  is  by  no  means  a  new  one,  as  it  finds  its 
origin  in  the  ye ry  causes  that  led  to  the  discovery  of  America. 
The  repeated  voyages  of  Columbus  were  for  the  purpose  of 
finding  an  open  waterway  to  the  East  Indies.  The  early 
Spanish  navigators  explored  every  bay  and  cove  and  ascended 
every  river  of  Central  and  South  America,  in  the  hope  of 
discovering  a  passage  through  which  their  vessels  might  reach 
those  lands  of  boundless  wealth  of  which  Marco  Polo  had 
given  account.  Their  object  was  to  find  a  short  and  direct 
route  "  from  Cadiz  to  Cathay."  Since  the  days  of  the  earliest 
explorers,  the  history  of  Central  America  has  been  closely 
associated  with  this  question  of  an  interoceanic  waterway,  — 
first,  to  discover  the  natural  one,  if  it  existed,  and  in  its 
absence,  to  construct  an  artificial  one. 

A  wagon  road  across  the  isthmus  from  Porto  Bello  to 
Panama  was  constructed  early  in  the  sixteenth  century  for 
transportation  to  and  from  the  "  El  Dorado "  that  Pizarro 
had  discovered  in  Peru ;  indeed,  as  early  as  1530,  Pedrarias 
Davila,  governor  of  Nicaragua,  wishing  to  divert  the  transit 
trade  of  Peru  from  Panama  to  his  own  flourishing  colony, 
conceived  the  plan  of  constructing  short  canals  about  the 
rapids  of  the  San  Juan  River,  in  order  to  make  a  waterway 
between  the  "  North  "  and  "  South  "  seas.  The  possibili- 
ties and  advantages  of  this  open  water  connection  between 
the  great  oceans  was  also  thoroughly  appreciated  by  the 
Spanish  home  authorities,  for  Charles  V  of  Spain,  in  1536, 
ordered  an  exploration  of  the  Chagres  River  (at  Colon)  for 
the  purpose  of  ascertaining  whether  a  ship  canal  could  be 
practically  substituted  for  the  wagon  road ;  and  Philip  II,  ia 
r  65 


66  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

1561,  sent  his  engineer  to  explore  Nicaragua  for  the  same 
purpose. 

From  the  earliest  days  of  Spanish  discovery  and  settlement 
in  Central  America,  down  to  the  present  moment,  canal 
schemes  have  originated,  flourished,  and  died.  Although 
never  quite  abandoned,  they  have  at  various  times  been  laid 
aside,  —  as  during  the  times  of  struggle  between  Spain  and 
the  English  freebooters  in  the  West  Indies,  times  when 
pirates  roamed  the  seas  and  infested  the  lagoons  of  the  main- 
land, and  marauding  expeditions  laid  waste  the  towns  along 
these  coasts.  But  whenever  a  lull  in  hostilities  occurred, 
Spanish  interest  in  the  great  canal  was  sure  to  spring  up 
anew,  to  be  followed  by  further  investigations  and  new  pro- 
jects. These  earlier  efforts,  however,  amounted  to  very 
little,  practically. 

With  the  decline  of  Spanish  power  and  influence,  other 
nations  became  interested  in  this  fascinating  canal  problem, 
notably  Holland^  Belgium,  France,  England,  and  finally  the 
United  States.  Volumes  of  maps  and  descriptions  of  favored 
routes  have  been  filed  away  in  government  archives  and^  in 
the  records  of  private  companies,  among  which  are  great 
numbers  of  extravagant  statements  concerning  the  wonderful 
topographical  advantages  offered  by  various  favored  sections, 
along  with  astonishingly  cheap  calculations  for  canal  con- 
struction. 

It  would  be  useless  to  the  purpose  of  this  review  to  ex- 
amine all  the  numerous  schemes  for  the  building  of  isthmian 
canals  from  the  beginning  of  the  sixteenth  century.  Suffice 
it  to  say,  they  furnish  a  history  of  failure  and  blighted  hopes. 
It  might  not  be  uninteresting,  however,  before  proceeding  to 
the  political  and  diplomatic  history  of  the  United  States  in  con- 
nection with  this  canal  problem,  to  make  brief  reference  to  some 
of  the  more  prominent  isthmian  canal  schemes  which  have 
been  projected  during  the  present  century. 

No  less  than  eight  routes  of  supposed  practicability  have 
claimed  the  attention  and  approval  of  engineers  and  those 
interested  in  the  construction  of  a  waterway  across  Central 
America.     The  six  important  ones  are :  — 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM         67 

I.  The  '^ehuantepec  Route.  The  isthmus  of  Tehuantepec 
forms  the  narrowest  portion  of  Mexico,  it  being  about  150 
miles  across,  from  ocean  to  ocean.  Cortez  established  a  line 
of  transit  at  this  point,  which  was  maintained  for  a  number 
of  years ;  but  it  subsequently  yielded  in  favor  to  the  admitted 
superiority  of  the  Nicaragua  route.  As  early  as  1550,  Galveo, 
a  Portuguese  navigator,  declared  the  Tehuantepec  route  a 
feasible  one,  and  urged  Philip  of  Spain  to  consider  it.  No 
further  notice  seems  to  have  been  taken  of  it  until  about  1770, 
when  Charles  III  of  Spain  ordered  the  viceroy  of  Mexico  to 
locate  a  site  for  a  canal  across  this  isthmus.  The  result  of 
the  viceroy's  survey  was  discouraging,  and  the  plan  there- 
after was  abandoned  as  unfeasible. 

II.  The  Nicaragua  Route.  This  leads  from  the  mouth  of 
the  San  Juan  River  to  Lake  Nicaragua,  thence  by  several 
proposed  lines  (preferably  by  way  of  Brito)  to  the  Pacific 
Ocean,  a  distance  of  169 J  miles.  Of  all  possible  routes,  this 
seems  to  have  claimed  the  most  favorable  attention  of  Ameri- 
can engineers.  It  is  said  to  possess  the  best  conditions  for 
the  location  of^a  lock-system  canal,  chief  of  which  is  the 
existence  of  Lake  Nicaragua,  which,  with  portions  of  its  out- 
let (the  San  Juan  River),  provides  many  miles  of  natural 
waterway,  and  an  abundant  and  constant  supply  of  water  for 
the  locks.  The  climatic  conditions  of  this  locality  are  also 
excellent.  It  is  not  unlikely  that  Philip  of  Spain  would  have 
here  attempted  the  work  of  canal  construction  in  1567,  which, 
in  those  days,  would  have  been  a  labor  of  Hercules,  had  not 
political  complications  at  home  diverted  his  attention  from 
his  ambition  across  the  sea. 

La  Condamine,  the  eminent  French  scientist,  who,  with  a 
■corps  of  able  ingenieurs^  was  sent  by  his  government  (in 
1735)  to  South  America  for  the  purpose  of  conducting  certain 
astronomical  observations,  made  an  examination  of  Lake 
Nicaragua  and  its  outlet.  He  became  much  impressed  with 
the  many  advantages  this  route  offered  for  the  construction 
of  a  canal,  and  so  reported  to  his  government,  but  France 
was  not  then  ready  to  undertake  so  great  a  project.  England 
.seems  always  to  have  recognized  the  value  of  this  route, 


68  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

and  for  two  centuries  persistently  sought  and  held  territory 
near  the  mouth  of  the  San  Juan  River,  while  American  impr- 
est has  always  been  especially  alive  to  its  feasibility  and 
importance. 

III.  The  Panama  Route  from  Colon,  or  Aspinwall,  on 
the  Caribbean  Sea,  to  Panama  on  the  Pacific. 

IV.  The  San  Bias  Route  from  the  Harbor  of  San  Bias  to- 
the  mouth  of  the  Rio  Chepo  on  the  Pacific. 

V.  The  Caledonian  Route,  across  the  isthmus  of  Darien,. 
frdii  Caledonian  Bay  on  the  Atlantic  side  to  the  Gulf  of  San 
Miguel.  This  is  the  narrowest  point  of  land  separating  the 
great  oceans  to  be  found  between  the  arctic  circle  and  Cape- 
Horn. 

To  the  Panama  Route  nature  has  contributed  much 
toward  the  possibility  of  constructing  the  work.  There  is^ 
here  a  depression  in  the  mountain  range,  the  great  Cordillera 
of  the  Americas,  furnishing  a  pass  only  284  feet  above  the- 
tide.  The  distance  from  sea  to  sea  is  scarcely  fifty  miles^ 
and  there  are  suitable  harbors  on  either  side.  The  ad- 
vantages of  a  canal  operated  throughout  upon  sea  levels, 
thus  avoiding  the  complications  and  inconveniences  of  locks^ 
are  so  very  great  that  one  turns  away  from  Panama  with 
reluctance.  One  is  inclined  to  hope  that  modern  scientific- 
ingenuity  may  yet  find  means  to  surmount  tlie  obstacles  pre- 
sented by  the  floods  of  the  Chagres  River,  the  yielding  sands- 
and  soils  of  the  isthmus,  and  the  deadly  climate  of  Colon 
and  Panama.  The  other  two  routes  near  Panama  were  once- 
supposed  to  be  practicable,  but  careful  surveys  by  more  accu- 
rate or  less  partial  engineei-s  have  demonstrated  the  fact  that 
the  mountain  ranges  crossing  them  present  almost  insur- 
mountable barriers  against  the  construction  of  a  canal. 

VI.  The  Atrato  Route.  The  Atrato  River  has  its  rise  in- 
Colombia,  on  the  eastern  slope  of  the  Andes,  and  flows  north 
about  two  hundred  miles,  close  to  the  foot  of  this  great  range 
of  mountains,  finally  debouching  into  the  Gulf  of  Darien. 
So  fearful  was  Philip  II  of  Spain  that  the  Atrato  River  might 
furnish  to  his  enemies  the  coveted  opening  to  the  Pacific,  and 
thereby  destroy  the  profits  of  his  carrying  trade  by  wagon  road 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM        69 

across  the  Panama  route  to  Peru,  that  he  issued,  in  1542,  a 
royal  order,  imposing  the  penalty  of  death  upon  any  one 
who  should  attempt  to  enter  that  river.  A  veil  of  profound 
mystery  long  enveloped  this  region,  and  for  upward  of  two 
centuries  tradition  gilded  the  unknown  with  its  usual 
magnificence.  This  most  alluring  river  of  the  Atrato  is 
separated  from  the  Pacific  Ocean,  along  its  entire  course,  by 
a  mere  strip  of  land.  This  land,  however,  is  the  Cordillera, 
or  summit  of  the  Andes,  and  although  it  is  furrowed  on 
the  eastern  side  by  numerous  streams  tributary  to  the 
Atrato,  the  explorer  has  always  been  confronted,  at  the 
sources  of  these  tributaries,  by  towering  walls  and  implass- 
able  heights.  This,  therefore,  has  been  a  region  of  brilliant 
promise  and  of  sad  disappointment. 

Each  of  these  routes  possesses  its  own  good  and  bad  fea- 
tures, its  own  peculiar  advantages  and  disadvantages.  Careful 
surveys  of  them  all,  made  in  the  light  of  modern  scientific 
methods,  together  with  comparisons  of  their  orographic, 
hydrographic,  and  climatic  conditions  have  resulted  substan- 
tially in  the  rejection  of  all  except  two  from  the  list  of  practical 
possibilities.    These  two  are  the  Panama  and  Nicaragua  routes. 

The  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century  found  Alexan- 
der von  Humboldt  making  a  critical  examination  of  the 
various  Central  American  routes.  He  discussed  them  at 
length  in  his  "Personal  Narrative  of  Travels,"  giving  par- 
ticular emphasis  to  the  superior  advantages  offered  by  the 
Nicaragua  route.  Humboldt  contributed  to  the  world's 
knowledge  the  first  valuable  information,  from  a  scientific 
point  of  view,  concerning  this  route ;  his  conclusions  so  in- 
spired the  Spanish  Cortez  that  it  passed  a  decree  for  the 
immediate  construction  of  a  canal  through  Central  America. 
Spain's  power  and  influence  in  the  Western  Hemisphere, 
however,  had  by  this  time  become  far  too  feeble  to  carry  out 
any  such  undertaking,  and  this  last  spasmodic  effort  to 
awaken  her  spirit  of  achievement  in  the  New  World  expired 
almost  with  its  conception. 

By  the  year  1824,  all  of  the  Spanish- American  colonies 
had   secured  their  political   freedom   from    Spain,  and  had 


70  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

established  themselves  as  free  and  independent  republics,  and 
those  whose  geographical  position  and  topography  warranted 
them  in  so  doing  stood  ready  to  enter  into  treaty  relations 
with  any  foreign  power  thought  to  be  able  and  willing  to 
construct  an  interoceanic  canal  within  their  borders.  The 
United  States  had,  at  this  time,  reached  a  point  in  its  national 
existence  when  the  entire  attention  of  its  government  was 
no  longer  confined  to  matters  purely  internal  and  domestic. 
For  the  first  time  it  was  then  ready  to  consider  the  subject 
of  connecting  the  oceans  at  some  favorable  point  between 
North  and  South  America.  The  Manama  Congress,  which 
had  been  called  to  meet  in  June,  1826,  had  for  one  of  its 
objects  the  discussion  of  this  canal  scheme,  and  the  attention 
of  Mr.  Clay,  the  American  Secretary  of  State,  was  specially 
directed  to  the  importance  of  the  question.  Perhaps  Amen- 
can  activity  was  somewhat  stimulated  by  the  fact  that  at  the 
sanTe  tifrie  British  influence  was  at  work  in  Nicaragua,  seek- 
ing concessions  for  canal-building  purposes. 

A  company  was  quickly  formed  in  New  York,  called  the 
"Central  American  and  United  States  Atlantic  and  Pacific 
Canal  CoinjiinN ."  Encouraged  by  an  Act  of  Congress,  this 
company  set  earnestly  to  work  to  present  its  bids  for  obtain- 
ing a  concession  from  Nicaragua  before  the  English  company 
could  anticipate  it  and  get  firmly  located  in  the  field.  Suc- 
ceeding in  obtaining  its  concession,  the  American  company 
signed  a  contract  in  1826,  with  the  Government  of  the  Central 
American  Confederation,  to  construct  a  canal  through  Nica- 
ragua "  for  vessels  of  the  largest  burden  possible."  Estimates 
of  cost  did  not  exceed  •i'5,000,000.  Great  interest  was  excited 
in  the  United  States  and  in  Central  America,  but  owing  to  a 
lack  of  funds  necessary  to  the  undertaking  of  so  very  large 
an  enterprise,  this,  the  first  American  effort  to  construct  an 
isthmian  canal,  served  but  to  add  one  more  example  to  the 
long  record  of  failures  and  disappointments. 

In  1830  the  king  ot  Holland,  at  the  head  of  a  Dutch  canal 
company,  secured  f  rornN  icaragua  an  exceedingly  liberal  con- 
cession, so  liberal,  indeed,  that  it  called  from  President  Jack- 
son a  strongly  worded  protest,  predicated  chiefly  on  those 


\,    THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM        71 

political  principles  so  recently  enunciated  in  the  celebrated  / 
"  Monroe  Doctrine." 

^  Following  the  failure  of  the  Dutch  company,  which  was 
immediate  and  complete,  a  number  of  less  pretentious  efforts 
on  the  part  of  American,  English,  and  French  companies  ap- 
pear and  disappear  in  rapid  succession  in  both  Nicaragua  and 
Panama.  The  interest  of  Louis  Napoleon,  then  a  prisoner  at 
Ham,  seems  to  have  been  keenly  aroused  to  the  importance 
of  the  question.  He  organized  a  company  known  as  ''La 
Canal  Napoleone  de  Nicaragua,"  and  in  1846  published  a  para-  ! 
phlet  advocating  the  Nicaragua  route,  which  remains  to-day  I 
as  a  sort  of  exclamation  mark  in  the  history  of  the  canal.  Its 
publication  aroused  new  interest  in  Europe,  and  at  the  time 
brought  to  its  author  much  reputation  for  practical  states- 
manship. Napoleon  was  forced,  however,  to  bide  his  time ; 
but  his  opportunity  he  supposed  had  come  at.  last,  when  from 
his  imperial  throne  in  Paris  he  watched  with  satisfaction  the 
gathering  of  the  war  clouds  in  the  United  States.  When 
the  storm  of  civil  strife  had  threatened  the  disruption 
of  the  Union,  he  undertook  the  task  of  overthrowing  the  re- 
publican institutions  of  Mexico  and  establishing  in  their  place 
a  government  dependent  on  France,  which  would  be  at  the 
same  time  an  ally,  offensive  and  defensive,  of  the  Confederate 
States  of  America.  In  this  delusive  dream  his  fancy  had 
sketched  the  dismemberment  of  the  American  Republic,  the 
aggrandizement  of  imperial  France,  and  a  final  subjection  of 
Western  interests  to  the  domination  and  control  of  Europe. 
The  overthrow  of  the  Sou  them  jre  volt  prevented  the  possibil- 
ity of  success,  and  his  splendid  revery  was  forever  dispelled 
by  the  fortunes  of  war  at  Sedan.  The  building  of  a  French 
canal  through  Nicaragua  was  probably  but  a  small  part  of 
Napoleon's  great  Western  project. 

About  the  year  1850  considerable  enthusiasm  was  aroused 
in  Europe,  and  especially  in  France,  over  the  report  of  certain 
explorers  in  the  lower  isthmus.     At  one  time  there  were 

i  4»three  parties  of  engineers  (American,  English,  and  French) 
struggling  in  the  pestilential   jungles  and  morasses  below 

I    Panama  in  search  of  reported  but  imaginary  depressions  ia 


72  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

the  mountains.  The  English  and  American  surveybrs  left 
the  region  in  disgust,  but  the  French  company,  encouraged 
by  the  Societe  de  L'Etude  of  Paris,  and  ^by  popular  enthusi- 
asm at  home,  continued  to  make  investigations  along  the 
lines  of  the  Caledonian  and  San  Bias  routes.  Between  1850 
and  1855,  a  wealthy  American,  Mr.  Kelly,  who  was  charmed 
by  the  mysteries  of  the  Atrato  RiverTspent  a  fortune  in  making 
a  reconnaissance  of  this  region.  The  result  of  this  active 
exploration  of  the  lower  isthmus  during  the  yeai-s  1850-55 
was  to  place  the  Atrato,  the  Caledonian,  and  the  San  Bla& 
routes  outside  the  limits  of  practical  canal  possibilities. 

The  "  Central  American  and  United  States  Atlantic  and 
Pacific  Canal  Company,"  launched  with  flying  colors,  and 
doomed  to  disappointment,  was  succeeded  twenty-two  years 
later  by  "  The  American  Atlantic  and  Pacific  Ship  Canal  Com- 
pany," which  was  organized  in  New  York,  with  Cornelius 
Vanderbilt  at  its  head.  It  secured  from  Nicaragua  (Septem- 
ber, 1849)  a  favorable  concession  to  build  a  canal  from  an}^ 
point  in  the  state  on  the  Atlantic  coast  to  some  Pacific  point, 
together  with  a  liberal  land  grant  and  a  monopoly  of  steam 
navigation  on  the  rivers  and  lakes  of  Nicaragua.  With  so 
promising  a  beginning  the  company  despatched  its  engineer. 
Colonel  Childs,  to  make  accurate  and  complete  surveys  of 
the  route.  The  Childs  survey  was  the  fii"st  really  technical 
examination  made  of  the  Nicaragua  route ;  and  the  line 
adopted  by  him  in  1850  has  been  practically  approved  and 
accepted  by  engineers  in  all  subsequent  surveys.  Preparatory 
to  embarking  upon  the  great  work  of  building  a  complete 
waterway,  the  company  operated  a  line  of  small  steamers  on 
the  river  San  Juan  and  Lake  Nicaragua,  continuing  the  transit 
by  stage  coaches  from  the  lake  to  the  Pacific  Ocean.  The  prof- 
its of  this  preliminary  enterprise  were  exceedingly  large 
during  the  pioneer  rush  to  the  gold  fields  of  California.  Al- 
though the  company  for  some  years  continued  successfully  to 
operate  this  "temporary  line"  of  transit  even  after  the  con- 
struction of  the  Panama  Railroad  (completed  in  1855),  it  % 
accomplished  comparatively  nothing  toward  the  declared 
object  and  purpose  of  its  creation. 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM        73 

A  series  of  diplomatic  difficulties  and  entanglements  then 
arose  between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  touching 
their  respective  rights  in  Nicaragua.  These  difficulties,  to- 
gether with  political  conflicts  in  the  United  States,  operated 
to  decrease  public  interest  in  the  great  undertaking,  and  so 
delayed  and  crippled  the  American  promoters,  that  tlie 
Nicaraguan  Congress  lost  entire  confidence  in  their  ability  to 
carry  out  the  company's  purpose.  It  finally  (May,  1858)  ' 
declared  a  forfeiture  of  the  franchises  of  the  American  com- 
pany and  transferred  similar  rights  to  one  Felix  Belly  of  Paris. 
The  Belly  company,  however,  Avas  unable  to  secure  the  funds 
necessary,  even  to  begin  the  work,  and  its  concession  accord- 
ingly lapsed.  Out  of  this  apparently  hopeless  confusion,  the 
American  Company  succeeded  in  effecting  a  reorganization 
under  the  name  of  the  "  Central  American  Transit  Compan}^," 
and  as  such  continued  to  claim  and  exercise  the  rights  and 
franchises  of  the  former  company  until  1869,  when  it  sold  and 
transferred  the  same  to  an  Italian  company.  After  1860  public-, 
interest  in  the  project  seems  to  have  wholly  subsided  in  the; 
United  States  until  the  year  1872,  when  President  Grant  re- 
vived the  subject  by  urging  that  the  canal  be  built  by  the  gov- 
ernment as  a  national  undertaking.  In  pursuance  of  his  sug- 
gestions, he  appointed  an  "  Interoceanic  Canal  Commission," 
consisting  of  the  chief  engineer  of  the  army,  A.  A.  Humphreys, 
the  superintendent  of  the  coast  survey,  C.  P.  Patterson,  and 
the  chief  of  the  bureau  of  navigation.  Admiral  Ammen,  under 
whose  direction  a  series  of  exhaustive  surveys  of  the  Tehuan- 
tepec,  Nicaragua,  Panama,  San  Bias,  and  Atrato  routes  was 
made.  The  report  of  the  commission  favored  the  Nicaragua 
route  as  formerly  surveyed  by  Colonel  Childs,  and  steps  were 
taken  to  organize  a  company  for  the  management  of  the  work. 

From  the  more  modest  operations  of  the  American  promoters 
in  Nicaragua  one  must  turn  for  a  moment  to  Panama,  where, 
by  this  time,  the  De  Lesseps  scheme  was  at  the  height  of  its 
activity.  Ferdinand  de  Lesseps,  a  French  engineer,  had  won 
the  confidence  and  admiration  of  the  world  by  his  splendid 
success  in  constructing  the  Suez  Canal.  He  had  revived  the 
old  scheme  of  a  tide-water  canal  from  Colon  to  Panama,  and 


74  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

having  organized  a  French  company,  and  also  secured  liberal 
franchises  from  the  Colombian  States,  he  took  in  hand  the  task 
of  raising  the  necessary  funds  for  its  construction.  Through 
the  aid  of  the  Paris  Geographical  Society,  he  caused  a  series 
of  surveys  to  be  made  in  the  lower  isthmus,  all  of  Avhich  were 
subsequently  found  to  have  been  absurdly  superficial ;  then, 
in  order  to  decide  upon  the  best  route  and  to  stamp  tlie 
approval  of  the  world  upon  his  choice  of  it,  he  invited  the 
political  authorities  of  Europe  and  America,  as  well  as 
the  presidents  of  many  geographic  and  scientific  societies  to 
send  delegates  to  an  "  International  Scientific  Congress."  By 
extraordinary  cleverness  and  ingenuity  De  Lesseps  carried 
every  point  in  this  convention,  which  finally  decided  that  a 
tide-level  canal  could  be  built  at  Panama  for  $140,000,000. 

^Hostile  criticism  of  the  undertaking  in  the  United  States, 
foreshadowing  a  protest  on  its  part  against  exclusive  French 
control  of  the  work,  finally  brought  De  Lesseps  to  Wash- 
ington for  the  purpose  of  overcoming  threatened  American 
opposition.  He  managed  the  "preparatory  arrangements" 
for  his  grand  scheme  with  marked  ability,  and  the  en- 
thusiastic and  readily  excited  French  people  struggled  to 
obtain  shares  in  his  company  with  as  much  zeal  as  they 
had  once  before  manifested  in  the  purchase  of  stock  in 
the  Mississippi  scheme  of  John  Law.  Work  was  begun  at 
Aspinwall  in  1881,  and  was  continued  for  nearly  seven  years, 
when  it  was  found  that  the  canal,  though  not  half  finished, 

^  had  cost  upward  of  1260,000,000.  Further  investigation 
disclosed  the  hopeless  insolvency  of  the  company.  The 
scandals  connected  with  the  enterprise  were  so  great  as 
to  compel  examination  by  the  legislative  authorities  of 
France,  resulting  in  the  discovery  of  corruption  and  fraud 
in  its  management,  which  fairly  astounded  the  world.  Many 
millions  had  been  spent  in  buying  the  favor  or  silence  of 
the  press  and  in  purchasing  the  support  of  legislators.  The 
names  of  many  prominent  officials  of  highest  rank  and  posi- 
tion in  France  were  sadly  smirched  in  the  process  of  the  in- 
vestigation. The  original  intentions  of  the  promoters  were, 
without  doubt,  honorable  ;  but  before  the  work  had  progressed 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM         75 

a  year,  it  became  evident  to  those  in  charge  of  the  operations 
on  the  isthmus  that  the  difficulties  to  be  overcome  had  been 
greatly  underestimated.  The  soft,  yielding  character  of  the 
soil,  the  heavy  rains  and  floods,  the  miasmic  climate,  all  added 
new  complications  which  vastly  increased  the  labor 'and  ex- 
pense of  the  undertaking.  To  attain  success  it  became  neces- 
sary greatly  to  enlarge  the  capital  of  the  compan}^  and  to 
accomplish  this  object  it  became  equally  necessary  to  encour- 
age public  enthusiasm  by  frequent  and  glowing  reports  of  the 
company's  successful  progress. 

When  an  utterly  hopeless  future  confronted  the  officers  of 
the  company,  Avhen  but  a  breath  was  needed  to  burst  the 
expanding  bubble,  the  promoters  still  maintained  their  strug- 
gle to  suppress  the  truth.  At  last  the  expense  became  too 
great.  The  _ci^ash_came,  carrying  down  many  thousands  of 
French  investors  who  had  staked  all  upon  the  reputation  and 
promises  of  De  Lesseps.  Even  to-day  the  great  dredges 
and  massive  machinery  employed  in  this  gigantic  undertak- 
ing, and  representing  many  millions  of  cost,  lie  half  buried  in 
earth,  corroded  with  rust,  and  draped  in  nature's  veil  of 
tropical  foliage.  They  lie  at  Colon  like  fallen  monuments 
to  the  greatest  failure  of  the  century.  This  is,  of  all,  tlie 
most  melancholy  event  in  the  somewhat  tragic  history  of 
isthmian  canal  projects.'     '     "      ~ 

For  a  brief  time  financial  success  marked  the  operation  of 
the  American  Canal  Company,  in  so  far  only  as  it  undertook 
to  maintain  a  trans-isthmian  overland  route.  In  actual  prog- 
ress toward  the  building  of  the  canal,  the  records  of  this,  as 
of  all  other  canal  companies,  tell  the  old  story  of  failure. 

Just  after  the  conclusion  of  the  Frelinghuysen-Zavalla 
treaty  with  Nicaragua  (1884),  a  number  of  prominent  busi- 
ness men,  encouraged  by  the  liberal  concessions  promised  to 
the  United  States  in  that  treaty,  met  in  New  York  and 
organized  the  "  Provisional  Canal  Association."  It  was  the 
object  of  the  energetic  promoters  of  this  association  to  form 
a  company  whose  distinguished  personnel,  whose  financial 
guarantees,  whose  advantages  in  the  way  of  concessions,  and 
whose  command  of    engineering  talent  would  make  failure 


76  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

an  impossibility.  The  association  was  neither  chartered  nor 
incorporated  ;  it  had  no  connection  with  the  government  ; 
it  was  simply  a  private  syndicate.  Between  two  and  three 
million  dollars  were  quickly  subscribed,  and  Mr.  Menocal 
was  sen*  to  Nicaragua  to  secure  the  necessary  concessions. 
With  an  ample  bonus  paid  in  advance  to  the  Nicaraguan 
authorities,  he  met  with  no  difficulty  in  obtaining  for  his 
clients  (April  24,  1887)  an  exclusive  right  to  build  and 
afterward  to  operate  ~g~i;anal  foTlmiety^iine  years.  The 
state  bound  itself  "  not  to  make  any  subsequent  concession 
for  the  opening  of  a  canal  between  the  two  oceans  during  the 
term  of  the  present  concession,"  and  the  association  pledged 
itself  to  expend  a  certain  amount  within  a  specified  time  and 
to  complete  tlie  work  in  ten  years. 

^  Upon  Mr.  Menocal'sj'eturn  to  the  United  States  the  syn- 
dicate caused  a  "Nicaraguan  Canal  Constptictibn  CqnipanyL" 
to  be  incorporated  under  the  laws  of  Colorado  with  a  nominal 
capital  of  ♦12,000,000.  As  an  adjunct  to  the  "  Association  " 
afnd  in  conformity  with  the  terms  of  their  concession,  the 
Construction  Company  at  once  set  about  making  necessary 
final  surveys  and  eliminating  the  technical  uncertainties  that 
still  stood  in  the  way  of  the  commencement  of  actual  construc- 
tion. Mr.  Menocal  led  this  engineering  expedition.  Tlie 
survey  covered  a  period  of  nearly  three  years,  and  was 
a  most  exhaustive  scientific  investigation  of  the  route. 
Throughout  the  country  considerable  interest  began  to  attach 
to  the  progress  of  Mr.  Menocal's  investigations,  and  the  Canal 

t Association  had  the  heartiest  good  will  of  all  for  its  future 
success  ;  in  fact,  a  general  belief  began  to  manifest  itself 
that  the  company  should  have  the  protection,  as  well  as  the 
dignity,  of  a  national  charter.  Under  stress  of  sudden  pop- 
ular enthusiasm,  both  Houses  of  Congress  assented  to  the 
proposition  to  charter  the  association,  and  very  soon  after  the 
introduction  of  the  measure  into  the  Senate  the  company 
received  its  articles  of  incorporation  and  was  christenedlthe" 
"Maritime  Canal_l[)ompany_of__Nicaragua ''  (February  20, 
1889).^ 

The  company  was  at  once  organized  with   •$10,000,000  of 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM        77 

stock  ;  new  contracts  were  made  with  the  Canal  Construc- 
tion Company,  and  the  ^Tggmg^  of  "the  Nicaragua  Canal  ac- 
tually began.  Hon.  Warner  Miller  of  New  York  was  made 
president  of  the  Construction  Company.  Having  raised 
funds  sufficient  to  undertake  his  contract  with  the  Maritime 
Canal  Company,  he  pressed  the  work  in  Nicaragua  with 
great  energy.  Within  one  year  the  stipulated  12,000,000 
had  been  expended  to  the  entire  satisfaction  of  an  exacting 
government  in  Nicaragua.  In  three  years  nearly  five  mill- 
ions had  been  spent.  Seemingly  insurmountable  difficul- 
ties were  overcome  in  building  a  line  of  railroad  thirteen 
miles  from  the  coast  to  the  foot-hills  across  the  lagoon, 
through  the  tangled  masses  of  swampy  jungle  that  inter- 
vened. A  canal  two  miles  long  was  dug,  breakwaters  at 
Greytown  were  constructed,  the  harbor  was  dredged,  and 
altogether  satisfactory  progress  was  being  made  when  the 
financjal^anic  of  1893  compelled  the  Construction  Company 
to  suspend  all  operatTons".  Despite  all  efforts  to  stem  the 
tide  of  adverse  fortune,  it  soon  after  fell  into  the  hands  of  a 
receiver.  ^ 

The  officers  of  the    Maritime  Canal  Company  constantly 
exerted  themselves  to  keep  fresh  the  lively  public  interest 
which  had  been  exhibited  in  their  project  from  the  beginning, 
and  their  efforts  were  rewarded  by  many  demonstrations  of 
public  enthusiasm.     In  January,  1891,  the  Senate  Committee) 
on  Foreign  Relations  framed  a  bill  authorizing  the    governn 
ment  to  guarantee  an  issue  of  one  hundred  millions  of  the  j 
Maritime  Canal  Company's  bonds  and  to  hold  as  a  pledge  a 
controlling  interest  in  the  stock  of  the  company.     Although 
the  measure,  which  was  warmly  supported  by  Senators  Sher- 
man and  Morgan,  did  not  become  law,  this  incident  of  the 
committee  room  served  to  demonstrate  the  trend  of  public 
thought  upon  the  matter  of  governmental  control  of  any  Cen- 
tral American  ship  canal  that  should  be  built. 

There  was  one  reason  in  particular  why  the  idea  of  gov- 
ernmental aid  to  the  great  undertaking  continued  to  grow 
in  popularity.  The  tragic  failure  of  the  Panama  Company 
had  made  a  strong  impression  upon  the  minds  of  investors. 


78  AMERICAN    DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

That  lamentable  event  had  furnished  the  best  proof  of  the 
utter  futility  of  any  private  corporation  undertaking  the 
gigantic  task  of  piercing  the  Central  American  Cordillera  ; 
none  but  a  Hercules  should  attempt  a  labor  of  Hercules. 
Aside  from  reasons  relating  to  the  physical  side  of  the  ques- 
tion, the  very  nature  of  the  project  itself  appeared  to  invest 
it  with  a  national  rather  than  with  a  private  character.^ 
The  difficulties,  political  and  economic,  as  well  as  technical, 
which  surrounded  the  enterprise,  removed  all  doubt  that 
the  construction  of  the  canal  should  be  under  the  auspices 
and  protection  of  the  United  States  Government.  The  use  of 
the  canal  when  completed  would  necessarily  be  most  inti- 
mately connected  with  vital  interests  of  the  nation.  Would 
it  then  be  safe  to  subject  to  the  chances  of  private  ownership 
an  undertaking  which  involved  interests  so  complex  and 
important  ?  Public  opinion  then  rapidly  shaped  itself  into 
a  conviction  that  the  canal  should  be  built  by  the  govern- 
ment in  order  that  it  might  at  last  be  controlled  by  the 
government. 

Further  re^ons  induced  the  stockholders  themselves  per- 
sistently to  seek  governmental  aid  for  their  project.  Periodic 
political  disturbances  in  Central  America  had  caused  the 
Maritime  Canal  Company  considerable  embarrassment.  A 
genuine  respect  for  any  body  of  private  citizens  operating 
within  her  borders  could  scarcely  be  expected  from  Nicara- 
gua's turbulent  political  factions.  At  any  moment  Central 
America  was  likely  to  go  to  war.  Indeed,  tlie  efforts  of  the 
company  to  prosecute  the  work  at  Greytown  had  been 
hampered  from  the  outset  by  quarrels  between  Nicaragua  and 
Costa  Rica.  The  news  of  the  annoying  delays  forced  upon 
the  company  by  these  frequent  political  disturbances  reached 
the  United  States^  and  deterred  many  who  were  otherwise 
most  enthusiastic  in  the  cause  of  the  canal  from  risking 
capital  in  its  development.  Even  while  active  work  on  the 
part  of  the  contractors  was  progressing  in  Nicaragua,  the 
lack  of  sufficient  funds  greatly  handicapped  the  Maritime 
Canal  Company's  operations.  In  this  awkward  predicament 
the  promoters  were  in  doubt  as  to  the  proper  course  to  be 


THE   INTEROCEANIC   CANAL  PROBLEM  79 

pursued.  It  seemed  doubtful  whether  it  were  better  to  open 
their  subscription  books  to  foreign  capital  or  to  make  another 
appeal  for  Congressional  aid.  The  first  course  carried  the 
objectionable  feature  of  permitting  foreign  influence  to  enter 
into  what  they  wished  should  be  a  purely  American  scheme  ; 
and  the  second  course  at  that  time  promised  but  little  hope 
of  success.  As  a  last  resort,  however,  great  pressure  was  again 
brought  to  bear  upon  Congress  to  guarantee  the  company's 
bonds  and  thus  secure  the  stockholders  from  possible  loss. 
In  furtherance  of  this  idea,  a  convention  held  at  New  Orleans 
in  November,  1892,  in  which  six  hundred  delegates  assembled, 
some  from  every  state  and  territory  in  the  Union,  unanimously 
passed  resolutions  calling  upon  Congress  to  lend  its  aid  to  the 
construction  of  the  Nicaragua  Canal.  These  representa- 
tions of  public  will  resulted  in  the  reintroduction  of  a  bill  in 
the  Senate  (December  23,  1892),  authorizing  a  govern- 
mental guarantee  of  the  company's  bonds  to  the  extent  of 
$100,000,000  providing  that  in  consideration  of  such  guar- 
antee the  government  should  receive  in  absolute  ownership 
880,500,000  of  the  capital  stock. 

The  passage  of  this  bill  would  most  assuredly  have  placed 
the  United  States  Government  in  the  position  of  owner  of 
the_canal ;  but  there  were  diplomatic  considerations  that  pre- 
vented the  United  States  from  thus  suddenly  converting  the 
company's  project  into  a  national  undertaking.  These  consid- 
erations must  be  examined  later,  but  for  the  present,  suffice 
it  to  say,  the  bill  never  passed  beyond  a  stage  of  lively  and 
animatedjdebate,  and  the  Maritime  Canal  Company  therefore 
gained  nothing  by  its  call  ypon  Congress.  New  issues  of 
the  company's  bonds  were  made,  but  the  financial  panic  of 
1893,  which  wrecked  the  Construction  Company,  so  increased 
the  timidity  and  caution  of  investors  as  to  render  the  success 
of  the  new  bond  issue  impossible.  The  Maritime  Canal  Com- 
pany became  substantially  stranded.  The  next  year  ahotHer 
desperate  attempt  was  made  to  secure  legislation  in  Congress 
that  should  place  the  company  upon  a  firmer  financial  basis. 
On  January  22,  1894,  the  old  guarantee  bill  of  1892  was. 
reintroduced  into  the  Senate  with  some  modifications.     By 


80  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

this  measure,  governmental  guarantee  of  i70,000,000  of  the 
company's  bonds  was  called  for  and  national  ownership 
of  $70,000,000  of  stock,  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
was  authorized  to  control  the  construction  of  the  work. 
Thus  the  idea  of  absolute  governmental  ownership  of  the 
canal,  together  with  a  governmental  responsibility  foT  its  con- 
struction, was  contemplated  by  Congress.  The  measure  bid 
defiance  to  treaty  stipulations  of  the  United  States,  which 
should  have  acted  as  an  estoppel  to  any  such  legislation. 
The  bill  was  lost  in  the  House,  notwithstanding  the  fact 
that  a  great  majority  in  both  branches  of  Congress  strongly 
favored  government  ownership  and  control  of  the  Nicaraguan 
Canal. 

In  1895  Congress  again  took  action  in  the  same  direction; 
but,  as  before,  the  Jinuse  refused  to  accept  the  measure  which 
the  Senate  had  been  wiliTngtirnttbpt.  However,  on  March  2, 
1895,  Congress  authamed._the  appointment  of  a  commission 
of  three  engineers  for  the  purpose~7yf nrepor ting^o^jthe.  f easi- 
•bility,  permanence,  and  final  cost  of  the  company's  project; 
$20,000  were  appropriated  for  the  purpose,  and  the  company 
added  generously  to  the  amount  of  the  appropriation  to  help 
defray  the  costs  of  the  commission.  The  creation  of  this 
commission  was  generally  accepted  as  evidencing  an  inten- 
tion of  Congress,  sooner  or  later,  to  extend  its  protection  over 
the  Maritime  Canal  Company,  by  the  absorption  of  its  capital, 
and  ultimately  to  secure  full  control  of  the  work.  The  same 
field  had  been  surveyed  and  resurveyed  many  times  by  com- 
petent engineers,  and  further  scientific  investigation  along 
the  well-known  route  was  hardly  necessary;  however,  the 
commission  (under  General  Ludlow)  entered  upon  the  task 
with  the  seeming  approval  of  the  country. 

The  commission  reported  in  November,  1895,  to  the  effect 
that  the  company's  project  for  a  ship  canal  in  Nicaragua  was 
perfectly  feasible,  save  for  some  detail  in  the  company's  plans 
to  which  the  commission  duly  excepted.  The  report  recom- 
mended still  further  investigation  in  order  to  obtain  certain 
additional  data  which  the  engineers  deemed  essential  for  a 
final  conclusion  and  a  correct  estimate  of  cost. 


THE   INTEROCEANIC   CANAL   PROBLEM  81 

I  The  opening  of  the  year  1896  found  the  Maritime  Canal 
jjCompany  almost  exhausted  in  its  struggle  against  adverse 
|fate.  Its  adjunct,  the  Canal  Company,  as  already  noted,  had 
■foundered  in  the  financial  storm  of  1893,  leaving  the  results 
of  its  labors  in  Nicaragua  exposed  to  the  destructive  influ- 
•ences  of  merciless  floods  and  to  the  devouring  growth  of 
tropical  vegetation.  A  new  construction  company  had  been 
organized  the  previous  year  (March,  1895),  and  chartered  in 

j  -Vermont,  to  resume  where  the  old  canal  company  left  off. 
tJirfortunately,  its  available  assets  were  quite  dissipated  in 
liquidating  the  debts  of  the  old  company,  and  none  were  left 

I  with  which  to  dig  canals.  All  the  efforts  of  the  parent  com- 
pany to  obtain  funds  had  failed ;  every  attempt  to  secure 
governmental  aid  had  failed  as  well ;  and  six  of  the  ten  years 
w^ithin  which  the  canal  should  be  completed,  under  its  con- 
■cession  from  Nicaragua,  had  slipped  away.  The  Ludlow 
Commission  had  reported  that  further  investigation  into  the 
technical  features  of  the  undertaking  was  necessary,  and  it 
was  therefore  quite  likely  that  Congress  would  do  nothing 
toward  rescuing  the  company  until  such  final  investigation 
could  be  made.  Tlie  outlook  for  the  company  was  gloomy. 
Notwithstanding  these  unfavorable  conditions,  the  friends 
of  the  company  in  the  Senate  and  House  continued  to  exert 
themselves  in  its  behalf.  With  recommendations  for  imme- 
diate action,  the  House  Interstate  and  Foreign  Commerce 
Committee  reported  a  bill  calling  for  such  national  aid  to  the 
enterprise  as  might  seem  requisite  to  enable  the  company 
to  obtain  funds  necessary  to  complete  the  work  in  Nicaragua 
already  commenced.  The  measure  contemplated  the  practi- 
cal conversion  of  the  company  into  a  governmental  concern. 
The  entire  capital  (a  new  issue  of  bonds  being  authorized)  ^ 
was  to  be  retained  by  the  United  States,  save  the  sum  of  j 
$7,000,000,  which  was  to  be  left  in  the  hands  of  the  com-/ 
pany's  original  stockholders,  to  reimburse  them  for  fundsy 
actually  expended  in  Nicaragua.  This  bill  passed  through ^ 
the  various  stages  of  committee-room  debate,  and  finally  took 
its  place  upon  the  Senate  calendar,  though  too  late  for  action 
■durins:  that  term.  ^ 


82  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

The  measure  was  not  again  called  up  until  January  18, 
1897,  when  it  became  the  special  order  of  business  in  the 
Senate  for  nearly  a  month.  A  vast  amount  of  testimony, 
from  many  sources,  had  been  taken  by  the  Senate  committee 
to  demonstrate  the  necessities  for  passing  the  bill,  and  volumi- 
nous documentary  reports  accompanied  the  Senate  com- 
mittee's recommendation.  But  behind  the  necessities  of  the 
case  there  existed  in  the  minds  of  many  of  the  Senators  an 
uncomfortable  feeling  that  the  passage  of  the  bill  might 
involve  a  neglect  of  those  moral  requirements  placed  upon 
the  nation  by  its  treaty  stipulations.  ManyL_adyocates  of 
governmental  control  of  the  canal  fully  believed^  that  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  with  England,  binding  the  United 
States  never  to  secure  sole  control  of  any  isthmian  canal,  had 
long  since  become  a  dead  letter;  yet  that  treaty  had  never 
been  formally  abrogated,  and  all  past  attempts  to  avoid  its^ 
terms  having  failed,  the  treaty  still  stood  as  though  fully  and 
unreservedly,  acknowledged.  This  treaty,  made  in  1850, 
operated  as  a  check,  though  as  yet  a  silent  one,  upon  any 
such  legislation  as  tlie  Senate  at  that  time  contemplated- 
Other  influences,  notably  those  of  the  great  transcontinental 
railways,  steadfastly  opposed  the  passage  of  the  bill.  It  was 
finally  tabled,  and  the  hopes  of  the  Maritime  Canal  Company 
agkrrr-Trithe'red. 

Before  the  close  of  1897  the  President  appointed  a  new 
commission,  consisting  of  Admiml  Walker,  Colonel  P.  C 
Haines,  and  Professor  Lewis  N.  Haupt,  to  make  a  final  and 
complete  survey  of  tlie  entire  Nicaraguan  route.  This  com- 
mission proceeded  to  Grey  town  in  November,  1897,  with  a 
corps  of  able  engineei's  and  a  large  force  of  assistants.  It 
was  armed  with  the  most  perfect  scientific  equipment.  The 
sending  of  this  commission — in  this  age  of  commissions  — 
was  really  to  serve  a  triple  purpose.  First,  it  would  gather 
all  the  information  needed  by  the  government  to  satisfy  Con- 
gress of  either  the  feasibility  or  non-feasibility  of  the  Nica- 
raguan route,  and  it  would  add  one  more  expert  estimate  of 
cost  to  the  many  previous  ones  on  file.  Secondly,  it  would 
give  the  encouragement  felt  to  be  due  those  who  clamored 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM        83 

for  governmental  control  of  the  work.  Thirdly,  it  would  gain 
time.  Time  was  the  most  necessary  factor  in  the  problem. 
The  administration  fully  realized  the  futility  of  agitating  the 
question  of  governmental  control  of  the  work,  so  long  as  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  remained  unrevoked  or  unmodified ; 
and  to  accomplish  either  of  these  ends,  negotiations  of  a  some- 
what  delicate  nature  must  first  be  had  with  Great  Britain. 
The  occasion,  however,  for  such  negotiations  was  rendered  in- 
auspicious TjjTtlie  approaching^  conflict  with  Spain.  England's 
~-g66^\\i\l  was  too  valuable  to  challenge  at  such  a  time,  con- 
sequently no  actual  efforts  were  made  toward  clearing  away 
the  diplomatic  difficulties  that  surrounded  the  canal  problem 
until  the  autumn  of  1899. 

In  the  meantime,  however,  the  Maritime  Canal  Company 
began  to  realize  that  misfortunes  never  come  singly.  The 
promoters  not  only  deplored  their  numerous  failures  to  secure 
governmental  aid  and  their  consequent  inability  to  raise  the 
funds  necessary  to  continue  the  work,  long  since  abandoned 
in  Nicaragua,  but  they  also  feared  a  revocation  of  their  con- 
cession by  the  Central  American  state. 

Nicaragua  had  already  (1898)  shown  signs  of  uneasiness 
at  the  company's  helplessness.  By  a  communication  of  Mr. 
Rodrigues,  Minister  of  the  Greater  Republic  in  Washington, 
to  Mr.  Olney  (January  15,  1897),  Nicaragua's  objection, 
under  the  terms  of  the  concession,  to  the  Maritime 
Canal  Company's  connections  with  the  United  States  Gov- 
ernment, .was  set  forth,  and  various  acts  of  the  company 
were  cited  to  show  a  forfeiture  upon  its  part  of  all  its 
rights  and  privileges  in  Nicaragua.  This  was  but  the  be- 
ginning. It  Was  obvious  that  Nicaragua  had  lost  faith  in 
the  company,  though  some  allege  that  the  government  at 
Managua  was  sorely  in  need  of  money,  and  wished  to  sell  a 
new  concession  —  their  stock  commodity;  others  maintain 
that  it  came  about  through  the  mutual  jealousies  of  Nicara- 
gua and  Costa  Rica.  These  two  neighboring  states  had  always 
oherished  the  bitterest  feelings  toward  each  other.  They 
quarrelled  over  their  boundaries ;  they  quarrelled  over  their 
respective  rights  on  the  San  Juan  River ;  and  they  quarrelled 


84  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

over  the  ratio  of  their  interests  in  the  Maritime  Canal  Company. 
Their  mutual  dislike  had  proved  unappeasable  by  war.  Did 
Nicaragua  desire  to  oust  Costa  Rica  from  her  concessionary 
rights,  or  did  Costa  Rica  demand  a  more  substantial  interest 
in  the  canal  ?  Whatever  may  have  been  the  inner  motives  that 
prompted  her  to  do  so,  Nicaragua  continued  to  give  evidence 
of  a  purpose  to  declare  the  forfeiture  of  the  Canal  Com- 
pany concession.  On  June  5, 1897,  she  entered  into  contract 
with  the  Atlas  Steamship  Company,  whereby  the  latter  se- 
cured exclusive  rights  of  navigation  and  railroad  construction 
on  the  lagoon  at  the  mouth  of  the  San  Juan  River  and  along 
the  bank  of  that  river.  Sole  privileges  of  navigation  on  Lake 
Nicaragua  were  also  granted  to  this  English  company.  While 
it  was  expressly  stated  in  this  contract  with  the  Atlas  Com- 
pany that  nothing  in  the  instrument  should  be  considered  as  an 
obstacle  to  the  carrying  out  of  any  contract  the  Nicaraguan 
Government  may  have  previously  made  in  regard  to  the 
opening  of  an  interoceanic  canal,  yet  the  contract  certainly 
bore  upon  its  face  an  affront  to  the  ^laritime  Canal  Company. 
The  latter  company  made  vigorous  protests,  alleging  gross 
violations  of  its  rights  under  its  concession  of  1887,  and 
called  upon  Congress  to  lend  its  support  in  resisting  this 
unwarrantable  act  on  the  part  of  Nicaragua. 

The  limit  of  grievances  was  not  yet  reached.  Jjl-1^^^ 
just  after  the  failure  of  the  Construction  Company^ jvdiic 
will  be  remembered,  liad  held  the  contracts  from  the  parent 
(Maritime  Canal)  company,  for  the  actual  constructFon  of 
the  canal,  a  number  of  wealthy  men  in  New  York  and 
Chicago  became  sufficiently  interested  in  the  ship-canal  pro 
ject  to  make  an  investigation  into  the  conditions  of  the  work 
along  the  route,  with  a  view  to  purchasing  necessary  righ 
and  unTtSrlaking  the  fulfilment  of  the  contract  themselves. 
Having  visited  the  scene  of  operations  the  following  year, 
they  reported  that  the  Maritime  Canal  Company  had  been 
unable,  according  to  the  terms  of  its  concession,  to  keep 
pace  with  fleeting  time  in  the  fulfilment  of  its  obligations. 
They  discovered  that  the  Nicaraguan  Government  was  dis- 
posed io  agree  with  them  in  that  the  existing  company  could 


^   -QNIVF.HSl 
THE   INTEROCEANIC   CANAL   PROBLEM  V    ^  85> 

Xg^UFO£ 

never  comply  with  the  terms  of  its  contract,  and  they  further 
discovered  a  willingness  on  the  part  of  Nicaragua  to  grant 
them  a  concession  of  their  own.  Accordingly^,  in  1898,  a 
canal  syndj.cate.Jvasiorniedin  J^ew  York  City,  among  whose 
directors  are  to  be  found  the  names  of  W.  R.  Grace,  J.  D. 
Crimmins,  J.  A.  McCall,  Warner  Miller,  J.  J.  Astor,  George 
Westinghouse,  D.  O.  Mills,  Levi  P.  Morton,  G.  T.  Bliss,  and 
many  others  well  known  in  the  financial  world.  This 
very  substantial  association,  called  the  ''  Grace-Eja-e-Cragin 
Syndicate,"  at  once  proceeded  to  secure  a  conces~sIoiT~Trom  -4-- 
l^caragua,  for  which  purpose  its  representatives  appeared  in 
Managua  in  the  autumn  of  1898.  At  that  particular  moment 
Central  America  was  just  reaching  the  point  in  the  usual  cycle 
of  its  political  affairs,  when  several  of  its  states  were  about  to  ' 
merge  their  own  sovereignty  into  that  of  a  Greater  Republic, 
and  their  interests  were  to  be  united.  They  were  to  forswear 
forever  the  old  bickering  and  quarrelling  in  a  bond  of  ever- 
lasting amity  and  peace.  President  Zelaya  received  the 
envoys  of  the  newly  formed  company  with  marked  cordiality. 
In  a  special  message  setting  forth  the  great  advantages  which 
would  accrue  from  granting  a  concession  to  the  newly  organ- 
ized company,  he  called  a  special  session  of  Congress  for 
the  purpose  of  considering  the  validity  of  the  old  con- 
cession of  1887  to  the  Maritime  Canal  Company,  and  the^ 
propriety  of  granting  a  concession  to  the  new  company. 
The  date  of  the  president's  message  is  October  27,  1897. 
That  same  day  a  contract  was  signed.  The  next  day  the 
Supreme  Court  pronounced  the  "  Maritime  "  concession  null 
and  void  foi-  iion-user  and  bWer  reasons:  TIie"28tirand_29th 
were  devoted  to  discussion  of  the  contract  byTEe'^Sgress. 
The  next  day,  the  30th,  it  was  accepted  by  unanimous  vote, 
and  the  day  after  it  was  approved  as  law.  At  12  o'clock 
that  night  (October  31)  iS'icaragua  ceased  to  exist  as  a 
sovereign  state,  and  became  a  part  of  the  Greater  Repub- 
lic of  Central  America,  along  with  Honduras  and  San  Sal- 
vador. 

The  contract  thus  hastily  secured  was  considered  by  all 
parties  to  be  an  actual  concession  infuturo^  to  take  effect  on 


S6  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

October  10,  1899,  upon  which  date  the  Maritime  concession 
was  declared  to  lapse.  It  differed  in  but  few  of  its  essential 
features  from  the  Maritime  concession  of  1887.  The  com- 
pany paid  for  it  1100,000,  with  a  promise  of  f400,000  more, 
as  a  pledge  of  good  faith.  It  bound  itself  to  begin  the  exca- 
vation of  the  canal  within  two  years,  and  complete  the  same 
within  ten  years.  The  concession  was  in  perpetuity,  and  the 
government  bound  itself  by  a  declaration  that  no  concession 
or  privilege  theretofore  granted  should,  in  any  manner, 
"  oppose,  conflict,  embarrass,  or  prejudice  "  this  one.  The 
free  navigation,  use,  or  disposition  of  all  watere  in  the  state 
were  given  to  the  company,  which  was  also  to  retain  ex- 
clusive control  of  the  management  and  operations  of  the 
canal.  The  final  articles  set  forth  that  it  is  "  understood 
that  for  the  purposes  of  this  contract  the  Cardenas- M  en ocal 
contract  (1887,  to  Maritime  Company)  shall  cease  to  have 
legal  existence  on  the  9th  day  of  October,  1899,  and  there- 
fore all  the  foregoing  stipulations  shall  take  effect  without 
further  action,  declaration,  or  law,  on  the  10th  of  October, 
1899,  or  sooner,  should  Messrs.  Eyre  and  Cragin,  their  heirs 
or  assigns,  obtain  the  rescission  of  the  Cardenas-Menocal 
contract.  ..." 

A  forfeiture  of  its  concession  from  Nicaragua  was  natu- 
rally the  greatest  calamity  that  could  possibly  befall  the 
Maritime  Company,  and  now  the  very  worst  had  happened. 
But  the  company  still  had  to  its  credit  nearly  a  year  of  grace 
before  the  contract  came  to  its  end,  and  the  company's  direc- 
tors, undaunted  by  evil  fortune,  decided  to  make  a  final 
and  desperate  effort  to  save  the  company's  life.  Their  best 
manner  of  seeking  redress  for  the  outrages  which  they  felt 
had  been  perpetrated  upon  them  by  a  fickle,  irresponsible  gov- 
ernment was  through  interposition  of  the  State  Department 
at  Washington.  The  right  of  the  company  thus  to  fall  back 
upon  national  protection  was  found,  first,  in  its  national 
charter,  which  gave  to  Congress  a  privilege  of  supervision 
over  all  its  affaire;  and  secondly,  because  its  concession 
from  Nicaragua  and  Costarica,  by  virtue  of  the  quasi  inter- 
national character  of  its  provisions,  partook,  in  a  measure, 


THE  INTEKOCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM        87 

of  the  nature  of  a  treaty.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the 
company  had  need  of  every  resource  at  its  command  to  extri- 
cate itself  from  the  awkward  position  into  which  it  had 
fallen,  and  it  certainly  played  its  strongest  card  in  an  appeal 
to  the  Department  of  State  (December  2,  1898).  A  corre- 
spondence ensued,  calling  upon  Nicaragua  to  show  cause  for 
its  summary  action  in  cancelling  the  contract  of  the  Mari- 
time Company,  and  further  asking  for  an  opportunity  on  the 
part  of  the  company  to  make  a  defence. 

The  year  1899  therefore  opened  with  two  rival  canal  com- 
panies, each  holding  exclusive  concessions  from  Nicaragua, 
and  each  clamoring  for  public  recognition. 

Now  a  third  company,  operating  in  Panama,  suddenly 
came  forward  with  a  flourish  of  concessions  and  a  budget 
of  seductive  arguments,  further  to  confuse  the  already  be- 
wildered Senate  and  House  committees  who  had  in  charge 
all  matters  pertaining  to  Central  American  canals.  When 
the  old  Panama  Company  reached  its  disastrous  end  in 
1889,  its  scattered  wreckage  was  put  through  a  process  of 
manipulation  by  the  courts  of  justice  in  France.  Singularly 
•enough,  there  remained  some  assets  after  the  disaster,  which, 
by  the  careful  management  of  the  "  liquidators,"  or  receiv- 
•ers,  were  converted  into  a  nest-egg  for  a  new  and  more 
healthy  company;  this  was  duly  organized  under  the  general 
•corporation  laws  of  France  on  October  20,  1894.  By  decree 
ot  court,1iirThe"canal  and  crmai'-WTTrks,  iTie  concessions,  etc., 
of  the  old  company  were  transferred  in  full  right  to  the  new 
•one.  An  extension  of  time  to  1904,  and  then  to  1908,  within 
which  to  complete  the  Panama  Canal,  was  obtained  from  the 
'Colombian  Government,  and  the  new  company  set  to  work 
i  seriously  and  hopefully,  though  modestly  in  the  matter  of 
•expenditures,  as  compared  with  the  reckless  extravagance  of 
the  previous   management. 

The  sudden  intrusion  of  this  new  factor  on  the  commercial 
•side  of  the  canal  problem  led  Congress  into  making  an  in- 
vestigation into  the  merits  and  prospects  of  all  three  compa- 
nies. From  January  17th  to  the  25th,  1899,  the  Committee 
^on  Interstate  and  Foreign  Commerce  of  the  House  heard  a 


88  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

presentation  of  the  claims  to  governmental  recognition  and 
encouragement  by  the  agents  of  the  three  rival  companies. 

The  Panama  Company  presented  an  unexpectedly  strong 
case.  They^  had^o^errci^it  oiie  TaiHjTgood  andtmenexcel- 
Tent  harbor  upon  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  sides  of  the  isthmus, 
nearly  one-half  of  the  entire  work  of  excavation  completed, 
an  existing  railroad  paralleling  the  route  of  the  canal,  good 
concessions,  and  a  force  of  three  thousand  men  actually  at 
work  in  the  field.  The  company  was  shown  to  be  solvent 
and  its  prospects  bright.  It  asked  for  no  financial  aid,  only 
to  be  spared  adverse  legislation.  "  We  have  a  right  to- 
assume,"  concluded  the  attorney  for  the  company,  "  that  the 
Panama  canal  is  a  necessary,  if  not  tlie  controlling,  factor  in 
the  solution  of  the  isthmian  canal  problem." 

The  representatives  of  the  Maritime  Canal  Company 
devoted  their  testimony  largely  to  a  defence  of  the  company's 
rights  under  its  concession  from  Nicaragua,  and  to  explana- 
tions why  it  had  failed  to  complete  the  canal  within  the 
ten  years'  limit  as  therein  specified.  They  stoutly  maintained 
that  their  concession  had  not  properly  lapsed,  notwithstand- 
ing their  own  failures.  As  against  the  Panama  route,  they 
urged  the  superior  advantages  of  their  own,  alleging  a  better 
harbor  on  the  Atlantic  side,  fewer  miles  of  actual  canaliza- 
tion, shorter  canal  termini  for  vessels  with  northern  port 
terminals,  better  advantages  in  the  matter  of  trade  winds ; 
and  filially,  as  a  convincing  argument,  they  showed  that  the 
Panama  route  involved  diplomatic  difficulties  in  the  way  of 
exploitation,  which  made  if  faf  less, deserving  of  public  notice 
than  their  own  project  in  Nicaragua.  Having  referred  to  the 
financial  panic  of  1893,  and  its  effects  upon  the  company,  Mr. 
Hiram  Hitchcock,  president  of  the  Maritime  Company,  said : 
"  This  condition  of  affairs  has  necessarily  led  to  a  waiting 
attitude  on  the  part  of  the  company,  during  which  time  its 
franchises  and  possessi-ons  have  been  actively  coveted  by 
aspiring  rival  routes  and  interests,  sometimes  under  the  indi- 
rect inspiration  of  foreign  powers ;  and  it  has  encountered 
criticisms  and  direct  opposition  of  enemies  in  the  United 
States  and  Central  America.    In  the  face  of  all  this,  the  com- 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM         89 

pany  has  remained  solvent  and  faithful  to  its  trusts,  and  it  has 
protected  the  enterprise  and  preserved  it  for  the  people  and  gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States."  Referring  to  the  Grace  con- 
cession, he  said,  ''  It  was  entered  into  by  Nicaragua  in  violation 
of  the  rights  and  interests  not  only  of  this  company  (Mari- 
time Company),  but  of  the  United  States  and  of  Costa  Rica." 
The  representatives  of  the  Grace-Cragin  syndicate  ap- 
proached their  examination  by  the  House  committee  in  the 
jaunty  manner  of  victors  fresh  from  the  fray,  and  bearing  the 
spoils  of  victory  —  in  the  shape  of  a  remarkably  liberal  con- 
cession from  Nicaragua.  They  believed  the  Maritime  con- 
cession to  have  already  become  a  worthless  instrument,  and 
insisted  upon  their  own  paramount  rights  to  begin  work  Oc- 
tober 9,  1899.  Upon  that  day,  they  asserted,  the  Maritime 
Company  would  be  called  upon  by  Nicaragua  to  open  the 
canal  to  navigation,  which,  needless  to  say,  the  Maritime 
Company  would  be  unable  to  do ;  then  the  latter  company 
would  be  obliged  to  stand  forth  and  acknowledge  its  failure 
to  carry  out  the  terms  of  its  contract  and  accept  its  forfeiture 
without  further  parley  ;  then  the  Grace  Company,  as  a  private 
corporation,  would  step  in  with  a  clear  field,  and,  with  the 
best  of  concessions  from  Nicaragua,  it  would  enter  upon 
the  task  with  every  assurance  of  success.  In  substantia- 
tion of  their  claims  in  regard  to  the  forfeiture  of  the  Mari- 
time franchise,  they  pointed  out  how  the  Nicaraguan  Govern- 
ment had  granted  the  Canal  Association  a  generous  concession 
along  with  ample  time  allowance,  which  should  have  assured 
the  opening  of  the  canal  for  universal  commerce  before  the 
close  of  the  century.  "  They  waited.  .  .  .  Their  chagrin  and 
disappointment  may  be  imagined  as  the  weeks  and  months 
rolled  into  years  without  the  turning  of  a  wheel  upon  the 
work.  .  .  .  The  dredges  have  for  years  been  wrecks,  rest- 
ing on  the  bottom  of  Greytown  Lagoon ;  the  railway  is 
rotted  out  and  overgrown  ;  the  buildings  are  mere  shells 
standing  upon  rotted  timbers ;  the  harbor  is  filled  with 
sand,  and  the  entrance  from  the  sea  is  never,  at  the  most, 
over  three  feet  in  depth.  Such  of  the  property  as  has  not 
been  destroyed  has  been  realized  upon.     Much  of  the  com- 


90  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

pany's  property  has  been  sold  under  judgments.  Piers, 
buildings,  telegraph  and  telephone  lines,  steamboats,  and 
dredges  are  gone.  The  remnant  of  railway  that  remains  re- 
verts to  Nicaragua  next  October.  We  were  told  that  the 
last  sale  of  the  company's  assets  was  of  hand  tools,  surveying 
instruments,  etc.,  sold  to  the  Nicaraguan  Government  for  a 
few  thousand  dollars,  part  of  which  was  paid  to  the  company. 
The  company's  representative  is  now  pushing  the  Govern- 
ment for  the  balance,  in  order  to  pay  his  salary  and  that  of 
the  watchman.  To  the  Nicaraguans,  at  least,  the  attitude  of 
the  company,  claiming  ability  to  carry  out  an  enterprise  in- 
volving $100,000,000,  pressing  a  claim  of  a  few  thousand 
dollars  against  a  Government  which  is  the  company's  credi- 
tor, is  ridiculous." 

Such,  then,  being  the  deplorable  condition  of  the  Maritime 
Company,  the  representatives  of  the  Grace  Company  believed 
that  any  claim  on  the  part  of  the  former  to  an  extension  of  its 
franchises  beyond  October  9  of  that  year  "  would  be  treated 
by  the  Government  of  Nicaragua  as  the  merest  effrontery."    ^ 

Before  the  committee  examination  into  the  status  and 
prospects  of  the  three  canal  companies  had  terminated, 
the  Senate  took  into  consideration  a  bill  to  amend  the 
old  act  incorporating  the  Maritime  Canal  Company,  its 
purpose  being,  as.  in  the  previous  year,  to  place  the  com- 
pany more  completely  under  the  auspices  and  control  of 
the  national  government.  Under  this  bill  all  the  stock  of  the 
company  originally  issued  was  to  be  recalled,  and  new 
shares  in  place  of  it  were  to  be  issued  to  the  United  States 
Government,  to  Nicaragua,  and  to  Costa  ilica.  Thus  the 
financial  bureau  of  the  company  would  be  transferred  to  an 
office  in  the  Treasury  Department.  In  the  Senate  bill  a 
guarantee  of  neutrality  of  the  canal  was  inserted  with  the 
following  proviso  :  "  The  Nicaragua  Canal  being  a  necessary 
connection  between  the  eastern  and  western  coast  lines  of 
the  United  States,  the  right  to  protect  the  same  against  all 
interruptions  and  at  all  times,  is  reserved  and  excepted  out 
of  this  declaration  of  the  neutrality  of  said  canal  and  its  free 
use  by  other  nations." 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM        91 

While  this  bill  was  pending,  the  examination  of  the  three 
rival  companies  was  progressing  in  the  committee  room,  and 
the  facts  developed  there  tended  very  considerably  to  modify 
the  ideas  held  by  many  in  Congress  upon  the  subject  of  the 
canal  problem.  The  original  draft  of  the  Senate  bill  was 
entirely  stricken  out,  and  an  amended  form,  entitled,  "A 
Bill  to  provide  for  the  construction  of  a  canal  connecting  the 
Waters  of  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  Oceans,"  was  reported. 
This  amended  bill  made  no  mention  whatever  of  the  Mari- 
time Compan}^,  nor  of  any  existing  schemes  in  Central 
America,  but  provided  simply  for  the  govermental  purchase 
of  a  portion  of  territory  along  the  proposed  canal  route  in 
Nicaragua,  and  called  for  an  appropriation  of  the  funds  nec- 
essary for  the  United  States  Government  immediately  to 
undertake  the  work  as  a  national  project,  irrespective  of  the 
claims  or  rights  of  any  private  company.  Here,  then,  for 
-the  first  time,  tlie^nate  had  reached  that  point  to  which  it 
had  for  so  many  years  been  tending, —  a  declaration  for  an 
American  canal  to  be  constructed  by  the  government  as  a 
national  undertaking.  The  bill  passed  the  Senate  by  a  safe 
margin,  and,  attached  as  a  rider  to  the  River  and  Harbor 
Bill,  was  turned  over  to  the  mercies  of  the  House.  There, 
however,  it  encountered  the  unyielding  opposition  of  Speaker 
Reed,  and  immediately  became  involved  in  the  meshes  of  an 
endless  controversy  over  matters  political,  diplomatic,  and 
technical.  It  was  consigned  to  the  waste-basket  on  the  last 
day  of  the  session^"         " 

In  the  meantime,  the  Nicaraguan  Canal  Commission,  of 
which  Admiral  Walker  was  the  chairman  and  which  had  been 
sent  to  Nicaragua  under  Act  of  June  4,  1897,  had  returned, 
and  submitted  to  the  President  a  preliminary  report  relative 
to  its  progress  "  in  investigating  the  question  of  the  proper 
route,  the  feasibility,  and  cost  of  construction  of  the  Nicara- 
gua Canal"  (January,  1899).  Three  months  later  the  final 
report  was  prepared  ;  a  synopsis  of  it,  furnished  by  the 
State  Department  (May  31,  1899),  gave  the  results  of  the 
two  years'  examination  of  the  Nicaragua  routes.  It  appeared 
by  this  synopsis  that  the  three  commissioners  agreed  as  to  the 


92  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

best  route  through  Nicaragua  (differing  in  some  particulars 
from  the  route  selected  by  the  Menocal  survey),  but  they 
disagreed  seriously  in  their  estimates  of  the  cost  of  construc- 
tion. Admiral  Walker  and  Professor  Haupt  calculated  the 
sum  as  not  exceeding  §118,113,790,  while  Colonel  Haines  be- 
lieved the  probable  cost  would  reach  quite  ^16,000,000  more. 
These  figures  were  deduced  from  a  generous  estimate  of  the 
expenses  of  actual  construction  ;  nevertheless,  there  was  left 
to  the  imagination  a  formidable  array  of  unknown  quantities 
which  might  call  for  extra  millions. 

The  effect  of  this  report,  made  by  the  most  competent  and 
disinterested  engineers,  and  after  a  prolonged  and  most  care- 
ful survey  of  the  region,  was,  in  one  sense,  encouraging  to 
I    the  friends  of  the  Nicaraguan  Canal,  and,  in  another  sense,  it 
1  was  quite  the  contrary.     The  feasibility  of  the  Nicaragua 
route  was  thoroughly  established  ;  there  could  be  no  further 
question  upon  that  score,  and  the  best  course  for  the  canal 
•from  Grey  town  and  Brito,  as  well  as  the  most  advantageous 
disposition  of  locks  and  dams,  were  definitely  fixed  ;  but  the 
amount  of  treasure  the  monster  would  consume  was,  after  all, 
\  highly  problematic. 

The  recent  appearance  of  the  Panama  agents  in  the  con- 
ferences of  the  Senate  and  House  committees,  and  the  sudden 
awakening  to  new  life^and  vigor  of  that  once  hopelessly 
discredited  French  project,  p^i-oduced  a  marked  ejffect  upon 
Congress.  Had  all  been  progressing  smoothly  in  Nicaragua, 
the  case  might  have  been  different ;  but  the  Nicaragua 
canal  project  was  becoming  each  year  more  and  more  en- 
tangled in  a  web  of  conflicting  concessions,  claims  of 
rival  companies,  and  the  vexations  of  diplomatic  misun- 
derstandings. The  Maritime  Company,  that  step-child  of 
the  Senate  and  expontnit^-of-the  Nicaraguan  route,  was 
dying  on  the  street  for  want  of  the  financial  nourishment 
the  Senate  had  constantly  striven  to  supply,  but  had 
always  failed  to  give.  Year  by  year  the  determined  efforts 
of  its  friends  to  make  the  building  of  the  Nicaragua  Canal 
a  governmental  project  had  also  failed.  In  both  branches 
of  Congress,  and  especially  in  the  House,  a  strong  under- 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM        93 

current  of  opposition  to  all  Nicaraguan  canal  measures 
tended  to  prevent  successful  legislation ;  now  came  the 
preliminary  Walker  report,  which,  though  cheerful  and 
hopeful  in  tone,  told  a  discouraging  story  of  costs  and  diffi- 
culties to  be  met.  Congress  began  to  look  to  Panama  ; 
perhaps,  after  all,  it  would  be  unwise  to  ignore  the  enticing 
promises  of  the  French  company. 

Panama  had  not  been  examined  for  many  years  ;  indeed,  it 
had  never  been  investigated  in  the  thorough  and  complete 
manner  in  which  the  Walker  commission  had  surveyed 
Nicaragua.  The  same  could  be  said  of  the  other  Central 
American  routes,  formerly  considered  within  the  realms  of 
possibility,  but  long  since  abandoned.  Possibly  Nicaragua, 
with  her  load  of  annoyances,  could  be  cast  aside,  and  another 
and  better  route  discovered.  At  all  events,  it  were  better  to 
act  upon  full  knowledge  of  all  the  conditions  upon  the  isth- 
mus, than  to  commit  the  nation  to  a  route  which  might 
eventually  prove  less  desirable.  A  further  and  more  com- 
prehensive investigation  of  all  the  possible  routes  was  felt  to 
be  the  proper  course  to  pursue. 

The  State  Department  was  embarrassed.  Each  year,  when 
the  canal  bills  were  under  discussion,  the  Secretary  felt  the 
awkwardness  of  the  diplomatic  situation  in  which  the  country 
was  likely  to  be  placed.  Congress  had  a  way  of  framing  bills 
in  matters  relating  to  the  canal  question,  and  of  giving  utter- 
ance in  the  freest  manner  to  policies,  which  were  not  in  accord 
with  the  legal  obligations  of  the  country  placed  upon  it  by 
treaty  stipulations.  In  short,  the  legislative  branch  of  the 
government  in  this  respect  often  worked  to  cross  purposes 
with  the  executive, —  while  Great  Britain  anxiously  looked 
on  with  a  protest  ready  for  filing  the  moment  Congress 
succeeded  in  converting  its  ship  canal  theories  into  law. 
Clearly,  if  Congress  were  determined  upon  building,  owning, 
fortifying,  and  controlling  a  Central  American  canal,- some- 
thing must  first  be  done  in  the  matter  of  amending  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty.  Delay  was  necessary,  —  obviously 
another  commission  was  the  thing ! 

On  the  last  day  of  the  session,  the  day  upon  which  the 


94  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

Senate  bill  for  the  construction  of  the  Nicaragua  Canal,  as  ar 
rider,  was  stricken  from  the  River  and  Harbor  Bill,  a  clause 
was  substituted  in  its  place  as  follows :  — 

The  President  is  authorized  to  make  investigation  of  any  and 
all  practicable  routes  for  a  canal  .  .  .  with  a  view  to  determining 
the  most  practicable  and  feasible  route  for  such  canal,  together 
with  the  proximate  and  probable  cost  of  constructing  a  canal  at 
each  of  two  or  more  of  said  routes :  And  the  President  is  further 
authorized  to  investigate  and  ascertain  what  rights,  privileges 
and  franchises,  if  any,  may  be  held  and  owned  by  any  corpora- 
tions, associations  or  individuals,  and  what  work,  if  any,  has- 
been  done  by  such  corporations,  associations  or  individuals  in 
the  construction  of  a  canal  at  either  or  any  of  said  routes,  and 
particularly  at  the  so-called  Nicaraguan  and  Panama  routes  re^ 
spectively ;  and  likewise  to  ascertain  the  cost  of  purchasing  all 
of  the  rights,  privileges  and  franchises  held  and  owned  by  any 
such  corporations,  associations  and  individuals  in  any  and  all  of 
such  routes,  particularly  the  said  Nicaraguan  route  and  the  said 
Panama  route ;  and  likewise  to  ascertain  the  probable  or  proxi- 
mate cost  of  constructing  a  suitable  harbor  at  each  of  the  termini 
of  said  canal,  with  the  probable  annual  cost  of  maintenance  of 
said  harbors,  respectively.  And  generally  the  President  is  au- 
thorized to  make  such  full  and  complete  investigation  as  to  deter- 
mine the  most  feasible  and  practicable  route  across  said  isthmus 
for  a  canal,  together  with  the  cost  of  constructing  the  same  and 
placing  the  same  under  the  control,  management  and  ownership 
of  the  United  States. 

To  enable  the  President  to  make  the  investigations  and  ascer- 
tainments herein  provided  for,  he  is  hereby  authorized  to  employ 
in  said  service  any  of  the  engineers  of  the  United  States  Army 
at  his  discretion,  and  likewise  to  employ  any  engineers  in  civil 
life,  at  his  discretion,  and  any  other  persons  necessary  to  make 
such  investigation,  and  to  fix  the  compensation  of  any  and  all  of 
such  engineers  and  other  persons. 

So  the  session  of  1899  closed  with  the  canal  question  rest- 
ing easily  under^the  certainty  of  at  least  a  year's  delay. 

The  President  at  once  appointed  the  members  of  the  new 
commission.  They  were  Admiral  Walker  and  his  two  col- 
leagues of  the  former  commission,  ex-Senator  Pasco  of  Flor- 
ida, Alfred  Noble,  George  S.  Morrison,  and  Professor  William 
H.  Burr  of  Columbia  University, — three  well-known   and 


THE   INTEROCEANIC   CANAL  PROBLEM  95 

distinguished  engineers,  —  General  (then  Colonel)  Ernst, 
U.S.A.,  and  Professor  E.  R.  Johnson  of  the  University  of 
Pennsylvania,  a  noted  student  of  commerce  and  economics. 
With  the  generous  sum  of  a  million  dollars  to  defray  ex- 
penses, the  new  commission  organized  and  proceeded  to 
Central  America. 

After  this  final  series  of  crushing  blows,  only  that  hope 
which  springs  eternal  in  the  human  breast  could  have  in- 
duced the  promoters  of  the  Maritime  Company  to  continue 
their  fight  for  existence.  Their  only  chance  for  success 
had  been  in  the  fidelity  of  Congress  to  their  cause;  now, 
in  their  darkest  hour  of  adversity,  the  Senate  had  all  but 
deserted  them.  It  was  upon  the  Senate  they  had  chiefly 
relied,  but  now  that  body  had  passed  a  Nicaragua  canal  meas- 
ure which  utterly  ignored  them,  and  Congress  had  adjourned 
in  March  with  the  creation  of  a  new  commission  whose  duty 
it  was  to  examine  and  report  upon  other  routes  as  well  as 
upon  their  own.  Their  one  course  to  pursue  was  to  in- 
duce Nicaragua  to  extend  their  privileges  beyond  the  9th  of 
the  following  October  —  the  fatal  day  upon  which  that  state 
had  arranged  to  celebrate  the  company's  obsequies.  Now,  by 
the  last  article  in  the  Maritime  Company's  concession,  it  is 
provided  that :  — 

Any  misunderstanding  that  may  arise  between  the  State  of 
Nicaragua  and  the  company  in  regard  to  the  interpretation  of  the 
present  stipulations  shall  be  submitted  to  a  court  of  arbitrators 
composed  of  four  members,  two  of  which  shall  be  appointed  by 
the  State  and  two  by  the  company. 

These  arbitrators  shall  be  designated  by  each  of  the  parties 
within  the  period  of  four  months  from  the  day  on  which  one  of 
the  contracting  parties  shall  have  informed  the  other  in  writing 
of  the  want  of  agreement  on  the  point  at  issue.  Should  one  of 
the  parties  allow  the  afoi-esaid  term  to  pass,  it  shall  be  considered 
as  assenting  to  the  opinion  or  claim  of  the  other. 

The  company's  last  hope  lay  in  this  clause,  and  the  directors 
sought  to  strengthen  their  position  before  Nicaragua  by  press- 
ing their  claims  for  a  hearing  through  the  State  Department. 
The  latter  assumed  the  burden  with  some  hesitation,  and  a 


96  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

correspondence  upon  the  subject  was  opened  with  Mr.  Merry, 
the  United  States  Minister  at  Costa  Rica,  there  being  at  that  time 
no  diplomatic  representative  from  Washington  at  Managua. 
The  company's  claim  to  an  extension  of  time,  under  the  terms 
of  its  concession,  was  based  upon  the  assertion  that  the  revo- 
lutions in  Nicaragua  within  the  last  ten  years  —  in  reality  a 
protracted  reign  of  political  disturbances  —  and  enforced 
cessation  of  work  caused  by  the  investigations  of  the 
various  governmental  commissions,  together  constituted 
"  events  of  main  force,"  that  are  "  duly  justified  and  sufficient 
to  impede  the  progress  of  the  work."  Negotiations  looking 
to  the  settlement  of  the  company's  grievances  progressed 
slowly,  and  the  9th  of  October  arrived  before  the  formal  protest 
of  the  company,  as  set  forth  and  required  in  the  bond,  reached 
the  Nicaraguan  capital.  By  the  company's  failure  to  make 
proper  and  due  protest,  and  to  present  its  case  before  the 
time  li^pit  set  upon  the  company's  franchise  had  expired,  the 
Maritime  Company  lost  its  right  to  a  tribunal ;  but  in  def- 
erence to  an  expressed  interest  in  the  company,  shown  by  the 
United  States  Government,  Nicaragua  waived  her  rights  in 
the  premises  and  agreed  to  arbitrate.  She  at  once  appointed 
two  natives  of  Nicaragua  to  serve  as  jurors,  and  invited  the 
company  to  name  two  arbitrators ;  the  company  selected  two 
men  who  were  personally  interested  in  the  company,  and 
whom  Nicaragua  challenged,  coupling  her  challenge  with  a 
demand  that  all  four  arbitrators  be  Nicaraguans.  To  this 
the  company  firmly  objected,  and  with  this  hitch  in  the  pro- 
ceedings the- matter  remained  unsettled.^ 

The  future  of  the  Maritime  Canal  Company  was  far  from 
bright.  It  did  not  seem  likely  that,  if  a  tribunal  of  arbitra- 
tion were  agreed  upon,  its  decision  could  be  otherwise  than 
adverse  to  the  company.  Senator  Morgan  warmly  champi- 
oned its  cause  in  1899,  but  the  following  year  Congress 
showed  a  more  decided  tendency  to  sever  itself  from  all 
private  or  corporate  canal  schemes,  and  to  retain  a  free  hand 

1  A  tribunal  was  eventually  agreed  upon  which  decided,  in  the  autumn  of 
1900,  adversely  to  the  company.  Against  this  decision  the  company  excepted 
and  lodged  a  protest  in  the  Department  of  IState. 


THE   INTEROCEANIC   CANAL   PROBLEM  97 

to  prosecute  the  work,  when  the  proper  time  should  come, 
as  a  purely  national  undertaking. 

The  Grace  Company  also  encountered  numerous  diffi- 
culties. According  to  the  provisions  of  its  very  liberal  con- 
cession, it  was  to  begin  its  corporate  existence  on  October 
9,  1899.  Six  months  from  that  day,  i.e.  April  9,  1900,  it 
was  expected  to  be  fully  organized  and  equipped  for  work, 
and  four  months  from  the  date  of  its  complete  organization 
it  was  expected  to  pay  to  Nicaragua  the  balance  of  the 
$500,000  deposit.  The  members  of  this  syndicate  felt  secure 
in  their  rights  and  reasonably  satisfied  with  the  outlook. 
They  awaited  judgment  upon  the  Maritime  Company  case, 
confident  that  their  rivals  would  be  forever  silenced  by  decree 
of  the  improvised  court.  They  asserted  perfect  organization  as 
a  company,  and  their  ability  to  furnish  the  funds  necessary  to 
complete  the  construction  of  the  canal;  and  they  declared 
themselves  to  bo  ready  to  pay  the  sum  of  $400,000  still  due 
to  Nicaragua,  the  moment  a  demand  should  be  made  for  it. 
Incidentally  they  considered  their  franchise  worth  15,000,000. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  syndicate  was  embarrassed  by  nu- 
merous difficulties.  The  good  will  of  Nicaragua  herself, 
an  essential  to  success,  was  apparently  lost.  A  decided 
coolness  toward  the  company  on  the  part  of  the  conces- 
sionary government  developed  into  outspoken  disfavor. 
Nicaragua  maintained  that  she  blundered  into  granting  the 
Cragin-Eyre  franchise  through  a  false  belief  that  the  syndi- 
cate represented  a  governmental  project,  and  that  it  had  the 
support  of  the  President  and  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States.  To-day  Nicaragua  expresses  her  desire  to  deal  with 
the  United  States  directly  and  to  rid  herself  of  private 
companies,  in  all  of  which  she  has  lost  faith.  In  the  second 
place,  the  Grace  Syndicate  never  won  the  support,  nor  even 
the  confidence,  of  the  men  in  the  United  States  Congress 
who  control  the  canal  committees.  Indeed,  Congress  was 
disposed  to  regard  the  syndicate  as  a  speculative  concern 
whose  claims  might  be  safely  and  properly  ignored,  should 
Congress  decide  to  build  the  canal  as  a  government  work. 
The  growing  conviction  of  Congress  that   the  government 


98  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

should  undertake  and  maintain  the  work  upon  a  national 
basis  promised  an  uncertain  future  to  this  Syndicate  as  it 
augured  ill  for  the  moribund  Maritime  Company.^ 

Despite  the  excellent  showing  made  by  the  representatives 
of  the  Panama  Company  in  the  Congressional  investigation 
of  January,  1899,  and  the  resulting  appointment  of  a  scien- 
tific commission  to  examine  that  route,  the  star  of  that  ill- 
fated  project  lost  lustre  as  the  new  year  (1900)  approached. 
Every  one  remembered  too  well  the  brilliant  promises  of  the 
old  company,  which  had  never  been  fulfilled;  indeed,  the 
whole  distressing  story  of  failure  and  fraud  was  too  fresh  in 
mind  to  permit  even  the  chance  of  its  repetition. 

Suspicion  began  to  attach  to  the  sudden  revival  of  this 
Panama  scheme,  and  the  impression  gained  ground,  and 
finally  prevailed,  that  its  sudden  advertisement  was,  after 
all,  but  a  clever  move,  on  the  part  of  the  transcontinental 
railroad  lobby,  to  divert  public  attention  from  the  only  feasi- 
,  ble  canal  route.  Despite  the  prejudice  it  encountered  in  the 
United  States,  the  Panama  Company  continued  its  strenuous 
efforts  to  impress  the  country  favorably  with  its  prospects. 
The  latest  move  of  its  promoters  has  been  in  the  direction  of 
"  Americanizing  "  the  French  company.  As  an  initial  step,  it 
organized  in  New  Jersey,  at  about  the  beginning  of  the  year 
1900,  the  "  Panama  Canal  Company  of  America,"  to  which 
the  rights  of  the  French  company  should  eventually  be  trans- 
ferred. In  this  manner  the  Panama  promoters  hoped  to 
place  their  project  upon  an  equal  footing  with  the  other  two 
American  companies  in  the  race  for  governmental  recognition. 

Although  the  scientific  commission  was  still  in  the  field 
at  the  opening  of  the  5()th  Congress  (December,  1899),  the 
canal  committees  in  both  branches  decided  not  to  wait  for 
Admiral  Walker's  report,  which  was  not  due  for  many  months. 
A  more  propitious  moment  for  carrying  through  a  canal  meas- 
ure had  never  before  existed.  The  private  companies  having 
suffered  themselves  to  become  involved  in  difficulties  from 

1  The  Grace  Syndicate  failed  to  meet  its  obligation  to  pay  the  balance  of 
$400,000  upon  the  stipulated  date ;  the  Nicaraguan  authorities  accordingly 
declared  its  franchise  cancelled. 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM        99 

which  they  could  not  extricate  themselves,  could  be  safely 
ignored.  The  country  at  large  favored  the  scheme  of  na- 
tional construction,  the  executive  endorsed  it,  Nicaragua 
demanded  it,  and  the  surplus  in  the  Treasury,  for  the  first 
time  in  years,  was  in  a  condition  to  meet  the  financial  obli- 
gations necessary  to  undertake  the  work. 

A  "  Bi'll  to  provide  for  the  Construction  of  a  Canal  connect- 
ing the  Waters  of  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  Oceans,"  was 
accordingly  introduced  into  the  House  by  Mr.  Hepburn, 
on  December  7  (189.9),  and  a  bill  of  similar  purport  was 
placed  before  the  Senate  ten  days  later  by  Mr.  Sullivan. 
Both  measures  provided  for  the  immediate  purchase  of  a 
strip  of  territory  from  Nicaragua  and  Costa  Rica  and  called 
for  appropriations  —  one  bill,  of  i>130,000,000,  and  the  other, 
of  1140,000,000  —  to  meet  the  expenses  of  construction. 
The  Senate  bill  authorized  and  requested  the  President  to 
negotiate  with  the  Government  of  Great  Britain  for  the 
abrogation  or  modification  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty, 
"so  far  and  to  such  an  extent  as  to  enable  the  United  States 
to  own,  construct,  maintain,  and  operate  under  its  exclusive 
jurisdiction,  a  canal.  .  .  ." 

It  also  provided  for  the  purchase  of  any  valid  outstanding 
concessions  from  Nicaragua  or  Costa  Rica,  but  the  House 
bill  not  only  ignored  the  treaty  rights  of  Great  Britain,  but 
the  legal  rights  of  the  concessionary  companies  in  Nicaragua 
as  well. 

In  his  report  accompanying  the  House  bill  (H.  R.  2538), 
Mr.  Hepburn  expressly  stated,  in  reference  to  these  con- 
cessionaries, that  "it  is  not  believed  that  any  one  of  these 
.  .  .  has  any  right  or  interest  that  he  can  convey  to  the 
United  States."  In  order  to  forestall  any  arguments  of  an 
ethical  character  which  might  be  urged  against  the  bill,  he 
set  forth,  with  considerable  positiveness,  his  belief  that  the 
Nicaragua  Canal,  when  finally  built,  would  be  entitled  to  no 
place  in  the  field  of  international  law,  and  further,  that  all 
considerations  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  could  well  be 
put  aside,  for  —  "  It  has  been  a  dead  letter  from  the  day 
the  treaty  was  signed  to  the  present  moment." 


100  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

The  passage  of  such  a  measure  in  Congress  was  at  that 
time  considered  by  many  to  be  particularly  indiscreet,  in 
view  of  the  fact  that  the  Walker  commission,  for  whose 
expenses  $1,000,000  had  been  appropriated,  was  still  engaged 
in  the  examination  of  the  various  routes.  An  international 
scientific  commission  of  high  authority  had  recently  pro- 
nounced the  Panama  project  entirely  feasible  and  had  placed 
the  cost  at  only  1102,000,000;  it  seemed,  therefoi;e,  highly 
desirable  that  Admiral  Walker's  coming  report  should  be 
received  before  either  Mr.  Hepburn's  or  Mr.  Sullivan's  bills 
should  become  law. 

Both  bills  were  amended  in  committee,  and  as  amended 
were  reported  back  to  their  respective  Houses  in  January 
and  February.  Consideration  of  these  bills  for  the  moment 
was  delayed  by  the  stress  of  other  and  more  important  busi- 
ness, but  the  friends  of  both  of  them  felt  confident  that  early 
action  would  be  taken,  and  that  some  sort  of  a  canal  bill 
would  receive  the  sanction  of  both  Houses  before  the  end  of 
the  term;  the  sudden  appearance  of  the  Hay-Pauncefote 
treaty,  with  its  unexpected  provisions,  effectually  blocked  for 
a  time  all  further  action  upon  the  pending  bills.  Although 
it  seemed  highly  improbable  that  final  action  on  either 
measure  could  be  reached  during  that  session  of  Congress, 
the  Hepburn  bill  nevertheless  passed  the  House  by  the 
overwhelming  majority  of  225  to  35  votes  (May  2). 

The  bill  ignored  all  the  private  companies,  and  enacted 
that  the  United  States  Government  should  "  acquire  from  the 
states  of  Costa  Rica  and  Nicaragua,  for  and  in  behalf  of  the 
United  States,  control  of  such  portion  of  territory  now 
belonging  to  Costa  Rica  and  Nicaragua  as  may  be  desirable 
and  necessary  on  which  to  excavate,  construct,  and  defend  a 
canal  of  such  depth,"  etc.  It  provided  for  such  fortifications 
along  the  route  "  as  will  be  required  for  the  safety  and  pro- 
tection of  said  canal  and  harbors."  An  appropriation  of 
§10,000,000  was  called  for  to  enable  the  Secretary  of  War  to 
enter  upon  contracts  for  "  materials  and  work  that  may  he 
deemed  necessary  for  the  proper  excavation,  construction, 
defence  and  completion  of  said  canal,  to  be  paid  for  as  appro- 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROKLEM' '  ;     .'  ,  101, 

priations  may  from  time  to  time  be  heresdtor 'i!ks^^hotiltoi 
exceed  in  the  aggregate  1140,000,000." 

The  passage  of  this  bill  in  the  House  marked  the  desire 
so  generally  felt  throughout  the  country  that  the  United 
States  Government  should  construct  an  isthmian  canal;  but 
its  passage  was  also  ill  timed,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the 
Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  was  then  before  the  Senate  awaiting 
confirmation.  The  provisions  of  the  treaty  and  of  the  bill, 
in  so  far  as  they  related  to  the  political  control  of  the  canal, 
were  diametrically  opposed,  and  the  sudden  passage  of  the 
bill  in  pointed  contempt  of  the  treaty  was  a  measure  well 
calculated  to  impugn  the  good  faith  of  the  nation.  The 
bill  failed  to  pass  the  Senate. 

On  February  13  (1900),  another  canal  bill  was  introduced 
into  the  House  by  Mr.  Levy  of  New  York,  which  differed 
essentially  from  all  previous  measures  looking  to  the  con- 
struction of  a  Central  American  canal.  Following  the  tenor 
of  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty,  which  was  then  before  the 
Senate,  it  provided  for  negotiations  between  the  United 
States  and  other  maritime  nations,  with  a  view  to  securing 
international  cooperation  and  contribution  according  to  the 
ship  tonnage  of  the  various  nations  in  the  construction  of  a 
neutralized  ship  canal.  This  bill  was  far  too  radical  to  meet 
with  favor  in  the  House. 


A  comprehensive  glance  at  the  history  and  development  of 
the  canal  problem  in  Central  America  discloses  the  following 
facts :  — 

First,  it  was  the  object  of  the  early  navigators  to  find  a. 
natural  strait  connecting  the  two  oceans. 

Second,  when  the  absence  of  such  a  natural  waterway  was 
definitely  determined,  the  purpose  was  conceived  to  construct 
an  artificial  one. 

Third,  a  number  of  projects  were  considered  and  discussed 
looking  to  this  end  during  the  sixteenth,  seventeenth  and 
eighteenth  centuries. 

Fourth,  the  United  States  became  interested  in  the  ques- 


102  American  diplomatic  questions 

tids'ii'tQ  tiite.. early* part  of  the  nineteenth  century,  after  the 
independence  of  the  Central  American  states  had  been 
established. 

Fifth,  other  nations  then  became  interested  in  the  project, 
and  numerous  surveys  Avere  made  covering  not  less  than  six 
possible  routes.  The  early  surveys  were  superficial,  and  wholly 
worthless  in  the  light  of  more  modern  engineering  science. 

Sixth,  the  result  of  later  surveys  has  been  to  reject  all 
€xcept  the  Panama  and  Nicaragua  routes.  French  interest 
became  focussed  upon  Panama,  and  the  United  States  favored 
the  Nicaraguan  route. 

Seventh,  the  failure  and  collapse  of  the  French  Panama 
Company  had  left  for  a  time  a  clear  field  to  the  American 
companies  in  Nicaragua;  but  when  the  latter  companies 
were  driven  to  insolvency  and  inactivity,  nothing  less  than 
governmental  aid  seemed  to  promise  success. 

Eighth,  the  result  of  recent  surveys,  combined  with  the 
experience  of  those  who  have  attempted  construction  of  the 
work,  has  been  to  demonstrate  that  the  physical  difiiculties 
in  the  way  and  the  probable  cost  of  construction  are  greater 
than  formerly  supposed.  While  the  advanced  skill  of  engi- 
neering science  has  devised  improved  means  of  overcoming 
physical  difficulties,  it  has  at  the  same  time  developed  many 
obstacles  hitherto  undiscovered. 

Ninth,  a  recent  phase  of  the  question  is  a  growing  distrust 
in  the  ability  of  any  private  company  to  complete  the  work 
of  constructing  a  Central  American  canal.  For  ten  years 
past  Congress  has  tended  toward  a  policy  of  placing  the 
work  trpon-ar  national  basis.  This  tendency  reached  its 
culmination  in  the  56th  Congress  by  the  introduction  of 
bills  into  both  Houses  looking  exclusively  to  governmental 
construction  of  the  canal. 

The  great  majority  of  the  people  of  Europe  and  America 
have  always  believed  that  this  convenient  doorway  to  the 
Pacific  should  be  opened  to  the  world's  commerce.  The 
query  naturally  arises.  Why,  after  three  hundred  years  of 
effort,  has  it  never  been  done?  In  spite  of  the  physical 
difficulties,    the    work    has    at   all    times   been    considered 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM       103 

feasible.  The  great  advance  in  the  efficiency  of  scientific 
investigation  has  not  tended  to  lessen  these  difficulties,  but 
the  admitted  resources  of  modern  engineering  are  acknowl- 
edged to  be  sufficient  to  overcome  them.  It  would,  of  course, 
require  many  millions  to  accomplish  the  task,  but  a  greater 
amount  of  private  capital  each  year  finds  means  of  invest- 
ment in  other  directions,  while  large  sums  prefer  inactivity 
to  an  investment  so  hazardous.  There  is  lack  of  neither 
skill  nor  capital.  The  majority  of  the  people  of  the  United 
States  are  probably  of  the  opinion  that  the  ship  canal  would 
pay  dividends  upon  its  capital  within  a  few  years  after  its 
completion,  yet  every  company  that  has  undertaken  its  con- 
struction has  failed  for  lack  of  funds.  For  ten  or  fifteen 
years  political  parties  in  the  country  have  been  united  in  the 
belief  that  the  government  should  undertake  this  work  as  a 
national  project;  and  each  year  bills  have  been  introduced 
into  Congress  looking  to  that  end,  yet  none  of  these  bills 
haviQ- become  law. 

It  is  true  that  a  large  transcontinental  railroad  interest  has 
steadily  opposed  these  measures,  but  that  opposition  could 
not  by  itself  prevail  year  after  year,  against  the  desire  of  the 
country  at  large.  One  must  then  look  elsewhere  for  that 
mysterious  influence  which  seems  to  prevent  the  realization 
of  these  hopes  of  triumph  over  the  obstacles  of  nature.  It 
is  probably  to  be  found  in  the  fear  and  distrust  of  each 
other  entertained  by  the  commercial  nations  of  the  world. 
While  each  one  hesitates  to  make  the  enormous  expenditure 
necessary  to  the  construction  of  a  Central  American  ship 
canal,  each  would  no  doubt  promptly  condemn  exclusive 
ownership  or  control  by  one  or  even  several  of  the  other 
nations.  So  far,  the  Powers  interested  have  been  unable  or 
unwilling  to  fix  among  themselves  the  political  status  of  the 
canal  when  it  shall  have  been  built.  It  is  necessary,  there- 
fore, that  preliminary  to  the  commencement  of  the  work  — 
work  that  will  finally  succeed  in  its  object  —  some  diplomatic 
questions  of  a  delicate  and  serious  character  calling  for 
adjustment  must  be  met.  For  the  United  States,  these  ques- 
tions have  become  more  complicated  by  reason  of  the  recent 


104  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

development  of  public  sentiment  which  indicates  a  purpose 
to  claim,  and  possibly  to  demand,  full  and  absolute  political, 
if  not  commercial,  control  of  any  Central  American  canal 
wherever  and  whenever  it  may  be  built. 

A  review  of  the  diplomatic  aspects  of  this  canal  problem 
must  be  taken,  and  to  make  its  history  the  more  intelligible, 
it  must  be  treated  in  connection  with  early  events  in  Central 
America,  out  of  which  these  international  questions  arose. 


n 

The  earliest  Spanish  discoverers  and  explorers  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere  were  followed  almost  immediately  by 
numbers  of  their  countr3mien  who  came  to  win  fortune  in 
the  New  World.  Considering  the  many  perils  of  unknown 
•n.'  seas  and  the  many  risks  ashore,  these  Spanish  pioneers 
vti  founded  flourishing  colonies  in  Central  and  South  America 
in  a  surprisingly  short  time.  The  Anglo-Saxon  navigators, 
■  for  the  greater  part,  limited  their  field  of  exploration  to  the 
mainland  of  North  America,  and  the  colonists  from  the  colder 
climates  of  Northern  Europe  sought  regions  where  the  win- 
ters brought  snow  and  ice. 

For  quite  a  hundred  years  the  Spanish  enjoyed  an  unlim- 
ited monopoly  of  the  trade  connected  with  the  Gulf  of  Mexico 
and  the  Caribbean  Sea.  In  the  sixteenth  century  Spain,  at  the 
zenith  of  her  power  and  strength,  grew  opulent  upon  the  rich 
returns  from  her  transatlantic  possessions.  But  her  fleets  of 
galleons,  which  took  home  the  treasures  of  America,  offered 
great  temptations  to  piracy  by  certain  adventurous  spirits  in 
Europe  and  America.  In  the  early  part  of  the  seventeenth 
century,  the  famous  "  Buccaneers  of  the  Spanish  Main  "  ap- 
peared like  so  many  harpies  to  prey  upon  these  richly  laden 
vessels  of  Spain.  They  came  in  steadily  increasing  numbers, 
sometimes  founding  settlements  of  their  own  in  the  West 
Indian  Islands,  whence  they  made  excursions  for  robbery  and 
plunder.  Among  these  companies  of  roving  freebaoters  a  band 
of  Englishmen  found  for  themselves  a  safe  and  convenient  ren- 
^     dezvous  in  the  lagoons  of  the  Mosquito  Coast  of  Nicaragua. 


THE   INTEROCEANIC   CANAL  PROBLEM  105 

They  cultivated  the  friendship  of  the  native  Indians,  and, 
though  unrecognized  and  unauthorized  to  do  so  by  England, 
they  established  upon  these  swampy  shores  an  English  set- 


tlement, thus  forming  the  nucleus  of  a  future  English  pos- 
session. In  like  manner,  though  many  years  later,  another 
Gand  of  English  adventurers,  who  may  doubtfully  be  spared 
the  name  of  pirates,  took  possession  of  points  along  the  coast 
of  Yucatan,  and  appropriated  to  their  own  use  certain  islands 
lying  off  the  coast  of  Honduras,  thereby  founding  the  settle- 
ment of  Belize,  later  known  as  British  Honduras,  and  more 
recently  created  into  a  British  colonial  possession. 

The  terrible  assaults  of  these  desperate  men  upon  Spanish 
commerce  led  to  many  angry  protests  from  Spain,  which 
only  drew  from  England  an  equal  number  of  denials  of 
responsibility  for  her  castaway  and  disowned  subjects.  Yet, 
with  her  accustomed  diplomatic  shrewdness,  England  lost 
no  occasion  to  make  political  recognition  of  her  settlements 
on  the  mainland  of  Central  America.  This  was  particu- 
larly evidenced  in  her  treaty  with  Spain  of  1670.  All 
Spanish  efforts  to  dislodge  these  unwelcome  neighbors  of 
her  colonies,  either  by  diplomacy  or  force,  proved  unavail- 
ing. In  course  of  time,  however,  and  possibly  through  press- 
ure of  civilization,  the  character  and  aims  of  these  piratical 
settlers  gradually  assumed  a  better  phase,  and  even  before  the 
beginning  of  the  eighteenth  century  the  descendants  of  these 
buccaneers  became  substantially  honest  and  peaceful  men. 
They  betook  themselves  to  cutting  logwood,  cultivating  the 
soil,  teaching  morality  to  the  Indians,  and  maintaining  a 
growing  and  profitable  trade  with  the  English  colony  of  Ja- 
maica. The  early  history  of  these  two  settlements  of  Belize 
and  Mosquitoland  is  but  the  story  of  a  ceaseless  struggle  by 
England  to  maintain  her  questionable  foothold  on  the  conti- 
nent against  the  efforts  of  the  Spanish  in  Central  America 
to  loosen  it.  The  degree  of  security  enjoyed  by  these  British 
settlers  in  Central  America  depended  largely  upon  the  vary- 
ing fortunes  of  England  and  Spain  in  the  European  wars  in 
which  both  powers  were  almost  constantly  involved.  Thus, 
as  late  as  1814,  by  the  treaty  of  Madrid,  England  was  com- 


106  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

pelled  to  disavow  all  colonial  claims  in  Mosquitoland,  and  by 
the  same  instrument  the  English  settlement  of  Belize  was  re- 
duced to  the  status  of  a  mere  tenancy  at  will.  The  claims 
of  her  subjects  amounted  to  a  bare  lumbering  privilege 
granted  to  a  company  of  Englishmen  by  the  Spanish  Govern- 
ment. 

In  the  future  course  of  events,  however,  England  found 
further  occasion  to  reestablish  her  lost  prestige  in  Central 
America.  A  few  years  after  the  ratification  of  the  Madrid 
treaty,  and  just  after  Spain  had  lost  her  sovereignty  over  the 
Central  American  states,  the  English  again  appeared  on  the 
Mosquito  shore.  With  much  pomp  and  ceremony  they 
crowned  the  chief  of  the  Mosquito  Indians,  "  King  of  Mos- 
quitia,"  and  established  an  English  protectorate  over  the 
newly  created  kingdom.  Under  the  sheltering  wing  of  the 
great  British  power,  the  southern  boundary  lines  of  Mos- 
quitia  suddenly  expanded  so  as  to  include  the  mouth  of  the 
San  Juan  River,  that  vital  spot  of  Nicaragua's  territory.  In 
quite  the  same  manner,  and  as  suddenly,  Belize  ripened  into 
an  English  "possession,"  with  a  governor  and  other  officers 
of  state,  under  the  title  of  "  British  Honduras,"  which  now 
as  a  colony  continues  to  flourish,  time  having  cured  the  weak- 
ness of  its  tenure  upon  the  land,  and  cleared  away  the  doubts 
formerly  cast  upon  its  rights  of  existence. 

The  purpose  of  England's  tenacious  hold  upon  the  main- 
land of  Central  America  became  clearer  when,  in  1847,  the 
King  of  Mosquitia  announced  to  the  Nicaraguan  Government 
that,  on  and  after  January  1,  1848,  he  would  "  reassume  his 
Awful  control "  over  the  San  Juan  River.  In  pursuance  of 
this  notice,  he  duly  appeared  at  the  river's  mouth  with  a 
force  of  English  marines,  and  raised  the  colors  of  Mosquitia. 
Some  skirmishes  with  the  Nicaraguan  soldiers  resulted,  but 
in  the  course  of  a  few  months,  when  the  excitement  had 
subsided,  the  English  were  thoroughly  established  in  the 
old  town  of  San  Juan  del  Norte  at  the  mouth  of  the 
San  Juan  River,  which  they  changed  to  the  name  of 
"  Greytown,"  and  they  were  moreover  strengthened  in  their 
enlarged  possessions  by  a  new  treaty  with  Nicaragua,  which 


THE  INTEROCEANIC   CANAL  PROBLEM  107 

purported  to  recognize  actual  rights  of  sovereignty  in  the 
Mosquito  king. 

These  English  encroachments  upon  American  soil  were 
regarded  with  growing  apprehension  in  Washington,  not 
only  because  it  seemed  to  be  a  clear  and  open  defiance  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  but  also  because  it  was  foreseen  that 
English  acquisition  of  territory,  through  which  the  proposed 
Nicaraguan  Canal  must  pass,  would  likely  give  rise  in  the 
future  to  many  serious  difficulties.  Prompt  action  on  the 
part  of  Congress  was  demanded  by  the  American  press  to 
check  this  dangerous  advance  of  British  influence  in  Nica- 
ragua. The  isthmus  routes  were  as  yet  unappropriated, 
and  to  gain  an  equal  advantage  with  Great  Britain,  Presi- 
dent Polk  at  once  concluded  a  treaty  with  New  Granada, 
now  known  as  the  United  States  of  Colombia,  securing 
to  the  United  States  exclusive  rights  of  transit  across  the 
isthmus,  in  return  for  our  promise  to  maintain  the  absolute 
neutrality  of  the  transit  line,  and  a  further  pledge  to 
guard,  against  all  attack.  New  Granada's  complete  politi- 
cal sovereignty  over  any  line  of  transit  the  United  States 
might  construct  within  her  territory.  While  securing  these 
rights  and  privileges  over  the  lower  isthmus.  President 
Polk  despatched  Mr.  Elijah  Hise  to  Nicaragua  to  investi- 
gate and  report  upon  the  recent  acts  of  the  British  in  con- 
nection with  the  Mosquito  king,  and  also  upon  the  extent  of 
their  encroachments,  if  any,  upon  the  rights  of  Nicaragua. 
He  was  not  clothed  with  powers  to  enter  upon  any  negotia- 
tions whatever,  the  purpose  of  his  mission  as  charge  d'affaires 
being,  besides  one  of  investigation,  to  use  his  influence  in 
establishing  more  cordial  relations  with  Nicaragua.  Hav- 
ing arrived  upon  the  scene,  however,  Mr.  Hise  became 
convinced  that  his  duty  was  to  obtain  for  his  country  the 
most  liberal  treaty  possible  from  Nicaragua.  He  soon  dis- 
covered ample  evidences  of  a  British  purpose  to  secure 
possession  of  ports  upon  both  coasts  of  Nicaragua,  which 
would  enable  them  absolutely  to  control  the  canal  that  it 
was  hoped  might  some  day  connect  the  oceans  at  that  point. 
The  recent  acquisition  of  California  with  its  promises  of 


108  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

future  wealth  convinced  him  of  the  utmost  importance  to  the 
United  States  of  maintaining  the  route  free  from  foreign  in- 
fluence. The  canal  was  destined  no  doubt  to  be  the  main 
high  way  connecting  the  two  distant  sections  of  the  country. 
In  those  early  days  the  all  but  impassable  deserts  and  unex- 
plored mountain  ranges  of  the  West  precluded  the  idea  of 
a  direct  overland  communication  by  rail  to  the  Pacific  coast, 
and  consequently  the  importance  attached  to  the  Central 
American  route  was  then  much  greater  in  the  public  mind 
than  in  later  years. 

Cognizant  of  these  conditions  and  fully  confident  that  the 
government  at  Washington,  when  once  it  had  been  led  to 
appreciate  the  extent  and  motives  of  British  aggressions  in 
Central  America,  would  ratify  them,  he  proceeded,  though 
unauthorized  to  do  so,  to  conclude  the  articles  of  a  new  con- 
vention with  the  very  willing  Nicaraguan  Congress.  The 
treaty  which  he  signed  in  June,  1849,  gave  to  the  United 
States,  besides  the  usual  privileges  of  such  an  agreement,  the 
right  to  erect  fortifications  along  the  course  of  a  proposed  canal, 
and  to  hold  and  fortify  the  ports  at  either  end  of  the  route. 
In  return  for  these  privileges,  the  United  States  undertook 
to  guarantee  Nicaragua's  sovereignty  from  sea  to  sea  over  all 
the  territory  she  claimed.  Such  a  compact,  of  course,  not 
only  completely  ignored  British  claims  at  Greytown,  threat- 
ening at  once  to  draw  England  and  the  United  States  into  a 
dispute,  but  it  also  involved  an  extravagant  application  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  which  was  far  too  radical  to  meet  with  the 
views  of  President  Taylor.  A  reaction  from  the  aggressive 
foreign  policy  of  the  Polk  administration  had  set  in;  Mr.  Hise 
was  recalled,  and  in  his  place  Mr.  E.  G.  Squier  was  despatched 
with  all  haste  to  Nicaragua  to  grapple  with  the  situation. 

Mr.  Squier's  instructions  were  extremely  conservative. 
He  was  cautioned  against  all  rash  measures  calculated  to 
infringe  upon  the  rights  of  others  or  needlessly  to  provoke 
hostility.  He  was  assured  that  while  the  government  was 
at  all  times  ready  and  willing  to  maintain  the  "  Monroe  Doc- 
trine," that  doctrine  was  not  inconsistent  with  the  idea  and 
purpose  that  an  interoceanic  canal  should  "concede  equal 


THE   INTEROCEANIC   CANAL   PROBLEM  109 

rights  of  transit  to  all  nations,"  and  that  it  "  should  not  be 
hampered  by  any  restrictions,  either  from  local  government 
or  the  company  building  it."  Mr.  Squier  at  once  drew  up 
a  treaty  with  Nicaragua  which  granted  the  United  States  a 
right  of  way  from  sea  to  sea,  and  the  United  States  in  return 
guaranteed  Nicaragua's  right  of  sovereignty  over  the  route 
and  at  both  terminal  ports ;  the  right  was  reserved  to  Nicara- 
gua to  make  similar  treaties  with  any  other  nation  or  nations 
that  cared  to  share  this  open  right  of  way.  Obviously,  by 
entering  into  such  a  compact  with  the  United  States,  Nicara- 
gua again  violated  her  treaty  of  the  year  before  with  Eng- 
land, and  in  guaranteeing  Nicaragua's  sovereignty  over  both 
ports  at  either  terminus  of  the  proposed  canal,  the  United 
States  necessarily  stamped  her  disapproval  upon  the  British 
seizure  of  Greytown. 

While  Mr.  Squier  was  negotiating  this  very  liberal  treaty, 
the  English  resolved  to  strengthen  even  more  firmly  their  grasp 
upon  Nicaragua  and  the  canal  route  by  obtaining  landed  inter- 
ests at  the  Pacific  terminus  of  the  canal.  A  British  expedition, 
accordingly,  started  for  the  Gulf  of  Fonseca,  in  the  territory  of 
Honduras,  which  was  the  supposed  future  Pacific  entrance  to 
the  inland  waterway,  for  the  purpose  of  seizing  the  islands  in 
this  gulf, — points  of  the  greatest  strategic  value.  Mr.  Squier 
hurried  to  Honduras,  and  in  order  to  forestall  these  British 
encroachments,  he  hastily  concluded  a  preliminary  treaty 
with  Honduras  (September,  1849),  whereby,  pending  final 
negotiations,  the  Island  of  Tigre,  in  the  Gulf  of  Fonseca,  was 
ceded  to  the  United  States  for  a  limited  period.  Now,  strangely 
enough,  Mr.  Squier's  hasty  mission  to  Honduras  had  scarcely 
been  accomplished,  when  the  British  expedition  appeared,  and 
upon  the  transparent  excuse  of  an  unpaid  debt  seized  this 
same  Tigre  Island  (October,  1849).  Thus,  in  their  struggle 
for  the  control  of  the  territory  through  which  the  inter- 
oceanic  canal  was  likely  to  pass,  the  two  powers  came  face  to 
face,  and  as  the  English  commander  refused  to  surrender  his 
newly  acquired  island,  it  seemed  that  war  was  inevitable.  In 
the  meantime,  the  British  had  been  no  less  active  along  the 
Atlantic  coast ;  under  pretext  of  definitely  fixing  the  boun- 


110  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

daries  of  the  Mosquito  kingdom,  its  domain  had  been  con- 
siderably enlarged.  The  extent  and  character  of  the  Hise 
treaty  (though  never  ratified  by  the  United  States)  had 
become  known  to  England  just  before  this  time,  but  fortu- 
nately the  subtle  forces  of  diplomacy  had  already  been  utilized 
to  avert  an  armed  conflict,  which  the  publication  of  the  Hise 
treaty  would  certainly  have  precipitated  ;  suddenly  the  news 
of  the  Tigre  Island  incident  came  to  intensify  the  existing 
excitement  in  the  United  States. 

In  1850  the  American  people  had  just  come  to  a  realizing 
sense  of  the  fact  that  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States 
were  rivals  for  a  controlling  influence  in  Central  America. 
The  United  States  had  occupied  itself  in  reclaiming  its  vast 
domains  and  in  creating  new  states  in  the  wilderness  which 
lay  beyond  the  Mississippi ;  without  thought  of  the  effect 
upon  the  world  at  large,  or  a  care  for  the  "  balance  of  power  " 
in  the  Americas,  territorial  expansion  westward  had  steadily 
continued.  Texas  was  absorbed  into  the  Union,  and  Cali- 
fornia, an  empire  in  itself,  was  added  to  the  growing  body  of 
the  nation.  Oregon  and  Washington  were  definitely  marked 
out,  and  a  lasting  check  was  thereby  placed  upon  British 
hopes  of  further  expansion  on  the  Pacific  coast.  Contact 
with  the  western  ocean  awakened  thoughts  of  Oriental  com- 
merce, and  here,  for  the  first  time,  the  influences  were  felt 
that  had  been  operating  to  draw  apart  the  two  great  powers, 
and  that  liad  made  them  rivals  in  Central  America.  Great 
Britain  enjoyed  monopoly  of  Indian  and  Asiatic  trade,  and 
when  once  that  source  of  her  commercial  vitality  was  jeopard- 
ized, her  disfavor  and  enmity  were  aroused. 

The  success  of  American  arms  in  Mexico  had  in  a  measure 
intoxicated  the  people,  and  every  advance  in  territorial  gain 
seemed  more  than  ever  to  prove  the  truth  in  those  early 
prophecies  that  "  a  manifest  destiny  "  would  eventually  place 
the  whole  continent  under  the  American  flag.  This  eager- 
ness for  territorial  aggrandizement  was  no  more  than  the 
outcome  of  a  race  between  the  North  and  South  for  exten- 
sion of  the  slaveholding  and  free-soil  area  of  the  United 
States;  but  British  statesmen  saw  in  this  mania  for  expan- 


THE   INTEROCEANIC   CANAL   PROBLEM  111 

sion  only  a  surer  prospect  of  the  extension  of  the  United 
States  north  into  Canada  and  south  into  Mexico  and  Central 
America.  In  the  interest  of  her  American  colonial  posses- 
sions, Great  Britain  sought  to  oppose  such  advances.  The 
British  Government  foresaw  the  importance  to  England  of 
a  neutral  Central  American  canal,  and  it  anticipated  the 
movements  of  the  United  States  that  should  seek  to  place 
Central  America  under  North  American  dominion,  and  de- 
prive England  of  those  joint  proprietary  rights  in  the  canal 
which  her  trade  interests  demanded. 

When  the  British  first  laid  claim  to  Mosquitia,  the  Ameri- 
can people,  unmindful,  continued  to  attend  to  their  own 
domestic  affairs ;  but  when  the  British  reoccupied  the  east 
coast  of  Nicaragua,  and  seized  Greytown,  the  United  States 
became  aroused.  The  causes  that  for  years  had  been  silently 
operating  to  estrange  the  two  nations  now  came  to  the 
surface,  and  a  spirit  of  jealousy  shadowed  the  popular  mind 
in  both  England  and  the  United  States,  and  no  doubt  in- 
fluenced both  governments.  The  American  people  resented 
these  recent  acts  of  British  aggression  in  Nicaragua,  which 
they  believed  to  have  been  inspired  through  feelings  of  en- 
mity toward  the  United  States.  The  mutual  feelings  of  sus- 
picion and  distrust  were  enhanced  by  the  determination  of 
Great  Britain  to  stand  by  the  assumptions  of  the  Mosquito 
chief  who  obstructed  the  building  of  an  American  canal 
through  his  territory.  The  belief  had  become  general  through- 
out the  country  and  especially  in  the  Southern  states,  that  an 
open  waterway  through  Nicaragua  was  absolutely  essential  to 
the  integrity  and  welfare  of  the  United  States.  The  demand 
for  a  neutral  canal  had  become  so  urgent,  its  importance  so 
vital,  that  the  people  themselves  were  ready  to  risk  war  for 
it  if  need  be ;  then  came  the  British  seizure  of  Tigre  Island, 
which  completed  the  chain  of  events  that  had  brought  about 
the  bitter  jealousies  of  the  two  nations.  The  danger  of  war 
in  1850  had  become  alarming. 

Mr.    Clayton,  the   Secretary  of    State,  fully  appreciated    t/ 
the    gravity   of   the    situation.      As   a   practical   statesman, 
he   believed   that  the   benefits  arising   from    a   great   com- 


112  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

mercial  enterprise  belonged  rather  to  a  state  of  peace  than 

to  a  state  of  war,  and  perhaps  already  realizing,  above  and 

'^"BeyonSTThe  excitement  and  passions  of  the  moment,  that  an 

1-interoceanic  canal  should  be  as  free  as  the  high  seas  them- 
selves, he  proceeded  to  open  the  way  with  the  English  Min- 
ister at  Washington  toward  the  negotiation  of  a  treaty,  which 
would  not  only  be  the  means  of  preventing  an  immediate  war, 
but  which  would  also  outline  those  practical  and  conserva- 
tive suggestions  which  he  believed  it  would  be  necessary  to 
adopt  to  insure  the  completion  of  this  great  work. 

The  conclusion  most  earnestly  sought  was  to  induce  Eng- 
land to  withdraw  from  Greytown,  for  in  that  occupancy  the 
Secretary  saw  the  certainty  of  armed  conflict.  On  this  point 
it  was  known  that  American  sentiment  was  fixed  and  irre- 
versible. In  return  for  such  a  concession,  however,  Mr. 
Clayton  was  willing  to  share  with  England  in  the  political 
control  and  use  of  the  canal,  for  he  saw  no  reason  why  any 
one  country  should  jnjoy  exclusive  rights  and  privileges  in 
whaf  was^esigned  to  be  an  international  highway,  which,  to 
be  profitable  and  to  subserve  the  purposes  of  its  creation, 
must  be  always  open  and  always  neutral.  In  this  spirit  of 
friendship,  and  desirous  of  makins^^  tlie  canal  a  "bond  of  in- 
terest and  peace "  between  the  two  nations,  rather  than  a 
"subject  for  jealousy,"  he  approached  Mr.  Crampton,  the 
British  Minister  in  Washington,  and  invited  his  cooperation 
in  considering  the  terms  of  a  treaty  that  would  harmonize 
British  and  American  interests. 

The  danger  in  the  situation  was  two-fold ;  first^  England 
had  seized  new  territory  upon  the  A-merican  continent  in 
open  defiance  of  the  "  Monroe  Doctrine,"  which,  .in  itself, 
^Tght  be  considered  by  Congress  as  a  casus,  belli;  and,  sec- 
ondly, the  territory  so  seized  was  the  country  about  the 
mouth  of  the  San  Juan  River,  which,  of  course,  meant  noth- 
ing less  forbidding  than  English  ownership  of  the  Atlantic 
entrance  to  the  proposed  canal,  —  a  condition  of  affairs  mani- 
festly intolerable  to  the  United  States. 

To  induce  England  to  yield  all  her  rights  in  Nicaragua 
would  have  been  a  most  desirable  consummation,  but  to  oust 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM        113 

her  at  once  from  her  position  of  vantage  at  Greytown  was  a 
sine  qua  non  of  peace. 

Mr.  Clayton,  blinded  perhaps  to  the  importance  of  the  first 
object  by  his  extreme  eagerness  to  accomplish  the  second,  en- 
tered upon  the  negotiation  without  feeling  quite  justified  in 
placing  before  England  as  an  ultimatum  the  complete  relin- 
quishment of  her  claims  over  Mosquitia.  He  was  prepared 
to  yield  community  of  interests  and  joint  control  in  the  canal, 
but  feared  to  present  this  as  the  ultimate  and  only  quid  pro 
quo  for  total  abandonment  of  British  territorial  claims  in  Cen- 
tral America.  British  statesmen  were  fully  advised  that  ex- 
clusive English  control  of  the  canal  would  not  be  tolerated 
by  the  United  States.  A  share  in  its  management  at  best 
was  as  much  as  England  could  reasonably  expect,  and  as  a 
means  of  securing  that  share  she  already  held  Greytown,  in 
the  name  of  the  Mosquito  king. 

In  the  correspondence  that  took  place  between  the  Secre- 
tary of  State,  Mr.  Clayton,  and  Messrs.  Bancroft  and  Law- 
rence, successive  American  Ministers  in  London,  and  also  in 
the  records  of  interviews  between  Mr.  Clayton  and  Mr.  Cramp- 
ton,  the  British  Minister  in  Washington,  preparatory  to  the 
actual  negotiations  for  a  treaty,  the  attitude  of  Mr.  Clayton 
-and  of  the  Tajdor  administration  toward  the  question  of  a 
Central  American  canal  is  fully  and  most  clearly  set  forth. 
The  Secretary  of  State  was  thoroughly  in  accord  with  the 
popular  view  that  under  no  circumstances  should  the  United 
States  permit  Great  Britain  or  any  other  power  to  exercise 
exclusive  control  of  any  isthmian  transit  route.  Upon  the 
other  hand,  he  did  not  seek  for  his  own  country  the  exclusive 
control  he  denied  to  others,  and  in  assuming  his  position  he 
followed  the  universally  accepted  theory  of  the  complete 
neutrality  of  ship  canals.  The  doctrine  of  international  free- 
dom of  transit  as  applying  to  artificial  waterways  had  been 
defended  by  Mr.  Clay  in  1826,  and  supported  by  unanimous 
resolutions  of  Congress  in  1835  and  again  in  1839.  President 
Polk  had  not  found  this  doctrine  inconsistent  with  his  notions 
of  an  aggressive  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  his  successor,  in  his 
annual  message  to  Congress  of  1849,  had  declared  that  "  no 


114  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

power  should  occupy  a  position  that  would  enable  it  hereafter 
to  exercise  so  controlling  an  influence  over  the  commerce  of 
the  world,  or  to  obstruct  a  highway  which  ought  to  be  dedi- 
cated to  the  common  use  of  mankind."  The  convention 
concluded  with  Colombia  three  years  previously  contained  a 
special  clause  calling  for  a  guarantee  of  neutrality  of  the  pro- 
posed isthmian  transit  route.  No  other  ideas  of  the  political 
status  of  an  interoceanic  ship  canal  had  ever  been  enter- 
tained, —  indeed,  the  very  essence  of  the  dispute  that  at  that 
time  bade  fair  to  involve  the  two  nations  in  war,  was  fear  on 
the  part  of  each  that  the  other  was  seeking  to  gain  for 
itself  the  monopoly  over  the  Nicaraguan  route.  ^^. 

When  once  it  was  understood  by  both  Mr.  Clayton  and 
Lord  Palmerston,  as  revealed  by  their  correspondence,  that 
neither  power  actually  sought  this  monopoly  over  the  canal, 
the  way  was  at  once  cleared  of  the  most  formidable  obstacles 
to  the  conclusion  of  a  treaty.  England's  stubborn  determi- 
nation to  maintain  her  foothold  upon  the  east  coast  of  Nica- 
ragua was  still  an  annoying  factor  in  the  negotiations  ;  yet 
Mr.  Clayton  had  reason  to  believe  that,  as  soon  as  both  nations 
had  given  a  pledge  not  to  seek  exclusive  control  of  the  pro- 
posed route  connecting  the  oceans.  Great  Britain's  object  in 
maintaining  her  territorial  interests  in  Central  America 
would  vanish,  and  she  would  then  voluntarily  and  gladly 
disembarrass  herself  of  her  charge. 

Having  in  mind  a  policy  thus  broad  and  liberal,  yet  sub- 
servient to  his  country's  best  interest,  Mr.  Clayton  entered 
upon  the  negotiations  of  a  treaty  with  Great  Britain  desirous, 
of  obtaining  no  exclusive  privileges  in  Central  America  that 
should  be  incompatible  with  the  just  rights  of  other  nations  ; 
he  was  intent  only  on  preparing  the  way  for  the  construction 
of  a  great  international  highway  that  should  be  open  to  the 
world's  commerce  upon  terms  equal  to  all. 

Final  negotiations  were  immediately  begun  upon  the  ar- 
rival in  Washington  of  Sir  Henry  Bulwer  (January,  1850). 
At  first  Mr.  Clayton  persisted  in  his  representations  that  un- 
less Great  Britain  were  willing  to  abandon  her  Mosquito  pro- 
tectorate he  did  not  believe  the  neutrality  of  the  canal  could 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM       115 

•ever  be  thoroughly  effected,  and  without  this  concession 
in  favor  of  a  common  ideal,  and  possibly  as  an  earnest  of 
^•ood  faith,  the  treaty  would  likely  prove  to  be  an  instrument 
of  empty  words.  But  it  seems  never  for  a  moment  to  have 
been  the  intention  of  Great  Britain  to  relinquish  her  holdings 
in  Central  America,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  she  was 
perfectly  willing  to  join  with  the  United  States  in  a  guaran- 
tee of  neutrality  of  the  canal.  With  considerable  shrewd- 
ness the  British  commissioner  argued  that  as  the  United 
States  could  have  no  real  interest  in  existing  British  pos- 
session in  Central  America  except  in  so  far  as  they  might 
appear  to  affect  the  neutrality  of  any  future  -transit  route, 
all  concern  upon  that  score  would  be  at  once  removed  by  the 
signing  of  the  proposed  treaty,  wherein,  he  alleged,  England 
was  entirely  willing  to  pledge  herself  never  to  make  use  of 
her  territorial  possessions  in  Central  America,  or  even  to 
a,vail  herself  of  her  influence  over  any  Central  American 
state,  to  gain  a  dominion  over  the  route  inconsistent  with 
the  strictest  terms  of  neutrality. 

Political  conditions  in  the  United  States  very  consid- 
erably favored  Sir  Henry  Bulwer  in  the  accomplishment 
of  his  purpose  to  conclude  a  treaty  without  yielding  any  of 
his  country's  territorial  claims.  Alarming  reports  of  the 
events  connected  with  recent  British  encroachments  in 
Central  America  were  just  beginning  to  spread  about  the 
country,  and,  in  consequence,  feelings  of  hostility  toward 
England  were  daily  growing  more  outspoken  and  intense. 
The  press  demanded  the  reasons  for  delay  in  the  building 
of  the  canal,  and  further  demanded  the  immediate  pub- 
lication of  the  Hise  treaty.  Congress  also  yielded  to  the 
popular  clamor  and  called  for  all  the  correspondence  per- 
taining to  the  Central  American  canal.  Mr.  Clayton  felt 
keenly  the  danger  in  making  public  these  documents  at 
that  particular  moment,  and  furthermore  he  betrayed  his 
anxiety  to  Sir  Henry  Bulwer;  the  President,  too,  felt 
much  embarrassed  in  continuing  to  withhold  the  desired 
correspondence  from  Congress.  Bulwer  was  quick  to  take 
advantage  of  his  opponent's  confusion,  and  he  played  upon 


116  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

Mr.   Clayton's  nervousness  and  evident  desire  to  adjust  the 
matter  speedily  as  possible. 

In  the  very  midst  of  these  diplomatic  troubles,  news  of  the 
Tigre  Island  incident  arrived,  and  instantly  popular  excite- 
ment throughout  the  United  States  arose  to  feverish  height. 
Indeed,  Mr.  Clayton  himself,  who  hitherto  had  been  struggling 
to  overcome  the  natural  suspicions  aroused  in  his  breast  by 
Great  Britain's  persistent  determination  to  cling  to  Mosquitia, 
was  thoroughly  angered.  His  hopes  for  a  satisfactory  conclu- 
sion of  a  treaty  were  wholly  dispelled  by  this  unfortunate 
event.  However,  Great  Britain's  proi^pt  disavowal  of  the 
act  restored  harmony  in  Washington,  though  it  left  the  coun- 
try in  a  passively  sullen  mood.  .  Negotiations  were  resumed 
and  hurried  along,  and  on  April  19  the  treaty  was  signed. 
In  brief  it  provided  :  —  * 

(1)  Neither  the  United  States  8or  Oreal^'Brit'iiin  sIo/elW  ever 
obtain  or  maintain  for  itself  anj^ exclusive  control  £>y.Qr  the 
proposed  ship  canal.  '  -^*->^* 

(2)  Neither  power  shall  ever  erect  or  maintain  any  for- 
tifications jjommanding  said  canaLor.iiL-lhe-  vicinity  thereof. 

(3)  Neither  power  shall  ever  occupy,  fortify,  colonize, 
assume,  or  exercise  any  dominion  over  Nicaragua,  Costa 
Rica,  the  coast,  or  any  part  of  Central  America,  nor  shall 
either  make  use  of  any  alliance  or  protection  that  either 
affords  or  may  afford,  or  make  use  of  any  intimacy,  con- 
nection, or  influence  that  either  may  possess,  to  gain  that  end. 

(4)  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  shall  mutually 
guard  the  safety  and  neutrality  of  the  canal,  and  invite  all 
other  nations  to  do  the  same. 

(5)  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  will  extend  their 
aid  and  protection  to  any  canal  company,  having  proper 
authority  and  working  under  fair  and  reasonable  terms. 

(6)  In  order  to  establish  a  principle  the  two  powers  will 
also  extend  their  aid  and  protection  to  any  other  practical 
means  of  transit  across  the  isthmus,  either  by  canal  or  rail. 

Neither  Mr.  Clayton  nor  Sir  Henry  Bulwer  was  fully  sat- 
isfied with  the  convention.  The  Secretary  of  State  felt 
troubled  by  his  failure  to   persuade  Great  Britain   openly 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM       117 

I  and  unreservedly  to  relinquish  the  Mosquito  protectorate, 
'yet  the  main  object  of  the  treaty  —  the  assured  neutraliza- 
ition  of  the  canal,  was  satisfactorily  accomplished.  With  that 
question  settled,  the  Mosquito  claims  of  England,  so  far  as 
the  United  States  was  concerned,  had  lost  their  greatest 
significance.  In  fact,  Bulwer  wrote  to  Palmerston  that,  "  We 
have  no  longer  any  interest  in  maintaining  the  Mosquitos 
[Indians]  where  they  are,  nor  our  protection  over  them  in 
that  locality ; "  but  as  Great  Britain  could  not  "  honorably 
abandon"  her  ties  with  the  Indians,  Bulwer  frankly  sug- 
gested to  the  British  foreign  secretary  that  some  arrange- 
ment be  made  whereby  the  Mosquito  Indians  "could  be 
withdrawn  from  the  vicinity  of  the  canal,  and  thereby 
remove  all  cause  of  dispute  [with  the  United  States]." 
Upon  the  whole,  then,  the  satisfactory  features  of  the  treaty 
—  among  which  must  be  counted  the  probable  exemption  of 
the  country  from  a  war  with  Great  Britain  —  seemed  at  the 
time  to  outweigh  its  omissions. 

The  instrument  was  severely  criticised  in  the  Cabinet,  and 
afterward  met  with  strong  opposition  in  the  Senate,  notwith- 
standing which,  however,  it  was  soon  ratified  by  a  vote  of  42 
toll. 

The  treaty  was  immediately  endorsed  by  the  British 
Government.  Before  the  exchange  of  ratifications  was 
effected,  however,  Palmerston  became  disturbed  by  the 
ambiguous  nature  of  the  phraseology  of  the  first  article, 
and  being,  moreover,  desirous  of  removing  any  misappre- 
hensions that  he  feared  might  still  exist  upon  the  subject, 
he  ordered  Bulwer  to  announce  to  Secretary  Clayton  that 
British  interpretation  of  the  language  of  the  treaty  left 
unaffected  existing  English  possessions  in  Central  America. 
Bulwer  accordingly  met  the  Secretary  of  State  with  the 
declaration  that  "  Her  Majesty's  Government  does  not  under- 
stand the  engagements  of  that  convention  to  apply  to  Her 
Majesty's  settlement  at  Honduras,  or  to  its  dependencies." 
The  word  "dependencies"  was  somewhat  vague,  and  as  it 
pointed  ominously  to  the  Mosquito  reservation,  it  no  doubt 
uncovered  to  Mr.  Clayton's  vision  the  skeleton  which  he  had 


118  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

been  so  anxious  to  conceal;  There  can  be  little  doubt  that 
the  great  majority  of  senators,  if  not  all  of  them,  who  had 
voted  for  ratification,  had  assumed  that  the  treaty  called 
for  relinquishment  of  Greytown  and  all  of  Mosquitia,  —  that 
being  but  part  of  the  agreement  which  they  hoped  would 
inaugurate  a  new  era  of  friendly  cooperation  of  tlie  two  great 
powers  in  the  construction  of  the  canal. 

Even  without  a  definite  statement  in  the  instrument  to 
the  effect  that  Mosquitia  would  be  abandoned,  Mr.  Clayton 
believed  that  that  result  would  very  soon  be  brought  about 
when  once  the  treaty  was  in  force,  and  he  was  undesirous  of 
surrendering  the  other  advantages  to  his  country,  which  he 
supposed  the  treaty  offered,  simply  on  account  of  this  new 
assertion  of  England's  unwillingness  to  yield  her  Mosquito 
pretensions.  But  the  subject  was  a  peculiarly  delicate  one  ; 
the  Secretary's  colleagues  in  the  Cabinet  (with  the  jjossible 
exception  of  Reverdy  Johnson,  the  Attorney  General),  and 
those  of  his  personal  friends,  in  whose  confidence  the  nego- 
tiations reposed,  felt  it  to  be  a  mistake  to  conclude  a  treaty 
without  a  positive  promise  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain  to 
withdraw  entirely  from  Nicaragua. 

Possibly  Mr.  Clayton  entertained  similar  misgivings.  The 
political  situation  in  the  United  States,  however,  which 
threatened  at  any  moment  to  spring  the  mine  of  anti-British 
feeling  at  home  and  thus  wreck  every  effort  he  had  made  to 
check  further  English  aggression  in  Nicaragua,  and  to  secure 
a  neutral  waterway,  impelled  him  to  continue  in  his  efforts 
to  reach  an  understanding,  even  though  an  ambiguous  one. 
Perhaps  a  half  loaf  were  better  in  this  case  than  none  at  all ; 
at  best,  the  treaty  represented  a  mutual  yielding  of  interests 
which  both  nations  considered  vital  and  were  extremely  loath 
to  concede.  From  a  first  formed  determination,  then,  to 
refuse  an  exchange  of  ratifications  upon  the  basis  of  Sir 
Henry  Bulwer's  declaration  and  to  abandon  all  further 
negotiations,  Mr.  Clayton  finally  decided,  as  a  last  resort, 
to  try  the  plan  of  placing  a  construction  upon  Sir  Henry 
Bulwer's  reservation  that  might  be  more  satisfactory  to  him- 
self and  yet  acceptable  to  Great  Britain.    Mr.  Clayton  accord- 


THE   INTEROCEANIC   CANAL   PROBLEM  119 

ingly  approached  Sir  Henry  Bulwer  with  a  proposition  for 
a  counter-declaration,  in  which  he  proposed  to  limit  the 
term  "dependencies"  by  making  special  mention  of  the 
islands  along  the  Honduras  coast,  expressly  omitting  refer- 
ence to  Mosquitia.  Sir  Henry  Bulwer  agreed  to  this  with 
the  understanding  that  "  it  was  not  the  intention  in  the  treaty 
to  embrace  whatever  is  Her  Majesty's  settlement  at  Hon- 
duras, nor  whatever  are  the  dependencies  of  that  settlement." 
To  leave  no  room  for  "charges  of  duplicity  'against  our 
government,"  Mr.  Clayton  addressed  a  note  to  Mr.  King, 
Chairman  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs, 
acquainting  him  with  Sir  Henry  Bulwer's  declaration,  but  he 
omitted  to  mention  in  his  note  to  Mr.  King  the  word 
"dependencies."  Mr.  King  was  probably  not  surprised  by 
receipt  of  the  Secretary's  letter,  for  he  had  never  supposed 
that  British  Honduras  was  to  be  abandoned  by  Great  Britain 
under  the  terms  of  the  treaty;  he  replied  the  same  day 
(July  4)  that  "The  Senate  perfectly  understood  that  the 
treaty  did  not  include  British  Honduras,  —  but,"  he  added, 
in  a  tone  of  admonition  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  "you 
should  be  careful  not  to  use  any  expression  which  would 
seem  to  recognize  the  right  of  England  to  any  portion  of 
Honduras  [^i.e.  outside  of  British  Honduras]."  Upon  receipt 
of  Mr.  King's  answer,  Mr.  Clayton  sent  a  note  (it  had  been 
already  prepared)  to  Sir  Henry  Bulwer,  in  which  he  said :  — 

The  language  of  the  first  article  of  the  convention  concluded 
on  the  19th  day  of  April  last,  between  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain,  describing  the  country  not  to  be  occupied,  etc.,  by  either 
of  the  parties,  was,  as  you  know,  twice  approved  by  the  govern- 
ment, and  it  was  neither  understood  by  them  nor  by  either  of  us 
(the  negotiators),  to  include  the  British  settlement  in  Honduras 
(commonly  called  British  Honduras,  as  distinct  from  the  state  of 
Honduras),  nor  the  small  islands  in  the  neighborhood  of  that  settle- 
ment which  may  be  known  as  its  dependencies. 

To  this  settlement  and  these  islands  the  treaty  we  negotiated 

was  not  intended  by  either  of  us  to  apply.     The  title  to  them  it 

I  ^s  now  and  has  been  my  intention  throughout  the  whole  negotia- 

ion  to  leave  as  the  treaty  leaves  it,  without  denying  or  affirming 

[')r  in  any  way  meddling  with  the  same,  just  as  it  stood  previously. 


120  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

The  Chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Kelations  of  the 
Senate,  the  Honorable  W.  R.  King,  informs  me  that  the  Senate 
perfectly  understood  that  the  treaty  did  not  include  British 
Honduras. 

With  this  last  presentation  of  "  declarations,"  ratifications 
were  exchanged  the  same  day  (July  4),  and  the  treaty  was 
proclaimed  as  law  the  day  after. 

It  appears  to  have  been  understood  by  both  Mr.  Clayton 
and  Sir  Henry  Bulwer  that  any  amendments,  alterations, 
or  qualifying  statements  in  the  treaty  subsequent  to  its 
ratification  by  the  Senate  would  be  considered  of  no  force 
whatever.  Such  being  the  case,  these  various  statements  on 
the  part  of  the  negotiators,  made  just  before  the  final 
exchange  of  ratification,  will  serve  only  to  show  the  inten- 
tion of  the  parties  who  framed  the  instrument,  but  may 
scarcely  be  accepted  as  part  of  the  res  gestce  of  the  negotia- 
tion. From  the  varying  shades  of  meaning  expressed 
throughout  these  negotiations,  —  particularly  as  both  negoti- 
ators were  not  only  sparring  to  gain  advantage  one  over  the 
other,  but  were  also  endeavoring  to  shield  their  designs  from 
publicity  —  it  is  not  easy  to  interpret  the  precise  under- 
standing of  either.  But  it  now  seems  reasonably  certain 
that  Mr.  Clayton  did  not  anticipate  British  withdrawal  from 
Mosquitia  as  obligatory  under  the  terms  of  the  treaty,  though 
he  expected  such  action  to  follow  as  a  natural  consequence  of 
the  British  promise  not  to  fortify,  etc.,  any  point  in  Cen- 
tral America,  and  also  because  he  conceived  Great  Britain's 
sole  object  in  retaining  her  hold  upon  Nicaragua  to  have 
departed  upon  ratification  of  the  treaty.  It  is  equally  cer- 
tain that  the  Senate  did  anticipate  an  immediate  withdrawal 
of  all  British  claims  on  the  Nicaraguan  coast.  Sir  Henry 
Bulwer's  acceptance  of  Secretary  Clayton's  **  counter-declara- 
tion "  would  indicate  that  he  had  wavered  in  his  determina- 
tion to  save  Mosquitia  for  Great  Britain ;  and  yet,  on  the 
other  hand,  his  whole  attitude,  from  the  opening  of  the 
negotiations  to  their  close,  demonstrates  a  fixed  and  dogged 
purpose  to  the  contrary.  There  can  be  but  little  doubt  that 
the  Bay  Islands  were  considered  by  both  Mr.  Clayton  and 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM       121 

Sir  Henry  Bulwer  as  part  of  the  dependencies  of  British 
Honduras.  As  for  British  Honduras  itself  —  the  former 
Belize  —  there  was  no  question  in  any  quarter,  not  even  in 
the  Senate,  but  that  it  was  excepted  from  operation  of  the 
treaty.  This  is  confirmed  by  an  official  exposition  of  the 
convention  which  appeared  in  the  National  Intelligencer  but 
three  days  after  its  promulgation ;  it  was  there  asserted  that 
"the  British  title  to  the  Belize  the  treaty  does  not  in  any 
manner  recognize,  nor  does  it  deny  it  or  meddle  with  it. 
That  settlement  remains,  in  that  particular,  as  it  stood  pre- 
viously to  the  treaty."  No  mention,  however,  was  here  made 
of  the  dependencies,  and  the  people  of  the  United  States 
were  still  left  in  ignorance  of  the  uncertainties  which  existed 
in  official  circles  connected  with  that  word. 

President  Taylor's  death  occurred  on  July  9,  and  about 
one  week  later  his  successor  in  office.  President  Fillmore, 
transmitted  a  communication  to  Congress,  with  which  he 
submitted^a  copy  of  the  treaty  itself.  "Its  engagements," 
he  said,  "apply  to  all  the  five  states  which  formerl}^  composed 
the  republic  of  Central  America  and  their  dependencies,  of 
which  the  Island  of  Tigre  was  a  part.  It  does  not  recognize, 
affirm,  or  deny  the  title  of  the  British  settlement  at  Belize, 
which  is,  by  the  coast,  more  than  five  hundred  miles  from 
the  proposed  canal  at  Nicaragua.  The  question  of  the  Brit- 
ish title  to  this  district  of  country,  commonly  called  British 
Honduras,  and  the  small  islands  adjacent  to  it,  claimed  as 
its  dependencies,  stands  precisely  as  it  stood  before  the 
treaty.  No  act  of  the  late  President's  administration  has, 
in  any  manner,  committed  this  government  to  the  British 
title  in  that  territory  or  any  part  of  it." 

Thus  it  seems  clear  enough  that  whatever  misunderstand- 
ing there  may  have  been  between  the  negotiators  of  the 
treaty,  that  misunderstanding  was  in  reference  to  Mosquitia, 
and  not  to  Belize,  known  as  British  Honduras,  nor  to  tlie 
Bay  Islands.  Furthermore,  whatever  may  have  been  the  be- 
lief in  Congress  as  to  the  meaning  of  the  abnegatory  clauses 
of  the  first  article  (whether  or  not  prospective  in  character, 
I.  requiring  Great  Britain  to  abandon  her  Central  American 


122  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

possessions,  or  permitting  her  to  retain  them),  the  Senate 
accepted  the  above  message  without  protest,  and  would 
thereby  seem  not  to  have  been  surprised  or  disappointed 
as  if  by  a  new  and  astounding  revelation. 

Had  Mr.  Clayton  been  endowed  with  a  keener  sense  of 
that  political  foresight  which  was  possessed  to  such  a 
marked  degree  by  Washington  and  Jefferson,  he  would  have 
recognized  his  error  in  not  holding  out  firmly  against  British 
asserted  rights  in  the  "dependencies  "  of  British  Honduras, 
and  making  British  abandonment  of  the  Mosquito  protec- 
torate a  condition  of  all  negotiation.  There  can  be  little 
doubt  that  Palmerston  eventually  would  have  yielded,  and 
Mr.  Clayton  would  have  spared  his  country  many  unfortu- 
nate misunderstandings  with  Great  Britain,  and  years  of 
controversy  between  Washington  and  London. 

With  due  respect  for  Mr.  Clayton's  skilful  management  of 
a  difficult  international  situation  and  for  the  ability  which 
•he  may  have  displayed  in  delivering  the  nation  from  possi- 
ble war,  an  unpleasant  appearance  of  double-dealing  with 
the  Senate  is  inseparably  connected  with  his  correspondence 
on  the  subject.  Just  why  Mr.  Clayton  did  not  choose  to 
make  Congress  cognizant  of  the  exact  meaning  of  Bulwer's 
qualifying  note  can  now  be  understood,  and  his  motives 
appreciated;  yet  the  questionable  course  which  he  saw  fit 
to  adopt  at  a  critical  moment  was  a  temptation  to  which  he 
should  not  have  yielded  —  an  error  he  should  not  have 
committed.  Had  Mr.  Clayton  been  less  actuated  by  fear,  he 
might  have  utilized  for  his  own  benefit  those  very  threats 
of  war  which  terrorized  him  into  concluding  a  bad  bargain. 
That  both  Bulwer  and  Palmei*ston  were  alarmed  by  the  pros- 
pect of  war,  and  that  they  were  willing  to  direct  their 
course  well  within  the  lines  of  discretion,  is  made  manifest 
from  certain  portions  of  their  correspondence  while  the  treaty 
was  in  course  of  negotiation. 

Sir  Henry  Bulwer's  tactics  in  the  making  of  the  treaty 
have  been  a  frequent  theme  of  censure  against  English 
diplomacy  in  this  country.  That  he  played  his  hand  skil- 
fully, reserving  to  best  advantage  his  largest  trump  until  the 


f 


THE  INTEROCEAl^IC  CANAL  PROBLEM       123 

last,  cannot  be  denied;  yet  the  method  employed  by  that 
shrewd  statesman,  in  all  fairness  to  both  sides,  cannot  be 
characterized  as  dishonest.  It  was  "  clever  "  in  so  far  as  he 
outwitted  his  antagonist  by  playing  upon  his  fears  and  profit- 
ing by  his  errors  in  judgment.  Mr.  Buchanan,  then  in 
private  life,  wrote  to  a  friend  shortly  before  the  conclusion 
of  the  treaty,  —  "  If  Sir  Henry  Bulwer  can  succeed  in  hav- 
ing the  first  two  provisions  of  this  treaty  ratified  by  the 
Senate,  he  will  deserve  a  British  peerage." 

Outside  the  ranks  of  the  administration's  most  stanch 
supporters  the  treaty  met  with  general  condemnation.  No 
objection  was  raised  against  those  provisions  of  the  agree- 
ment which  called  for  international  guarantee  of  the  neu- 
trality of  the  canal,  but  the  fatal  omissions  in  the  instrument, 
when  detected,  brought  forth  the  severest  criticism  upon  the 
document,  and  on  Mr.  Clayton  fell  the  accusations  of  a 
cowardly  weakness.  "The  Nicaragua  treaty  is  even  worse 
than  I  had  supposed,"  again  wrote  Buchanan  in  May,  1850. 

Buchanan's  words  were  true  and  his  criticism  just.  The 
United  States  had  pledged  itself  never  to  seek  or  exercise 
exclusive  control  over  any  Central  American  canal,  nor  to 
acquire  any  territory  on  the  isthmus.  Great  Britain,  on  the 
other  hand,  had  received  a  recognition  of  her  claims  in 
Honduras  and  all  of  its  vaguely  defined  dependencies. 
Without  actual  surrender  of  anything,  England  had  really 
secured  an  excellent  footing  for  subsequent  territorial  ex- 
pansion in  Central  America. 


Ill 

Aside  from  the  misunderstandings  under  which  the  Clay- 
ton-Bulwer  treaty  was  concluded,  both  Sir  Henry  Bulwer 
and  Mr.  Webster,  the  newly  appointed  Secretary  of  State 
under  President  Fillmore,  realized  that  the  instrument  was 
imperfect,  and,  in  many  respects,  far  from  satisfactory. 
They  accordingly  entered  upon  negotiations  looking  to  the^ 
settlement  of  several  important  questions  left  open  by  t^ 
treaty.     One  of  these  questions  was  to  determine  the  actual 


124  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

status  of  Greytown  —  a  matter  rendered  perplexing  by 
the  chronic  boundary  disputes  between  Nicaragua  and  Costa 
Rica.  Indeed,  this  old-time  quarrel  had  just  then  broken 
out  afresh.  The  negotiations  dragged  along  wearily  for 
quite  a  year  with  the  unhappy  result  of  demonstrating  to  both 
men  th^  impossibility  of  a  mutually  satisfactory  conclusion. 

A  series  of  unfortunate  events  now  took  place,  which 
seemed  to  sharpen  the  ill  feeling  already  existing  between 
the  two  powers,  and,  because  of  the  mutual  jealousies  and 
suspicions  thereby  aroused,  a  deadlock  resulted,  making  the 
reconciliation  of  American  and  British  interests  in  Central 
America  impossible  for  some  time  to  come.  Perhaps  the 
distressing  political  conditions  in  Central  America,  at  that 
particular  time,  were,  in  a  large  measure,  responsible  for 
numerous  British  and  American  follies ;  but,  at  all  events, 
both  England  and  the  United  States  were  led  into  commit- 
ting acts  in  Central  America  which  were  in  open  violation 
of  their  treaty  stipulations,  and  seemed  to  indicate  bad  faith 
upon  the  part  of  both. 

With  the  evident  intention  of  making  it  perfectly  clear  to 
all  concerned  that  she  still  considered  Mosquitia  a  part  of  the 
dependency  of  British  Honduras,  Great  Britain  proceeded 
formally  to  occupy  Greytown  with  a  military  force,  and 
profited  further  by  the  occasion  to  reassert  her  protectorate 
over  the  Indians.  Having  accomplished  this,  the  British 
commander  urged  upon  the  Nicaraguans  the  advantages  they 
would  reap  by  abandoning  their  "pretended  friends"  (the 
United  States),  and  coming  "  to  an  understanding  without 
delay  with  Great  Britain,"  for  only  in  London  could  sufficient 
capital  and  "spirit  of  enterprise  be  found  for  carrying  out 
a  project  (the  building  of  the  canal)  of  such  magnitude." 
Thus  were  the  Nicaraguans  impressed  with  the  fact  of  un- 
impaired Mosquito  control  of  their  Atlantic  coast  and  over 
the  port  of  Greytown.  The  United  States  was  expected  of 
course  to  take  notice.  This  new  assertion  of  British  sover- 
eignty over  Greytown  soon  brought  American  and  British 
subjects  there  resident  into  direct  conflict.  A  crisis  was 
reached  in  November,  1851,  when  an  American  vessel,  be- 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM       125 

longing  to  the  American  Canal  Company,  the  Prometheus, 
was  fired  upon  by  a  British  man-of-war,  for  refusing  to  pay 
certain  port  dues  to  the  Anglo-Mosquito  authorities. 

The  matter  being  reported  to  Mr.  Webster,  he  promptly 
renewed  his  efforts  to  reach  an  understanding  with  the  Brit- 
ish Minister  regarding  Central  American  affairs.  The  act 
of  firing  upon  the  Prometheus  was  at  once  disavowed  by  Earl 
Granville;  but  the  issue  which  Secretary  Clayton  had  care- 
fully avoided  was  now  sharply  presented,  and  the  Secretary 
of  State  appreciated  the  urgent  necessity  for  coming  to  a 
clear  and  perfect  understanding  as  to  the  construction  of 
the  term  —  "dependencies  of  British  Honduras."  The 
boundary  dispute  between  Nicaragua  and  Costa  Rica  had 
become  violent,  and  in  this  quarrel  the  sympathies  of  the 
United  States  and  of  England  were  arrayed  upon  opposite 
sides.  Costa  Rica,  which  had  always  cultivated  British 
favors,  claimed  the  right  bank  of  the  San  Juan  River,  includ- 
ing Greytown  and  a  small  adjoining  settlement  of  Ameri- 
cans who  operated  the  temporary  transit  route  across  the 
state.  Nicaragua,  on  the  other  hand,  insisted  upon  the 
inclusion  of  Greytown  within  her  limits,  and  she  naturally 
resented  the  English  occupation  of  that  port;  she  also  denied 
her  neighbor's  territorial  rights  to  the  south  bank  of  the  San 
Juan  River.  .  In  these  contentions  she  was  encouraged  and 
upheld  by  the  sympathies  of  the  United  States. 

Mr.  Webster  and  Mr.  Crampton,  the  English  Minister  (Sir 
Henry  Bulwer  having  returned  to  England)  entered  upon 
the  settlement  of  the  new  disputes  by  attempting  first  to 
locate  the  true  boundary  line  between  the  two  little  repub- 
lics, thus  hoping  to  eliminate  one  irritating  factor  from  the 
total  of  their  differences.  To  accomplish  this,  of  course,  it 
would  be  necessary  to  formulate  a  plan  which  would  prove 
acceptable  to  both  republics  as  well  as  to  themselves.  On 
April  30,  1852,  an  agreement  was  signed  in  Washington 
which,  as  a  tentative  arrangement,  provided  that  Greytown 
and  "Mosquitia"  should  be  receded  to  Nicaragua  and  a 
reservation  set  apart  for  the  Indians.  The  Costa  Rican 
territorial  claims  were   acknowledsred  as   far  north   as  the 


126  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

San  Juan  River,  and  full  rights  of  navigation  in  the  great 
lake  were  also  accorded  her.  The  plan  was  ostensibly  a 
compromise  measure,  which  would  likely  have  relieved  the 
situation  had  it  been  accepted;  but  Nicaragua  not  only  re- 
jected the  agreement  with  a  show  of  indignation,  but  curtly 
announced  her  displeasure  at  this  instance  of  foreign  med- 
dling in  her  domestic  affairs.  Costa  Rica's  acceptance  of 
the  plan  was  not  in  itself  sufficient ;  so  the  efforts  of  Webster 
and  Crampton  came  to  naught. 

With  matters  in  this  unsatisfactory  condition  in  Nicaragua 
and  "Mosquitia,"  the  attention  of  the  United  States  was 
suddenly  directed  to  Honduras.  English  capital  had  recently 
become  interested  in  a  railway  project  to  connect  two  Hon- 
duran  ports  on  the  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific  oceans,  and 
thereby  to  establish  a  transit  route  which  would  compete 
with  the  American  transit  route  across  Nicaragua,  and  also 
with  the  Panama  route  still  farther  south.     The  Bay  Islands 

—  a  group  lying  off  the  Honduran  and  Guatemalan  coasts 

—  had  formerly  been  appropriated  by  Great  Britain  and  con- 
stituted, according  to  her  assertions,  a  dependency  of  her  set- 
tlement on  the  mainland  (Belize  or  "British  Honduras''). 
Her  sovereignty  over  these  islands  had  negligently  been 
permitted  to  lapse,  but  in  the  interests  of  her  projected 
schemes  in  Honduras,  the  British  Government  decided  to 
reoccupy  them.  Accordingly,  on  June  17,  1852,  the  London 
foreign  office  announced  that  the  islands  of  Ronatan,  Bonacca, 
Brabant,  Helma,  and  Morant  should  constitute  a  colony,  "to 
be  known  and  designated  as  the  Colou}^  of  the  Bay  Islands." 
In  August  following  the  islands  were  formally  occupied  by 
crown  officials. 

Whatever  may  have  been  the  merit  in  the  British  conten- 
tion of  ownership  of  the  Bay  Islands,  the  moment  chosen  for 
the  overt  act  of  their  seizure  was  a  most  unfortunate  oiie. 
The  amicable  relations  of  the  two  nations  had  at  all  times 
been  more  or  less  strained  since  the  Tigre  Island  incident ; 
and  since  the  promulgation  of  an  unsatisfactory  treaty  each 
government  had  continued  to  view  the  acts  of  the  other  in 
Central  America  with  a  high  degree  of  suspicion  and  dis- 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM       127 

trust.  The  numerous  failures  thereafter  to  harmonize  their 
conflicting  interests  had  only  aggravated  the  situation ;  both 
governments  were  more  than  ever  ill  disposed  to  grant 
favors  or  yield  a  point  in  Central  America.  In  fact,  the 
situation  called  for  the  most  careful  diplomacy,  if  their  dif- 
ferences were  to  be  settled  upon  a  peaceful  footing;  but 
with  an  offensive  bluntness,  the  British  Government  com- 
mitted an  act  which,  it  must  have  foreseen,  could  only  be 
accepted  by  the  United  States  as  one  of  unwarranted  aggres- 
sion and  in  direct  violation  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty. 
The  people  of  the  United  States  were  filled  with  indigna- 
tion. The  election  of  1852  had  brought  the  Democratic 
party  into  power,  and  the  new  administration  —  if  for  party 
reasons  only  —  was  strongly  anti-British. 

When  Congress  convened  in  December,  the  Senate  at  once 
called  for  all  the  correspondence  relating  to  British  advances 
in  Central  America,  and  General  Cass  of  Michigan  intro- 
duced a  resolution,  asking,  "What  measures,  if  any,  have 
been  taken  by  the  Executive  to  prevent  the  violation  of 
Article  I  of  the  Treaty  of  July  4,  1850?"  On  January  4 
(1853),  the  President  sent  a  copy  of  such  correspondence  to 
the  Senate,  which  included  the  letters  exchanged  by  Mr. 
Clayton  and  Sir  Henry  Bulwer  just  before  the  concluding 
ceremonies  of  the  treaty.  Then,  it  appeared  for  the  first 
time,  that  the  full  meaning  of  that  instrument,  with  its 
fatal  reservation,  was  understood  in  the  Senate.  The  scene 
that  followed  in  that  chamber  was  sensational.  One  after 
another  of  the  senators  arose  to  denounce,  in  the  most  vigorous 
language,  the  treaty,  Mr.  Clayton,  the  preceding  Whig 
administration  and  Great  Britain. 

A  resolution  was  drafted  by  the  Foreign  Affairs  Committee 
to  the  effect  that  England's  title  to  Belize  was  worthless, 
and  that  her  occupation  of  the  Bay  Islands,  and  her  position 
in  Mosquitia  were  in  direct  violation  of  the  terms  of  the  treaty 
and  in  defiance  of  the  principles  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
The  debate  which  followed  upon  the  presentation  of  this 
resolution  was  characterized  by  an  intemperate  display  of 
partisan  feeling  that  has  not  often  been  equalled  in  the  Sen- 


128  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC    QUESTIONS 

ate.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  bitterness  of  personal 
abuse,  and  the  feelings  of  hostility  against  England  that 
developed  in  this  debate  were  induced,  to  some  extent  at 
least,  by  political  reasons,  for  the  discussion  soon  assumed 
a  party  cast.  The  Democrats,  led  by  Douglass  and  Cass, 
attacked  the  treaty;  the  Whigs,  under  Sumner  and  Seward, 
generally  supported  it.  The  committee  resolution  was 
adopted,  and  the  fury  of  the  Senate  finally  spent  itself  in  a 
declaration  reasserting  the  principles  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

The  storm  at  the  capitol  spread  over  the  country,  and  the 
feelings  of  enmity  toward  England  became'  more  than  ever 
pronounced.  With  an  administration  in  power  whose  plat- 
form was  essentially  anti-British,  a  vigorous  diplomatic 
campaign  against  England  was  expected.  Mr.  Marcy,  the 
Secretary  of  State,  had  already  expressed  an  opinion,  that 
the  Mosquito  protectorate  was  void;  that  the  erection  of 
the  Bay  Islands  into  a  British  colony  was  unwarranted  and 
.in  clear  violation  of  the  terms  of  the  treaty,  and  that  with 
the  exception  of  British  Honduras,  to  whose  occupation  by 
England  he  made  no  objection.  Great  Britain  should  at  once 
abandon  all  her  territorial  claims  in  Central  America.  He 
was  not  to  be  shaken  from  his  conviction  that  the  American 
interpretation  of  the  phraseology  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty,  as  held  by  the  Democratic  party,  was  a  correct  one,  and 
that  its  acceptance  by  England  should  therefore  be  insisted 
upon.  With  such  positive  instructions  Mr.  Buchanan,  the 
American  Minister  in  London,  was  directed  to  enter  upon 
negotiations  with  Lord  Clarendon. 

The  earnest  efforts  of  these  two  men  to  harmonize  their 
conflicting  views  of  the  true  meaning  and  intent  of  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  resulted  in  a  total  failure.  Lord 
Clarendon  made  a  lengthy  statement  in  defence  of  his  posi- 
tion, in  which  he  maintained  that  Belize  was  not  a  part  of 
Central  America,  as  understood  by  the  negotiators  of  the 
treaty,  as  it  had  for  many  years  been  a  British  possession, 
acknowledged  by  Spain,  later  by  the  Central  American  states, 
and,  finally,  recognized  by  the  United  States,  as  evidenced 
by  the  fact  that  an  American  consul  had  been  sent  to  Brit- 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM       129 

ish  Honduras  in  1847  and  had  been  permitted  to  carry  on  the 
duties  of  his  post  under  a  British  exequatur.  As  to  the 
Bay  Islands,  he  maintained  that  they  also  had  for  some  years 
before  the  treaty  been  British  territory,  and  were  considered 
a  part,  or  rather  a  dependency,  of  Belize.  To  Mosquitia,  he 
maintained,  the  treaty  in  no  way  referred,  but  that  it  only 
prohibited  further  colonization.  Existing  English  posses- 
sions were  in  no  way  affected  by  the  treaty,  the  inhibitory 
clauses  relating  merely  to  future  acquisitions.  Further 
to  sustain  the  correctness  of  his  views.  Lord  Clarendon  called 
attention  to  the  fact,  that  although  this  was  fully  evidenced 
in  the  words  of  the  treaty  itself,  yet,  to  remove  all  possible 
doubt,  the  negotiators  had  thought  it  well,  before  final  rati- 
fication, to  exchange  written  declarations  upon  the  subject, 
the  purport  of  which  had  been  to  except  British  Honduras 
and  its  dependencies  from  the  operation  of  the  treaty.  Con- 
tinued occupation  of  these  territories,  therefore,  by  England, 
or  any  alterations  in  their  political  relations  toward  the 
British  Government,  could  not  be  regarded  as  an  infraction 
of  the  treaty. 

Mr.  Buchanan  was  equally  firm  in  his  views,  which  were 
upon  every  point  diametrically  opposed  to  those  of  Lord 
Clarendon.  With  convictions  so  radically  divergent,  the 
futility  of  compromise  ought  to  have  been  foreseen,  and  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  should  then  have  been  abandoned  for 
one  more  specific  in  its  terms.  The  controversy  was  finally 
closed  by  Clarendon's  somewhat  impatient  statement  that 
Great  Britain  could  not  accept  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  an 
axiom  of  international  law,  and  that  he  would  decline  fur- 
ther discussion  of  his  country's  original  rights  in  Central 
America.  Thus  ended  the  matter  for  a  time,  leaving  Central 
American  affairs  in  the  same  unsatisfactory  condition  as 
before. 

About  this  time  an  American  Canal  Company  was  operat- 
ing a  temporary  transit  route  across  Nicaragua  over  the  San 
Juan  River  and  Lake  Nicaragua,  and  thence,  by  an  overland 
stage  road  from  the  lake,  to  the  Pacific  Ocean.  Just  immedi- 
ately south  of  Greytown  an  American  settlement,  made  up 


130  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

of  the  company's  operators  and  that  flotsam  and  jetsam  of 
wanderers  who  gather  at  pioneer  posts,  had  sprung  into 
existence. 

In  an  altercation  between  some  Mosquito  Indians   and 

'  Americans  an  Indian  was  killed,  and  the  smouldering  antip- 
athies of  the  two  towns  began  to  blaze.  An  Anglo-Mos- 
quito mob  attacked  the  house  of  the  American  consul,  and 
the  sailors  of  an  American  ship  in  the  harbor  came  to  their 
countryman's  rescue.  A  pitched  battle  ensued.  When  the 
news  reached  Washington  a  gunboat  was  despatched  to  the 
scene  and  indemnity  was  demanded  from  the  Anglo-Mosquito 
authorities.  Upon  their  refusal  to  consider  such  a  propo- 
sition, the  American  gunboat  proceeded  to  bombard  and 
destroy  Greytown.  This  passage  at  arms  did  not  help 
to  relieve  the  diplomatic  situation  between  England  and 
the  United  States;  nor,  indeed,  was  the  general  situation 
in  Nicaragua  improved   by  events  which  immediately  fol- 

^  lowed.  An  American  citizen  named  Walker  gathered  about 
himself,  in  the  Southern  states,  a  band  of  followers  who  Avere 
desirous  of  adventure,  and,  finding  his  opportunity  in  one 
of  the  periodical  civil  wars  in  Central  America,  he  made  a 
bold  dash  for  the  city  of  Granada,  and  soon  placed  himself 
in  control  of  Nicaragua.  He  was  supported  for  a  time  by 
one  of  the  warring  factions  of  this  turbulent  republic,  but  his 
filibustering  expedition,  ostensibly  carried  out  in  the  in- 
terest  of  the  United  States,  was,  in  reality,  for  the  purpose 

'    of  extending  the  area  of  African  slavery. 

In   every  possible   manner   Walker  antagonized   British 

^  interests  in  Nicaragua,  and  the  belief  became  general  in 
England  that  the  United  States  sought  to  acquire  a  Central 
American  state.  A  counter  military  demonstration,  on  the 
part  of  Costa  Rica,  created  the  suspicion  in  America 
that  England  was  covertly  taking  a  part  in  these  struggles 
along  the  canal  route;  and  this  belief  elicited  for  Walker  a 
larger  measure  of  sympathy  throughout  the  United  States 
than  he  would  have  otherwise  received.  The  Government 
at  Washington  finally  went  to  the  length  of  receiving  a 
diplomatic  agent,  representing  the  Walker  government  at 


THE   INTEROCEANIC   CANAL   PROBLEM  131 

Granada;  the  incident  also  stimulated  the  unfriendly  feel- 
ings between  England  and  the  United  States,  and  served  as 
well  to  estrange  from  ourselves  the  good  will  of  the  Cen- 
tral American  states.  Walker  was  eventually  deported  and 
tried;  but  before  his  death  he  made  several  warlike  expedi- 
tions into  Central  America,  and  succeeded  in  almost  hope- 
lessly entangling  the  United  States  in  a  triple  contest,  full 
of  ill  will,  between  herself,  England,  and  Nicaragua. 

These  events  in  Central  America  reopened  all  the  old 
wounds  which  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  had  been  designed 
to  heal,  and  another  series  of  acrimonious  discussions  in  the 
Senate,  levelled  against  British  interference  in  Greytown 
and  in  Nicaragua,  tended  in  no  way  to  assuage  the  popular 
anger. 

Mr.  Buchanan  had  been  succeeded  in  London,  in  the  fall 
of  1855,  by  Mr.  Dallas,  and  the  latter  was  directed  by  the 
President  to  make  a  strenuous  effort  to  secure  a  settlement 
of  these  Central  American  questions.  These,  along  with 
other  grievances  against  Great  Britain,  were  rapidly  assum- 
ing a  dangerous  aspect.  The  country  was  already  deeply 
agitated  by  the  drift  of  internal  political  issues,  and  party 
zeal  was  alarmingly  strong.  In  the  excitement  and  passions 
of  the  period,  there  was  no  skill  of  prophecy  that  could  fore- 
tell the  length  to  which  either  party  might  go,  should  for- 
eign complication  offer  relief  from  the  strain  of  that  fearful 
"domestic  difficulty  —  the  slavery  question. 

The  Dallas-Clarendon  negotiations  were  hurried  along, 
and,  on  October  17  (1856),  an  agreement  was  reached,  which 
was  immediately  sent  to  Washington  for  confirmation.  It 
provided:  (1)  for  the  freedom  of  the  port  of  Greytown  under 
nominal  Nicaraguan  sovereignty;  (2)  the  establishment  of  a 
reservation  for  the  Mosquito  Indians,  thus  abandoning  the 
British  protectorate;  (3)  the  limiting  of  the  Belize  settle- 
ment within  certain  fixed  lines ;  (4)  the  cession  of  the  Bay 
Islands  to  Honduras.  The  convention  was  made  conditional 
upon  the  ratification  of  a  certain  treaty  just  drawn  up  be- 
tween Honduras  and  Great  Britain.  This  latter  treaty 
ihad  been  made  in  August,  1856,  and  constituted  the  Bay 


132  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

Islands  a  free  territory,  coining  partially  under  the  sover- 
eignty of  Honduras,  and  j^et  free  in  the  sense  that  it  could 
not  be  taxed,  nor  its  subjects  be  called  upon  to  perform  mili- 
tary duty,  other  than  in  their  own  exclusive  defence.  It 
will  be  seen,  therefore,  that  the  ratification  of  the  Dallas- 
Clarendon  agreement  would  oblige  the  United  States  ta 
acknowledge  the  Bay  Islands  to  be  a  free  territory,  over 
which  a  British  protectorate  would  continue  virtually  to- 
exist. 

It  has  been  thought  not  a  little  remarkable  that  the  execu- 
tive, representing  a  party  so  radically  anti-British,  and  sa 
positive  in  its  demands  that  England  should  abandon,  under 
the  terms  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  all  her  Central 
American  possessions,  should  have  accepted  this  convention 
with  favor.  In  his  last  annual  message  the  following 
December  (1856)  President  Pierce  said  that  the  "occasion 
of  controversy  on  this  point  [British  pretensions  in  Central 
America]  has  been  removed.  .  .  .  Should  the  proposed 
supplemental  arrangement  be  concurred  in  .  .  .  the  objects 
contemplated  by  the  original  convention  [Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty]  will  have  been  fully  attained.'* 

Obviously,  this  convention  was  a  compromise  which  left 
Great  Britain  firmly  establisheiiiLBelize,  doubtfully  so  in 
the  Bay  Islands,  but  did  away  entirely  with  her  influence  in 
Nicaragua.  The  Senate  did  not  share  the  President's  opti- 
mism, but  promptly  condemned  the  instrument,  though 
finally,  after  considerable  discussion,  ratified  it  with  certain 
amendments.  The  most  important  of  these  amendments- 
struck  out  the  clause  making  the  treaty  conditional  upon 
the  acceptance  of  the  British-Honduran  treaty  of  August, 
1856.  This  particular  amendment,  however,  was  unsatisfac- 
tory to  Lord  Clarendon,  for,  by  making  an  unconditional 
surrender  of  the  Bay  Islands  to  Honduras,  he  alleged  it 
would  leave  unprotected  a  large  number  of  British  subjects 
who  had  taken  up  their  abode  there  with  the  natural  expec- 
tation of  protection  from  the  home  government;  however, 
since  the  Senate  could  not  accept  the  conditions  placed  upon: 
the  retrocession  of  the  Bay  Islands,  as  already  set  forth,  he 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM       133 

would  propose  a  new  basis  of  settlement,  which  was,  — 
cession  of  the  Bay  Islands  to  Honduras,  according  to  certain 
conditions  to  be  incorporated  in  a  new  treaty  between  Great 
Britain  and  Honduras. 

If  the  Senate  had  been  unwilling  to  agree  to  conditions 
already  known,  it  was  not  to  be  expected  it  would  accept 
conditions  that  were  unknown.  Nothing  short  of  the  un- 
qualified retrocession  of  the  Bay  Islands  to  Honduras  was 
acceptable  ;  and,  as  Great  Britain  declined  to  accede  to  that 
proposition,  the  Dallas-Clarendon  convention  failed  of  rati- 
fication (May,  1857).  Thus  the  two  powers  were  thrown 
back  once  more  upon  the  unsatisfactory  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty,  with  British  officers  at  Greytown,  a  British  protec- 
torate over  Mosquitia,  together  with  British  occupation  of 
the  Bay  Islands,  and  full  sovereignty  over  Belize. 
^  In  the  fall  of  1856  Mr.  Buchanan  was  elected  President 
upon  a  Democratic  platform  extolling  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
and  calling  for  a  vigorous  foreign  policy.  He  appointed 
General  Cass,  Secretary  of  State,  whose  radical  views  upon 
the  subject  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  were  well  known, 
as  he  had  upon  former  occasions  in  the  Senate  led  his  party 
in  fierce  opposition  to  that  compact.  Mr.  Cass  immediately 
concluded  an  agreement  with  Nicaragua  which  made  secure 
American  rights  along  the  route  of  the  proposed  canal,  and 
further  accorded  the  United  States  the  unrestricted  right  of 
transit  for  troops  and  munitions  of  war.  The  neutrality  of 
\  the  canal  was  guaranteed,  and  the  influence  of  both  parties 
I  pledged  toward  securing  international  cooperation  toward 
!  that  desirable  end.  Great  Britain  objected  to  this  agreement 
I  upon  the  ground  that  it  violated  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty 
of  1850.     It  was  never  ratified. 

Such  was  the  diplomatic  situation  of  the  "canal  problem" 
in  the  fall  of  1857,  and  in  accordance  with  the  spirit  of  his 
party's  platform,  the  President  decided  to  remove  embar- 
I    rassment,  at  once  and  for  all  time,  by  abrogating  the  Clayton- 
I    Bulwer  treaty  and  proceeding  thenceforth  upon  an  entirely 
I   new  basis.     "The  fact  is,"  the  President  urged  upon  Con- 
gress, "  when  two  nations,  like  Great  Britain  and  the  United 


134  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

States,  mutually  desirous,  as  they  are,  and  I  trust  ever  may 
be,  of  maintaining  the  most  friendly  relations  with  each 
other,  have  unfortunately  concluded  a  treaty  which  they  un- 
derstand in  senses  directly  opposite,  the  wisest  course  is  to 
abrogate  such  a  treaty  by  mutual  consent  and  to  commence 
anew.  Had  this  been  done  promptly,"  he  continued,  "all 
difficulties  in  Central  America  would  most  probably  ere  this 
have  been  adjusted  to  the  satisfaction  of  both  parties.  The 
time  spent  in  discussing  the  meaning  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty  would  have  been  devoted  to  this  praiseworthy  pur- 
pose, and  the  task  would  have  been  the  more  easily  accom- 
plished because  the  interest  of  the  two  countries  in  Central 
America  is  identical,  being  confined  to  securing  safe  transits 
over  all  the  routes  across  the  isthmus." 

LordNapier,  the  British  Minister  in  Washington,  scenting 
danger  in  the  hostile  attitude  of  the  Buchanan  administra- 
tion, approached  the  President  with  a  new  plan  of  settlement 
which  he  said  his  government  was  desirous  of  suggesting. 
An  arbitrary  abrogation  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  he  be- 
lieved, would  surely  lead  to  acts  in  Central  America  which 
would  disrupt  the  diplomatic  relations  of  the  two  countries ; 
this  he  was  anxious  to  prevent.  His  proposition  included 
two  alternatives:  a  mutual  abandonment  of  the  treaty  with 
a  return  to  the  status  quo  ante,  in  which  case  both  powers 
would  be  left  free  to  act  in  Central  America  just  as  if  no 
treaty  had  ever  been  made  ;  the  other  alternative  was  to 
lay  the  treaty,  with  its  ambiguous  phraseology  and  mis- 
undei-stood  provisions,  before  some  European  court  of  arbi- 
tration. 

The  President  could  accept  neither  of  these  propositions. 
That  portion  of  the  treaty  which  especially  called  for  revision 
involved  principles  relating  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  the 
President  suspected  that  those  principles  would  not  stand  the 
test  of  a  European  tribunal.  And,  on  the  other  hand,  a 
formal  recognition  by  the  United  States  of  the  complete 
validity  of  English  rights,  as  previously  claimed  in  Central 
America,  would  be  wholly  impracticable. 

With  these  avenues  closed.  Lord  Napier  then  presented  to 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM        135 

the  President  a  third  scheme  for  the  settlement  of  the  diffi- 
culty. He  explained  that  the  British  Government  was  about 
to  despatch  an  agent  to  Central  America  for  the  purpose  of 
concluding  a  series  of  treaties  with  those  states.  In  these 
prospective  compacts  he  declared  his  government  intended  to 
make  a  disposition  of  Mosquitia  and  of  the  Bay  Islands,  in 
accordance  with  the  wishes  of  the  United  States,  as  expressed 
in  the  amended  form  of  the  Dallas-Clarendon  convention. 
Now,  if  this  could  really  be  accomplished,  the  President  would 
have  no  cause  to  feel  otherwise  than  satisfied.  "  To  him  it 
was  indifferent,"  the  President  said,  "  whether  the  concession 
contemplated  by  Her  Majesty's  Government  was  consigned  to 
a  direct  engagement  between  England  and  the  United  States, 
or  to  treaties  between  the  former  and  the  Central  American 
republics."  After  a  period  of  argumentative  sparring,  into 
which  he  entered  with  abundant  caution,  in  order  to  make  it 
clear  to  Lord  Napier  that  only  a  settlement  of  those  vexed 
Central  American  matters  upon  a  basis  of  the  American  inter- 
pretation of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  would  be  acceptable 
to  the  United  States,  the  President  consented  to  await  the 
results  of  British  negotiations  in  Central  America  before 
making  any  further  move  toward  its  abrogation. 

Sir  William  Ouseley,  the  British  agent  in  question,  after 
a  preliminary  sojourn  in  Washington,  proceeded  to  Central 
America  upon  his  diplomatic  mission.  He  was  for  a  time  de- 
layed by  a  series  of  misadventures,  brought  about  by  the  tur- 
bulent condition  of  affairs  existing  in  Nicaragua ;  and  it  was 
not  until  1860  that  Lord  Napier  was  finally  enabled  to  sub- 
mit to  Mr.  Buchanan  the  three  treaties  which  Great  Britain 
had  concluded  with  Guatemala,  Honduras,  and  Nicaragua  re- 
spectively. 

The  first  of  these  treaties  was  designed  to  adjust  the 
boundary  lines  of  British  Honduras,  which  were  liberally  en- 
larged in  favor  of  England,  so  as  to  include  nearly  all  she  had 
ever  claimed  in  that  region.  As  the  original  settlement  of  Be- 
lize had  never  figured  as  a  cause  of  serious  contention  between 
the  United  States  and  England,  the  President  was  inclined  to 
accord  his  approval  to  this  agreement. 


136  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

The  second  treaty  —  the  one  with  Honduras  —  retroceded 
to  that  republic  the  Bay  Islands,  with  the  conditions  that  the 
recipient  should  never  part  with  them  to  any  other  nation,  and 
that  British  subjects,  continuing  to  reside  there,  should  be  un- 
molested in  their  property  rights  and  religious  freedom.  By 
this  same  instrument,  England  abandoned  her  territorial 
claim  along  the  shores  of  Honduras,  occupied  by  the  Mosquito 
Indians,  on  the  sole  condition  that  Honduras  should  pay  to 
the  Indians  an  annual  indemnity  of  $5000  for  ten  yeara.  This 
treaty  also  met  with  the  President's  approval,  although  he 
would  have  preferred  the  release  of  English  territorial  rights 
less  hampered  by  conditions. 

The  third  treaty  (with  Nicaragua)  was  the  most  important 
one  to  American  interests.  By  this  compact  England  withdrew 
from  her  protectorate  over  Mosquitia,  but  Nicaragua  was  re- 
quired to  establish  a  reservation  along  her  shores  for  the  Ind- 
ians, permitting  them  to  exercise  local  self-government,  and 
also  allowing  them  at  any  time  to  incorporate  themselves 
absolutely  into  the  body  politic  of  Nicaragua,  should  they 
so  desire.  In  this  contingency,  the  reservation  would  be 
abandoned.  Nicaragua  was  also  obligated  to  pay  annually 
to  the  Indians  the  sum  of  i<5000  for  a  period  of  ten  years,  in 
default  of  which  Great  Britain  reserved  the  right  to  interfere 
in  behalf  of  her  former  charges.  Greytown  was  to  become  a 
free  port  under  Nicaraguan  sovereignty. 

At  last  it  seemed  tliat  all  went  well  in  Central  America. 
Had  England  absolutely  and  unconditionally  surrendered  all 
her  territorial  claims  in  Honduras  and  Nicaragua,  it  would 
have  been  more  satisfactory  to  the  United  States;  yet,  upon 
the  other  hand,  this  arrangement  was  a  long  move  in  the 
right  direction,  and  it  appeared  to  be  a  victory  for  the  Ameri- 
can interpretation  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  and  a  vindi- 
cation of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  well.  In  his  last  annual 
message  (December  3,  1860),  President  Buchanan  expressed 
his  satisfaction  in  the  happy  results  of  his  diplomacy.  "  Our 
relations  with  Great  Britain,"  he  said,**  are  of  the  most  friendly 
character.  Since  the  commencement  of  my  Administration 
the  two  dangerous  questions  arising  from  the  Clayton  and 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM        137 

Bulwer  treaty  and  from  the  right  of  search  chiimed  by  the 
British  Government  have  been  amicably  and  honorably  ad- 
justed. The  discordant  construction  of  the  Clayton  and 
Bulwer  treaty  between  the  two  Governments,  which  at  differ- 
ent periods  of  the  discussion  bore  a  threatening  aspect,  have 
resulted  in  a  final  settlement  entirely  satisfactory  to  this 
Government." 

The  country  at  large  acquiesced,  and  it  was  confidently 
hoped  that  the  matter  was  forever  settled,  and  that  the 
troublesome  Clayton-Bulwer  convention  would  be  permitted 
to  rest  peacefully  in  the  archives  of  the  State  Department. 

Thus  closed  in  peace  and  concord  a  decade  of  bitter  con- 
troversy growing  out  of  this  treaty.  Fundamentally,  the 
motives  of  these  disagreements  may  be  largely  traced  to  sus- 
picion. While  neither  party  actually  sought  a  monopoly  of 
political  control  over  the  canal  route,  each  power  distrusted 
the  other,  and  was  ready  to  detect  in  every  move  of  its  oppo- 
laent,  a  covert  attempt  to  secure  those  forbidden  advantages. 
But  the  hope  that  the  controversy  was  forever  ended  proved 
irain.  Twenty-one  years  later.  Great  Britain  found  her  sus- 
picions verified.  The  United  States  did  covet  a  monopoly  of 
^ihe  canal,  and  openly  proclaimed  her  intention  of  acquiring 
It.  The  Ciayton-Bulwer  treaty  was  scanned  anew  for  its 
[mperfections,  and  the  old-time  quarrel  was  fought  over 
bnce  again,  but  upon  new  lines  of  argument. 


IV 

From  1860  to  1865  the  United  States  was  engaged  in  a 
truggle  at  home  that  rendered  Central  American  affairs 
ji<)mparatively  of  little  importance ;  nevertheless,  the  subject 
[f  a  canal  was  never  entirely  lost  sight  of.  In  1856  a  series 
f  riots  at  Panama  interfered  with  the  freedom  of  transit  over 
le  isthmian  railway,  and  the  United  States  found  herself 
fnder  obligation  to  use  military  force  to  relieve  the  interrupted 
)ute.  Upon  this  occasion  the  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Marcy, 
lisclaimed  any  desire  for  exclusive  advantage  in  that  line  of 
jansit;  he  went  so  far  as  to  announce  the  American  inten- 


138  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

tion  of  inviting  other  nations  to  join  in  a  "  guarantee  for  the 
neutrality  of  that  part  of  the  isthmus."  Six  years  later,  revo- 
lutionary movements  in  Colombia  again  menaced  the  safety 
of  the  railway,  and  the  Government  at  Bogota  called  upon 
the  United  States  to  lend  aid  in  suppressing  the  rebellious 
uprising  that  endangered  the  freedom  of  transit  between 
Colon  and  Panama. 

Mr.  Seward,  the  new  Secretary  of  State,  felt  that  the  burden 
imposed  upon  the  United  States  to  maintain  alone  and  single- 
handed  the  integrity  of  the  Panama  route  against  the 
numberless  revolutions  of  a  Latin- American  state  was  unjust. 
The  route  was  open  to  the  world's  commerce,  and  the  responsi- 
bility of  its  protection,  he  believed,  should  rest  equally  upon 
the  shoulders  of  all  beneficiaries.  The  interest  of  the  United 
States  was  in  no  manner  "  different  from  that  of  other  mari- 
time powers."  He  instructed  Mr.  Adams  and  Mr.  Dayton, 
Ministers  to  London  and  Paris  respectively,  to  ascertain 
whether  Great  Britain  and  France  would  *' unite  with  the 
United  States  in  guaranteeing  the  safety  of  the  transit  route 
and  the  authority  of  the  new  Granadian  confederation." 

At  the  close  of  the  Civil  War,  a  more  lively  interest  in  a 
ship  canal  was  manifested,  and  steps  were  soon  taken  to 
encourage  more  friendly  relations  with  the  Central  American 
states.  American  interests  in  Central  America  had  been  per- 
mitted to  decline,  and  they  were  greatly  in  need  of  the  stimu- 
lus which  fresh  treaties  would  give  them. 

The  United  States  emerged  from  its  four  years'  conflict 
with  enlarged  ideas  of  her  position  in  the  world  ;  the  seeds  of 
a  new  and  more  agressive  foreign  policy  had  been  sown.  The 
progress  of  those  ideas  is  marked  by  the  Alaskan  purchase, 
the  attempts  to  secure  naval  bases  in  the  West  Indies,  the  ex- 
pulsion of  the  French  from  Mexico,  and  by  the  evidences  of 
a  belief,  then  gradually  forming  in  the  minds  of  the  people, 
that  the  United  States  should  exercise  sole  political  control 
over  any  Central  American  canal  that  should  ever  be  built. 

Mr.  Seward  first  gave  expression  to  this  new  canal  policy 
in  1866,  when  he  directed  Mr.  Adams,  the  American  Minister 
in  London,  to  broach  the  subject  to  Lord  Clarendon  of  the 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM       139 

United  States  purchase  of  Tigre  Island  as  a  coaling  station 
(the  same  island  that  had  figured  so  prominently  in  British- 
American  relations  in  1850).  Would  such  action  on  the  part 
of  the  United  States  be  considered  by  Great  Britain  as  a  vio- 
lation of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty?  In  his  letter  to  Mr. 
Adams,  Secretary  Seward  hinted  that  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty  was  void  because  it  related  to  the  building  of  a  certain 
canal  which  had  never  even  been  undertaken.  "  It  may  be  a 
question,"  he  said,  "  whether  the  renunciatory  clauses  of  the 
treaty  are  to  have  perpetual  operation."  The  matter  was  not 
pressed  by  Mr.  Adams,  but  the  episode  is  important  here,  as 
demonstrating  the  birth  of  a  new  sentiment,  which  was  in 
later  years  destined  to  expand  into  a  national  policy. 

The  Dickinson-Ayer  treaty  with  Nicaragua,  which  stands 
in  force  to-day,  was  ratified  in  June,  1868.  It  cedes  to  the 
United  States  a  right  of  way,  though  not  an  exclusive  one, 
for  canal  building  purposes ;  it  guarantees  freedom  of  ports 
and  neutrality  of  canal,  subject  to  the  political  sovereignty  of 
Nicaragua.  The  United  States  also  agreed  to  use  its  influence 
to  induce  other  commercial  nations  to  cooperate  with  it  in 
guaranteeing  such  neutrality. 

This  treaty,  therefore,  like  the  one  concluded  with  Colom- 
bia, twenty  years  previously,  contemplated  the  neutrality 
of  the  canal;  in  this  respect  it  was  in  full  accord  with  the 
provisions  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty.  A  new  treaty 
was  also  made  with  Colombia  (1868),  in  the  negotiations 
for  which  Mr.  Seward  exhibited  a  decided  change  of  senti- 
ment from  1862,  touching  the  neutrality  of  the  isthmian 
route.  He  inserted  a  clause  in  the  draft  of  this  Colombian 
treaty  which  provided  that  enemies  of  the  United  States 
should  be  excluded  from  the  use  of  the  proposed  canal  in 
times  of  war.  The  Colombia  Government  rejected  the  arti- 
cle, adding  in  its  place  a  clause  favoring  international  con- 
trol. The  treaty  was  given  full  discussion  in  the  Senate, 
but  failed  of  ratification.  Had  the  Senate  accepted  this 
agreement  with  Colombia,  it  is  quite  certain  that  Great 
Britain  would  have  protested  against  it  as  a  violation  of  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty.     No  doubt  Mr.  Seward  well  knew 


140  '    AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

this,  and  he  was  probably  intending  to  hasten  an  issue  with 
Great  Britain  by  this  practical  exposition  of  his  theories. 

Upon  the  inauguration  of  President  Grant  in  187y,  a  keen 

/interest  in  the    interoceanic  problem  was  revived,  and  the 

I  new  policy  calling  for  exclusive  American  control  of  a  Cen- 

'  tral  American  canal  rapidly  gained  adherents.    It  was  strongly 

urged  by  General  Grant,  and  soon  found  many  champions 

among  the  public  men  of  the  day. 

"There  were  several  causes  for  the  rapid  development  of 
this  policy  during  the  Grant  administration.  Many,  who 
theretofore  had  never  considered  the  question  of  canal  neu- 
tralization in  the  light  of  a  national  issue,  had  their  interest 
suddenly  aroused  by  the  French  operations  under  De  Lesseps 
at  Panama.  The  prospect  of  European  influence  in  the  lower 
isthmus  brought  many  converts  to  the  extreme  views  of  the 
administration,  —  and  they,  as  is  usual  with  most  converts, 
exhibited  great  zeal  in  their  new  cause.  The  Monroe 
Doctrine,  which  had  recently  been  fittingly  and  successfully 
applied  in  Mexico,  had  left  its  impression  in  a  general  revival 
of  those  principles  which  led  the  American  mind  to  protest 
against  any  form  of  foreign  aggrandizement  on  this  con- 
tinent. Indeed,  the  maintenance  of  these  principles  seemed 
sufficient  reason  in  itself  to  warrant  a  demand  for  an  exclu- 
sive American  control  of  any  ship  canal  enterprise  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere.  As  most  Americans,  according  to  their 
own  varying  interpretations,  believed  in  the  wisdom  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  they  came  perforce  to  accept  what  appeared 
to  be  a  mere  corollary  or  incident  of  that  well-established 
\  faith. 

i  After  the  period  of  reconstruction  and  the  consequent  re- 
union of  the  states,  the  need  of  such  a  canal  continued  to 
I  grow  in  importance,  especially  as  the  Pacific  seaboard  states 
'  rapidly  developed  a  marvellous  commercial  growth.  With 
two  coasts  to  defend,  the  military  value  of  such  an  American 
waterway,  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Pacific,  came  more  than 
ever  to  be  appreciated.  Consequently  many  began  to  argue 
that  there  could  be  no  safety  in  a  canal  whose  international 
guaranty  should  keep  it  at  all  times  open  as  the  high  seas. 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM       141 

Thus  the  idea  that  the  iuteroceanic  canal  should  be  con-l 
structed,  owned,  and  then  solely  controlled  by  the  United! 
States,  came  so  generally  to  be  accepted  by  all  political  | 
parties  that  it  may  be  said  in  1880  to  have  become  crystallized) 
into  a  definite  national  policy. 

The  most  formidable  obstacle,  however,  which  stood  just 
in  the  way  of  realizing  this  ideal  was  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty.  Consequently  each  administration,  since  that  of 
President  Grant,  has  in  turn  made  some  attempt  to  remove 
this  obstruction.  With  the  general  acceptance  of  the  more 
radical  theories  of  American  monopoly  of  the  canal  route,  it 
has  been  difficult  for  many  legislators  to  comprehend  how 
their  predecessors  could  have  entertained  dissimilar  views 
upon  the  subject ;  for  this  reason  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treat}^ 
has  been  frequently  denounced  in  Senatorial  debate  within/ 
the  last  twenty  years,  as  a  monument  to  American  imbecility! 
These  critics  are  apparently  unmindful  of  the  conditions 
under  which  the  treaty  was  originally  made  and  of  the 
diplomatic  negotiations  which  followed  its  ratification.  Act- 
uated by  the  conviction  that  the  agreement  is  a  prejudicial 
one,  senators  have  for  twenty  years  periodically  sought  to 
abrogate  it. 

Prior  to  1880,  however,  no  systematic  effort,  because  of  its 
supposed  antagonism  to  American  interests,  had  been  made 
to  repudiate  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  for  although  the 
growing  sentiment  in  the  United  States,  calling  for  American 
control  of  the  canal,  conflicted  with  the  provisions  of  that 
treaty,  up  to  that  year  the  instrument  itself  was  generally 
accepted  as  a  binding  agreement,  and  no  actual  attempt  was 
made  by  those  who  regarded  it  with  disfavor  to  abrogate  or 
otherwise  avoid  it.  On  the  contrary,  great  solicitude  was 
at  times  manifested  lest  Great  Britain  should  violate  its 
provisions.  When  Belize  was  transformed  from  a  British 
settlement  to  a  colonial  possession,  American  protests  were 
made  predicated  upon  the  provisions  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty.  Upon  other  occasions  as  well,  when  Great  Britain's 
motives  in  "adjusting"  her  Central  American  boundary 
lines  were  brought  into  question,  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty 


142  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

was  quoted  to  the  British  Minister  in  Washington  as  a 
sufficient  condemnation  of  England's  conduct. 

As  already  noted  in  the  development  of  this  new  theory 
of  American  political  control  of  the  canal,  the  operations  of 
the  French  company  under  De  Lesseps,  at  Panama,  played  an 
important  part.  Fearing  that  the  French  might  realize  their 
Central  American  objects  and  thereby  gain  for  themselves  an 
undue  military  advantage  over  the  United  States,  President 
Hayes,  in  March,  1880,  sent  a  special  message  to  Congress 
declaring  the  policy  of  this  country  to  be  **An  American 
canal  under  American  control."  He  said :  "  The  United  States 
cannot  consent  to  the  surrender  of  this  control  to  any  Euro- 
pean power  or  combination  of  European  powers.  If  existing 
treaties  .  .  .  stand  in  the  way  of  this  policy  .  .  .  suitable 
steps  should  be  taken  ...  to  promote  and  establish  the 
American  policy.  ...  It  is  the  right  and  duty  of  the  United 
States  to  assert  and  maintain  such  supervision  and  authority 
over  any  such  interoceanic  canal  across  the  isthmus  ...  as 
will  protect  our  interests."  At  another  time  President  Hayes 
asserted  that  the  United  States  should  consider  the  banks 
of  the  Nicaragua  Canal  as  a  continuation  of  the  Ameri- 
can shore  line,  which  doctrine  would,  of  course,  claim  the 
right  in  the  United  States  to  hold,  fortify,  and  defend 
the  same. 

Following  this  exposition  of  the  executive's  position  on 
the  canal  question  —  which  was  the  first  official  and  public 
declaration  of  the  new  policy  —  Congress  passed  several  reso- 
lutions recommending  the  repudiation  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty.  These  resolutions  were  inspired  by  the  same  fear  that 
had  actuated  President  Hayes,  and  were  also  aimed  at  France 
and  her  Panama  canal  scheme. 

The  growing  opposition  to  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  and 
to  the  principles  for  which  it  stood  reached  one  of  its  crises 
in  1881-82.  In  the  early  part  of  that  year  rumors  were  cir- 
culated in  Washington  that  several  European  powers,  at  the 
request  of  Colombia,  were  considering  the  advisability  of 
adopting  some  plan  of  concerted  action  looking  toward  a 
joint  guarantee  for  the  neutralization  of  the  French  canal  at 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM        143 

Panama.  Colombia  had  again  declined  to  make  a  treaty 
with  the  United  States  which  would  bind  her  to  accept  the 
sole  guarantee  of  the  latter  for  the  neutrality  of  the  isthmian 
transit  route;  the  situation  in  Central  America  seemed  un- 
satisfactory. President  Garfield,  in  his  inaugural  address, 
March  4,  1881,  touched  upon  this  question,  though  with  con- 
siderably more  calmness  than  had  been  displayed  by  his 
predecessor.  While  declaring  that  the  United  States  wished 
to  follow  no  narrow  or  exclusive  policy,  nor  sought  exclusive 
privileges,  yet  on  the  other  hand,  it  was  the  "  right  and  duty 
of  the  United  States  to  assert  and  maintain  such  supervision 
and  authority  over  any  interoceanic  canal  across  the  isthmus/ 
...  as  will  protect  our  national  interests." 

But  the  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Blaine,  was  more  deeply 
moved  by  the  threatened  danger  to  American  interests.  He 
was  wholly  in  sympathy  with  the  popular  movement  demand- 
ing the  abrogation  of  the  Clayton- Bui wer  treaty  ;  he  felt  that 
the  time  had  arrived  for  action,  and  he  precipitated  a  contro- 
versy with  Great  Britain  by  a  bold  and  altogether  defiant 
stroke.  On  June  24,  1881,  quite  in  disregard  of  the  obliga- 
tions imposed  upon  the  country  by  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty, 
he  issued  a  circular  letter  to  the  powers  of  Europe,  informing 
one  and  all  that  the  United  States  would  in  future  tolerate 
no  foreign  interference  in  the  matter  of  political  control  of 
any  isthmian  canal ;  assurance  being  given,  however,  that  the 
United  States  Avould  itself  "positively  and  efficaciously" 
guarantee  the  neutrality  of  any  such  route ;  also,  that  no 
assistance  or  aid  from  any  other  power  to  this  end  was  neces- 
sary; furthermore,  he  gave  notice  to  all  that  any  insistence 
on  the  part  of  European  nations  to  have  a  share  of  responsi- 
bility in  the  neutralization  of  the  canal  would  "  partake  of 
the  nature  of  an  alliance  against  the  United  States."  In 
further  elaboration  of  this  recently  adopted  and  somewhat 
novel  attitude  of  his  country  toward  the  subject  of  canal 
equalization,  Mr.  Blaine  especially  desired  that  the  various 
diplomatic  envoys  of  the  United  States,  to  whom  he  had  ad- 
dressed his  circular  letters,  should  "  not  represent  this  position 
as  a  development  of  a  new  policy."    He  alleged,  on  the  con- 


144  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

trary,  that  it  was  "nothing  more  than  the  pronounced  ad- 
herence to  principles  long  since  adopted." 

It  is  difficult  to  see  just  how  Mr.  Blaine  had  been  enabled 
to  justify  to  himself  the  correctness  of  this  last  statement, 
especially  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  American  canal  policy, 
as  set  forth  in  his  circular  note,  had  been  but  the  actual  out- 
growth of  the  previous  decade,  while  the  theory  of  a  com- 
pletely neutralized  canal,  on  the  other  hand,  had  obtained  in 
the  United  States  for  more  than  half  a  century. 

No  doubt  the  British  Government  was  surprised  by  the 
receipt  of  Mr.  Blaine's  circular  letter.  The  full  statement  of 
the  new  American  position  had  been  made  in  complete  disre- 
gard, if  not  in  open  contempt,  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty. 
The  British  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  Lord  Granville,  was 
pointedly  brief  in  reply,  and  his  answer  beai-s  a  hint  that  he 
suspected  Mr.  Blaine  felt  the  weakness  of  his  own  i)osition. 
He  merely  said  that  the  matter  in  question  had  already  been 
settled  by  the  engagements  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty, 
and  that  "  Her  Majesty's  Government  relied  with  confidence 
upon  the  observation  of  all  the  obligations  of  that  treaty." 

Mr.  Blaine  anticipated  the  issue  to  be  presented,  and  be- 
fore the  receipt  of  Granville's  note,  he  despatched  to  Mr. 
Lowell,  the  American  Minister  in  London,  a  lengthy  commu- 
nication upon  the  subject  (November  19,  1881).  The  letter 
is  no  less  remarkable  for  its  plausibility  than  for  its  lack  of 
logical  consistency. 

1.  "This  convention  [Clayton-Bulwer],"  he  said,  "was 
made  more  than  thirty  years  ago,  under  exceptional  and  ex- 
traordinary conditions  which  have  long  since  ceased  to 
exist,  —  conditions  which  at  best  were  temporary  in  their 
nature  and  which  can  never  be  reproduced.  The  remarka- 
ble development  of  the  United  States  on  the  Pacific  coast 
since  that  time  has  created  new  duties  for  this  government, 
and  developed  new  responsibilities  upon  it,  the  full  and  com- 
plete discharge  of  which  requires,  in  the  judgment  of  the 
President,  some  essential  modifications  in  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty." 

2.  "The   interests   of  Her    Majesty's  Government,  [in  a 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM       145 

Central  American  canal]  .  .  .  are  so  inconsiderable  in  com- 
parison with  those  of  the  United  States,  that  the  President 
hopes  "  for  a  readjustment  of  the  treaty. 

3.  At  present  the  treaty  "  concedes  to  Great  Britain  the 
control  of  whatever  canal  may  be  constructed."  This  is 
necessarily  the  case  because  of  England's  great  sea  power. 

4.  The  United  States  (owing  to  its  position  in  the  West- 
ern Hemisphere)  "  will  not  consent  to  perpetuate  any  treaty 
that  impeaches  our  rightful  and  long-established  claim  to 
priority  on  the  American  continent." 

5.  Great  Britain  practically  holds  tlie  route  to  India,  her 
fortifications  at  all  the  important  strategic  points  secure  to 
her  the  mastery  of  the  Mediterranean  and  the  S^d  seas,  and 
this,  together  with  the  controlling  interest  in  the  Suez^'Canal, 
practically  converts  those  waters  into  a  mare  clausum 
Therefore,  he  argued,  "  If  a  hostile  movement  should  at  any 
time  be  made  against  the  Pacific  coast,  threatening  danger  to 
its  people  and  destruction  to  its  property,  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  would  feel  that  it  had  been  unfaithful  to 
its  duty  and  neglectful  toward  its  own  citizens,  if  it  per- 
mitted itself  to  be  bound  by  a  treaty  which  gave  the  same 
right  through  the  canal  to  a  warship  bent  on  an  errand  of 
destruction  that  is  reserved  to  its  own  navy  sailing  for  the 
defense  of  our  coast  and  the  protection  of  the  lives  of  our 
people.  And  as  England  insists  by  the  might  of  her  power 
that  her  enemies  in  war  shall  strike  her  Indian  possessions 
only  by  doubling  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  so  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  will  equally  insist  that  the  inte- 
rior, more  speedy,  and  safer  route  of  the  canal  shall  be 
reserved  for  ourselves,  while  our  enemies,  if  we  shall  ever  be 
so  unfortunate  as  to  have  any,  shall  be  remanded  to  the  voy- 
age around  Cape  Horn." 

6.  ''.  .  .  Only  by  the  United  States  exercising  supervision 
can  the  Isthmus  canals  be  definitely  and  at  all  times  secured 
against  the  interference  and  obstruction  incident  to  war.  A 
mere  agreement  of  neutrality  on  paper  between  the  great 
powers  of  Europe  might  prove  ineffectual  to  preserve  the 
canal  in  time  of  hostilities.      The  first  sound  of  a  cannoii 


146  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

in  a  general  European  war  would,  in  all  probability,  annul 
the  treaty  of  neutrality,  and  the  strategic  position  of  the 
canal,  commanding  both  oceans  might  be  held  by  the  first 
naval  power  that  could  seize  it."  This  would  likely  embroil 
the  United  States  in  foreign  wars. 

7.  The  United  States  is  less  likely  to  be  engaged  in 
foreign  wars  than  are  the  European  powers.  Therefore  to 
her  should  be  entrusted  the  care  of  the  canal. 

8.  Other  powers  are  extending  their  Central  American  trade, 
while  France  is  building  a  canal.  The  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty 
leaves  the  United  States  powerless  to  assert  her  just  rights  on 
the  isthmus,  while  these  other  powers  are  free  to  control  the 
situation. 

9.  "  One  of  the  motives  that  originally  induced  this  gov- 
ernment to  assent  to  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  not  distinctly 
expressed  in  the  instrument,  but  inferable  from  every  line  of 
it,  was  the  expected  aid  of  British  capital  in  the  construction  of 
the  Nicaraguan  Canal.  That  expectation  has  not  been  real- 
ized, and  the  changed  condition  of  this  country  since  1850 
has  diminished,  if  it  has  not  entirely  removed  from  consider- 
ation, any  advantage  to  be  derived  from  that  source." 

Therefore  the  United  States  asks  that  "every  part  of  the 
treaty  which  forbids  the  United  States  fortffying  the  canal 
and  holding  the  political  control  of  it  in  conjunction  with 
the  country  in  which  it  is  located  should  be  cancelled ; "  that 
"every  part  of  the  treaty  in  which  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  agree  to  make  no  acquisition  of  territory  in 
Central  America  should  remain  in  full  force ; "  and  that  a 
neutral  zone  about  each  terminus  of  the  canal,  of  liberal 
extent,  should  be  preserved  by  agreement  of  the  great  powers 
of  the  world. 

Ten  days  later,  Mr.  Blaine  despatched  another  letter  to  Mr. 
Lowell,  upon  the  same  subject.  The  argument  of  "  Tempora 
mutantur'"'  was  further  elaborated.  Mr.  Blaine  did  not  hold 
the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  to  be  a  void,  but  rather  a  voidable, 
instrument ;  it  had  always  been  a  cause  of  friction  between 
the  two  governments,  a  compact  "misunderstandingly  entered 
into,  imperfectly  comprehended,  contradictorily  interpreted, 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM       147 

and  mutually  vexatious,"  for  which  reasons,  he  inferred,  its 
provisions  could  not  properly  be  accepted  as  a  guide  to  the 
action  of  either  party  in  Central  America.  A  full  historical 
account  of  these  many  contradictory  interpretations  of  the 
vexatious  treaty,  throughout  the  period  of  Sir  William 
Ouseley's  mission  to  Central  America,  down  to  1859,  is 
given.  The  numerous  quotations  presented  demonstrate 
clearly  enough  the  dissatisfaction  felt  in  the  United  States 
throughout  that  period.  He  concludes,  that  for  harmony's 
sake,  the  objectionable  features  of  the  convention  should  be 
removed  by  the  common  consent  of  the  parties. 

The  weakness  in  Mr.  Blaine's  position  is  at  once  apparent.- 
His  argument  amounts  to  a  statement  that  the  United  States,J 
having  found  the  obligations  of  its  contract  irksome,  and  an-j 
tagonistic  to  its  new  political  policies,  it  therefore  deems  itj 
fitting  and  proper  to  avoid  them.  The  particular  reasons  ad-U 
vanced  in  support  of  his  contention  are,  for  the  most  part, 
quite  unsatisfactory.  The  vast  growth  of  the  Pacific  states,  con- 
nected by  numerous  railway  systems  with  the  East,  had  been 
made  under  the  very  restrictions  he  complained  of,  and  the 
ability  of  the  West  coast  to  protect  itself  had  been  strength- 
ened by  its  marvellous  advance  in  population  and  wealth. 
It  is  true,  the  interests  of  the  United  States  were  probably 
greater  in  a  Central  American  canal  than  were  the  interests 
of  Great  Britain,  yet  the  measure  of  interest  cannot  affect  the 
legality  of  the  contract.  England  might  easily  have  asserted 
her  own  great  interests  in  the  route  by  simple  reference  to 
her  merchant  marine,  which  exceeded  many  times  in  value 
that  of  the  United  States ;  her  own  territorial  possessions  on 
the  North  American  continent,  having  a  Pacific  coast  line  as 
well,  though  less  in  extent  than  that  of  the  United  States, 
demanded  protection  of  their  interests.  The  route  from 
Halifax  to  Vancouver  would  be  shortened  as  well  as  the 
route  from  New  York  to  San  Francisco. 

Mr.  Blaine's  contention  that  the  terms  of  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty,  uniting  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States 
in  joint  protection  of  the  Isthmian  Canal,  would  give  to  the 
former  virtual  control,  is  scarcely  true  —  and  if  true,  could 


148  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

have  no  weight  as  an  argument  in  this  discussion.  If  Great 
Britain  could  gain  control  of  the  canal,  to  the  injury  and 
prejudice  of  the  United  States,  it  would  not  be  by  virtue  of 
any  provisions  in  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  but  by  reason  of 
her  ^perior  naval  strength,  —  a  fact  lying  wholly  outside 
the  issue  in  question.  On  the  contrary,  the  very  obligations 
from  which  Mr.  Blaine  sought  relief,  being  equally  binding 
upon  both  governments,  prevented  the  "  control  "  of  England 
over  the  canal.  The  treaty  called  for  a  joint  guarantee  of 
neutrality — a  guarantee,  it  must  be  remembered,  which  tied 
^England's  hands,  as  well  as  our  own.     There  is  no  pardonable 

kxcuse    for    avoiding   a   contract    because   of   the    superior 
trength  of  one  of  the  parties. 

The  claim  to  priority  on  the  American  continent,  and  to 
that  position  of  vantage  which  gives  to  the  United  States  a 
greater  right  in  the  management  of  all  the  political  ventures 
in  the  Western  Hemisphere,  is  a  claim  only  to  be  upheld  by 
military  strength ;    such  asserted  right  can  be  maintained 
only  by  force  —  it  cannot  be  supported  in  the  law.     If  this 
argument  of  Mr.   Blaine  were  to  be  brought  forward  as  a 
positive  finale  of  the  discussion,  it  could  only  indicate  that 
the  United  States  had  decided  to  abandon  its  '  '^Hy  pledges, 
to  assert  its  control  of   the  canal,  and   the:      .And   by  the 
consequences.     But  Mr..  Blaine    had   no  intention    of  thus 
conveying  an  ultimatum  to  Great  Britain  ;  his  argument  con- 
cealed no  threat, —  it  was  made  solely  in  the  hope  that  it 
might  convince  the  British  Minister  that  England's  interests 
I  were  not  sufficiently  important  to  give  her  any  part  in  the 
f  maintenance  of  an  open  waterway  connecting  the  Atlantic 
jiijind  Pacific  oceans.     As  such,  it  could  only  be  considered  a 
I  politicaLargument,  possessing  but  little  of  legal  force. 

The  exposition  of  Great  Britain's  position  along  the  route 
to  India,  and  her  alleged  control  of  the  Suez  Canal,  as  an 
argument  for  a  similar  course  to  be  followed  by  the  United 
States,  along  her  route  from  the  East  to  the  West,  was  not 
sufficiently  grounded  on  fact,  even  had  it  been  relevant,  to 
invest  it  with  argumentative  force.  At  that  time  the  neu- 
tralization of  the  Suez  Canal  had  not  been  thoroughly  effected, 


(    WWIVERSITY    \ 

^"^^^^E^fE   INTEROCEANIC   CANAL   PROBLEM  149 

but  Great  Britain  was  the  central  figure  in  the  attempt  then 
being  made,  and  later  carried  out  by  treaty  of  Constantino- 
ple, to  secure  the  perfect  neutrality  of  the  Suez  Canal.  By 
this  agreement  Great  Britain  estopped  herself  fi-om  acquiring 
the  control  of  that  canal  which  her  great  naval  strength 
might  have  given  her.  Her  position  along  the  route,  through 
the  Mediterranean  and  Red  seas,  had  nothing  more  to  do  with 
the  legal  status  of  the  Suez  Canal  than  our  own  naval  sta- 
tions along  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  coasts  might  have  with 
the  Isthmian  Canal. 

Mr.  Blaine's  assertion  that  "  only  by  the  United  States  ex- 
ercising supervision,  can  the  Isthmian  Canal  be  definitely,  and 
at  all  times,  secured  against  the  interference  and  obstruction 
incident  to  war,"  is  a  statement  much  more  susceptible  of 
refutation  than  of  proof.  It  is  manifestly  easier  for  two  to 
stand  guard  than  for  one,  and  still  more  easy  for  three  to 
protect  than  for  two ;  when  all  are  willing  and  are  pledged 
to  stand  guard,  there  becomes  no  further  need  for  the  sentry. 
With  the  United  States  alone  doing  guard  duty  upon  the 
banks  of  the  canal,  what  is  there  to  prevent  any  two  war- 
ring powers  from  blockading  the  route?  What  is  there, 
even  to  preve^  their  closing  the  way  against  American 
ships?     The  x  of  this  contention  by  Mr.  Blaine  can  be 

better  appreciate _l  in  the  fervency  of  patriotic  sentiment, 
but  logically  it  fails.  As  an  argument  for  abrogation  of  that 
part  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  calling  for  international^ 
guarantee,  it  was  of  little  force,  for  there  is  every  reason  toi 
suppose  that  no  single  nation  can  perpetually  maintain  the) 
freedom  of  an  interoceanic  ship  canal. 

Mr.  Blaine's  fear  that  France  might  gain  entire  control  of 
the  Panama  Canal  was  without  reasonable  foundation.  De 
Lesseps  made  no  claim  for  his  country's  exclusive  interests 
in  the  result  of  his  labors.  He  himself  demanded  interna- 
tional agreement  for  the  protection  of  the  route ;  and  had  he 
not  done  so,  or  had  France  assumed  a  right  to  exclude  all 
other  nations  from  a  share  in  its  political  management,  it  is 
certain  that  Great  Britain  would  have  protested  as  vigorously 
as  the  United  States.     Indeed,  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose, 


150  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

judging  from  the  attitude  of  the  commercial  powers  toward 
the  subject,  that  the  other  nations  of  Europe  would  have  per- 
mitted France  to  control  the  Panama  Canal  to  their  disad- 
vantage. 

It  is  difficult  to  see,  as  contended  by  Mr.  Blaine,  wherein 
the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  gives  promise  of  British  capital 
for  the  construction  of  the  canal.  English  money  had  never 
been  solicited  for  the  purpose.  Mr.  Webster,  as  Secretary  of 
State,  two  years  after  the  ratification  of  the  treaty,  declared 
that  the  necessary  means  could  easily  be  obtained  in  this 
country.  There  is  no  evidence  to  show  that  the  United 
States  ever  expected  to  draw  upon  English  sources  for  a 
proportion  of  the  funds  necessary  for  the  building  of  the 
canal. 

Lord  Granville  replied  in  two  despatches,  dated  January 
7  and  14,  1882.  At  the  outset,  he  arraigned  the  principles 
upon  which  Mr.  Blaine  had  founded  his  arguments  as 
"novel  in  international  law."  Denying  the  charge  of 
Great  Britain's  control  of  the  Suez  route,  he  hastened 
"cordially  [to]  concur  in  what  is  stated  by  Mr.  Blaine  as 
regards  the  unexampled  development  of  the  United  States  on 
the  Pacific  coast  .  .  .  but  Her  Majesty's  Government  can- 
not look  upon  it  in  the  light  of  an  unexpected  event,  or 
suppose  that  it  was  not  within  the  view  of  the  statesmen'who 
were  parties  on  either  side  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty. 
The  declarations  of  President  Monroe  and  of  his  cabinet  in 
1823  and  1824  .  .  .  show  at  least  .  .  .  twenty-six  years 
anterior  to  the  treaty  .  .  .  there  was  a  clear  prevision  of  the 
great  future  reserved  to  the  Pacific  coast.  It  is  ...  an 
inadmissible  contention  that  the  regular  and  successful  oper- 
ation of  causes  so  evident  at  the  time  .  .  .  should  be  held  to 
have  completely  altered  the  condition  of  affaii-s  to  the  extent 
of  vitiating  the  foundations  of  an  agreement  which  cannot  be 
supposed  to  have  been  concluded  without  careful  thought  and 
deliberation."  Great  Britain,  as  well  as  the  United  States, 
has  important  interests  connected  with  the  waterway  between 
ithe  Atlantic  and  Pacific  oceans.  Such  a  canal,  he  urged,  "is 
la  work  which  concerns  not  merely  the  United'  States  or  the 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM       151 

American  continent,  but  the  whole  civilized  world.  .  .  . 
Her  Majesty's  Government  are  as  anxious  as  that  of  the 
United  States  that,  while  all  nations  should  enjoy  their 
proper  share  in  the  benefits  to  be  expected  from  the  undertak- 
ing, no  single  country  should  acquire  a  predominating 
influence  or  control  over  such  a  means  of  communication." 
Its  universal  and  unrestricted  use  should  be  secured  upon 
an  international  basis.  This,  he  reminded  Mr.  Blaine,  was 
the  attitude  of  the  United  States  in  the  past,  and  to  save  all 
annoyance  and  ti'ouble,  and  to  subserve  the  best  interests  of 
all  alike,  this  should  be  their  attitude  in  the  future. 

To  the  historical  objections  presented  by  Mr.  Blaine,  Lord 
Granville  replied  at  much  greater  length  in  his  second 
despatch  of  January  14.  The  substance  of  the  letter  is  con- 
densed in  its  closing  paragraph,  which  sets  forth  that  the 
various  differences  which  arose  between  the  two  governments 
out  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  and  to  which  Mr.  Blaine 
refers,  related,  not  to  the  general  principles  of  the  treaty, 
(neutralization,  international  control,  etc.,)  but  to  that  por- 
tion of  the  instrument  forbidding  new  acquisitions  of  terri- 
tory in  Central  America.  These  old  quarrels  found  their 
origin  in  allegations  that  Great  Britain  was  violating  the 
provisions  of  the  treaty  by  acquiring  Central  American 
territory.  This  portion  of  the  treaty  Mr.  Blaine  does  not 
now  attack,  but  desires,  on  the  contrary,  to  retain  intact; 
indeed,  it  was  in  defence  of  those  very  principles  of  neutrali- 
zation that  the  United  States  objected  to  Great  Britain's  move- 
ments in  Central  America.  In  his  historical  review,  Mr. 
Blaine  stops  at  the  very  point  where  the  controversy  should 
begin.  In  1860,  upon  the  conclusion  of  the  three  British 
treaties  with  the  Central  American  States,  the  old  disputes 
between  England  and  the  United  States  were  entirely  set- 
tled, and  President  Buchanan,  in  his  annual  message  of 
that  year,  said :  "  The  discordant  constructions  of  the  Clay- 
ton-Bulwer treaty  between  the  two  governments,  which  at 
different  periods  of  the  discussion  bore  a  threatening  aspect, 
have  resulted  in  a  final  settlement  entirely  satisfactory  to 
this  government." 


? 


152  /      AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

Here  then  was  an  estoppel  to  Mr.  Blaine's  "historical 
arguments." 

The  Garfield  administration  soon  after  coming  to  a  tragic 
end,  President  Arthur's  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Frelinghuy- 
sen,  resumed  the  controversy  with  Lord  Granville.  His 
first  letter  upon  the  subject  (to  Mr.  Lowell,  May  8,  1882)  is 
a  state  paper  of  considerable  strength. 

\  Mr.  Frelinghuysen  maintained  that  the  construction  of  an 
1  isthmian  canal,  open  to  all  ships,  at  all  times,  would  expose 
lour  Western  coast  to  attack,  destroy  our  isolation,  oblige  us 
Ito  improve  our  defences,  increase  our  navy,  and  compel  us, 
Icontrary  to  our  'traditions,  to  take  an  active  interest  in 
European  affairs.  The  physical  conformation  of  this  con- 
tinent is  (»iie  of  our  greatest  safeguards,  and  any  change 
made  in  it  might  most  injuriously  affect  the  interests 
of  the  Republic ;  hence  the  severance  of  the  isthmus  must 
be  effected  in  harmony  with  those  interests.  Relating  to 
he  canal,  there  is  no  conflict  between  American  political 
claims  and  the  material  interests  of  other  nations.  The 
Panama  Railroad  and  the  Suez  Canal,  without  any  inter- 
national pledges  of  neutrality,  have  remained  open  and  in 
service  during  the  most  turbulent  times.  If  no  protectorate 
were  found  necessary  for  them,  it  can  scarcely  be  required 
for  the  Isthmian  Canal.  He  therefore  considered  it  "  un- 
necessary and  unwise,  through  an  invitation  to  the  nations 
of  the  earth,  to  guarantee  the  neutrality  of  the  transit  of 
the  isthmus,  to  give  their  navies  a  pretext  for  assembling 
in  waters  contiguous  to  our  shores,  and  to  possibly  involve 
this  republic  in  conflicts  from  which  its  natural  position 
entitles  it  to  be  relieved."  Such  international  agreements 
—  calling  for  interference  by  force  —  are  apt  to  breed  dis- 
sension and  trouble.  In  times  of  peace  they  are  harmless 
and  useless,  and  in  times  of  war  they  often  cannot  be 
enforced.  Besides  this,  such  an  agreement  would  lead  to 
foreign  intervention  in  American  affairs,  which  the  tradi- 
tional policy  of  the  United  States  would  make  it  impossible 
to  tolerate.  A  protectorate  of  European  nations  over  the 
isthmus  transit  would  be  in  conflict  with  the  ^Monroe  Doctrine. 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM  »      153 

The  treaty  had  two  primary  objects,  —  the  construction  of 
the  Nicaragua  Canal,  and  the  dispossession  of  Great  Britain 
from  her  Central  American  settlements.  To  this  end,  the 
parties  agreed  not  to  exercise  any  dominion  over,  fortify,  or 
colonize,  Nicaragua,  Costa  Rica,  the  Mosquito  coast,  or  any 
part  of  Central  America.  Yet  Great  Britain  exercises  do- 
minion over  Belize  or  British  Honduras,  —  an  area  equalling 
Massachusetts,  Connecticut,  and  Rhode  Island,  —  and  the 
impression  prevails  that  since  1850  Great  Britain  has  con- 
siderably increased  the  region  in  Central  America  over 
Avhich  she  assumes  control.  Such  dominion  seems  incon- 
sistent with  the  provisions  of  the  treaty.  At  the  time  of  tlie 
conclusion  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  English  domin- 
ion in  Belize  consisted  merely  in  a  privilege  to  cut  wood 
and  establish  saw-mills  in  a  territory  established  by  metes 
and  bounds.  It  was  referred  to  by  Sir  Henry  Bulwer  in 
1850,  as  a  "settlement"  at  Honduras.  His  letter  to  Mr. 
Clayton,  excepting  this  settlement  and  its  dependencies  from 
operation  of  the  treaty,  was  made  after  the  conclusion  of  same, 
and  was  unknown  to  the  President  and  Senate.  In  1859  Great 
Britain  made  a  treaty  with  Guatemala,  in  which  her  "settle- 
ment "  was  referred  to,  as  "  Her  Britannic  Majesty's  settle- 
ments and  possessions,"  and  the  commissioners  appointed 
to  mark  the  boundaries  discovered  the  British  area  to  have 
greatly  expanded.  The  United  States  never  gave  assent  to 
this  conversion  of  a  British  settlement  into  a  British  pos- 
session under  full  British  sovereignty.  "Under  treaty  of 
1850,  while  it  is  binding,  the  United  States  have  not  the 
right  to  exercise  dominion  over  or  to  colonize  one  foot  of 
territory  in  Central  America.  Great  Britain  is  under  the 
same  rigid  restriction.  And  if  Great  Britain  has  violated  and 
continues  to  violate  that  provision,  the  treaty  is,  of  course, 
yoidable  at  the  pleasure  of  the  United  States." 

Referring  then  to  Lord  Granville's  mention  of  President 
Buchanan's  message  of  December  3,  1860,  in  which  the 
executive  expressed  his  entire  satisfaction  with  the  outcome 
of  negotiations  arising  under  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  Mr. 
Frelinghuysen  said :  — 


154  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

"  It  is  well  known  that  the  parties  to  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty  anticipated  that  a  canal  by  the  Nicaragua  route  was 
to  be  at  once  commenced.  Under  the  assumption  of  a  pro- 
tectorate of  Mosquito,  British  authority  was  at  that  time 
in  actual  and  visible  occupation  of  one  end  of  the  Nicaragua 
route,  .  .  .  and  it  was  intended  by  this  treaty  to  dispossess 
Great  Britain  of  this  occupation.  This  object  was  accom- 
plished in  1859  and  1860  by  treaties  between  Great  Bi-itain, 
Guatemala,  Honduras,  and  Nicaragua.  ...  It  was  to  this 
adjustment,  which  was  one  of  the  prime  objects  of  the  treaty, 
and  not  to  the  colonization  of  British  Honduras,  that  Mr. 
Buchanan  alludes.   ..." 

An  ample  review  of  the  negotiations  between  Sir  Henry 
Bulwer  and  Mr.  Clayton,  which  led  up  to  the  treaty,  was 
then  given,  in  order  to  show  that  the  primary  object  of  the 
parties  was  to  insure,  at  the  earliest  possible  moment,  the 
cornpletion  of  the  particular  ship  canal  for  which  a  concession 
had  already  been  made  by  Nicai-agua  to  citizens  of  the  United 
States  (August  29,  18-49).  It  is  to  this  particular  canal, 
(Nicaragua  Canal)  Mr.  Frelinghuysen  urged,  that  all  the  pro- 
visions of  the  first  seven  articles  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty 
apply. 

Coming  then  to  the  seventh  and  eighth  articles  of  that  instru- 
ment, which  provide  for  the  coui-se  of  action  to  be  followed  by 
the  two  governments  toward  any  other  Central  American 
scheme  for  connecting  the  oceans,  Mr.  Frelinghuysen  insisted 
that  reference  was  only  made  therein  to  such  projects  as  were 
then  in  contemplation,  i.e.  at  the  time  the  treaty  was  signed. 
All  that  part  of  the  treaty  (Articles  1  to  7)  relating  to  one 
particular  canal  (the  Nicaragua  Canal)  had  lapsed  by  failure 
to  construct  the  canal  to  which  it  especially  referred.  The 
canal  "now  (1882)  in  question"  was  the  Panama  Canal, 
and  the  position  of  the  United  States  in  reference  to  that  is  de- 
termined by  a  convention  between  the  United  States  and  New 
Granada  (United  States  of  Colombia),  concluded  in  1846, 
and  still  in  force.  In  this  treaty,  the  United  States  is  placed 
in  the  position  of  sole  guarantor  of  the  neutrality  of  any 
route  across  the  Isthmus  of   Panama.      The  United  States 


THE   INTEROCEANIC   CANAL   PROBLEM  155 

protectorate  is  therefore  exclusive  in  its  character,  and  should 
Great  Britain  claim,  under  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  a 
right  to  join  the  United  States  in  the  protection  of  this 
route,  "  the  United  States  would  submit  that  experience  has 
shown  that  no  such  joint  protectorate  is  requisite ;  that  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  is  subject  to  the  provisions  of  the 
treaty  of  1846,"  between  the  United  States  and  Colombia. 

Furthermore,  the  United  States  having  successfully  exer- 
cised her  protectorate  over  the  Panama  Railroad  route,  for 
upward  of  thirty  years,  during  the  most  turbulent  times, 
Great  Britain  has  no  right,  at  this  late  date,  to  demand  any 
share  in  the  guarantee  of  any  canal  hereafter  to  be  built 
across  the  isthmus. 

In  conclusion,  Mr.  Frelinghuysen  maintained  that  both  his- 
tory and  theory  support  him  in  his  position  against  a  joint 
protectorate  with  Great  Britain  over  the  Panama  transit 
route,  and  finally  that  the  United  States  cannot  take  part  in 
extending  an  invitation  to  the  powers  of  the  world  to  co- 
operate with  them  upon  the  basis  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty ;  and  that  the  United  States  "  would  look  with  disfavor 
upon  any  attempt  at  a  concert  of  political  action  by  other 
powers  in  that  direction." 

This  letter  of  Mr.  Frelinghuysen  is,  perhaps,  the  best  ex- 
position of  the  American  case  that  has  ever  been  made  for 
the  abrogation  or  modification  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty. 
The  arguments  are  set  forth  with  great  earnestness  and 
much  plausibility ;  but  despite  the  elaborate  preparation  of 
the  brief,  it  was  completely  traversed  by  Lord  Granville's 
reply  to  Mr.  West  (December  30,  1882). 

To  offset  Mr.  Frelinghuysen's  contention  that  the  Clay- 
ton-Bulwer treaty  had  reference  only  to  the  interoceanic 
routes  then  in  contemplation.  Lord  Granville  needed  but  to 
offer  in  quotation  the  treaty  itself,  which  declared  "  that 
neither  the  one  nor  the  other  of  the  high  contracting  parties 
would  ever  obtain  or  maintain  for  itself  any  exclusive  control 
over  any  ship  canal  which  might  he  constructed  between  the 
Atlantic  and  Pacific  Oceans,  by  way  of  the  river  San  Juan." 
Having  then  declared  for  a  principle^  as  well  as  for  the  accom- 


156  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

plishment  of  a  particular  object,  the  parties  agreed  "  to  extend 
their  protection  by  treaty  stipulations  to  any  other  practicable 
communications,  whether  by  canal  or  railioad,  across  the 
isthmus  which  connects  North  and  South  America,  and  espe- 
cially to  the  interoceanic  communications,  should  the  same 
prove  to  be  practicable,  whether  by  canal  or  railway,  which 
are  now  proposed  to  be  established  by  way  of  Tehuantepec 
or  Panama."  The  use  of  the  words  ''''general  principle'''  and 
'•'•especially^'"  in  reference  to  Tehuantepec  and  Panama,  seem 
to  remove  all  doubt  as  to  the  construction  of  the  treaty. 
Granville's  position  was  still  further  strengthened  by  the 
general  acceptance  of  this  construction  of  the  treaty  in  the 
United  States  for  many  yeai-s  following  its  ratification. 

General  Cass,  while  Secretary  of  State  in  1857,  had  asserted 
to  Lord  Napier  that  "the  United  States  demanded  no  exclusive 
privileges  in  the  interoceanic  passages  of  the  isthmus."  All 
of  the  treaties  made  since  1850,  by  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  with  Central  American  states,  acknowledged 
the  principle  of  joint  protection.  From  one  of  these  American 
treaties  (that  of  June  21,  1867,  with  Nicaragua),  Lord  Gran- 
ville called  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  United  States  not 
only  "agreed  to  extend  their  protection  to  all  such  routes, 
guarantees,"  etc.,  but  it  did  further  "agree  to  employ  their 
influence  with  other  nations  to  induce  them  to  guarantee  such 
neutrality  and  protection."  Therefore,  as  the  United  States 
had  seen  fit  to  pledge  itself  to  the  carrying  out  of  that  "  gen- 
eral principle  "  established  by  the  Clayton- Bui wer  treaty  and 
opposed  to  all  ideas  of  exclusive  control,  by  treaties  since 
made,  they  could  not  now  consistently  fall  back  upon  the 
Colombian  treaty  of  1848,  as  giving  them  exclusive  rights 
upon  the  isthmus. 

It  was  to  Mr.  Frelinghuysen's  contention  that  certain  acts 
of  Great  Britain,  in  violation  of  the  terms  of  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty,  had  voided  the  treaty  itself,  and  liberated  the 
United  States  from  its  operations,  that  Granville  especially 
turned  his  attention.  These  alleged  acts  on  the  part  of 
Great  Britain,  it  will  be  recalled,  were  the  conversion  of  a 
more   restricted   right  of  settlement  in  Honduras  to  a  full- 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM       157 

fledged  colony,  and  to  the  unlawful  extensions  of  the  boun- 
dary of  this  British  possession.  Lord  Granville  furnished  an 
historical  account  of  Belize,  showing  that  while  originally  the 
occupation  of  this  territory  by  Englishmen  was  maintained 
under  the  sovereign  laws  of  Spain,  yet  by  conquest  it  had 
subsequently  become  English  territory,  as  acknowledged  by 
Spain,  and  later  by  the  Central  American  states.  All  these 
acts,  which  secured  to  Great  Britain  the  sovereignty  over  her 
Central  American  territory,  had  been  committed  before  1850. 
In  that  year,  and  while  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  was  awaiting 
ratification,  Mr.  Clayton,  the  Secretary  of  State,  acknowledged 
this  British  possession.  Finally,  to  close  the  discussion.  Lord 
Granville  pointed  to  the  postal  convention  of  1869,  between 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  which  formally  recog- 
nized British  Honduras  as  a  "  colony  "  of  Great  Britain. 

Mr.  Frelinghuysen  returned  to  the  discussion,  and  the  con- 
troversy with  Lord  Granville  was  urged  along,  though  with 
signs  of  diminishing  vigor  on  the  part  of  the  United  States. 
Nothing  new  was  developed  in  what  might  be  termed  this 
supplementary  correspondence,  —  the  old  lines  of  argument 
were  preserved,  and  the  same  facts  reiterated.  The  end  of  the^ 
debate  was  only  brought  about  when  the  line  of  argumen^ 
returned  once  more  to  Mr.  Frelinghuysen's  former  charge  of 
Great  Britain's  bad  faith  in  creating  a  "colony  "  in  Honduras 
since  the  ratification  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty.  Lord 
Granville's  curt  reply  to  this  repeated  assertion  was  simply 
that  the  United  States,  through  its  official  mouthpiece,  had 
expressed  its  satisfaction  and  recognized  English  rights  in 
Honduras.  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  which  had  crept  into  the 
discussion,  he  dismissed  with  a  query,  —  Why  had  it  not 
applied  during  the  past  thirty  years  ?  If  the  defenders  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  could  accept  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  in 
1850,  they  could  equally  recognize  it  in  1883. 

The  only  effect   of   this   two   years'    controversy  was   to  ij\ 
establish  all  the  more  firmly  the  validity  of  the   Clayton-    \^ 
Bulwer  treaty.     Whatever  ills  its  provisions  may  have  im- 
posed upon   the   United  States,  there   was  no  escape  from 
the  treaty  through  the  avenues  of  logic  or  by  recourse  to 


158  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

legal  arguments.  The  merits  of  the  case  belonged  to  Great 
Britain.  There  was  no  position  which  either  Mr.  Blaine  or 
Mr.  Frelinghuysen  had  taken,  which  was  not  disproved  by- 
admissions  elsewhere  made  ;  at  every  turn  there  appeared 
to  be  an  estoppel. 

The  reason  for  this  utter  failure  of  American  statesmen 
to  free  the  nation  from  a  burdensome  treaty  is  at  once 
clear.  For  twenty-five  years  after  the  conclusion  of  the 
treaty  the  principles  embodied  therein  had  been  accepted  by 
the  United  States  as  sound  and  wise.  On  such  a  basis  other 
treaties  had  been  negotiated,  authoritative  endoi-sements  had 
been  made,  and  the  whole  course  and  tenor  of  the  nation's 
thought  and  attitude  toward  the  question  had  apparently 
built  an  impregnable  bulwark  about  the  treaty  itself,  as  it 
had  consecrated  the  principles  for  which  it  stood.  Whenever 
the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  shall  be  attacked,  another  diplo- 
matic victory  will  be  given  to  British  statesmen,  and  another 
defeat  scored  at  home.  The  treaty  is  not  void,  and  cannot 
be  avoided  upon  purely  legal  ground. 

If  the  conviction  which  has  apparently  seized  upon  the 
public  mind  that  full  American  control  of  any  Central  Ameri- 
can canal  is  necessary  to  the  safety  and  welfare  of  the  United 
States,  and  must  be  a  condition  of  any  waterway  to  be  con- 
structed, and  if  this  conviction  persists,  the  time  will  soon 
come  when  the  United  States  will  feel  itself  justified  in 
adopting  the  only  rational  plan  for  dissolving  the  obligations 
of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty.  That  plan  is,  —  boldly  to  pro- 
claim its  abrogation  and  take  the  consequences  of  a  breach 
of  faith,  whatever  those  consequences  may  prove  to  be.  One 
way  short  of  so  radical  a  procedure  would  be  to  offer  to 
Great  Britain  some  manner  of  compensation  for  the  relin- 
quishment of  her  rights  under  the  treaty.  But  the  assumption 
should  not  be  made  that  the  United  States  is  so  great  a 
sufferer  under  the  provisions  of  that  treaty.  The  subject 
will,  be  discussed  under  the  title  "Neutralization  of  the 
Canal." 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM        159 


The  results^  of  the  Blaine-Frelinghuysen-Granville  con- 
.troversy  gre'dtlf  displeased  the  executive;  it  was  unsatis- 
factory to  Congress  ;  it  was  regarded  as  a  humiliating  defeat 
by  the  country  at  large.  The  conviction  was  general  in 
Washington  that  the  United  States  had  been  duped  in  1850, 
and  had  been  afterward  seduced  into  the  damaging  admis- 
sions, which  now  arrose  like  ghosts,  to  frighten  the  nation  into 
the  observance  of  a  self-sacrificing  compact.  Many  believed 
it  to  be  an  exaggerated  sense  of  virtue  that  bound  the  nation 
to  the  fulfilment  of  those  agreements.  Technically,  perhaps, 
it  was  thought.  Great  Britain's  position  in  Belize  was  justi- 
fied ;  but  honestly,  as  the  human  heart  appreciates  the  word, 
it  was  noti  Granville's  arguments  did  not  seem  to  ring 
quite  true. 

But  especially  discontented  with  the  outcome  of  this  cor- 
respondence was  a  numerous  group  of  Congressmen,  who 
persistently  asserted  that  the  salvation  of  the  United  States 
depended  upon  the  immediate  construction  of  an  isthmian . 
canal  that  should  be  entirely  American  in  every  particular. 
President  Arthur  himself  had  been  of  this  opinion,  and  he 
at  once  entered  upon  the  task  of  putting  his  convictions 
into  execution,  notwithstanding  the  unfavorable  outcome  of 
the  recent  diplomatic  encounter  with  Great  Britain.  Having 
convinced  himself  that  the  Panama  Canal  (then  in  process 
of  construction)  could  never  come  under  the  full  American 
control,  which  he  felt  to  be  a  necessary  condition  to  his 
country's  safety,  he  determined  that  the  United  States  should 
construct  a  canal  of  its  own  in  Nicaragua.  Mr.  Freling- 
huysen  prepared  the  way  by  concluding  a  new  treaty  with 
Seiior  Zavala,  Special  Envoy  from  Nicaragua  (1884). 

This  treaty  was  made  in  total  disregard  of  the  conven- ' 
tion  of  1850,  It  established  a  perpetual  alliance  between 
the  United  States  and  Nicaragua ;  the  United  States 
should  construct  a  canal  and  then  maintain  an  exclusive 
control  over  it.  A  strip  of  territory  upon  either  side  of  the 
route   was  transferred  to  the   United  States  in   fee  simple. 


.v1 


160  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

Nicaragua's  territorial  integrity  was  guaranteed,  and  the 
United  States  placed  itself  in  the  position  of  protector  of 
the  smaller  republic. 

It  may  readily  be  surmised  that  the  ratification  of  this 
treaty  would  certainly  have  reopened  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
controversy.  It  would  necessarily  have  provoked  a  contest 
between  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  the  treaty  obligations  of 
the  United  States.  The  Senate,  however,  was  unwilling  to 
incur  the  risk  of  such  a  debate,  and  a  vote  of  thirty-two  yeas 
to  twenty-three  nays  left  the  treaty  unconfirmed.  A  recon- 
sideration was  then  ordered,  and  the  matter,  still  unsettled, 
continued  over  into  the  Cleveland  administration. 

The  new  Democratic  President  entered  his  office  with 
ideas  on  this  question  differing  radically  from  those  of  his 
predecessor,  or  rather  from  those  of  his  last  four  predecessors. 
In  his  first  message  of  December  8,  1885,  Mr.  Cleveland 
took  occasion  to  make  public  these  views.  Referring  to  the 
Frelinghuysen-Zavala  treaty,  which  he  had  previously  with- 
drawn from  the  Senate,  he  said  :  — 

My  immediate  predecessor  caused  to  be  negotiated  with 
Nicaragua  a  treaty  for  the  construction,  by  and  at  the  sole  cost 
of  the  United  States,  of  a  canal  through  Nicaragua  territory,  and 
laid  it  before  the  Senate.  Pending  the  action  of  that  body 
thereon,  I  withdrew  the  treaty  for  re-examination.  Attentive 
consideration  of  its  provisions  leads  me  to  withhold  it  from 
re-submission  to  the  Senate. 

Maintaining,  as  I  do,  the  tenets  of  a  line  of  precedents  from 
Washington's  day,  which  proscribe  entangling  alliances  with 
foreign  States,  I  do  not  favor  a  policy  of  acquisition  of  new  and 
distant  territory  or  the  incorporation  of  remote  interests  with 
our  own. 

I  am  unable  to  recommend  propositions  involving  paramount 
privileges  of  ownership  or  right  outside  of  our  own  territory, 
when  coupled  with  absolute  and  unlimited  engagements  to  defend 
the  territorial  integrity  of  the  State  where  such  interests  he. 
While  the  general  project  of  connecting  the  two  oceans  by  means 
of  a  canal  is  to  be  encouraged,  1  am  of  opinion  that  any  scheme 
to  that  end  to  be  considered  with  favor  should  be  free  from  the 
features  alluded  to.  .  .  . 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM       161 

Whatever  highway  may  be  constructed  across  the  barrier 
dividing  the  two  greatest  maritime  areas  of  the  world  must  be 
for  the  world's  benefit  —  a  trust  for  mankind,  to  be  removed  from 
the  chance  of  domination  by  any  single  power,  nor  become  a  point 
of  invitation  for  hostilities  or  a  prize  for  warlike  ambition.  An 
engagement  combining  the  construction,  ownership,  and  operation 
of  such  a  work  by  this  government,  with  an  offensive  and  defen- 
sive alliance  for  its  protection,  with  the  foreign  state  whose  re- 
sponsibilities and  rights  we  would  share  is,  in  my  judgment,  incon- 
sistent with  such  dedication  to  universal  and  neutral  use,  and 
would,  moreover,  entail  measures  for  its  realization  beyond  the 
scope  of  our  national  polity  or  present  means. 

The  lapse  of  years  has  abundantly  confirmed  the  wisdom  and 
foresight  of  those  earlier  Administrations  which,  long  before  the 
conditions  of  maritime  intercourse  were  changed  and  enlarged  by 
the  progress  of  the  age,  proclaimed  the  vital  need  of  interoceanic 
transit  across  the  American  Isthmus  and.  consecrated  it  in  ad- 
vance to  the  common  use  of  mankind,  by  their  positive  declara- 
tions and  through  the  formal  obligation  of  treaties.  Toward 
such  realization,  the  efforts  of  my  Administration  will  be  applied, 
ever  bearing  in  mind  the  principles  on  which  it  must  rest,  and 
which  were  declared  in  no  uncertain  tones  by  Mr.  Cass,  who, 
while  Secretary  of  State,  in  1858,  announced  that  "  what  the 
United  States  want  in  Central  America,  next  to  the  happiness  of 
its  people,  is  the  security  and  neutrality  of  the  interoceanic  routes 
which  lead  through  it." 

The  attitude  of  the  executive  throughout  both  of  Mr. 
Cleveland's  administrations  served  to  check  the  attempts  to 
repudiate  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  which  were  demanded 
from  influential  sources ;  indeed,  the  earnest  efforts  of  Mr. 
Blaine  and  Mr.  Frelinghuysen  to  abrogate  that  convention 
have  never  since  been  revived,  although  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty  has  never  ceased  to  be  regarded  in  other  than  a  most 
unfavorable  light.  On  two  occasions,  indeed,  since  1883,  the 
provisions  of  the  treaty  have  been  invoked  in  such  a  manner 
as  to  indicate  our  renewed  adherence  to  it. 

It  will  be  recalled  that  by  the  treaty  of  Managua,  between 
Great  Britain  and  Nicaragua,  concluded  by  Sir  William 
Ouseley  in  1860,  the  former  abandoned  her  protectorate  over 
Mosquitia—  that  strip  of  territory  lying  along  the  gulf  coast 


162  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

of  Nicaragua.  By  the  terms  of  this  instrument,  Nicaragua 
had  guaranteed  to  pay  a  certain  indemnity  to  the  Mosquito 
Indians.  Probably  inspired  by  the  hope  that  the  United 
States  would  support  her  against  any  British  quarrel  she 
might  stumble  into,  Nicaragua  persistently  refused  to  pay 
the  promised  yearly  stipend  to  the  Indians ;  the  latter 
clamored  for  their  pay,  and  called  upon  Great  Britain  to 
enforce  her  treaty  rights.  Accordingly,  in  1880,  a  demand 
to  this  end  was  made  upon  Nicaragua;  but  in  consequence 
of  the  latter's  continued  refusal  to  abide  by  the  terms  of  her 
contract,  the  matter  in  dispute  between  the  two  nations  was 
submitted  to  the  Emperor  of  Austria  for  arbitmtion.  At 
first  the  administration  felt  that  the  United  States  had  been 
slighted,  and  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  had  been  violated  as 
well.  It  appeared  to  be  a  clear  case  of  "foreign  interference" 
on  the  Western  continent;  but  for  several  reasons  the  Presi- 
dent believed  an  American  protest  would  be  ill  advised. 
Great  Britain  was  clearly  acting  within  her  own  rights  as  a 
party  to  a  treaty,  and  the  United  States  had  fully  approved 
of  the  convention  when  fii-st  concluded  (Buchanan  Message, 
1860).  Although  a  foreign  tribunal  of  arbitration  threatened 
the  renewal  of  British  claims  in  Mosquitia,  there  was  simply 
no  help  for  it,  except  in  the  use  of  force.  As  apprehended, 
the  arbitration  proceedings  (July,  1881)  resulted  in  the  rees- 
tablishment  of  the  English  protectorate  over  the  Mosquito 
reservation ;  but  consolation  was  sought  by  the  Senate  in 
reaffirming  the  principles  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  The 
episode  called  forth  no  direct  protest  from  either  Mr.  Blaine 
or  Mr.  Frelinghuysen. 

/   The   commercial   and^rinnrfll    pffpnf  of   the  restoration  of 
/rBritish  influence  carrying  enlightened  Anglo-Saxon  rule  along 
lithe  Mosquito  shore,  was  almost  magical.     Immigration  set  in, 
['business  revived,  and  the  dilapidated  village  of    Bluefields 
became   a   commercial   centre  where   British  and  American 
capital  sought  investment.     A  large  fruit  trade  was  opened 
with  New  Orleans,  and  American  capital  began  the  exploita- 
tion of  Mosquito  resources  upon  a  comparatively  large  scale. 
This  rapid  development  of  Mosquitia  operated  adversely  to 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM       163 

Nicaragua's  prospects  in  the  ra^^for  wealth.  Jealousies 
soon  arose,  and  Nicaragua  appealed  to  the  United  States 
to  protect  her  in  her  efforts  to  regain  control  of  the  Indian 
reservation.  Acts  were  committed  by  Nicaraguan  officials 
in  contempt  of  Mosquito  and  English  authority  at  Bluefields 
and  elsewhere  within  the  limits  of  the  reservation.  A  crisis 
was  reached  in  1888,  which  renewed  the  old  controversy,  in 
which  the  UniteoKtates  again  reprimanded  Great  Britain 
for  violation  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty.  Mr.  Bayard,  the 
Secretary  of  State,  opened  the  new  diplomatic  skirmish  by 
a  sharp  remonstrance.  His  letter  of  November  23,  1888,  to 
Mr.  Phelps,  American  Minister  at  London,  took  the  position 
that  a  continuance  of  the  protectorate  of  Great  Britain  over 
the  Mosquito  territory  would  be  regarded  by  the  United  States 
as  conflicting  with  the  provisions  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty. 
He  maintained  that  Great  Britain  was  using  her  Managua 
treaty  as  a  mere  cloak  to  shield  her  in  the  continued  exercise 
of  sovereignty  along  the  Central  American  coast ;  that  the 
United  States,  being  no  party  to  the  Austrian  arbitration  pro- 
ceedings, was  not  bound  nor  committed  to  an  admission  of 
British  right  of  interference  between  Nicaragua  and  the 
Indians  within  her  borders;  he  therefore  insisted  that  the 
United  States  was  free  to  oppose  a  British  protectorate  in 
Central  America,  as  being  wholly  inconsistent  with  her  general 
views  and  political  policy. 

Mr.  Bayard's  appeal  was  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  quite  as 
much  as  to  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty;  but  his  somewhat 
elaborate  argument  had  the  fatal  weakness  of  many  American 
state  papers  —  the  presentation  of  a  political  theory  or  policy 
against  generally  accepted  tenets  of  international  law.  What- 
ever objections  the  United  States  might  interpose  to  British 
actions,  they  were  rendered  nugatory  by  the  simple  fact  that 
Great  Britain  was  acting  consistently  within  the  limits  of  a 
treaty  which  the  United  States  herself  had  sanctioned;  and 
finally,  she  was  clearly  justified  under  the  award  of  a  tribunal 
assented  to  by  Nicaragua. 

Lord  Salisbury  replied  to  Mr.  Bayard  some  months  later 
(March  7, 1889).  He  denied  any  English  claim  of  sovereignty 


1/ 


164  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

over  the  Mosquito  Indians,  and  asked  only  for  the  Nicaraguan 
observance  of  the  Managua  treaty  to  offer  Great  Britain  the 
opportunity  she  desired  to  withdraw  from  the  affairs  of  the 
Indian  reservation. 

For  some  years  Mosquitia  continued  to  prosper  under 
British  rule.  The  increasing  number  of  American  immi- 
grants to  Bluefields  contributed  a  decided  American  flavor 
to  Mosquito  politics.  Although  British  influence  remained 
paramount,  this  fact  was  more  than  ever  manifested  inj^92j^ 
when  the  Mosquito  authorities  placed  a  duty  upon  irS^orta^ 
tions  received  at  Bluefields  in  excess  of  specified  rates  pre- 
viously fixed  by  treaty  between  Nicaragua  and  the  United 
Itates, — Nicaragua  having  become  unable  to  abide  by  her 
tariff  pledges  to  the  United  States,  as  her  own  sovereignty 

falong  the  coast  had  been  entirely  suspended.     The  Mosquito 
iff  act  presented  an  auspicious  occiision  to  Nicaragua  to 

I'  reopen  the  old  controversy  with  Great  Britain ;  a  correspon- 
dence ensued,  in  which  tlie  United  States  was  necessarily 
soon  involved.  In  a  letter  to  the  American  Minister  in  Lon- 
don, the  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Foster,  declared  with  great 
emphasis,  that  Nicaragua's  sovereignty  over  Mosquitia  had 
not  been  impaired ;  her  concessions  to  Great  Britain  being, 
in  their  nature,  tribal  and  not  territorial.  "A  suppositi- 
tious Mosquitia  is  not  to  be  arbitrarily  substituted  for  the 
territory  allotted  to  and  reserved  for  the  residence  of  the 
Mosquito  Indians  by  the  sovereign."  "  The  United  States 
cannot  look  with  favor  upon  any  attempt,  however  indirect, 
on  the  part  of  Great  Britain  to  render  illusory  the  sover- 
eignty of  the  Republic  of  Nicaragua  over  the  Mosquito 
Indians  and  the  territory  reserved  for  their  dwelling."  A 
lengthy  discussion  might  have  resulted,  which  would  no  doubt 
have  brought  forth  much  learning  upon  the  subject  of  suze- 
rain rights,  had  not  more  stirring  events  in  Mosquitia  sud- 
denly diverted  attention,  from  academic  debates  between 
London  and  Washington,  to  the  consideration  of  an  imme- 
diate military  interference  on  the  spot.  In  the  usual  course 
of  Central  American  history,  Nicaragua  and  Honduras,  along 
with  most  of  the  adjoining  states,  became  involved  in  war. 


THE   INTEROCEANIC   CANAL   PROBLEM  165 

Mosquitia  remained  neutral,  which  in  the  estimation  of  Vj'^ 
Nicaragua,   claiming  sovereignty  over   the   reservation,   was      \ 
nothing  less  than  disloyalty.     Accordingly  Nicaraguan  troops    fl//^ 
swept  into  the  reservation,  seized  and  occupied   Bliiefields    \ 
(February,  1894)  against  the  combined  protests  of  the  native    *  |Ad 
Indian  Chief,  Clarence,  and  his  political  supporter,  the  Brit-  ^ 
ish    Consul.     The    U.    S.    S.   Kearsarge  was   wrecked    while 
hastening  to  the  scene  ;  but  upon  the  arrival  of  a  British 
war   vessel,  and   the   landing   of   marines,   the   Nicaraguan 
troops  retired,  leaving,  however,  a  Nicaraguan  commissioner 
in  the  hands  of  the  foreigners  at  Bluefields.     This  sudden 
flurry  at  arms  had  a  sobering  effect  upon  the  English  authori- 
ties, who,  since  the  Austrian  arbitration,  had  been  inclined  to 
disregard  in  toto  Nicaraguan  claims  to  sovereignty  over  Mos- 
quitia.   The  Nicaraguan  commissioner  was  therefore  accepted 
as  a  factor  in  a  new  provisional  govei'nment  formed  for  Mos- 
quitia.    The  infusion  of  the  Nicaraguan    element   into   the 
governmental  affairs  of  the  reservation  soon  brought  discon- 
tent among  the  foreigners,  which  resulted  in  a  nocturnal  coup 
d  etat  overthrowing  the   provisional  government   and  again 
placing  Chief  Clarence  in  control.     In  consequence  of  this, 
Nicaraguan  troops  soon  appeared  near  Bluefields,  in  fighting 
array,  and    demanded    the    restoration   of   the    Nicaraguan 
authorities. 

Such  was  the  crisis  when  the  United  States  fully  awoke  to 
the  importance  of  events  taking  place  in  Central  America. 
Explanations  were  demanded;  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  was 
carefully  reread  at  the  State  Department ;  American  citizens 
in  Bluefields  were  cautioned  to  take  no  part  in  acts  violating 
Nicaraguan  sovereignty  in  Mosquitia,  and  Great  Britain  was 
asked  to  withdraw  her  troops.     England  yielded,  the  marines     • 
departed,  and    a  deplorable  condition  of  political  confusion 
resulted  in    Mosquitia.     A   resumption  of   Nicaraguan  sov- 
ereignty in  Bluefields,  with  its  attendant  abuses  and  extor-^A 
tions,   soon  brought  about   a  second   coup    d'etat,  in   which  I 
American,  English,  and  Indians  all  combined  to  cast  out  the 
intolerable  rule  of  Nicaragua.     The  United  States  was  thus 
placed  in  the  awkward  position  of  favoring  the  legitimate 

T-  or    THK  \ 

UNIVBRSITYj 


166  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

rule  of  Nicaragua  over  Mosquitia,  which  the  business  inter- 
ests of  American  citizens  there  resident  had  twice  prompted 
them  to  overthrow. 

The  Indian  Chief  (Clarence)  was  scarcely  established  in 
office,  with  a  "  council  of  state "  of  American  and  British 
citizens  to  aid  him  in  directing  the  affairs  of  Mosquitia, 
when  the  Nicaraguan  army  again  appeared.  England  having 
already  abandoned  hope  for  the  fulfilment  of  her  Mosquito 
projects,  held  aloof.  The  United  States,  to  be  consistent, 
encouraged"  Nfcaragua.  Bluefields  was  taken,  Clarence  fled 
to  Jamaica,  all  American  and  British  subjects  including  the 
British  Consul,  who  were  suspected  of  complicity  in  the  last 
Mosquito  uprising,  were  seized,  and  with  scarcely  a  pretence 
of  trial,  were  summarily  banished. 

Through  the  exercise  of  an  unusual  amount  of  tact  by 
the  United  States  authorities,  Nicaragua  relented,  and  par- 
doned the  exiles,  many  of  whom  returned  to  Bluefields  to 
resume  their  former  occupations;  but  further  efforts  to 
maintain  a  Mosquito  nation  were  seen  by  all  parties  to  be 
useless,  and  in  November,  1894,  the  Indians  voluntarily 
declared  for  incorporation  into  Nicaragua.  "  Mosquitia " 
became  the  Nicaraguan  state  of  "  Zelaya,"  with  which  cliange 
the  last  remnant  of  Great  Britain's  grasp  upon  it  faded. 

England's  demand  for  indemnity  growing  out  of  the  ban- 
ishment of  her  Consul,  Mr.  Hatch,  resulted  in  the  seizure  of 
the  Nicaraguan  port  of  Corinto  (April,  1895).  The  event 
caused  some  excitement  in  the  United  States,  but  it  marked 
the  final  episode  of  British  interference  in  Nicaragua.  The 
claim  was  paid,  and  the  British  warships  sailed  away,  leaving 
behind,  for  the  first  time  in  a  century,  no  shadow  of  English 
authority  in  Nicaragua,     y^ 

Since  1895  a  number  of  American  citizens  have  continued 
under  Nicaraguan  authority  to  live  and  do  business  in  Blue- 
fields  ;  but  frequent  signs  of  their  irritation  have  come  to  the 
surface,  indicating  their  disrespect  for  a  governmental  system 
that  thrives  upon  revolution  and  permits  many  deeds  of  injus- 
tice under  excuse  of  military  necessity.  Could  Great  Britain 
be  induced  to  sanction  the  abrogation  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM       167 

treaty  and  free  the  United  States  from  the  ban  of  territorial  / 
expansion  in  Central  America,  it  is  probable  that,  sooner  or 
later,  a  fourth  coup  d'Stat  in  Bluefields  might  transfer  the 
State  of  Zelaya  to  the  United  States.  Such  a  consummation 
would  be  pleasing  to  those  members  of  Congress  who  favor 
the  immediate  construction  of  the  proposed  canal  as  a  national 
undertaking. 

VI 

As  already  noted,  the  views  of  President  Cleveland,  touch- 
ing the  political  status  of  the  Central  American  Canal,  being 
more  in  accord  with  those  entertained  by  the  country  pre- 
vious to  1870,  precluded  the  possibility  of  any  definite  action 
looking  to  the  abrogation  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  under 
his  administrations.  From  1885  to  1889  and  from  1893  to 
1897  no  renewal  of  Mr.  Blaine's  and  Mr.  Frelinghuysen's 
efforts  in  that  direction  were  undertaken,  notwithstanding 
the  fact  that  the  treaty  received  several  denunciations  in 
Congress,  and  public  opinion  throughout  the  country  was 
becoming  more  and  more  fixed  against  the  toleration  of 
foreign  influence  in  the  management  of  the  canal. 

President  McKinley  at  first  gave  to  the  public  no  hint  of  his     i 
own  position  in  the  matter ;  but  in  his  second  annual  message    f 
(December  1898),  moved  by  the  new  conditions  which  had   [ 
arisen  within  the  short  space  of  a  year,  he  recorded  himself  a 
champion  of  the  doctrine  of  an  "  American  Canal."     He  said 
in  reference  to  the  Nicaraguan  Canal:  —  "The  construction 
of  such  a  maritime  highway  is  now  more  than  ever  indispen- 
sable to  that  intimate  and  ready  intercommunication  between 
our  Eastern  and  Western  seaboards  demanded  by  the  annex- 
ing of  the  Hawaiian  Islands  and  the  prospective  expansion  of 
our  influence   and  commerce  in  the   Pacific,  and  that  our 
national  policy  now  more  imperatively  than  ever  calls  for  its 
control  by  this  government,  are  propositions  which  I  doubt 
not  the  Congress  will  duly  appreciate  and  wisely  act  upon." 

Thus  President  McKinley  came  to  endorse  the  ultra-Amer-| 
lean  principle  of  the  political  status  of  a  Central  American  I 


\ 


168  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

canal  as  supported  by  Presidents  Hayes,  Garfield,  Arthur,  and 
Harrison.  The  position  of  the  executive  was  concurred  in 
by  Congress,  and  approved  by  the  country  at  large. 

Events  growing  out  of  the  Spanish  War  went  far  to  con- 
vince a  conservative  minority,  who  doubted  the  wisdom  or 
'  expediency  of  abrogating  the  ClaytiajtlJulwer  treaty,  that 
they  had  probably  erred  in  judgment.  The  long  voyage  of  the 
Oregon  from  San  Francisco  to  Santiago,  at  a  time  of  national 
peril,  furnished  the  only  proof  still  lacking  to  demonstrate 
the  necessity  of  a  canal  connecting  the  oceans  which  should 
be  under  the  military  protection  of  the  United  States  Gov- 
ernment. The  expansion  policy  of  the  United  States  in  the 
West  Indies,  and  the  acquisition  of  a  Pacific  empire  with  its 
promises  of  trade  and  of  a  greatly  enlarged  American  mer- 
chant marine,  further  stimuhited  the  desire  of  the  country 
for  a  ship  canal  under  American  control.  Shipping  subsidies  p* 
were  under  discussion  in  the  Senate  ;  a  greatly  increased 
navy  was  called  for  to  protect  distant  possessions;  new  and 
unlooked-for  conditions  suddenly  transformed  the  nation  into 
an  alert  and  aggressive  power.  With  these  changes  of 
national  sentiment,  public  interest  became  more  than  ever 
aroused  in  the  completion  of  the  Nicaraguan  Canal.  Unani- 
mous committee  reports  in  both  houses  of  Congress  favored 
prompt  construction  by  the  United  States  Government;  a 
growing  disposition  in  Congress  manifested  itself  for  the  ac- 
quisition of  a  strip  of  Nicaraguan  and  Costa  Rican  territory, 
in  order  that  the  canal  might  lie  wholly  within  American 
soil.  Resolutions  of  Congress  again  declared  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty  to  be  void.     The  press  was  unsparing  in  its 

/Stacks  upon  the  old  compact,  and  never  before  had  all  par- 
ties so  persistently  clamored  for  the  immediate  undertaking 

\of  the  work  upon  a  national  basis,  although  in  defiance  of 

Weaty  obligations. 

/    In  January,  1900,  a  rumor  became  current  that  negotiations  <' 
were  in  progress  to  conclude  a  new  treaty  with  Great  Britain 
relative  to  the  ship  canal.     Knowing  the  sentiments  of  the 
administration  on  the  subject,  the  proponents  and  friends  of 
the  canal  rejoiced  in  the  prospect  of  final  delivery  from  the  J 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM       169 

diplomatic  entanglements  which  for  fifty  years  had  prevented 
the  realization  of  their  hopes.  The  people  at  last  concluded 
that  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  was  to  be  abandoned.  A  con- 
gratulatory tone  pervaded  the  press  comments,  while  the 
appearance  of  the  new  treaty  was  eagerly  awaited.  Surmises 
were  rife  that  Great  Britain,  having  encountered  evil  fortune 
in  South  Africa,  and  being  in  danger  of  European  intervention, 
had  consented  to  withdraw  her  Central  American  pretensions 
for  the  sake  of  assured  American  friendship.  It  was  also  sus- 
pected that  in  order  to  humor  Canada,  England  might  ask  of 
the  United  States  concessions  in  Alaska,  and  give  in  return 
all  that  was  demanded  relative  to  the  canal.  On  February 
5,  the  Hay^Pauncefote  Convention  was  signed,  sent  to  the 
Senate,  read  and  immediately  referred  to  the  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations.  It  was  entitled,  ''A  Convention  between 
the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  to  Facilitate  the  Con- 
struction of  a  Ship  Canal  to  Connect  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific 
Oceans,  and  to  Remove  any  Objection  which  Might  Arise  out 
of  the  Convention  Commonly  Called  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty."  The  agreement  called  for  the  construction  of  the 
canal  under  the  auspices  of  the  United  States  Government,  to 
be  done  at  its  own  expense  and  to  carry  with  it  the  enjoyment 
of  all  the  rights  incident  to  such  construction.  The  "  General 
Principles  "  of  ^neutralization  as  established  in  the  eighth 
article  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  were  to  be  preserved, 
and  to  that  purpose  a  set  of  rules  analogous  to  those  con- 
tained in  the  Constantinople  treaty  (October  29,  1888)  were 
adopted.  These  rules  called  for — («)  freedom  of  transit  in 
times  of  ^ar^or  ^eace  to  all  vessels  of  all  nations ;  (5)  a  free- 
dom from  blockade ;  (<?)  a  code  of  procedure  for  war  vessels 
entering  and  leaving  the  canal ;  (^)  no  fortifications  along 
the  route.  The  high  contracting  parties  should  call  upon 
the  other  powers  to  unite  with  them  in  guaranteeing  neu- 
trality of  the  canal. 

When  the  text  of  the  convention  was  made  public  a  few 
days  later,  it  bewildered  the  country.  Those  who  endorsed 
the  principles  of  neutralization,  for  which  the  new  treaty 
stood,  were  amazed,  because  the  administration  had  already 


170  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

pledged  itself  to  quite  the  opposite  theory  in  reference  to  the 
canal.  All  others  who  read  the  words  of  the  treaty  were  no 
less  disappointed  than  astonished.  The  Clayton-Hulwer  treaty 
was  not  abrogated  in  the  instrument,  as  they  thought  would 
be  the  case;  on  the  contrary,  its  principles  were  reaffirmed. 
The  new  agreement  did  not  abandon  the  old ;  it  supple- 
mented g-nd  enlarged  upon  it.  Those  features  of  the  old 
convention  relating  to  the  neutralization  of  a  canal,  which 
had  been  denounced  for  so  many  years  as  objectionable,  were 
emphasized  and  perpetuated  in  the  new  instrument.  The 
disabilities  placed  upon  the  United  States  by  the  old  conven- 
tion,, in  the  matter  of  acquisition  of  Central  American  terri- 
tory, not  being  expressly  removed,  were,  in  consequence, 
(recognized  by  the  new.  And  finally  and  above  all  other  con- 
siderations, the  despised  Cla^rtoj^jiiilwer  treaty  was  acknowl- 
edged to  be  binding  and  in  force,  —  creating  thereby  a  new 
land  effective  estoppel  to  future  efforts  seeking  British  consent 
/to  its  abrogation. 

In  the  committee-room  the  following  amendment  to  the 
treaty  was  appended  to  the  instrument  by  Senator  Davis :  — 

It  is  agreed,  however,  that  none  of  the  immediately  foregoing 
conditions  and  stipulations  in  sections,  Nos.  1,  2,  3,  4,  5,  of  this 
article,  shall  apply  to  measures  which  the  United  States  may  find 
it  necessary  to  take,  for  securing  by  its  own  forces  the  defense  of 
the  United  States  and  the  maintenance  of  public  order. 

This  amendatory  clause  was  based  upon  a  provision  in  the 
Constantinople  treaty  of  1888  touching  the  neutralization  of 
the  Suez  Canal,  and  was  meant  by  Senator  Davis  to  supply  an 
omission  which  had  occurred  through  "  oversight "  of  the  ne- 
gotiators. It  will  be  seen  that  the  Davis  amendment  at  once 
robbed  the  instrument  of  its  main  purpose  —  the  neutraliza- 
tion of  the  route,  —  and,  if  adopted,  would  virtually  nullify 
the  treaty. 

The  appearance  of  the  Hay-Pauncefote  agreement  brought 
the  subject  of  neutralization  of  the  canal  to  a  final  and  defi- 
nite issue,  and  its  acceptance  or  rejection  by  the  Senate  would 
indicate  the  course  the  United  States  must  finally  adopt.  The 
alternatives  were :  — 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM       171 

(1)  A  canal  neutralized  to  the  use  of  the  world's  com- 

merce by  a  joint  guarantee  of  all  nations,  and 

(2)  A  national  waterway  belonging  to  the  United  States, 

and  over  which  it  exercises  full  control. 

The  sudden  presentation  of  this  issue  in  so  positive  a  form 
brought  forth  many  virulent  criticisms  by  the  more  radical 
advocates  of  American  exclusiveness  in  a  canal  policy.  The 
apparent  change  in  the  President's  sentiments  from  1898  to 
1900  on  the  subject  of  canal  equalization  gave  to  the  oppo- 
nents of  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  the  handle  of  a  whip 
wherewith  to  flay  the  administration.  It  was  inevitable  that 
the  "canal  question"  should  develop  a  political  aspect,  and 
before  the  close  of  the  session  it  began  to  accommodate 
itself  to  party  needs.  The  Republican  supporters  of  the 
President  were  openly  accused  of  seeking  to  perpetuate  a 
vicious  anti-American  compact.  Railroad  interests,  the 
Trusts,  and  a  snobbish  catering  to  British  policies  were 
alleged  as  the  causes.  In  the  House,  the  Hepburn  Bill, 
which  wholly  ignored  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  and  was  in 
direct  opposition  to  the  principles  of  the  agreement  awaiting 
confirmation  in  the  Senate,  was  passed  by  a  large  majority  of 
votes  to  the  discredit  of  American  methods  of  negotiation 
with  foreign  nations. 

The  1st  Session  of  the  51st  Congress  came  to  a  hurried 
adjournment  in  early  June  without  having  ratified  the 
Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  or  even  having  acted  upon  the  Davis 
amendment;  and  the  matter  was  postponed  to  the  following 
December.  On  account  of  the  delay,  the  period  for  ratifi- 
cation of  the  treaty  was  extended  by  mutual  agreement  to 
March  4,  1901. 

Both  party  platforms,  adopted  in  the  National  Conventions 
immediately  after  the  adjournment  of  Congress,  endorsed  the 
policy  of  absolute  and  exclusive  American  control  of  the 
canal.  The  acceptance  of  such  a  plank  in  the  Republican 
platform  at  Philadelphia  could  only  be  regarded  as  a  party 
expression  of  disapproval  of  the  position  assumed  by  the 
executive  toward  a  neutralized  waterway  connecting  the 
oceans.     This  protest  from  the  party,  which  had  been  presum- 


1T2  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

ably  won  over  to  a  neutral  canal,  and  which  was  supposedly 
backing  the  ratification  of  the  treaty,  greatly  lessened  its 
chances  for  adoption  by  the  Senate  the  following  session. 

An  unusual  degree  of  interest  in  canal  legislation  was 
manifested  at  the  opening  of  Congress  on  December  4,  1900. 
Two  important  events  were  looked  forward  to,  —  the  appear- 
ance of  the  canal  commission's  report^  and  an  early  vote 
upon  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty.  The  preliminary  report  of 
the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  was  submitted  to  Congress 
with  the  President's  message.  It  contained  in  a  condensed 
form  the  outcome  of  one  and  a  half  years'  exhaustive  study 
of  all  the  possible  canal  routes  across  Central  America.  The 
advantages  or  disadvantages  of  these  various  routes  were  con- 
sidered from  their  physical,  political,  and  strategic  points  of 
view.  The  probable  costs  of  construction  were  estimated, 
and  the  location  of  each  possible  route  with  reference  to  full 
and  complete  ownership  by  the  United  States  was  investi- 
gated. 

Basing  their  calculations  upon  the  statistics  of  entrances 
and  clearances  at  European,  North  and  South  American  ports, 
the  commission  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  freight 
tonnage  passing  through  the  canal  would  be  sufficient  to 
warrant  its  commercial  success.  To  meet  the  requirements 
of  modern  sea-going  vessels,  in  view  of  their  constantly  in- 
creasing size,  the  report  recommended  a  greater  depth  and 
width  of  channel  than  ever  before  proposed.  The  uniform 
low  water  depth  of  35  feet,  with  a  bottom  width  of  150  feet, 
together  with  a  double  system  of  locks,  furnished  a  more 
extravagant  basis  for  estimates  of  cost  than  had  ever  before 
been  considered. 

Abandoning  all  other  routes  as  impracticable,  the  commis- 
sion found  the  probable  cost  of  the  Nicaragua  and  Panama 
canals  each  to  be  about  $200,000,000.  In  the  case  of  the  latter, 
the  estimated  cost  of  completion  was  placed  at  $142,342,579, 
but  this  amount,  added  to  the  sum  required  to  buy  out  the 
French  company  already  in  the  field,  would  make  the  final 
cost  of  the  two  routes  about  equal. 

^  For  creation  of  this  commission,  see  page  94. 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM       173 

A  careful  comparison  of  the  advantages  offered  by  these 
two  waterways  led  the  commission  into  a  close  examination 
of  the  rights  and  privileges  owned  under  franchises  by  the 
various  canal  companies  interested  in  Central  America.  All 
such  franchises  of  course  stood  directly  in  the  way  of  the  gov- 
ernment undertaking  the  construction  as  a  national  project. 
The  report  concludes  as  follows :  — 

"  1.  The  estimated  cost  of  building  the  Nicaragua  Canal  is 
about  $58,000,000  more  than  that  of  completing  the  Panama 
Canal,  leaving  out  the  cost  of  acquiring  the  latter  property. 
This  measures  the  difference  in  the  magnitude  of  the  ob- 
stacles to  be  overcome  in  the  acutal  construction  of  the  two 
canals,  and  covers  all  phj^sical  considerations,  such  as  the 
greater  or  less  height  of  dams,  the  greater  of  less  depth  of 
cuts,  the  presence  or  absence  of  natural  harbors,  the  presence 
or  absence  of  a  railroad,  the  exemption  from  or  liability  to 
disease,  and  the  amount  of  work  remaining  to  be  done. 

''  The  New  Panama  Canal  Company  has  shown  no  disposi- 
tion to  sell  its  property  to  the  United  States.  Should  that 
company  be  able  and  willing  to  sell,  there  is  reason  to 
believe  that  the  price  would  not  be  such  as  would  make  the 
total  cost  to  the  United  States  less  than  that  of  the  Nicara- 
gua Canal. 

*'  2.  The  Panama  Canal,  after  completion,  would  be  shorter, 
have  fewer  locks  and  less  curvature  than  the  Nicaragua 
Canal.  The  measure  of  these  advantages  is  the  time  re- 
quired for  a  vessel  to  pass  through,  which  is  estimated  for  an 
average  ship  at  twelve  hours  for  Panama  and  thirty-three 
hours  for  Nicaragua. 

"  On  the  other  hand,  the  distance  from  San  Francisco  to 
New  York  is  377  miles,  to  New  Orleans  579  miles,  and  to 
Liverpool  386  miles  greater  via  Panama  than  via  Nicaragua. 
The  time  required  to  pass  over  these  distances  being  greater 
than  the  difference  in  the  time  of  transit  through  the 
canals,  the  Nicaragua  line,  after  completion,  would  be  some- 
what the  more  advantageous  of  the  two  to  the  United 
States,  notwithstanding  the  greater  cost  of  maintaining  the 
longer  canal. 


174  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

"  3.  The  Government  of  Colombia,  in  which  lies  the  Pan- 
ama Canal,  has  granted  an  exclusive  concession,  which  still 
has  many  years  to  run.  It  is  not  free  to  grant  the  necessary 
rights  to  the  United  States,  except  upon  condition  that  an 
agreement  be  reached  with  the  New  Panama  Canal  Com- 
pany. The  commission  believes  that  such  agreement  is 
impracticable.  So  far  as  can  be  ascertained,  the  company  is 
not  willing  to  sell  its  franchise,  but  it  will  allow  the  United 
States  to  become  the  owner  of  part  of  its  stock.  The  com- 
mission considers  such  an  arrangement  inadmissible. 

"  The  Governments  of  Nicaragua  and  Costa  Rica,  on  the 
other  hand,  are  untrammelled  by  concessions  and  are  free  to 
grant  to  the  United  States  such  privileges  as  may  be  mutu- 
ally agreed  upon." 

And  the  report  in  conclusion  says :  — 

"  In  view  of  all  the  facts,  and  particularly  in  view  of  all  the 
difficulties  of  obtaining  the  necessary  rights,  privileges,  and 
franchises  on  the  Panama  route,  and  assuming  that  Nicara- 
!  gua  and  Costa  Rica  recognize  the  value  of  the  canal  to  them- 
selves, and  are  prepared  to  grant  concessions  on  terms  which 
are  reasonable  and  acceptable  to  the  United  States,  the  com- 
mission is  of  the  opinion  that  '  the  most  practicable  and  feas- 
ible route  for'  an  isthmian  canal  to  be  *  under  the  control, 
management,  and  ownership  of  the  United  States '  is  that 
i  known  as  the  Nicaragua  route." 


The  report,  being  so  thoroughly  in  accord  with  the  estab- 
lished American  preference  for  the  Nicaragua  route,  gave 
great  satisfaction.  The  character  and  ability  of  the  com- 
missioners and  the  thoroughness  of  their  investigations  have 
no  doubt  settled  for  all  time  the  choice  of  routes.  The  field 
is  clear  in  Nicaragua,  the  concessionary  companies  have  been 
disposed  of,  and,  with  abundant  means  in  the  Treasury  and 
popular  favor  to  hasten  the  consummation  of  the  project, 
there  remains  but  one  obstacle  to  postpone  or  defeat  the 
undertaking.      That  obstacle  is  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty. 

Soon  after  the  convening  of  Congress  in  December  1900, 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM       175 

the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  was  called  up  for  consideration, 
and  for  some  days  the  Senate  in  executive  session  consid- 
ered the  adoption  of  the  Davis  amendment,  along  with  numer- 
ous other  amendatory  clauses  offered  by  various  senators. 
The  Davis  amendment  was  agreed  to  on  December  13  (65 
to  17),  —  a  clause  which,  as  already  shown  (p.  170),  com- 
pletely transformed  the  character  and  purpose  of  the  treaty. 
On  December  20,  two  additional  amendments  presented  by 
Senator  Foraker  were  adopted.  One  of  these  consisted  of 
the  insertion  of  the  words  "which  convention  is  hereby 
superseded,"  just  after  the  words  "  Clayton-Bulwer  Conven- 
tion," in  the  second  article  of  the  instrument.  The  second 
amendment  provided  for  striking  out  the  entire  third  article  of 
the  convention,  which  abandoned  article  had  called  upon  the 
parties  to  bring  the  convention  to  the  notice  of  the  other 
powers,  and  to  invite  them  to  adhere  to  it. 

The  ratification  of  the  treaty  so  amended  by  the  Senate 
took  place  the  same  day  (December  20, 1900),  and  the  instru- 
ment was  immediately  returned  to  the  President  for  delivery 
to  Lord  Pauncefote. 

As  the  treaty  now  stands,  it  is  virtually  a  compromise 
between  absolute  neutralization  and  complete  American  con- 
trol. It  provides  for  the  construction  of  the  route  as  a  purely 
American  project  under  the  auspices  of  the  government,  and 
gives  to  the  government  full  management  of  the  waterway, 
the  fixing  of  tolls,  etc.  The  *'  neutralization  "  of  the  route 
is  then  effected,  so  far  as  the  two  powers  concerned  are 
able  to  guarantee  its  neutralization.  It  shall  be  open  in  time 
of  war  as  in  time  of  peace  to  all  vessels  of  all  nations,  with- 
out discrimination,  save  when  there  is  war  against  the  United 
States ;  then  the  United  States  may  take  such  measures  as  it 
may  find  necessary  to  protect  itself,  even  to  the  closing  of  the 
canal  against  the  vessels  of  the  enemy.  This  reservation  of 
course  defeats  the  absolute  neutrality  of  the  route,  and  the 
denial  of  the  rights  of  the  other  great  powers  to  cooperate 
in  such  a  guarantee  also  removes  the  canal  from  the  class 
of  neutralized  waters.  Should  Great  Britain  decide  to  ratify 
the  treaty  as  already  accepted  by  the  Senate,  the  status  of  the 


176  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

Nicaragua  Canal  would  be  that  of  a  private  waterway,  with 
provisons,  however,  relating  to  its  control,  which  give  to  it  the 
semblance  of  a  neutralized  channel.^ 


VII 

The  "  Canal  question  "  involves  three  sets  of  problems,  all 
of  which  call  for  definite  solution  before  the  actual  work  of 
excavation  shall  begin.  These  problems  relate,  first,  to  the 
physical  features  of  the  uridiBPtfdrrng  and  its  cost ;  second,  to 
its  commercial  aspects  and  probable  value  to  the  United  States  ; 
and  third,  to  the  political  status  of  the  waterway  —  in  other 
words,  shall  it  be  controlled  by  the  United  States  alone,  or 
shall  it  be  neutralized  by  common  consent  of  all  nations? 
These  three  questions  are  of  paramount  importance. 

1.  To  the  first  of  these  questions  (the  engineering  fea- 
tures and  cost),  much  attention  has  already  been  given.  It 
may  be  assumed  that  reasonably  correct  estimates  have  been 
made  by  the  United  States  Government  through  the  ex- 
haustive researches  of  its  recently  appointed  scientific  com- 
missions. The  civil  engineer  and  the  geologist  are  enabled  to 
base  their  calculations  upon  actual  facts  ;  with  tlie  utmost  pre- 
cision they  have  measured  the  amount  of  earth  to  be  removed  ; 
they  have  ascertained  the  hardness  of  rock  to  be  encountered, 
and  have  probed  the  underlying  strata  to  great  depths  with  a 
view  of  obtaining  a  perfect  knowledge  of  their  character. 
The  water-levels  of  the  lakes  and  rivers  have  been  accurately 
measured,  and  the  most  advantageous  sites  for  dams  and  locks 
have  been  located.  The  harbors  have  been  sounded,  and  their 
approaches  most  carefully  studied.  From  the  engineer's 
standpoint,  then,  the  problem  has  already  been  solved.  The 
conclusions  are  definite,  and  the  Nicaraguan  Canal  is  beyond 
all  doubt  a  physical  possibility. 

In  so  far  as  it  is  possible  to  compute  the  cost  of  so  gigantic 

an  enterprise,  this  has  also  been  calculated.     It  is  true  that 

these  estimates  vary,  yet  their  differences  are  not  discourag- 

ingly  great.      The  most  expensive  of  them  all  in  no  way 

^  Great  Britain  declined  to  accept  the  treaty  as  amended. 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM       177 

removes  the  undertaking  from  the  limits  of  a  financial  possi- 
bility. The  last  phase  of  the  problem  connected  with  the 
physical  aspects  of  canal  construction  relates  to  the  choice 
of  routes.  This  has  been  narrowed  down  to  Panama  and 
Nicaragua.  It  was  the  chief  object  of  the  last  isthmian  com- 
mission, which  has  already  submitted  its  preliminary  report, 
to  make  a  final  selection.  American  preference  has  so  long 
inclined  toward  the  completion  of  the  latter  route,  that  the 
adoption  of  the  other  is  extremely  unlikely ;  however,  in  case 
of  any  future  change  of  sentiment  to  Panama,  the  physical 
features  of  tliat  route  have  been  as  thoroughly  investigated, 
and  its  feasibility  equally  demonstrated. 

2.  The  second  class  of  considerations  involves  the  com- 
mercial aspects  of  the  proposed  route,  —  Will  it  pay  ?  This 
feature  of  the  canal  question  has  perhaps  been  too  little 
considered.  The  people  of  the  United  States  have  been 
rather  inclined  to  assume  that  so  splendid  a  triumph  of  engi- 
neering science  must  surely  receive  the  reward  of  commercial 
success  ;  and  for  proof  of  this,  the  satisfactory  earnings  of  the 
Suez  Canal  have  been  offered  in  evidence.  The  contemplation 
of  huge  enterprises  affects  the  mind  somewhat  after  the 
manner  of  wine,  and  care  should  be  taken  lest  the  splendor 
of  achievement  shall  dim  the  judgment.  It  must  be  borne 
in  mind  that  ships  follow  the  shortest  and  best  routes,  and  that 
freight  seeks  the  cheapest  highways.  It  should  be  noted  that 
the  Nicaraguan  Canal  does  not  furnish  tlie  shortest  route  from 
New  York  to  the  Philippines,  nor  from  the  ports  of  China 
and  the  East  Indies  to  London  or  New  York ;  the  fact  must 
also  be  considered  that  the  Suez  route  offers  greater  induce- 
ments to  steam  vessels  in  the  way  of  coaling  stations  and 
shorter  laps  between  ports. 

Again,  the  five  competing  railroad  systems  across  the  conti- 
nent of  North  America  have  so  reduced  the  freight  rates  in 
the  last  fifteen  years  that  assertion  has  been  frequently  made, 
if  not  thoroughly  proved,  that  any  all-water  route  from  the 
Pacific  to  the  Atlantic  coasts  cannot  compete  with  the  all- 
rail  routes.  The  products  of  the  Pacific  slope  which  would 
have  to  be  shipped  first  by  rail  to  the  coast  and  then  trans- 


178  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

shipped  to  a  vessel,  might  be  enabled  to  reach  their  Atlantic 
destination  at  less  cost  by  the  all-rail  journey.  Indeed,  when 
railroads  have  come  into  direct  competition  with  water  routes, 
the  latter  have  often  declined  in  commercial  importance.  The 
canal  and  river  systems  of  the  United  States,  once  the  commer- 
cial highways  of  the  nation,  have,  in  many  instances,  become 
virtually  abandoned  in  the  presence  of  competing  railways. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  is  a  great  unknown  quantity  of 
trade  that  may  be  promoted  by  this  ''marriage  of  the  oceans." 
With  the  Suez  isthmus  aheady  pierced,  there  remains  but  the 
breaking" of  the  Central  American  barrier  to  complete  an  open 
road  to  vessels  around  the  world  in  a  comparatively  straight 
course.  How  far  the  lealization  of  this  prospect,  so  pleasing 
to  the  imagination,  is  likely  to  prove  commercially  successful, 
should  be  the  subject  of  tliorough,  accurate,  and  scientific 
investigation.  An  original  outlay  of  two  hundred  millions  is 
too  great  a  sum  to  be  hazarded  without  at  least  a  fair  promise  I 
of  return,  —  a  return  that  is  susceptible  of  demonstration  by 
better  evidence  than  mere  conjecture  or  sentiment. 

The  commercial  aspect  of  the  question  is  somewhat  neu- 
tralized, if  not  overshadowed,  by  military  considerations.  If 
the  canal  is  necessary  for  national  defence,  its  probable  suc- 
cess or  failure,  as  a  commercial  venture,  is  of  little  relative 
importance.  The  original  cost  and  the  yearly  outlay  there- 
after would  be  charged  to  the  legitimate  expense  column. 
However,  estimates  of  the  strategic  value  of  the  canal  to  the 
United  States  involve  inquiries  which  come  more  fittingly 
under  the  third  class  of  considerations  relative  to  the  "  Canal 
problem." 

3.  With  the  physical  elements  of  the  problem  removed, 
and  the  practicability  of  the  undertaking  determined,  there  \ 
still  remain  problems  of  utmost  importance  to  be  solved  be- 
fore connecting  the  oceans.  These  considerations  are  of  a 
political  nature.  What  shall  be  the  legal  status  of  the  canal 
when  constructed  ?  Shall  it  be  open,  like  the  high  seas,  to 
the  world's  commerce  ?  Shall  it  be  neutralized  by  common 
pledge  of  all  nations,  or  shall  it  be  regarded  as  a  private 
waterway  belonging  to  the  United  States  ? 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM       179 

Whenever  the  work  is  actually  begun,  this  question  will 
necessarily  become  vital;  indeed,  it  has  already  become  so. 
It  cannot  be  evaded.  The  commercial  powers  of  the  world 
are  too  alert  to  permit  their  trade  interests  to  be  jeopardized, 
and  these  interests  must  be  reckoned  with.  To  avoid  all 
future  complications  in  this  respect,  the  political  status  of  the 
canal  should  be  determined  in  advance. 

One  of  the  following  plans  must  be  adopted :  — 

1.  Exclusive  American  political  control. 

2.  An  "  understanding  "  with  Great  Britain  to  divide  the  re- 
jponsibility  of  maintaining  the  canal  and  securing  its  neutrality. 

3.  A  treaty  or  arrangement  with  the  great  commercial  nations 
)f  the  world  whereby  the  absolute  neutrality  of  the  canal  shall  be 
guaranteed  to  all  ships  of  trade  or  war. 

The  second  of  these  schemes  may  be  eliminated  from  the 
list,  for  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  growing  out  of 
dual  control  in  such  a  waterway  are  practically  identical  with 
those  of  the  first  scheme  —  sole  American  control.  This  nar- 
rows the  problem  of  the  political  character  of  the  canal  to  the 
alternatives  of  exclusive  American  control  or  complete  neu- 
tralization. 

There  is  some  confusion  as  to  the  true  meaning  of  the  word 
"neutralization."  Statements  are  frequently  met  in  the 
press,  in  party  platforms,  and  in  the  declarations  of  Congress 
that  the  Nicaragua  Canal  should  be  a  ''  neutral  "  waterway, 
and  open  to  all  vessels  of  any  flag,  but  that  the  United  States 
should  at  the  same  time  reserve  to  herself  the  right  of  closing 
the  canal  in  times  of  war  against  the  vessels  of  an  enemy. 
Again,  it  has  been  frequently  asserted  in  Washington  that 
the  United  States  is  willing  to  "guarantee  the  neutrality" 
of  the  canal,  but  for  reasons  involving  her  own  safety,  she 
cannot  consent  to  the  participation  of  other  nations  in  such 
guarantee.  This  position  was  taken  by  Mr.  Blaine  in  his 
correspondence  with  Lord  Salisbury  in  1881,  when  he  seri- 
ously maintained  that  there  was  no  need  of  international 
cooperation  to  this  end  because  the  United  States  was  herself 
willing  and  competent  "  positively  and  eflicaciously  to  guar- 


180  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

an  tee"  such  neutrality.  In  a  vague  sort  of  way  this  has 
ever  since  been  the  canal  doctrine  in  the  United  States. 

The  reservation  of  any  special  privileges  for  American 
ships  in  time  of  war  is  considerably  at  variance  with  the 
idea  of  a  neutral  canal;  and  the  belief  in  the  sufficiency  of 
American  guarantee  indicates  a  decided  misconception  of 
the  meaning  of  "neutralization."  United  States  guarantee 
of  neutrality  really  means  nothing  more  than  her  promise  to 
defend  the  open  waterway  against  attack.  No  nation  can 
give  a  guarantee  against  the  attack  of  another ;  it  can  only 
pledge  its  resistance  against  such  attack.  No  nation  can 
"  positively  and  efficaciously  guarantee  "  neutrality,  unless, 
indeed,  it  be  sufficiently  strong  and  powerful  to  enforce  the 
guarantee,  —  even  then  it  could  not  really  give  more  than  a 
promise  to  defend  the  canal  route  in  case  another  sought  to 
hold  or  destroy  it. 

Neutralization  means  an  exeni[)tioii  from  all  warlike  opera- 
tions, and  this  condition  can  only  be  L'liLcicd  by  an  agree- 
ment of  all  parties  to  abstain  from  such  warlike  operations. 
It  consists  of  that  immunity  from  attack  that  can  only  be 
secured  by  general  consent.  ^^NeutralFzaf lori  Is  the  assign- 
ment to  a  particular  territory  or  territorial  water  of  such 
a  quality  of  permanent  neutrality  in  respect  to  all  future 
wai-s  as  will  protect  it  from  foreign  belligerent  disturbance. 
This  quality  can  only  be  impressed  by  the  action  of  the 
great  powers  by  whom  civilized  wars  are  waged,  and  by 
whose  joint  interposition  such  wars  could  be  averted" 
(Wharton  Digest,  §  145). 

It  thus  becomes  evident  that  if  the  United  States  is  really 
sincere  in  its  determination  to  accomplish  the  neutrality  of 
the  Central  American  Canal,  it  defeats  its  own  object  by 
declining  to  accept  international  cooperation  to  that  end  — 
for  by  that  means  only  can  neutralization  be  secured. 

The  "  American  Canal  doctrine  "  of  to-day,  generally  ad- 
vocated, does  not  in  reality  contemplate  neutralization.  It 
■promises  merely  to  keep  the  canal  open  in  times  of  peace ; 
Ito  defend  it  in  times  of  war ;  and  to  close  it  against  enemies 
x)f  the  country. 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM       181 

With  this  understanding  of  the  word  "neutralization," 
(and  it  admits  of  no  other  interpretation)  tlie  issue  is  sharp 
and  jcl^r..hetvveen  .an  American-owned  canal,  g'ontrolled  by 
the  United  States,  and  a  neutralized  canal  as  desired  by  the 
commercial_nadoi^^^^  of  the  world  and  called  for  by  the 
Clayton -Bui  we  r  treaty. 

The  question  resolves  itself  into  this,— should  the  Nicara- 
gua or  Panama  Canal  be  neutralized? 

Arguments  for  or  against  this  proposition  may  spring  from 
three  sources,  viz. :  — 

(a)  International  Law.     Are  there  any  legal  duties  im- 
posed upon  the  United  States  as  owner  of  a  ship 
canal  passing  through  the  territory  of  another  state, 
and  connecting  two  high  seas,  —  in  other  words,  is 
the    United    States  under   any  legal   obligation  to 
accept  the  neutralization  of  such  a  canal? 
(5)  Precedents.      Is   the    United   States   obliged   by  any 
precedents  relating  to  ship  canals  in  general,  or  to 
the  Central  American  Canal  in  particular,  to  unite 
with   other  nations  in  a  joint  guarantee   of  canal 
equalization  ? 
"  Precedents  "  as  here  used  would  naturally  include  all  the 
treaties,  agreements,  or  official  declarations  of  the   United 
States  which  can  be  taken  to  indicate  not  only  its  interna- 
tional   obligations   but   also   national   sentiments   upon   the 
subject. 

(c)  Self  Interests.     Do  the  best  interests  of  the  United 
States  require  her  monopoly  of  the  Central  Ameri- 
can Canal,  or  are  they  better  subserved  by  a  neutral- 
ized Central  American  canal  ? 
International  law  does   not  throw  direct  light  upon  this 
question,  and  there  is  in  consequence  much  confusion  among 
the  various  authorities  as  to  the  status  of  a  ship  canal  in  the 
domain  of  public  law.     It  is  only  in  comparatively  recent 
years  that  the  advances  of  science  have  made  possible  the 
construction  of   great  artificial  channels  connecting  oceans, 
and  the  very  few  such  waterways  already  in  existence  have 
not  had  sufficient  time  to  establish  for  themselves  a  legal  code. 


182  amp:rican  diplomatic  questions 

The  application  to  them  of  legal  principles  is  indirect ;  they 
can  only  be  made  through  the  more  or  less  doubtful  analogies 
of  natural  straits,  arms  of  the  sea,  territorial  waters,  and  the 
high  seas.  The  value  of  such  comparison  is  not  always  to 
be  relied  upon  ;  but  the  general  advance  of  liberal  sentiments 
relative  to  the  freedom  of  the  seas,  as  developed  in  the 
progressive  evolution  of  international  ethics,  is  far  more 
significant.  This  would  indicate  a  decided  tendency  toward 
impressing  an  international  character  upon  ship  canals  con- 
necting open  seas. 

The  protracted  controversy  concerning  mare  clausum  and 
mare  liberum,  which  lastfed  for  more  than  a  hundred  years, 
long  since  resulted  in  complete  victory  for  the  adherents  of 
the  latter  doctrine.  The  high  seas  are  free  to  all  vessels,  but 
natural  straits  connecting  the  high  seiis,  when  narrow,  and 
lying  within  the  territory  of  a  single  power,  may  or  may  not 
be  entirely  free,  according  to  circumsttinces.  Their  exact 
position  in  law  has  not  yet  been  satisfactorily  determined, 
though  it  may  be  confidently  asserted  that  the  trend  of 
modern  usage  is  to  withhold  from  nations,  through  whose 
territory  such  waterways  pass,  exclusive  control  over  their 
navigation. 

It  is  to-day  generally  agreed  that  bodies  of  water  answer- 
ing to  the  description  of  a  strait  ough^  to  be  free  because 
they  are  in  a  greater  or  less  degree  necessary  to  navigation ; 
and  only  such  limitations  upon  their  full  freedom  of  naviga- 
tion are  allowable  as  the  security  of  the  staTe^^^Hrough  which 
the  strait  passes  seems  to  demand.  When  the  interior  waters 
of  a  state  terminate  at  either  end  in  the  open  sea,  the  result- 
ing freedom  of  navigation  in  them,  in  times  of  war,  might 
operate  as  a  serious  menace  to  the  welfare  of  such  state; 
hence  it  is  that  certain  modifications  of  the  free  rights  of 
navigation  in  such  waters  may  be  made  by  special  compact. 
Yet  the  fact  is  not  altered  that  they  do  in  a  measure  belong 
to  the  world's  commerce.  A  sovereign  may  not  debar  alien 
vessels  from  innocently  using  such  courses,  and  his  own 
sovereignty  over  them  has  been  practically  limited  to  the 
extent  of  collecting  only  such  dues  from  passing  vessels  as 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM       183 

may  reimburse  him  for  the  expense  of  keeping  the  way 
lighted,  buoyed,  and  properly  charted.  Denmark  no  longer 
can  collect  revenue  from  the  sound  dues  she  formerly  exacted. 
Such  is  the  case  in  regard  to  the  Gut  of  Canso,  the  Straits 
of  Magellan,  and,  theoretically  at  least,  to  those  at  Gibraltar. 
The  Dardanelles  and  the  Bosphorus  are  anomalous,  in  that 
their  navigation  continues  to  be  regulated  entirely  by  treaty. 
These  straits  do  not,  however,  connect  two  open  seas  —  the 
Black  Sea  being  a  body  of  water  "neutralized"  by  inter- 
national agreement,  and  its  free  navigation  being  in  some 
respects  restricted;  hence  the  Bosphorus  and  the  Dardanelles 
do  not,  strictly  speaking,  fall  within  the  class  of  natural 
channels  connecting  the  high  seas.  In  regard  to  artificial 
waterways  connecting  two  open  seas,  a  number  of  elements 
enter  which  would  seem  to  remove  them  at  once  from  the 
operation  of  international  law,  and  to  exclude  them  from 
the  class  of  natural  waterways. 

It  has  been  asserted  by  high  authorities  that  an  artificial 
canal,  linking  two  open  seas,  and  being  also  a  navigable  ., 
waterway,  should  therefore  be  open  to  the  world;  that  it 
should  be  regarded  as  a  part  of  the  high  seas,  and  that  its 
freedom  of  use  is  a  corollary  to  the  rule  governing  the 
open  oceans  it  connects,  it  being  a  necessity  to  naviga- 
tion. A  canal,  therefore,  becomes  a  public  way,  like  the 
arms  of  the  sea,  and  should  be  regulated  by  the  same  laws 
that  direct  the  world's  shipping.  On  the  other  hand,  it  has 
been  as  freely  asserted  by  equally  good  authority,  that  the 
fact  of  an  artificial  channel  not  having  been  granted  by 
nature  to  the  use  of  man,  but  being  wholly  the  work  of  man 
himself,  invests  it  with  the  character  of  private  or  national 
ownership.  One  cannot  w*ell  avoid  this  conclusion.  To 
assert  that  a  nation  may  not  construct  a  waterway  through 
its  own  territory  without  conceding  its  free  navigation,  is  to 
assert  that  a  nation  is  not  sovereign  within  its  own  limits. 
There  is  no  public  law  that  permits  a  nation  to  send  its 
armies  across  the  territory  of  a  neutral  power,  or  in  any  manner 
to  assume  a  right  of  transit  over  its  domains.  Convenient 
routes   of  overland  transit,  such  as  railways,  are  obviously 


184  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

under  the  protection  and  control  of  the  sovereign  power 
whose  territory  they  traverse.  A  great  tmnscontinental  rail- 
road might  be  considered  necessary  to  the  world's  commerce, 
yet  no  one  would  seek  to  invest  such  a  route  with  an  inter- 
national character.  Should  the  nations  of  Europe  claim  a 
voice  in  the  management  of  our  transcontinental  railroads,  we 
should  at  once  resent  the  suggestion  as  an  assumption  wholly 
without  reason  or  law.  If  railroads  are  subject  only  to  the 
municipal  law,  why  should  canals  when  sul)stituted  for  roads 
become  international  in  character?  The  ap[)roaches  to  a 
canal  are  a  part  of  the  territorial  waters  of  a  state,  and  the 
waters  of  the  canal  must  necessarily  be  under  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  teriitory  within  which  they  lie. 

Again,  no  ship  canal  necessarily  involving  great  labor  and 
cost  of  construction  will  ever  likely  be  built  by  any  one 
nation  for  philanthropic  reasons,  and  the  builders  must  of 
necessity  have  the  right  to  levy  tolls.  If  it  were  a  natural 
waterway,  no  nation  could  derive  profit  in  such  a  manner; 
nor  could  a  company  of  stockholders  frame  a  constitution 
for  its  government.  There  can  be  no  rules  or  regulations 
conflicting  with  the  freedom  of  vessels  upon  the  high  seas ; 
therefore,  if  the  watere  of  a  canal  are  a  part  of  the  liigh  seas 
there  would  naturally  be  no  need  of  treaty  regulations  govern- 
ing them. 

Again,  no  nation  or  even  combination  of  nations  has  the 
right  to  construct  a  ship  canal  through  the  territory  of 
another  without  the  latter's  consent.  This  fact  necessarily 
implies  the  right  of  a  sovereign  to  construct  a  canal  of  his 
own,  for  he  could  not  well  transfer  to  another  a  right  he  him- 
self does  not  possess.  If  he  constructs  a  canal  through  his 
own  territory,  it  would  seemingly  then  belong  to  him,  and 
not  to  the  world  at  large  ;  and  if  he  transfers  such  a  privilege 
to  another,  the  latter  should  stand  in  the  place  of  the  seller. 

In  the  municipal  law,  the  government  is  authorized,  under 
certain  restrictions,  to  condemn  private  property  for  the  use 
of  the  state.  International  law  has  not  reached  in  its  de- 
velopment so  advanced  a  state  ;  yet  it  may  reasonably  be  sup- 
posed that  at  some  future  time  there  will  be  an  undei-standing 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM       185 

between  the  great  nations  of  the  world,  allowing  them,  under 
proper  conditions,  to  condemn  territory  for  the  use  and  interests 
of  the  world  in  general.  Such  a  canal  could  offer  no  question 
as  to  its  position  in  public  law,  for  the  element  of  private 
ownership  would  be  entirely  eliminated. 

Reasoning  on  this  subject  is  much  confused,  because  a  ship 
canal,  partaking  of  the  nature  of  an  arm  of  the  sea  and  also 
of  any  artificial  transit  route  through  the  teriitory  of  a  state, 
admits  of  the  conflicting  arguments  which  a  double  analogy 
must  always  furnish.  On^||l,  however,  enabled  to  maintain 
with  fewer  violations  of  ^cognized  legal  principles  that  a 
canal  built  by  a  nation  through  its  own  territory  and  CQ,n- 
necting  two  open  seas  is  not  a  public  highway,  uncondition- 
ally open  to  the  world's  use.  It  would  be  going  too  far  to 
assert  that  when  a  nation  at  great  expense  connects  two 
oceans  by  a  channel  within  its  own  domain,  it  possesses  no 
more  right  over  its  transit  regulations  than  does  the  world  in 
general. 

Considering,  then,  the  various  attributes  of  ship  canals7as 
compared  with  those  of  natural  waterways,  one  is  led  to 
assume  that  if  the  Nicaragua  Canal  shall  be  constructed  by 
the  United  States,  it  will  not  become  "  an  arm  of  the  sea  " ; 
and  that  the  United  States  will  not  necessarily  be  deprived 
by  international  law  of  the  superior  rights  of  the  builder  and 
private  owner. 

If  international  law  has  not  yet  fully  extended  its  system 
over  artificial  channels  connecting  open  seas,  commercial 
powers  have  already  felt  the  need  of  such  an  advance.  Ex- 
perience has  partially,  if  not  fully,  demonstrated  the  advisa- 
bility of  such  control  over  ship  canals,  and  the  tendency 
therefore  is  to  invest  them  with  international  character.  This 
seems  to  call  for  some  definite  understanding  on  the  subject 
among  the  various  nations  interested. 

Although  the  qualities  belonging  to  an  artificial  waterway 
do  not  entitle  the  nations  of  the  world,  as  a  right,  to  a  voice 
in  its  control,  yet  for  the  sake  of  harmony,  for  the  best  inter- 
ests of  the  builder,  and  in  order  better  to  serve  those  whose 
patronage  is  desired  in  the  use  of  the  channel,  it  has  been 


186  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

found  desirable  to  guarantee  the  safety  and  neutrality  of  the 
passage  by  treaty  stipulations.  The  importance  of  a  canal 
which  will  shorten  by  many  hundreds  of  miles  the  usual 
commercial  routes,  is  coming  to  be  considered  too  great  to 
be  left  to  the  control  of  any  one  nation.  In  the  struggling 
competition  of  ti-ade,  nations  are  indisposed  to  tolerate  any 
handicap  which  tends  to  interfere  with  its  equality.  In  time 
of  war,  it  would  become  necessary  for  a  belligerent  to  blockade 
or  to  hold  against  the  enemy  a  point  so  important  as  a  ship 
canal.  Commerce  would  be  interrupted,  and  the  very  object 
for  which  the  canal  was  constructed  would  be  defeated.  It  is 
natural,  therefore,  that  nations  have  come  to  look  upon  ship 
canals  as  subjects  of  international  regulation.  Indeed,  from 
the  moment  the  construction  of  the  Suez  Canal  was  contem- 
plated, this  idea  of  international  concert  for  its  guarantee  of 
neutrality  was  considered  a  sine  qua  non  of  its  financial  suc- 
cess. Prince  Metternich  had  declared  that  its  success  must 
depend  upon  confidence  in  its  neutrjility,  and  De  Lesseps  him- 
self fully  appreciated,  as  he  acknowledged,  the  truth  of  his 
statement.  In  the  Act  of  Concession  given  by  the  Viceroy 
of  Egypt,  and  endorsed  by  the  Sultan  in  1856,  a  promise  was 
solemnly  made  that  *'  the  Grand  Maritime  Canal  from  Suez  to 
Pelusium  and  its  dependent  ports  would  l)e  open  forever,  as 
neutral  passages  to  all  ships  of  commerce  passing  from  one  sea 
to  the  other,  without  any  distinction,  exclusion,  or  preference 
of  persons  or  nationalities.  .  .  ."  The  mere  promise  of 
^  Egypt  in  1856  (then,  as  now,  under  the  suzerainty  of  the 
Sultan  of  Turkey)  to  maintain  this  status  was  regarded  as 
inadequate,  and  the  principal  nations  of  Europe,  except  Rus- 
sia, signed  a  treaty  in  1873,  agreeing  that  the  Suez  Canal 
should  be  open  to  the  warships  of  all  parties  to  the  agree- 
i  ment.  Even  this  treaty  was  deemed  insufficient  to  determine 
^  clearly  and  positively  the  international  character  of  the  canal  j 
and  in  1887  the  Convention  of  Constantinople  was  signed  by 
all  the  great  European  powers,  again  excepting  Russia. 
.  This  convention  declared  that  the  canal  shall  forever  be  open 
[  and  free,  in  time  of  war  as  well  as  in  time  of  peace,  to  the 
ships  of  all  nations.     Its   approaches  shall  never  be  block- 


THE   INTEROCEANIC   CANAL  PROBLEM  187 

aded ;  no  act  of  war  shall  take  place  upon  it ;  and  hostile 
ships  leaving  from  either  terminus  must  allow  a  period  of 
twenty-four  hours  to  elapse  between  departures.  No  perma- 
nent fortifications  are  permitted ;  no  nation  may  mass  its 
naval  strength  within  the  waters  of  the  canal  nor  land  troops 
or  material  of  war  along  its  shores.  When  the  neutrality  of 
the  canal  is  threatened,  the  Khedive  or  Sultan  may  call  upon 
the  signatory  powers  for  assistance.  Turkey,  in  whose 
territory  the  canal  lies,  is  entitled  to  exercise  sovereignty 
over  it,  but  no  contracting  power  may  enjoy  any  special 
advantages  or  privileges  in  it.  All  powers  are  invited  to 
join  in  this  comprehensive  guaranty. 

Although  Russia  has  never  been  willing  to  join  in  the  gen- 
eral European  guaranty,  her  attitude  was  made  clear  when,  in 
the  Turko-Russian  War  she  assured  the  powers  that  she  had 
no  intention  of  threatening  the  neutrality  of  the  canal,  as  she 
regarded  that  route  as  belonging  to  the  world  and  sacred  to 
its  commerce.  \ 

It  is  safe  therefore  to  conclude  that  international  law  of  1 
itself  places  no  restrictions  upon  American  control  of  a  Cen- 
tral American  Canal ;  further  inquiry,  however,  develops  the 
fact  that  nations  have  come  to  look  upon  interoceanic  ship 
canals  as  a  proper  subject  for  treaty  stipulations.  The  powers 
could  not  as  of  right  demand  the  neutralization  of  the  Central 
American  Canal;  but  they  will  surely  expect  the  United  States  [ 
to  admit  it  for  the  common  interest  of  all. 

This  expectation  is  in  .  accoi-d  -  with  the  general  theories 
accepted  by  the  United  States  until  recently.  This  is  fully 
demonstrated  by  a  long  line  of  precedents.  Indeed,  the 
neutralization  of  the  canal  is  the  traditional  policy  of  the 
United  States.  From  1825,  when  Mr.  Clay  declared  that 
the  benefits  of  a  trans-isthmian  canal  "  ought  not  to  be  exclu- 
sively appropriated  to  any  one  nation,"  until  1881,  when  Mr.  >J^ 
Blaine  advanced  the  opposite  theory,  American  statesmen  of 
all  parties  were  intent  on  securing  a  passageway  for  ships 
across  the  isthmus,  whose  absolute  freedom  of  transit  should 
be  secured  by  international  guarantee.  Every  administration 
from  that  of  President  John  Quincy  Adams,  to  that  of  Presi- 


188  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

dent  Grant,  who  first  favored  exclusiveness  on  the  isthmus,  has 
indorsed  these  broad  theories  favoring  the  international  charac- 
ter of  ship  canals.  Since  the  Grant  administration,  President 
Cleveland  and  President  McKinley  have  also  supported  this 
traditional  American  policy.  During  that  period  of  heated 
controversy  over  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  from  1850  to  1860, 
it  was  not  the  object  of  the  United  States  to  obtain  exclusive 
proprietary  rights  in  the  canal.  On  the  contrary,  it  was  to 
the  maintenance  of  the  neutrality  of  the  proposed  route  that 
American  argument  was  wholly  directed.  From  1860  to 
1880  the  only  concern  manifested  in  respect  to  isthmian 
matters  was  lest  Great  Britain  should  violate  her  agreements 
by  acquiring  Central  American  territory,  thereby  threatening 
the  neutrality  of  the  route,  and  lest  France  might  insist  upon 
monopoly  of  control  at  Panama. 

A  glance  at  the  history  of  the  interoceanic  transit  problem 
in  Central  America  reveals  the  fact  that  all  nations  interested 
in  its  solution,  including  the  United  States  and  the  Central 
American  states  themselves,  have  invariably  insisted  upon  the 
strict  neutrality  of  any  Centml  American  canal.  This  con- 
dition has  at  all  times  been  demanded.  In  its  treaties  bear- 
ing upon  this  subject  the  United  States  has  fully  recognized 
this  principle ;  and  in  its  diplomatic  correspondence  relating 
thereto,  it  has  so  frequently  reaffirmed  these  views  that  no 
confusion  or  doubt  can  exist  as  to  its  position.  This  is  finally 
set  forth  in  three  canal  treaties  now  in  force;  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty  with  England,  the  Dickinson-Ayers  treaty 
with  Nicaragua,  and  the  treaty  with  Colombia  of  1846.  All 
previous  United  States  treaties  and  all  preliminary  drafts  of 
treaties  with  Central  American  states  concerning  a  canal,  kept 
in  view  this  principle  of  neutrality.  In  the  Colombia  treaty 
the  United  States,  by  its^Sth  article,  "guarantees  positively 
and  efficaciously  to  New  Granada,  by  the  present  stipulation, 
the  perfect  neutrality  of  the  before-mentioned  isthmus,  with 
the  view  that  the  free  transit  from  one  to  the  other  sea  may 
not  be  interrupted  or  embarrassed  in  any  future  time  while 
this  treaty  exists." 

The  Dickinson-Ayers  treaty  with  Nicaragua  (1867)  in  its 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM       189 

fifteenth  article  declares  that  "  The  United  States  hereby  agree 
to  extend  their  protection  to  all  such  routes  of  communication 
as  aforesaid,  and  to  guarantee  the  neutrality  and  innocent  use 
of  same.  They  also  agree  to  employ  their  influence  with 
other  nations  to  induce  them  to  guarantee  such  neutrality  and 
protection." 

The  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  of  1850  recites  that  neither 
government  will  ever  "obtain  or  maintain  for  itself  any 
exclusive  control  over  the  said  ship  canal."  The  purport  and 
aim  of  this  instrument  is  to  place  a  safeguard  of  guaranteed 
neutrality  over  any  isthmian  canal.  After  going  to  the 
length  of  asserting  that  neither  power  shall  annex  Central 
American  territory,  the  two  parties  agree  to  ask  all  other 
nations  to  unite  in  similar  engagements. 

The  change  of  sentiment  in  regard  to  neutralization,  first 
officially  championed  by  Messrs.  Blaine  and  Frelinghuysen, 
was  not  intended  as  a  complete  reversal  of  the  former  doc- 
trine on  the  subject.  This  new  American  policy  contemplated 
a  guarantee  of  neutrality  to  be  given  by  the  United  States 
alone.  As  both  these  statesmen  believed  that  an  American 
guarantee  was  sufficient  to  that  end,  their  views  become  rather 
a  modification  of  the  generally  accepted  theories  of  neutrali- 
zation, as  secured  by  concerted  action  of  the  powers.  Both 
were  entirely  willing  to  pledge  the  United  States  "  positively 
and  efficaciously  to  guarantee,"  etc.  They  cannot  therefore 
be  said  to  have  fully  repudiated  the  ideals  of  a  neutral 
passageway  through  the  isthmus,  although  the  method  they 
advocated  to  effect  that  end  would  have  been  inadequate. 

It  is  only  within  the  past  few  years  that  advocates  of  an 
unqualifiedly  American  canal  have  come  forward.  This 
ultra- American  theory  is  exemplified  by  a  House  document 
presented  in  March  1900,  by  Mr.  Hepburn  of  Iowa,  who 
aigues  in  favor  of  a  Nioaraguan  canal  so  controlled  by  the 
United  States  that  discriminations  against  foreign  vessels 
may  be  made  even  in  times  of  peace. 

An  adherence  to  the  principles  of  neutralization  is  also 
evidenced  in  the  numerous  charters  and  -concessions  which 
have  been  granted  during  the  past  twenty  years  to  various 


190  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

American  canal  companies.  In  most  of  these  instruments  a 
neutral  waterway  is  called  for.  Indeed,  neither  Nicaragua 
nor  Colombia  could  grant  the  exclusive  right  to  control  a 
canal  through  her  territory  without  violating  treaty  stipula- 
tions with  European  powers. 

Thus  it  appears  that  the  doctrine  of  canal  neutralization 
is  the  traditional  policy  of  the  United  States,  as  well  as  of 
Great  Britain,  the  European  nations,  and  the  Central  Ameri- 
can states  ;  that  the  doctrine  changed  in  American  diplomacy 
to  neutralization  as  secured  by  American  guarantee  alone; 
and  it  further  appears  that  the  theory  of  sole  control  as  op- 
posed to  neutralization  is  of  comparatively  recent  origin. 

To-day  the  idea  seems  to  prevail  that  the  geographical 
position  of  the  United  States  in  connection  with  its  commer- 
cial interests,  its  safety  in  time  of  war,  its  political  relations 
with  its  neighbors,  and  lastly,  its  obligations  to  its  commer- 
cial marine,  all  combine  to  warrant  a  disregard  of  precedent 
and  to  justify  the  demand  for  complete  political  control  of  the 
Central  American  canal.  In  other  words,  American  interests 
in  the  isthmian  canal  are  so  great  that  the  United  States 
cannot  afford  to  be  governed  simply  by  precedent.  In  de- 
termining, therefore,  the  political  attitude  toward  the  pro- 
jected canal,  the  elements  of  self-interest  will  no  doubt  figure 
far  more  prominently  than  considerations  of  precedent. 

It  is  not  unreasonable  to  assume  that  in  the  development 
of  national  needs  and  conditions,  cases  may  arise  where  it 
would  be  unwise  to  adhere  to  ancient  customs  merely  for  the 
sake  of  consistency.  The  mind  is  apt  to  cling,  as  by  instinct, 
to  the  traditions  of  the  past.  Well-grounded  precedents  in 
law  have  often  so  effectually  blinded  the  eyes  to  reason  that 
a  century  of  progress  has  scarcely  been  sufficient  to  efface 
them  from  the  statute  books.  Hoary  abuses,  when  dignified 
by  age,  have  defied  correction  for  centuries. 

Precedents  cease  to  have  validity  when  the  circumstances 
on  which  they  are  based  cease  to  exist.  The  obligations  to 
follow  them  are  purely  theoretical.  In  this  particular  case 
there  may  be  special  reasons  why  the  past  should  be  dis- 
regarded.    As  observed,  the  subject  of  ship  canals  connecting 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM        191 

high  seas,  being  comparatively  modem,  has  not  yet  found 
a  definite  place  in  public  law,  though  evidence  tends  to  prove 
that  ship  canals  do  possess  a  quasi-international  character, 
and  that  their  owners  are  under  some  manner  of  obligation 
to  the  world  to  keep  them  inviolable  from  hostile  attack.  At 
best,  the  precedent  is  but  doubtfully  fixed  in  law,  and  might 
be  fittingly  ignored  should  self-interest  so  demand.  Indeed, 
an  exclusive  American  control  of  the  Nicaragua  Canal  might 
in  itself  establish  a  new  precedent  more  valuable  than  the 
old. 

Abandoning,  therefore,  all  thought  of  the  past,  the  subject 
may  be  considered  solely  from  the  standpoint  of  the  future, 
—  Is  it  to  the  best  interests  of  the  United  States  to  construct 
the  canal  as  a  national  undertaking  and  to  maintain  over  it 
sole  financial  and  political  control  ?  Do  those  interests  favor 
the  repudiation  of  all  existing  treaties  bearing  upon  the  sub- 
ject ?  Do  they  call  for  a  denial  of  the  spirit  of  public  law  ? 
The  preponderance  of  public  sentiment  in  the  United  States 
is  in  the  affirmative. 

The  advocates  of  American  monopoly  of  the  canal  route 
contend  that  the  safety  of  the  United  States  demands  this 
course ;  that  the  protection  of  the  country  being  of  the  first 
importance,  all  other  considerations  should  be  regarded  as 
secondary.  They  maintain  that  a  neutralized  canal  would 
expose  both  of  the  American  coasts  to  hostile  attack.  In 
case  of  war,  the  United  States  would  be  compelled  to  permit 
an  enemy's  fleet,  while  bent  upon  an  errand  of  destruction, 
to  pass  unchallenged  through  a  neutral  canal.  In  time  of 
peace,  it  would  be  obliged  to  maintain  a  largely  augmented 
fleet  in  both  Pacific  and  Atlantic  waters;  in  short,  to  double 
its  navy.  Now,  on  the  other  hand,  were  the  United  States  to 
fortify  the  banks  or  the  entrances  of  the  route,  a  hostile  fleet 
could  be  debarred  from  its  use ;  at  the  same  time  the  Ameri- 
can navy  would  be  vastly  increased  in  effectiveness  by  exclu- 
sive freedom  of  passage.  In  this  manner  a  squadron  could  be 
quickly  transferred  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Pacific,  while 
the  enemy  would  be  relegated  to  the  long  voyage  by  way  of 
Magellan. 


192  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

Furthermore,  a  neutralization  of  the  canal  by  genei-al  com- 
pact would  likely  prove,  when  the  test  came,  to  be  nothing 
more  than  a  paper  agreement.  The  route  not  being  fortified, 
an  enemy  might  seize  the  canal  and  hold  it  as  a  base,  greatly 
to  the  prejudice  of  the  United  States. 

They  further  maintain  that  there  are  circumstances  con- 
nected with  the  neutralization  of  the  Suez  Canal  which  should 
serve  as  a  warning  to  those  who  advocate  an  equality  of 
interests  in  the  isthmian  canal.  Great  Britain  holds  the  con- 
^  trol  of  that  route.  Her  occupation  of  the  territory  through 
which  the  passage  has  been  cut  furnishes  all  the  proof  neces- 
sary that  England  would  not  hesitate  to  seize  the  canal,  if  the 
defence  of  her  Indian  possessions  seemed  to  call  for  such  ac- 
tion. The  same  conditions  and  necessities  would  drive  the 
United  States  to  a  similar  course  in  Nicaragua.  How  much 
better  it  is,  they  say,  to  avoid  all  cause  of  future  misunder- 
standing, by  promptly  asserting  the  right  to  fortify  and  hold 
the  canal. 

They  also  maintain  that  commercial  interests  demand  an 
American  monopoly  of  the  route.  Efforts  are  being  made, 
through  subsidy  and  various  other  measures,  to  restore  the 
prestige  of  the  American  merchant  marine.  To-day  the  sea- 
carrying  trade  of  the  world  is  almost  wholly  commanded  by 
Englishmen.  The  discrimination  in  tolls  that  could  be  made 
in  favor  of  American  shipping  through  the  isthmian  canal 
would  no  doubt  furnish  a  decided  stimulus  to  this  growing 
American  industry. 

Possibly  the  strongest  arguments  for  an  "  American  Canal  '* 
are  found  in  the  application  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  to  the  sub- 
ject of  canal  equalization.  While  those  principles,  as  enun- 
ciated by  President  Monroe  in  1823,  only  denounced  foreign 
interference  in  the  domestic  affairs  of  the  American  states, 
they  have  since  been  extended  into  a  broader  doctrine  which 
gives  to  the  United  States  this  very  right  of  interference.  The 
result  of  nearly  seventy  years  of  varying  interpretations  of 
this  political  creed  has  tended  to  remove  the  Western  conti- 
nents from  the  sphere  of  European  influence,  and  to  spread 
the  mantle  of  a  United  States  protectorate  over  their  whole 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM       193 

extent.  The  Nicaragua  Canal,  by  virtue  of  its  geographical 
position,  and  also  because  of  the  American  interests,  which 
it  is  particularly  designed  to  serve,  seems  to  fall  appropriately 
under  the  operations  of  this  doctrine. 

The  nations  of  the  Old  World  have  already  completed  their 
short  cut  to  the  Orient,  and  opened  the  way  to  their  colonies. 
They  are  entirely  free  to  make  any  disposition  of  their  own 
route.  The  United  States  claims  no  right  to  interfere,  and 
asks  no  voice  in  its  management.  Therefore,  when  the  United 
States  shall  construct  her  short  route  from  the  Atlantic  sea- 
board to  California,  Alaska,  and  Pacific  islands,  she  has  a 
right  to  insist  upon  its  exclusive  control.  A  joint  guarantee 
of  the  Nicaragua  Canal  would  reduce  the  United  States  to  the 
lower  plane  of  importance  and  influence  in  Central  America 
occupied  by  the  nations  of  the  Old  World.  This  should  never 
be  permitted ;  by  her  position  in  the  Western  Hemisphere, 
the  United  States  should  enforce  the  claim  to  those  privileges 
which  her  paramount  interests  there  clearly  entitle  her  to 
enjoy.  The  United  States  is  heir  to  the  Western  Hemisphere. 
The  same  "  manifest  destiny  "  which  impelled  the  fathers  to 
reach  forth  to  the  Pacific  Ocean  will  likewise  urge  their  sons 
to  follow  a  scheme  of  rational  expansion  which  will  extend 
the  shore  line  of  the  United  States  to  the  Nicaragua  Canal. 
This  course,  they  say,  is  inevitable.  The  first  step  in  this 
direction  has  been  taken  in  Cuba  and  the  West  Indies.  The 
unlooked  for  acquisitions  in  the  Pacific  will  make  the  second 
step  more  than  ever  necessary.  The  territory  intervening 
between  the  Rio  Grande  and  the  San  Juan  rivers,  they  insist, 
must  eventually  come  under  the  control  of  the  great  northern 
state.  This  fair  land  is  misruled  by  a  number  of  irresponsible 
governments,  the  merest  travesties  upon  republican  institu- 
tions. They  are  unable  to  maintain  order,  or  to  protect 
United  States  capital  seeking  investment  there.  Peaceful 
conditions  in  Mexico  will  probably  end  with  the  resignation 
or  death  of  President  Diaz,  and  a  return  to  tumultuous  poli- 
tics may  be  confidently  expected.  American  interest  will 
sooner  or  later  demand  the  acquisition  of  these  states,  when 
the  canal  will  be  actually  upon  American  soil. 


194  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

With  such  a  future  of  expansion  in  mind,  it  would  be 
unwise,  they  believe,  to  hamper  the  government  by  pledges 
of  neutrality  or  promises  against  fortifying  the  canal.  Sup- 
pose, for  instance,  that  Jefferson  had  been  confronted  by  a 
previous  agreement  never  to  acquire  territory  west  of  the 
Mississippi  River,  or  that  Polk  had  been  prevented  by  some 
former  treaty  stipulations  from  establishing  full  American 
sovereignty  over  the  narrow  entrance  to  San  Fi-ancisco  Bay. 

Let  there  be  no  future  mistakes  such  as  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty.  The  parting  of  the  ways  is  at  hand ;  there  can  be 
reconciliation  between  the  doctrine  of  American  control  of 
the  canal  as  dictated  by  self-interest,  and  enjoined  upon  us  by 
the" Monroe  Doctrine,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  doctrine 
of  canal  equalization  as  demanded  by  European  interests  on 
the  other.  The  United  States,  therefore,  must  abandon  all 
its  treaties  which  call  for  international  control  of  the  channel. 
It  should  acknowledge  its  breach  of  faith,  and  take  the  con- 
sequences, whatever  they  may  be.  This  action  would  prove 
less  serious  than  to  abandon  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  accept 
European  dictation  in  any  part  of  the  Western  Hemisphere, 
and  open  a  convenient  passageway  to  the  fleets  of  Europe. 

The  advocates  of  a  policy  of  neutralization  hold,  on  the 
contrary,  that  the  greatest  good  demands  the  entire  freedom 
of  commercial  tmnsit.  They  found  their  theory  upon  the 
broad  principles  of  mare  libenim^  and  in  accordance  with 
the  development  of  international  law.  The  inviolability  of 
the  canal  is  a  condition  contemplated  in  all  fairness  by  the 
world  at  large,  and  it  is  also  a  condition  wholly  consistent 
with  the  best  interests  of  the  United  States.  It  is  a  policy 
dictated  by  practical  wisdom. 

Wars  are  not  the  outgrowth  of  open  and  free  competition, 
but  too  often  result  from  trade  restrictions  of  one  kind  or 
another.  The  tendency  of  modern  times  is  to  remove  as  far 
as  possible,  all  barriers  to  free  and  untrammelled  commerce. 
The  progress  of  international  law  has  been  in  the  direction  of 
securing  and  safeguarding  the  common  interest  of  the  whole 
family  of  nations  in  opposition  to  the  tendencies  of  local 
greed  and  aggression.     The  same  policy  that  calls  for  an 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM       195 

"  open  door "  in  China,  for  universal  freedom  of  trade  com- 
petition, for  the  removal  of  protective  tariffs,  also  calls  for 
the  unrestricted  use  of  all  commercial  highways.  The  com- 
mercial isolation  of  the  United  States  should  not  be  main- 
tained. The  great  extension  of  her  commerce  has  already 
brought  her  so  intimately  in  connection  with  other  powers, 
that  her  own  commercial  interests  have  in  a  great  measure 
become  indentical  with  theirs.  To  close  s^)  important  a  high- 
way as  the  Nicaragua  Canal  involves  the  adoption  of  a  policy 
opposed  to  progress  and  civilization;  it  would  remove  the 
United  States  from  the  commercial  fellowship  of  nations, 
and  bring  upon  her  every  form  of  retaliatory  legislation. 
With  the  enmity  and  jealousies  engendered  by  so  narrow  and 
selfish  a  policy,  the  way  would  be  constantly  open  to  disagree- 
ment and  war  upon  slight  provocation.  The  sympathies  of 
the  world  would  be  against  the  United  States,  and  other 
nations  would  find  common  cause  against  her. 

The  neutralization  of  the  canal  is  an  inevitable  result,  and 
it  does  not  comport  with  the  progressive  character  of  Western 
ideas  to  delay  or  seek  to  avoid  it. 

The  principles  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  are  in  no  manner 
violated  by  equalization  of  the  route.  It  would  not  introduce 
the  political  system  of  the  Old  World  into  the  New,  nor  give 
to  Europe  a  right  of  interference  in  the  affairs  of  the  Ameri- 
can continent.  On  the  contrary,  a  guarantee  of  neutrality 
is  the  very  opposite  of  interfei-ence.  It  is  a  pledge  of  non- 
interference. It  places  a  lasting  check  upon  the  advance  of 
foreign  influence  at  a  particularly  vital  spot  in  the  Western 
continent. 

Such  an  agreement  does  not  contemplate  the  yielding  of 
the  United  States  to  any  foreign  influence  or  control  of  the 
canal,  but  expressly  removes  all  possibility  of  such  interfer- 
ence or  control  by  any  one  or  more  nations.  It  does  not, 
then,  even  violate  the  spirit  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine ;  it  is 
rather  directly  in  line  with  it.  It  exacts  a  promise  from  the 
most  powerful  and  most  rapacious  nations  of  the  world,  made 
firm  and  binding  by  treaty  regulations,  to  abstain  from  any 
kind  of  interference  in  the  affairs  of  the  isthmian  canal. 


196  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

But  even  should  the  dogma  of  Monroeism  be  infringed  upon 
by  the  proposition  of  a  neutral  Central  American  waterway, 
there  is  no  reason  why  that  doctrine  should  not  be  disregarded 
in  the  furtherance  of  a  better  cause.  It  would  be  folly  to 
cling  to  a  doctrine  simply  for  the  sake  of  the  doctrine  itself,  or 
for  any  other  sentimental  reason.  The  object  of  every  general 
policy  is  for  the  general  good.  If,  in  any  particular  case,  the 
application  of  a  theory,  however  sound  in  a  broader  sense,  is 
found  to  be  unwise,  it  should  be  cast  aside.  If  logic  and 
reason  show  that  the  best  interests  of  the  United  States  are 
subserved  in  assuming  the  entire  responsibility  of  managing 
the  political  affaii-s  of  the  canal,  and  a  consistent  observance 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  equally  demands  it,  then  it  is  proper 
to  follow  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  —  otherwise,  as  in  this  case, 
by  all  means  abandon  it. 

Assuming  further  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  would  be  en- 
croached upon  by  conceding  a  joint  guarantee  of  neutrality, 
it  may  be  asked:  By  what  right  does  the  United  States  deny 
the  privilege  European  nations  claim  to  look  after  the  wel- 
fare of  their  commercial  interests  in  the  Western  Hemisphere  ? 
There  can  be  no  reasonable  doubt  that  foreign  nations  will  be 
solicitous  about  the  advantiiges  to  accrue  to  their  commerce 
by  maintenance  of  the  freedom  of  tmnsit  through  the  Nica- 
ragua Canal.  The  United  States  has  not  onl}'  commercial 
but  territorial  interests  in  the  Eastern  Hemisphere,  and  is 
also  demanding  an  open  door  in  Asiatic  ports.  How  may  she 
be  justified,  then,  in  denying  to  foreign  nations  in  America 
what  she  herself  claims  elsewhere? 

The  neutralization  of  the  canal  would  moreover  avoid  those 
dangerous  aggressive  tendencies  which  must  surely  be  engen- 
dered by  commercial  advantages  retained  only  through  force 
of  arms,  both  in  defiance  of  the  rights  of  others,  and  contrary 
to  the  better  instincts  of  justice  prevailing  at  home. 

The  imposition  of  differential  tolls  would  excite  universal 
disapproval,  and  would  call  upon  the  United  States  the  denun- 
ciation of  all  commercial  nations.  The  commercial  and  politi- 
cal interests  of  several  European  nations  in  the  Far  East,  aside 
from  the  desire  to  defend  a  vital  principle  of  justice,  would 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM       197 

force  them  to  combine  against  the  United  States,  should  the 
latter  persist  in  claiming  the  privilege  to  close  the  canal 
against  their  ships.  Each  maritime  power  would  immedi- 
ately call  upon  Nicaragua  or  Colombia,  as  the  case  might  be, 
for  the  observance  of  those  treaty  rights  secured  to  them  by 
"  most  favored  nation  "  clauses.  There  need  be  no  occasion 
for  self-deception  in  this  matter.  England's  determined  re- 
sistance to  American  attempts  to  avoid  the  obligations  of  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  demonstrates  her  probable  attitude 
toward  the  freedom  of  transit  through  the  Nicaragua  Canal. 

France  is  solicitous  concerning  the  maintenance  of  this 
principle,  as  plainly  shown  by  her  Central  American  treaties ; 
and  one  cannot  well  suppose  that  Germany  or  Russia  would 
permit  itself  to  be  handicapped  by  any  navigation  disabilities 
that  other  nations  escape.  The  United  States  might,  indeed, 
defy  the  nations  of  the  world,  were  the  cause  a  just  one.  In 
this  case  she  would  be  defending,  against  overwhelming  odds, 
a  principle  which  has  been  condemned  by  the  civilized  world, 
including  herself.  Nations,  like  individuals,  cannot  afford 
to  ignore  the  good-will  of  their  fellows.  To  persist  in  this 
policy  is  simply  to  invite  troubles  which  would  far  outbalance 
any  temporary  trade  benefits  which  might  at  first  accrue 
through  a  monopoly  of  the  waterway. 

At  all  events,  the  policy  would  have  to  be  abandoned 
sooner  or  later;  but  while  upholding  this  position  of  supposed 
vantage  in  Central  America,  the  United  States  would  be  sub- 
jected to  the  greatest  amount  of  needless  expense,  annoyance 
and  risk.  Upon  the  United  States  alone  would  devolve  the 
duty  of  preserving  order  and  protecting  the  canal.  In  times 
of  the  profoundest  peace  the  United  States  would  be  obliged 
to  police  the  route  in  a  thoroughly  effective  manner ;  in  time 
of  threatened  disturbance  a  large  military  force  would  be 
required  upon  the  scene.  The  United  States  would  have  to 
be  prepared  always  to  despatcli  troops  to  the  line  of  the  canal. 
Foreign  vessels  departing  upon  long  journeys  via  Nicaragua 
or  Panama  must  be  assured  of  finding  the  way  clear.  No 
Central  American  revolution  must  be  permitted  to  interfere, 
no  political  disturbances,  riots,  or  threats  of  lawlessness  in 


198  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

the  neighborhood  of  the  channel  could  be  tolerated,  which 
would  in  any  way  render  hazardous  peaceful  passage  through 
the  canal.  The  danger  of  hostile  acts  committed  when  un- 
friendly relations  exist  between  two  nations  woukl  have  to  be 
provided  against.  For  all  "  accidents  "  the  United  States 
would  alone  be  responsible  under  her  sole  guarantee.  Thus 
the  United  States  would  undoubtedly  be  forced  to  assume 
a  more  or  less  active,  though  unwelcome,  interest  in  the 
never  ceasing  revolutions  of  those  turbulent  Central  Ameri- 
can states. 

The  liabilities  of  the  United  States  would  only  begin  here. 
To  fulfil  her  promise  alone  and  unaided  to  maintain  the 
"  strict  neutrality  "  of  the  canal,  she  would  needlessly  burden 
herself  with  a  task  which  under  the  most  favorable  conditions 
of  universal  peace  would  prove  irksome  and  expensive,  and 
which,  upon  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  at  home  or  abroad, 
might  become  onerous  in  a  high  degree.  But  granting 
immunity  from  foreign  intervention,  in  times  of  peace,  what 
would  be  the  extent  and  character  of  her  obligations  toward 
nations  in  time  of  war?  The  political  complications  in  East- 
ern Asia,  consequent  upon  territorial  changes,  have  already 
sown  the  seeds  of  jealousy  and  bitter  feeling  in  Europe.  It  is 
not  unlikely  that  conflicts  of  European  powers  will  result. 
In  case  of  any  war  between  two  or  three  great  maritime 
powers,  and  particularly  in  the  event  of  one  growing  out  of 
interests  in  Eastern  Asia,  the  isthmian  canal  would,  beyond 
question,  become  involved.  This  would  naturally  lead  to  a 
naval  demonstration  at  one  or  the  other  entrance  to  the  canal. 
Suppose,  for  instance,  that  England,  free  from  treaty  obliga- 
tions to  observe  the  neutrality  of  the  canal,  should  attempt 
to  blockade  the  Atlantic  entrance,  to  prevent  the  entrance  or 
exit  of  French,  German,  or  Russian  vessels.  Would  it  not 
become  the  duty  of  the  United  States  at  once  to  raise  the 
blockade  ?  The  injured  party  might  come  to  her  assistance, 
but  would  that  not  inevitably  draw  her  into  a  foreign  war? 
—  a  war  in  which,  in  all  probability,  the  United  States  would 
not  have  the  slightest  material  interest.  Then,  it  may  safely 
be  assumed  that  from  the  moment  the  United  States  consti- 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM       199 

tutes  herself  the  sole  guardian  of  the  open  route  from  the 
Atlantic  to  the  Pacific,  she  takes  upon  herself  a  grave  respon- 
sibility, —  a  responsibility  which  may  prove  exceedingly  bur- 
densome. The  almost  inevitable  conclusion  presents  itself 
that  the  first  European  war  would  thus  convert  the  United 
States  from  a  neutral  power  into  an  unwilling  participant. 
This  should  be  reckoned  a  large  price  to  pay  for  the  advan- 
tages to  be  gained  from  an  "  American  Canal." 

The  return  for  so  great  a  price  —  a  price  that  means  no 
less  than  a  departure  from  a  cherished  and  time-honored 
policy  —  should  indeed  be  great.  It  should  be  a  national 
advantage,  so  great  and  valuable  that  it  is  absolutely  indis- 
pensable to  her  safety  and  welfare. 

Is  the  advantage,  then,  of  fortifying  the  canal  and  closing 
it  against  foreign  measures  of  aggi'ession  worth  so  great  a 
sacrifice  ? — for  only  in  time  of  war  against  the  United  States 
would  she  desire  to  bar  the  route  against  naval  vessels,  and 
then  only  against  the  ships  of  an  enemy.  Under  present  con- 
ditions this  might  indeed  be  considered  a  doubtful  advantage. 
The  value  to  the  United  States  of  exclusive  control  of  this 
route  in  periods  of  hostility  will  depend  very  largely  upon 
the  relative  size  of  her  own  and  her  adversary's  navy.  The 
peculiar  nature  of  a  long  narrow  channel  through  a  region 
of  tropical  jungle  is  such  as  to  render  it  extremely  doubtful 
whether  a  large  protective  force  could  secure  its  use,  —  even 
against  an  inferior  foe. 

A  canal  with  its  series  of  locks,  dams,  and  artificial  embank- 
ments, presents  many  vulnerable  points  to  methods  of  modern 
attack.  A  resolute  enemy  equipped  with  efficient  appliances 
might  easily  destroy  the  use  of  the  passage  for  months,  an  act 
which  the  most  extraordinary  vigilance  could  not  prevent. 
In  case  of  war,  when  a  superior  navy  might  invest  the  place, 
the  advantages  to  the  United  States  of  the  possession  of  the 
passage  might  be  turned  into  an  actual  disadvantage.  A 
blockade  might  then  be  effected  at  either  terminus  of  the 
route,  and  maintained  to  the  great  injury  of  the  United 
States.  The  imprisonment  of  American  war  vessels  in  the 
canal,  either  by  blockade  or  by  the  destruction  of  a  dam  or 


200  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

lock,  might  easily  result  in  the  most  serious  calamities.  In 
fact,  the  fear  of  this  very  contingency,  and  of  the  loss  of  ves- 
sels by  explosion  of  mines  placed  in  the  channel,  would  likely 
render  its  use  impracticable  in  times  of  war. 

Assuming  that  it  were  possible  so  effectively  to  guard  the 
channel  that  its  use  could  be  preserved  to  the  United  States 
in  times  of  conflict,  and  closed  against  the  enemy,  the  fact 
yet  remains  that  the  United  States  is  wholly  unprepared  to 
maintain  with  safety  the  exclusive  control  over  the  route. 
The  protection  of  the  American  coasts  depends,  after  all, 
upon  the  strength  of  the  navy,  and  all  outlying  posts  which 
must  be  guarded  are  of  value  only  as  they  may  be  defended 
without  too  great  a  division  of  strength. 

While  the  policy  of  the  United  States  calls  for  an  annual 
increase  in  the  navy,  there  are  other  powei-s  whose  needs  will 
require  them,  not  only  to  keep  pace  with  the  general  advance 
in  armament,  but  to  maintain  for  many  yeare  to  come  larger 
naval  fleets  than  that  of  the  United  States.  Such  being  the 
case,  American  efforts  to  retain  a  ix)8ition  of  exclusiveness 
on  the  isthmus  may  prove,  after  all,  to  be  of  doubtful  expedi- 
ency. 

It  may  often  be  asserted  that  England's  military  occupa- 
tion of  Egypt  and  her  fortifications  along  the  route  to  India, 
together  with  her  ownership  of  a  controlling  interest  in  the 
Suez  Canal  itself,  virtually  invest  her  with  political  proprie- 
torship of  that  channel.  But  while  it  is  true  that  the  free- 
dom of  transit  into  the  Red  Sea  has  not  been  subjected  to  the 
test  of  a  general  European  war  yet,  there  has  been  no  act  of 
England  so  far  that  violates  the  terms  of  the  Constantinople 
agreement.  She  claims  no  extraordinary  political  rights  over 
the  canal  itself,  and  makes  no  attempt  to  fortify  the  route. 
Her  line  of  possessions  and  naval  stations  from  Gibraltar  to 
Hong  Kong,  are  permitted  in  no  way  to  threaten  the  neu- 
trality of  the  canal.  On  the  contrary,  England  has  always 
taken  the  initiative  steps  in  bringing  about  international  agree- 
ments to  secure  its  neutral  character.  Her  superior  naval 
strength  undoubtedly  would  give  her  the  power,  in  case  of 
war,  to  effect  a  blockade  of  the  Suez  Canal  without  entering 


THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  PROBLEM       201 

within  the  zone  of  neutrality.  This  fact,  however,  cannot 
be  regarded  as  an  evidence  of  England's  bad  faith,  or  cited 
to  disprove  her  belief  in  the  neutrality  of  interoceanic  high- 
ways. The  position  of  the  United  States,  with  islands  and 
coaling  stations  on  either  side  of  Central  America,  would 
place  her  in  somewhat  the  same  attitude  toward  the  Nicara- 
gua Canal. 

By  following,  therefore,  the  spirit  of  international  law,  by 
observing  her  treaties,  and  by  inviting  the  nations  of  the 
world  to  join  in  keeping  open  the  canal,  the  United  States 
deprives  herself  of  one  doubtful  advantage,  and  at  once 
relieves  herself  from  a  host  of  perplexities. 

With  the  neutrality  of  the  canal  guaranteed  by  interna- 
tional agreement  between  the  great  maritime  powers,  there 
would  be  no  need  of  fortifications ;  because  in  the  face  of  so 
powerful  a  combination  none  would  dare  to  violate  the  free- 
dom of  the  route.  American  armies  would  not  be  needed  to 
defend  its  banks ;  American  ships  would  not  be  called  upon 
to  raise  a  blockade  or  disperse  a  threatening  squadron.  The 
United  States  would  escape  the  many  pitfalls  of  foreign 
entanglements  which  the  selfish  policy  of  sole  political  con- 
trol must  inevitably  place  in  her  path ;  and  thus,  —  the  advo- 
cates of  neutralization  maintain, — by  the  adoption  of  a  more 
liberal  policy  in  Central  America,  *'  an  inexhaustible  source 
of  international  conflict "  would  be  avoided. 


Ill 

THE   UNITED   STATES   AND   SAMOA 


t 


• 


Ill 

THE   UNITED   STATES   AND   SAMOA 

Differences  between  nations  are  necessarily  of  a  serious 
character,  because  the  settlement  of  such  disputes  affects 
directly  or  indirectly  the  fortunes  of  many  individuals. 
They  are  also  attended  with  danger,  because  close  behind 
international  misunderstandings  lurks  the  spectre  of  war. 
In  every  heart  exists  a  belligerent  chord,  and  the  most  im- 
partial of  men  will  magnify  the  shortcomings  of  other  nations 
while  they  laud  the  virtues  of  their  own.  Race  prejudices  are 
always  more  or  less  acute.  War  quickly  appeals  to  popular 
favor  when  quarrels  over  personal  rights  or  privileges  expand 
into  national  issues,  and  then  patriotism  is  likely  to  assume 
the  form  of  blind  passion  without  reason  or  forbearance. 

However  trifling,  then,  an  international  dispute  may  appear, 
it  possesses,  nevertheless,  a  hidden  element  of  danger.  It  is 
partly  on  this  account  that  the  Samoan  imbroglio,  though 
now  happily  relieved,  is  worthy  of  attention.  In  the  world's 
history  the  story  of  Samoa  can  never  expect  to  find  a  more 
prominent  place  than  a  footnote.  In  the  annals  of  diplo- 
macy it  must  figure  as  a  farce.  Robert  Louis  Stevenson 
aptly  characterized  the  Samoan  wars  as  an  "  infinitesimal 
affray  " ;  Samoa  was  like  a  tea-got  in  which  a  tempest  raged 
while  three  great  nations  jostled  each  other  in  fussy  endeavors 
to  keep  the  little  pot  from  boiling  over. 

If  the  Samoan  episode  appears  trivial  to  the  general 
observer,  it  possessed  nevertheless  a  pathetic  side  to  the 
philanthropist,  who  could  not  fail  to  see  in  this  South  Sea 
enterprise  of  England,  Germany,  and  the  United  States, 
another  demonstration  of  the  withering  influence  of  civiliza- 
tion upon  semi-barbarous  peoples.  The  assumed  burden  of  the 
white  man  to  protect  and  educate  the  black-one^DiteaJifi&iilts 
in  the  undoing  of  the  latter.     The  result  comes  naturally, 

205 


u 


206  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

for,  in  the  long  run,  the  law  which  proclaims  the  survival  of 
the  fittest  regulates  human  affairs  as  it  controls  all  organic  life. 
When  the  lion  is  hungry  the  lamb  dies ;  when  the  man  with 
a  rifle  takes  to  expansion,  the  man  with  the  spear  yields  his 
estate.  In  Samoa  the  operation  of  this  law  was  unique. 
The  unfortunate  natives  were  only  saved  from  immediate 
extermination  through  the  jealous  watchfulness  of  three  pro- 
tectors. The  duty  in  Samoa  of  each  protector  was  ostensibly 
to  shield  the  natives  from  the  rapacity  of  the  other  two.  In 
the  meantime,  the  Samoans  lost  all  control  over  their  own 
a^ffairs,  and  were  crushed  under  the  weightofjanj^utono- 
ipoUs''gOYfiJ:annent,"  created'hy  tlieir  kindly  disposed  friends. 
TFe  inevitable  eTid  —  the  loss  of  their  territory  —  has  just 
recently  been  effected,  and  their  ultimate  race  extinction  is 
simply  deferred. 

The  history  of  American  political  relations  with  Samoa  is 
primarily  of  interest  because  it  reveals  the  first  genuine 
instance  of  departure  from  a  time-honored  policy  of  non- 
intervention in  the  domestic  affaii-s  of  alien  nations.  In 
assuming  the  responsibilities  of  fashioning  and  maintaining  a 
system  of  government  for  this  little  group  of  islands  in  the 
mid-Pacific,  the  United  States  entered  into  treaty  relations 
with  two  great  powers,  pledging  itself  to  protect  a  people  it 
had  not  accepted  into  the  Union,  and  in  whose  interests  it 
had  not  the  least  concern. 

Since  the  famous  farewell  address  of  President  Washing- 
ton, until  quite  recently  there  have  been  few  public  officials 
of  the  United  States  who  have  not  expressed  belief  in  a  doc- 
trine of  non-interference  in  the  political  affairs  of  other 
nations.  This  principle,  which  had  become  as  much  a  tenet 
in  the  American  political  creed  as  any  enactment  of  the  con- 
stitution, was  forcibly  expressed  by  Washington,  who  realized 
that  his  country  was  destined  to  attain  great  wealth  and 
influence,  could  it  be  spared  the  exhausting  drain  of  need- 
less wars.  He  foresaw  the  great  danger  of  -meddling  in  the 
chronic  quarrels  that  tormented  the  nations  of  Europe.  Simi- 
lar sentiments  were  expressed  in  the  strongest  language  by 
John  Adams  and  Thomas  Jefferson.     President  Fillmore,  in 


THE  UNITED   STATES   AND   SAMOA  207 

his  annual  message  of  1851,  pithily  characterized  the  nation's 
maxim,  "  Friendly  relations  with  all,  but  entangling  alliances 
with  none." 

Frequent  temptations  have  been  held  out  to  the  people 
of  the  United  States  to  depart  from  their  traditional  policy, 
—  and  especially  when  the  sympathies  of  the  country  were 
aroused  by  appeals  from  weak  nations  suffering  impositions, — 
or  when  neighbors  of  the  Western  world  were  struggling  to 
obtain  their  independence,  and  asked  for  aid  or  moral  sup- 
port. But  every  appeal  to  assume  an  interest  or  to  share  a 
responsibility  in  the  domestic  concerns  of  alien  nations  has 
been  consistently  refused  by  the  government. 

Mr.  Seward,  when  Secretary  of  State,  in  declining  an  invi- 
tation from  France  to  join  in  the  exercise  of  a  moral  influ- 
ence upon  the  Emperor  of  Russia,  said :  — 

Our  policy  of  non-intervention,  straight,  absolute,  and  peculiar  as 
it  may  seem  to  other  nations,  has  thus  become  a  traditional  one 
which  could  not  be  abandoned  without  the  most  urgent  occasion, 
amounting  to  a  manifest  necessity. 

Mr.  Frelinghuysen,  Secretary  of  State,  instructing  a  diplo- 
matic representative  in  Chili  (January  9,  1882),  said:  — 

The  President  wishes  in  no  manner  to  dictate  or  make  any 
authoritative  utterance  to  either  Peru  or  Chili  as  to  the  merits 
of  the  controversy  existing  between  those  republics.  .  .  .  Were 
the  United  States  to  assume  an  attitude  of  dictation  towards  the 
South  American  republics,  even  for  the  purpose  of  preventing 
war,  the  greatest  of  evils,  or  to  preserve  the  autonomy  of  nations, 
it  must  be  prepared  by  army  and  navy  to  enforce  its  mandate,  and 
to  this  end  tax  our  people  for  the  exclusive  benefit  of  foreign 
nations. 

This  fundamental  principle  of  the  American  government 
was  observed  for  nearly  a  century. 

It  is  true  that  in  its  earlier  history  there  are  numerous 
instances  when  the  government  sent  out  military  expeditions 
to  attack  bands  of  pirates,  or  to  redress  wrongs  committed 
upon  the  rights  of  American  citizens.  Several  naval  demon- 
strations were  made  in  the  Mediterranean  in  the  first  part 


208  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

of  the  century,  for  the  purpose  of  suppressing  the  buccaneer- 
ing propensities  of  the  Barbary  pirates  who  flaunted  the  black 
flag  from  various  strongholds  on  the  North  African  coast. 
A  letter  from  the  Dey  of  Algiers,  in  1815,  to  the  "  happy, 
the  great,  the  amiable  James  Madison,  Emperor  of  America, 
may  His  reign  be  happy  and  glorious,"  was  answered  b}"  a 
broadside  from  Admiral  Decatur's  fleet,  for  the  Dey  had  been 
tolerating  acts  of  piracy  upon  American  commerce.  But 
none  of  these  examples  of  interference  could  be  quoted  as 
exceptions  to  the  rule  of  non-intervention.  On  several 
occasions  the  operations  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  have  seem- 
ingly led  the  United  States  to  swerve  from  this  same  policy ; 
but  in  those  instances  there  was  the  reason  of  jeopardy  to 
American  interests  —  reasons  sufficient  to  exclude  those  acts 
of  threatened  belligerency  from  the  category  of  wilful  and 
useless  meddling. 

The  Samoan  affair,  indeed,  marks  the  beginning  of  a  new 
epoch  in  the  history  of  American  foreign  relations.  Com- 
menting thereon,  Mr.  Gresham,  the  Secretary  of  State,  in  a 
report  to  the  President,  May  9,  1894,  said:  — 

This  duty  is  especially  important  [of  reviewing  the  facts  of  the 
W  case],  since  it  is  in  our  relations  to  Samoa  that  we  have  made  the 
first  departure  from  our  traditional  and  well-established  policy  of 
avoiding  entangling  alliances  with  foreign  powers  in  relation  to 
objects  remote  from  this  hemisphere.  Like  all  other  human 
transactions,  the  wisdom  of  that  departure  must  be  tested  by  its 
fruits.  If  the  departure  was  justified,  there  must  be  some  evidence 
of  detriment  suffered  before  its  adoption,  or  of  advantage  since 
gained,  to  demonstrate  the  fact.  If  no  such  evidence  can  be 
found,  we  are  confronted  with  the  serious  responsibility  of  hav- 
ing, without  sufficient  grounds,  imperiled  a  policy  which  is  not 
only  coeval  with  our  Government,  but  to  which  may,  in  great 
measure,  be  ascribed  the  peace,  the  prosperity,  and  the  moral 
influence  of  the  United  States.  '  Every  nation,  and  especially 
every  strong  nation,  must  sometimes  be  conscious  of  an  impulse 
to  rush  into  difficulties  that  do  not  concern  it,  except  in  a  highly 
imaginary  way.  To  restrain  the  indulgence  of  such  a  propen- 
sity is  not  only  the  part  of  wisdom,  but  a  duty  we  owe  to  the 
world  as  an  example  of  the  strength,  the  moderation,  and  the 
beneficence  of  popular  government. 


THE   UNITED   STATES   AND   SAMOA  209 

Whether  or  not  the  signing  of  the  treaty  of  Berlin  in 
[•elation  to  the  Samoan  matter  actually  planted  the  seed  of 
1  new  political  religion  must  be  left  to  individual  opinion, 
^et  the  fact  is  certain  that  since  the  making  of  that  treaty  in 
1889,  a  "  new  school,"  advocating  a  more  generous  foreign 
policy,  has  sprung  into  existence.  Supporters  of  an  aggressive 
■oreign  policy  argue  that  conditions  have  changed,  and  that 
Aie  United  States,  being  no  longer  a  fledgling  among  nations, 
nust  assume  its  proper  share  of  responsibility  in  furthering 
:he  common  welfare  of  mankind. 


The  term  "  Samoa  "  is  applied  to  a  group  of  twelve  small 
slands  whose  combined  area  scarcely  exceeds  that  of  Rhode 
[sland.  It  is  one  of  the  many  island  systems  of  Polynesia, 
^hich,  like  constellations  upon  a  map  of  the  heavens,  dot  the 
50uthern  Pacific  chart,  converting  that  vast  region  into  a 
ireritable  island  world.  The  position  of  this  particular  group 
s  approximately  between  latitudes  13-15  south,  and  longi- 
tudes 168-173  west,  and  it  lies  upon  the  direct  route  taken  by 
;ressels  from  Western  American  ports  which  ply  via  Honolulu 
:o  the  Australasian  colonies.  The  principal  port,  in  fact 
:he  only  port  worthy  the  name,  is  Apia,  situated  on  the  island 
)f  Upolu.  At  that  point  foreign  mercantile  interests  in  the 
irchipelago  centre,  and  there  for  many  years  the  consular 
'epresentatives  of  several  countries  resided. 

The  islands  are  of  volcanic  origin,  and  rise  boldly  from 
:he  sea,  —  the  isolated  mountain-tops  of  a  great  submerged 
'ange.  From  summit  to  coral-fringed  base,  they  are  blessed 
mth.  luxuriant  tropical  vegetation,  and  charm  the  eye  with 
surpassing  loveliness. 

The  central  position  of  the  group,  with  its  fine  climate 
md  the  amiable  character  of  its  people,  attracted  many 
ivanderers  to  its  shores.  In  the  earlier  part  of  the  cen- 
tury Samoa  was  visited  by  a  few  roving  traders  who  came 
:o  barter  their  calico  prints  and  cheap  baubles  for  copra 
md  tortoise  shell.  Numerous  adventurers  of  a  recognized 
South  Sea   type^    mostly  escaped   convicts   from    Australia, 


210  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

deserters  from  ships,  and  the  nondescript  ne'er-do-wells 
who  infested  the  Pacific  islands  in  the  earlier  days,  drifted 
in  the  course  of  their  wanderings  to  Samoa.  They  came 
from  time  to  time,  either  for  gain  or  adventure,  or  else  to 
escape  the  consequences  of  crimes  committed  in  more  civilized 
parts  of  the  world.  At  that  early  day  in  the  far-away  haven 
of  the  Central  Pacific,  retribution  followed  slowly  the  mis- 
deeds of  men.  Missionaries  came  and  found  in  Samoa  a. 
congenial  field.  Whalers  from  New  Bedford  and  Sydney 
touched  at  the  islands  for  fresh  supplies,  and  to  enjoy  a 
period  of  revelry.  Those  are  recorded  by  South  Sea  chroni- 
clers as  the  romantic  days  of  the  small  trader  and  the  ubiqui- 
tous "  beach-comber,"  —  the  days  of  native  simplicity  and 
welcome  that  preceded  the  modern  period  of  organized  com- 
mercial enterprise.  With  German,  English,  and  American 
trading  firms  soliciting  business  upon  the  islands,  Samoa 
entered  upon  an  era  of  foreign  interference  and  arrogance, 
—  an  era  of  mischievous  political  plots  and  counter-plots, 
of  bitter  jealousies  and  war.  The  Samoans  then  discovered 
that  the  white  men,  whom  they  had  revered  as  superior 
beings,  were  morally  no  better  than  themselves,  if,  indeed, 
they  were  quite  as  good.  The  natives  were  wholly  disen- 
chanted  when  they  found  at  last  that  the  white  man's 
anxious  solicitude  for  theirwelfare  was  a  nep^ative  cl^aritv 
based^jQjQ^  greed.  Finally  the  Samoans  realized  that  they 
must  accept  willy-nilly  the  invincible  white  strangers  who 
had  settled  among  them,  and  whom  they  could  never  drive 
away. 

As  early  as  1850,  England,  Germany,  and  the  United  States 
were  represented  by  commercial  agents  in  Apia ;  and  in  1854 
the  great  South  Sea  trading  firm  of  Godeffi-oy  and  Company, 
of  Hamburg,  a  chartered  monopoly,  established  itself  upon 
Upolu.  For  many  years  thereafter  the  history  of  Samoa  was 
the  history  of  this  well-organized  trading  company.  Under 
the  able  leadership  of  its  first  manager,  Theodore  Weber,  who, 
it  appears,  was  both  chief  of  the  firm  and  German  Consul,  the 
company  prospered  marvellously.  By  a  mortgage  system 
admitting  of  skilful  manipulation  of  titles,  which  was  quite 


THE   UNITED  STATES  AND   SAMOA  211 

beyond  the  native  understanding,  large  tracts  of  land  fell 
to  the  company's  portion,  and  these  were  industriously  con- 
verted into  plantations  of  cocoanuts.  The  methods  of  Godef- 
froy  and  Company,  from  a  purely  commercial  point  of  view, 
have  been  denounced  as  unscrupulous,  but  the  testimony  of 
rivals  should  be  carefully  weighed.  One  must  also  bear  in 
mind  that  the  honor  line  is  exceedingly  hard  to  trace  in  all 
dealings  of  civilized  with  semi-civilized  peoples.  In  course 
of  time  rival  American  and  English  trading  concerns  sprang 
into  existence  at  Apia.  Fierce  competition  between  these 
companies,  where  the  volume  of  business  could  scarcely  sup- 
port one,  often  induced  their  zealous  managers  to  adopt  unfair 
methods  for  the  purpose  of  gaining  native  favor  and  trade. 
The  efforts  of  the  three  consuls,  who  were  usually  strongly 
prepossessed  in  favor  of  their  kinsmen,  to  protect  the  traders 
of  their  own  nationality,  led  to  many  official  blunders.  Sev- 
eral hundred  foreigners — principally  German,  English,  and 
American  —  resided  at  Apia.  The  jealous  competition  of  the 
traders  reacted  upon  these,  and  each  partisan  faction  espoused 
with  intense  enthusiasm  the  cause  of  its  own  nationality. 
Seemingly  incapable  of  regulating  their  own  affairs  within  the 
municipality  of  Apia,  the  sterner  interference  of  home  govern- 
ments was  often  invoked,  for  the  purpose  of  restoring  order 
where  chaos  reigned.  Commercial  rivalry  ripened  into 
national  jealousy,  and  all  within  the  confines  of  a  mile  of 
ocean  beach.  When  the  situation  at  Apia  became  hopelessly 
involved,  and  wholly  beyond  the  possibility  of  local  adjust- 
ment, England,  Germany  and  the  United  States  took  the 
matter  in  hand.  Therein  lay  the  motive  of  Samoa's  woes, 
and  the  perplexing  problem  of  her  relief.  Therein  also  lay 
the  causes  of  the  United  States'  abandonment  of  her  time- 
honored  policy  of  non-interference. 

The  native  Samoans  are  generous,  emotional,  amiable  in 
disposition,  of  pleasing  and  even  courtly  manners,  and  much 
given  to  ceremony  and  merriment.  There  is  much  of  good 
and  little  of  evil  in  them.  They  are  willing  to  kill  white 
men  only  because  white  men  kill  them.  Nature  has  so  fully 
responded  to  their  simple  wants  that  they  are  inclined  to 


212  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

indolence  and  easy  enjoyment  of  nature's  bounty.  They 
possessed  no  real  property  in  fee.  A  political  economy  based 
upon  communal  ideas  weakens  the  incentive  to  acquire  large 
private  wealth,  hence  it  was  difficult  for  the  "  government " 
to  tax  its  subjects.  Their  own  system  of  government  was 
essentially  of  the  patriarchal  type.  Every  community  or  clan 
had  a  "  royal "  family,  the  chieftainship  being  hereditary  as 
to  the  family,  but  elective  as  to  the  individual.  When 
a  chief  was  selected  by  vote  of  his  neighbors,  he  was  usually 
dignified  by  honorific  titles.  The  well-known  name  of 
"  Malietoa,"  the  "  Pleasing  Hero,"  is  one  of  these.  In  a 
measure  the  chief  was  a  sacred  being,  of  greater  influence  — 
if  he  proved  popular  —  than  of  actual  power  over  his  people. 
His  son  succeeded  to  his  name  and  position  only  when  elected ' 
to  do  so.  A  chief  having  attained  very  great  popularity  or 
military  success  might  have  honorific  titles  bestowed  upon 
him  by  clans  other  than  his  own;  and  should  he  receive  in 
this  manner  the  recognition  of  five  different  clans,  he  was 
considered  the  Supreme  or  Highest  Chief,  and  accorded 
kingly  honors.  The  idea  of  royalty,  as  understood  in 
Europe,  seems  rather  to  have  been  a  foreign  innovation  in 
the  islands. 

When  Samoa  became  a  treaty-making  power,  the  necessity 
for  a  stronger  central  government  with  a  definite  and  respon- 
sible head  was  felt.  The  step  from  a  patriarchal  form  of 
government  was  easily  taken  under  the  tutelage  of  the 
whites,  but  true  conceptions  of  a  king  apparently  never 
sank  deeply  into  the  Samoan  consciousness.  -To  revolt 
against  the  de  facto  king  because  he  had  enjoyed  an  inning  of 
several  years  and  should  therefore  give  other  worthy  men  a 
chance  to  realize  their  ambitions,  was  entirely  proper  and 
legitimate  according  to  Samoan  custom.  The  people  there- 
fore had  little  idea  of  "government,"  as  understood  by 
modern  civilized  nations,  and  consequently  a  strong  central 
power  levying  taxes  and  actually  enforcing  judicial  decrees 
was  not  properly  comprehended.  The  Samoans  were  unable 
to  appreciate  the  utility  of  contract  obligations  ;  they  rejoiced 
in  peace,  but  tribal  disturbances  were  more  or  less  frequent 


THE   UNITED   STATES   AND   SAMOA  213 

throughout  the  islands.  The  white  man  was  given  the 
heartiest  welcome,  and  has  never  since  found  an  enemy 
among  the  Samoans,  except  when  his  own  misdeeds  have 
driven  the  simple  natives  to  desperate  retaliation. 


n 

Previous  to  the  year  1872  no  interest  whatever  in  the 
United  States  attached  to  these  distant  islands.  They  were 
of  neither  political  nor  commercial  importance.  In  that 
year,  however.  Admiral  Meade,  who  was  cruising  about  the 
Central  Pacific  in  the  U.  S.  S.  Narragansett^  entered  into  an 
agreement,  quite  upon  his  own  authority,  with  a  certain 
chief  on  the  Samoan  island  of  Tutuila,  whereby  the  local 
chief  granted  to  the  United  States  the  exclusive  privilege 
of  establishing  a  naval  and  coaling  station  in  the  harbor  oV 
Pago-Pago.  In  return  for  this  favor  the  chief  expected  the 
friendship,  and  if  need  be  the  protection,  of  the  United 
States.  The  value  of  a  coaling  station  in  that  locality  was 
appreciated,  especially  in  the  event  of  the  completion  of  an. 
isthmian  canal.  When  Admiral  Meade's  agreement  with  the 
chief  reached  Washington,  the  Senate  hesitated  to  sanction 
the  '^  friendship  and  protection  "  part  of  the  bargain,  and  no 
action  was  taken  upon  the  matter.  Soon  after  this  (1873), 
having  been  urged  by  "  certain  highly  respectable  per- 
sons" who  represented  to  the  government  the  importance 
of  the  growing  trade  between  the  United  States  and  the 
South  Sea  Islands,  President  Grant  sent  Col.  A.  B.  Stein- 
berger  as  United  States  Commissioner  to  Samoa,  with  in- 
structions to  make  a  full  report  concerning  the  conditions, 
commercial  possibilities  and  general  importance  of  the  islands. 

A  report  was  soon  made,  and  Mr.  Steinberger  was  again 
invested  with  authority  (1874)  to  revisit  the  islands  for  the 
purpose  of  "observing  and  reporting  upon  Samoan  affairs,  and 
impressing  those  in  authority  there  with  the  lively  interest 
which  we  take  in  their  happiness  and  welfare."  Instead  of 
returning  at  once  to  Samoa  to  carry  out  the  object  of  his 


214  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

mission,  it  is  alleged  that  Mr.  Steinberger  proceeded  directly 
to  Hamburg,  and  there  entered  irrEo  contract  relations  with 
the  president  of  the  great  trading  firm  of  Godeffroy  and 
Company,  pledging  himself  to  their  interests.  Mr.  Stein> 
berger,  who  seems  therefore  to  have  become  an  adventurer, 
and  unfaithful  to  his  trust,  proceeded  thence  to  Samoa  under 
the  mask  of  United  States  Commissioner,  but  in  reality  to 
carry  out  the  terms  of  his  Godeffroy  contract.  He  arrived 
in  Samoa  in  the  early  part  of  1875,  and  devoted  his  energies 
to  the  interests  of  his  new  business.  He  soon  became  in- 
volved in  Samoan  politics.  Internal  dissensions  con- 
vulsed the  islands,  the  primary  cause  of  disturbance  being 
the  rivalry  of  two  members  of  one  family,  who  claimed  each 
the  coveted  title  of  **Malietoa."  Under  a  new  form  of  gov- 
ernment, but  recently  adopted,  Malietoa  Laupepa,  the  "king" 
was  in  retirement,  and  the  country  was  ruled  by  Councils  of 
State.  Mr.  Steinberger  gained  great  favor  among  the  natives; 
and  with  the  aid  of  some  other  white  men,  who  were  in 
sympathy  with  his  projects,  he  prevailed  upon  the  Samoans 
so  to  alter  their  constitution  that  Malietoa  Laupepa  should 
become,  for  a  limited  number  of  years,  the  recognized  king, 
and  he,  Steinberger,  should  be  made  Prime  Minister.  While 
acting  in  such  a  capacity,  he  represented  to  the  Sainoans  that 
their  islands  were  under  the  protection  of  the  United  States. 
In  course  of  time  rumors  of  this  condition  of  affairs  reached 
Washington,  and  Congress  speedily  called  for  information  in 
relation  to  Steinberger,  his  mission  and  his  powers,  which 
resulted  (May,  1876)  in  the  Senate's  repudiating  any  consid- 
erations of  a  United  States'  protectorate  over  Samoa,  and  dis- 
avowing all  interference  in  Samoan  domestic  concerns.  In 
the  meantime,  however,  a  Bi'itish  war  vessel  happened  along, 
and  the  enemies  of  Steinberger  took  the  opportunity  of 
having  that  reputed  adventurer  seized  and  deported.  By 
the  same  movement,  Malietoa,  the  king,  was  dethroned  and 
held  prisoner.  Instantly  the  islands  blazed  into  war,  and  tlie 
vacant  throne  became  a  prize  for  several  contending  chiefs. 
The  prospect  of  never  ending  tumult  which  followed  the 
downfall  of  Steinberger  (encouraged  by  the  interference  of 


THE   UNITED   STATES  AND   SAMOA  215 

several  rival  foreign  factions  in  Apia),  finally  induced  the 
Samoans  to  pray  for  an  English  protectorate  over  their 
distracted  country.  When  the  fact  became  known  to  the 
foreigners  in  Apia,  the  German  and  American  representa- 
tives and  residents  were  greatly  alarmed.  For  once  they 
forgot  their  commercial  rivalries,  and  acted  together,  their 
interests  being  united  in  a  common  cause  against  English 
annexation.  With  the  connivance  of  the  German  Consul,  as 
is  supposed,  the  American  commercial  agent  at  Apia  hoisted 
his  flag  over  the  city,  and  proclaimed  a  United  States  pro- 
tectorate. A  similar  occurrence  took  place  a  year  later,  when 
an  English  commissioner  arrived  at  Apia  for  the  purpose  of 
extorting  certain  treaty  concessions  from  the  king.  Upon 
this  occasion  English  persuasion  was  rendered  the  more 
potent  by  a  squad,  of  marines  from  a  vessel  lying  in  the 
harbor;  and  the  American  flag  was  again  hoisted  by  the  agent 
over  the  government  building,  in  order  to  proclaim  to  the 
world,  and  especially  to  the  British  commissioner,  that  any 
treaties  relative  to  Samoa  should  be  made  in  Washington. 
Both  of  these  somewhat  hasty  acts  were  disavowed. 

The  efforts  made  by  the  natives  for  English  annexation 
proved  unsuccessful,  and   the  disappointed  chiefs  returned 
from  their  mission  abroad  only  to  find  the  land  still  in  the 
throes  of  civil  war.       Encouraged  by  the  flag-raising  pro- 
pensities of  the  American  Consul,  they  turned  to  the  United 
States,  in  the  hope  of  finding  relief  in  an  American  protecto- 
rate.    Mamea,  a  high  chief,  proceeded  to  Washington  (1877), 
but   there    he   found    no    disposition   on   the   part    of   the 
authorities   to  depart   from  a  policy  that   opposed  all   en- 
tangling alliances  with  foreign  nations.     The  generous  offer 
of  his  realm  was  declined  by  the  President,  but  the  object  of 
his  mission  to  the  United  States  was  not  wholly  defeated.   . 
He  concluded  a  treaty  in  Washington,  January  16,_1878,  ^^ 
whereby  the  United  States  was   granted  "the  privile^of 
entering  and  using  the  port  of  Pago-Pago,  and  establishing  • 
therein  and  on  the  shores  thereof,  a  station  for  coal  and  other   \ 
naval  supplies";,  the  treaty  further  guaranteed,  that  there- 
after Samoa  would  "neither  exercise  nor  authorize  any  juris- 


2 


216  AMERICAN    DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

diction  within  said  port  adverse  to  such  rights  of  the  United 
States,  or  restrictive  thereof."  In  return  for  these  con- 
cessions it  was  provided  in  the  treaty,  that :  — 

If,  unhappily,  any  differences  should  have  arisen,  or  should 
hereafter  arise  between  the  Samoan  Government  and  any  other 
government  in  amity  with  the  United  States,  the  Government  of 
the  latter  will  employ  its  good  offices  for  the  purpose  of  adjusting 
these  differences  upon  a  satisfactory  and  solid  foundation. 

This  treaty  was  made  by  the  United  States  more  in  the 
desire  not  to  appear  wholly  indifferent  to  the  friendly 
advances  of  the  Samoans  than  for  any  importance  it  attached 
to  Samoa,  or  advantage  to  be  gained  by  close  political  or 
commercial  relations  with  her.  It  was  indeed  felt  by  many 
that  the  mere  offer  to  use  friendly  offices  in  case  of  difficulty 
was  a  rash  promise  that  might  some  day  call  for  fulfilment, 
especially  as  Germany,  with  her  preponderance  of  commercial 
interests  in  the  islands,  would  probably  sooner  or  later  seek 
forcibly  to  acquire  the  group. 

The  Samoans,  however,  proceeded  to  make  treaties  of 
similar  character  the  following  year  with  England  and  Ger- 
many, granting  to  each  exclusive  rights  in  certain  harbors 
for  naval  and  coaling  stations.  In  the  case  of  the  German 
treaty  the  Samoans  were  far  more  generous,  through  coercion 
it  is  said,  and  granted  to  the  energetic  German  representa- 
tive certain  concessions  that  appeared  to  be  incompatible 
with  the  favored  nation  clause  in  the  American  treaty.  This 
fact  excited  some  feeling  of  displeasure,  which  was  no  doubt 
more  keenly  felt  in  the  American  consulate  at  Apia  than  in 
the  State  Department  at  Washington.  To  American  citi- 
zens in  Samoa  it  suggested  imposition  on  the  part  of  Ger- 
many, and  convinced  them  of  Germany's  intention  to 
secure  a  grasp  upon  the  islands  that  would  lead  to  ulti- 
mate annexation.  There  can  be  little  doubt  had  Ger- 
many then  made  a  coup  d'Stat^  and  formally  seized  the 
islands  with  a  graceful  recognition  of  American  and  Eng- 
lish rights  in  their  respective  harbors,  the  world  would  not 
have  been  profoundly  moved  or  the  United  States  greatly 
shocked.     But   the   American   Consul,   who   hoped   for   an 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  SAMOA  217 

American  Samoa,  became  alarmed  by  the  evidences  of  Ger- 
man intrigue,  and  he  decided  it  to  be  his  duty  to  thwart 
Teutonic  ambition  in  the  island.  The  breach  between  the 
United  States  and  Germany  in  Samoa  was  thus  begun,  and 
English  subjects  in  Apia  took  sides  with  the  Americans 
against  the  greater  rival. 

'  Civil  dissensions  between  various  native  factions  continued 
unabated  throughout  the  year  1878.  The  followers  of 
Malietoa  Telavu  and  the  adherents  to  the  old  regime  of  the 
"  Councils  of  the  Chiefs  "  took  to  the  bush,  Samoan  fashion, 
to  glare  at  each  other  over  their  rude  fortifications,  to  brandish 
fiercely  their  arms  and  to  fill  the  forests  with  their  war- 
cries.  It  was  during  this  long  period  of  strife  that  the 
foreigners  in  Apia  for  their  own  safety  obtained  from  both 
warring  factions  the  recognition  of  a  strip  of  territory,  in- 
cluding the  municipality  of  Apia,  as  neutral  and  sacred  from 
all  hostile  attack.  Over  this  tract  of  land  the  three  nations, 
which  were  in  treaty  relations  with  Samoa,  were  authorized 
to  exercise  the  rights  of  extra-territoriality.  In  regard  to 
the  native  wars,  the  three  consuls  in  Apia  proclaimed  of- 
ficially the  strictest  neutrality;  but  notwithstanding  their 
determination  to  hold  aloof  from  any  participation  in  the 
troubled  affairs  of  Samoa,  their  languishing  trade  interests 
compelled  them  to  intervene.  In  the  light  of  later  Samoan 
history,  it  is  not  a  little  remarkable  that  all  three  consuls, 
backed  by  the  concurrent  opinions  of  several  naval  captains 
in  the  harbor,  were  enabled  to  unite  in  the  selection  of 
Malietoa  Telavu  as  the  ruler  of  Samoa.  They  thereupon 
threw  the  weight  of  their  influence  in  his  favor.  Desultory 
fighting  continued,  nevertheless,  for  over  a  year,  when  peace 
was  finally  restored  only  by  the  interposition  of  Captain 
Deinhart  of  the  German  cruiser  Bismarck. 

Though  peace  had  been  accomplished  by  no  less  vigorous 
measures  than  a  bombardment  of  native  villages,  Samoan 
politics  continued  in  a  most  unsettled  condition.  The  three 
consuls  decided  to  take  a  still  more  active  part  in  the  man- 
agement of  local  affairs,  if  for  nothing  more  than  to  insure 
the  stability  of  the  government  they  had  united  in  establish- 

I        L 


N 


4 


218  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

ing.     Accordingly  they  entered  into  a  compact  with  Malietos 
Telavu,  agreeing  to  support  his  government,  he  to  accept 
t{      three  advisers,  —  a  German,  an  Englishman,  and  an  Ameri- 
can.    The  successor  of  Telavu  was  to  be  chosen  "  by  the  thret 
^  protecting  powers  "  (March  24,  1880).      Such  an  agreemeni 
as  this  bore  all  the  earmarks  of  a  protectorate;  but  botl 
England  and  the  United  States  declined  to  regard  the  agree- 
ent  as  more  than  a  "  scheme  of  arrangement  between  th( 
consular  body  and  the  government  of  the  islands  for  the 
protection  of  the  foreigners."    *Malietoa  Telavu,  however 
was  explicitly  recognized  as  head  of    the  Samoan  Govern 
^       ment,  and  upon  his  death  in  1881,  Malietoa  Laupepa  waj 
<r  V  j-ecognized  as  his  successor.     On   March  19,  1881,  Laupepi 
Y\   was  duly  anointed    king,  according  to   native   custom,  anc 
^   installed  at  Mulinuu,  the  royal  seat  of  Samoa. 
^      ^     In  some  other  islands  of  the  ^up  there  wiis  opposition  t( 
^  ^"   a  Laupepa.    Possibly  his  too  close  association  with  the  foreign- 
.;    i^-^crs  who  sustained  him  displeased  some  of  the  "old  party.* 
^  At  all  events,  a  native  anti-administration  faction  crowned  i 
i/lfv Certain  high  chief   Tamasese  as  opposition  king  to  Malie 
y^        tjoa  Laupepa,  and  the  rifles  and  spears  were  again  broughi 
into  use.    Captain  Gillis,  of  the  U.  S.  S.  Lackawana,  happen 
ing  in  port,  succeeded  in  quelling  the  rebellion  by  bringing 
about  a  compromise.   ^Talfetoa  LaupepS  was  to  remain  king 
^nd  Tamasese  was  created  vice-king  (Julx  12,  1881). 

At  last  all  native  factions  were  appeased,  and  the  con 
suls  were  reasonably  in  accord.  Peace  continued  for  severa 
years ;  no  one  heard  of  Samoa's  troubles  ;  and  seemingly  al 
was  well. 

Those  who  profess  to  comprehend  the  untutored  savag( 
mind,  maintain  that  primitive  peoples  cannot  long  remain  ir 
peace.  Be  that  as  it  may,  the  period  of  rest  from  July,  1881 
to  the  early  part  of  1885  proved  to  be  only  the  calm  tliai 
precedes  the  storm.  With  all  due  allowance  for  native  vacil 
lation  and  the  savage's  readiness  for  an  affray,  the  foreign 
ers  in  Apia  must  be  held  guilty  for  bringing  about  th( 
troubIes_SKhicli.iQl]Qarp.d,  .^nd^Jht^  0  &i  iflgBF  must  accept  i 
little  more  than  equal  share  in  the  guilt. 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  SAMOA  219 


HI 

A  glance  at  the  somewhat  complex  social  conditions  which 
existed  at  Apia  in  1884-89,  the  years  of  greatest  disturbance, 
is  necessary  to  an  understanding  of  the  series  of  events  which, 
beginning  about  that  time,  culminated  in  the  tripartite  treaty 
of  Berlin. 

The  municipality  of  Apia  was  governed  wholly  by  the 
consular  representatives  of  England,  Germany,  and  the 
United  States ;  and  the  private  property  within  this  neutral 
area  generally  belonged  to  citizens  of  one  or  the  other  of 
these  three  powers  residing  and  doing  business  in  the  islands. 
To  the  Samoans,  Apia  was,  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  a  fof^ 
eign  city,  over  which  they  exercised  no  control  whatever. 
Here  was  concentrated  the  wealth  of  the  islands,  and  within 
the  neutral  zone  at  Mulinuu  resided  King  Malietoa  Lau- 
pepa  and  his  Vice-King  Tamasese,  the  nominal  heads  of  a 
peculiarly  weak  and  unstable  government.  In  the  environs 
of  Apia  in  every  direction  the  painted  sign-posts  of  foreign 
property  holdings  stealthily  advanced,  sometimes  moving  on 
by  night  into  the  wilderness  that  surrounds  the  neutral  strip 
of  the  municipality. 

In  Apia  proper  the  foreign  population  was  composed  of 
three  distinct  elements,  that  quarrelled  among  themselves  or 
united  in  friendship  as  their  own  separate  and  rival  interests 
dictated.  Of  these  three  elements  the  German  was  the  most 
aggressive  and  commanding.  Their  commercial  interests  in 
Samoa,  embodied  in  the  Godeffroy  firm  (reorganized  into 
the  "  Deutsche  Handels-  und  Plantagen-Gesellschaft  f  iir  Siid- 
see-Inseln  zu  Hamburg"),  greatly  exceeded  those  of  the 
American  and  English  residents  combined.  A  vast  amount 
of  capital  had  been  expended  in  improving  their  large  planta- 
tions scattered  throughout  the  islands,  and  their  excellent 
trade  had  been  established  by  thirty  years  of  constant  vigi- 
lance and  toil.  To  the  Germans  in  Apia,  the  prestige  of  their 
country  and  the  success  of  their  great  "  firm  "  had  almost 
become  synonymous  terms.    Nothing  should  be  permitted  to 


220  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

check  their  company's  growth,  —  not  even  an  unfriendly 
native  king.  To  "  aid  "  in  framing  laws  for  Samoa,  to  incite 
a  revolution,  or  to  depose  a  hostile  government,  must  be  ac- 
cepted as  legitimate  acts  if  the  company's  interest  demanded 
them;  in  short,  any  means  were  permissible  to  that  end.  It 
is  not  to  be  wondered  that  the  Germans  regarded  the  Ameri- 
can and  English  traders  somewhat  in  the  light  that  a  game- 
keeper regards  a  poacher  within  his  preserves.  When  the 
latter  evinced  a  tendency  to  adopt  their  own  tactics  for  in- 
fluencing native  legislation,  the  Germans  resented  their  bold- 
ness, and  bitter  feelings  were  aroused ;  when  they  hinted  at 
annexation,  the  Germans  lost  their  equanimity  of  temper. 
The  predominance  of  their  commercial  interests  was  their 
excuse  for  all  acts  of  interference  in  native  affairs,  and  in  the 
passively  hostile  attitude  which  they  sullenly  maintained 
toward  the  other  foreigners  in  Apia. 

The  English  element  was  a  smaller,  but  in  some  respects  a 
no  less  active,  one.  On  the  veranda  of  the  British  consulate 
and  at  the  counter  of  McArthur  and  Company  they  discussed 
with  much  feeling  the  growing  influence  of  the  Germans, 
and  plotted  for  the  advancement  of  their  own  business  affairs. 
England  was  known  to  favor  imperialism,  and  she  was  con- 
stantly alive  for  the  absorption  of  new  territory.  Her  ships 
ranged  the  seas,  and  her  commanders  were  quick  to  act. 
With  an  avowed  policy  of  expansion  in  London,  the  English 
residents  felt  their  strength  in  Apia.  They  watched  the 
Germans  narrowly,  and  resented  their  meddling  with  the 
natives.  They  also  had  considerable  influence  over  the  lat- 
ter, by  reason  of  the  activity  of  the  London  Missionary 
Society,  whose  workers  in  Samoa  had  succeeded  in  favorably 
impressing  the  religiously  inclined  aborigines. 

The  American  element  in  Apia  consisted  of  a  mere  hand- 
ful of  men  who  rallied  around  the  premises  of  an  American 
firm  to  denounce  the  German  and  English  attempts  to  gain 
greater  influence  in  the  islands.  Their  trade  was  a  grow- 
ing one,  but  they  felt  hampered  by  the  knowledge  that  the 
United  States  would  probably  never  care  to  annex  thfe  group. 
It  would  be  unfair  to  say  that  they  always  held  aloof  from 


THE   UNITED   STATES  AND  SAMOA  221 

the  purely  domestic  affairs  of  the  Samoans,  or  that  they 
constantly  maintained  that  attitude  of  strict  neutrality 
toward  warring  factions  in  the  islands  that  the  traditions  of 
their  country  should  have  prompted  them  to  observe.  Theirs 
was  the  position  of  eager  spectators  whose  interests  led  them 
from  time  to  time  to  take  a  part  in  native  politics,  chiefly 
to  thwart  the  machinations  of  their  English  and  German 
neighbors. 

In  general,  therefore,  the  one  motive  in  Samoa  was  to 
acquire  commercial  advantage.  When  competition  is  fierce 
between  citizens  of  several  nationalities,  in  a  neutral  land  and 
under  a  weak  and  dependent  government,  the  temptation  to 
secure  a  controlling  influence  in  the  councils  of  the  nation 
becomes  too  great  to  withstand.  It  was  impossible,  under 
such  conditions,  for  these  commercial  strugglers  to  eliminate 
the  sense  of  patriotism  from  their  efforts  to  increase  their 
trade.  Race  prejudices  were  fed  by  business  rivalry,  and  a 
clash  was  always  imminent. 

Each  foreign  faction  was  headed  by  a  consul  who  was 
quick  to  discern  the  right  and  slow  to  detect  any  wrong  in 
the  acts  of  his  "subjects."  Under  the  laws  of  extraterri- 
toriality these  ofiicials  enjoyed  considerable  authority  and 
power.  They  exercised  judicial  functions  and  supervised  the 
governmental  affairs  of  the  municipality  wherein  those  of 
their  own  nationality  resided.  In  an  advisory  capacity  they 
exerted  a  decided  influence  over  tlie  native  government.  As 
might  be  supposed,  where  all  the  elements  were  so  favorable, 
political  feelings  were  intense,  and  occasionally  ran  riot.  The 
atmosphere  was  constantly  charged  with  rumors  of  intrigue. 
The  movements  of  native  factions  were  keenly  watched  in  the 
light  of  possible  advantage  to  be  gained  by  any  threatened 
political  change.  Every  act  of  the  king  or  his  vice-king 
was  examined  under  the  lens  of  a  jealous  interest,  to  deter- 
mine whether  it  savored  of  preference  for  German,  English, 
or  American. 

Besides  these  foreigners  whose  residence  in  Apia  was  osten- 
sibly f^r  legitimate  purposes  of  trade,  men  of  a  lower  social 
stratuii,  a  bar-room  riffraff  of  decidedly  uncertain  charac- 


222  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

ter,  infested  the  place.  The  South  Sea  Islands  appear  to 
furnish  the  conditions  necessary  to  the  development  of  an 
unprincipled  class  of  men  who  are  always  ready  to  breed 
difcnsions  among  native  peoples,  whom,  by  glibness  of 
tongue,  they  influence  to  evil.  Thieves  profit  by  confusion. 
These  adventurers,  like  stormy  petrels  scenting  the  tempest 
from  afar,  were  a  constant  menace  to  peace  in  the  islands. 

King  Malietoa  Laupepa,  installed  in  a  shanty  at  Mulinuu, 
gloomily  contemplated  the  shadow  of  his  slender  authority. 
He  was  thoroughly  dependent  upon  the  cooperation  of  the 
consuls  to  repress  the  little  rebellions  that  sprang  up  like 
weeds  in  his  garden.  He  was  nevertheless  much  loved  by 
his  people.  Laupepa  has  often  been  described  as  a  gentle, 
lovable  old  man,  of  the  most  generous  impulses,  but  pitifully 
weak.  Tamasese,  the  vice-king  possessed  no  distinctive 
qualities,  either  good  or  bad,  and  his  popularity  among  his 
people  was  but  luke-warra. 

Out  in  the  bush,  a  great  chief  and  warrior,  a  man  of  high 
courage  and  principle,  of  large  and  enthusiastic  following, 
Mataafa  by  name,  rested  upon  his  arms.  He  may  be  said  to 
have  been  at  that  moment  in  a  quiescent  state.  He  was 
ambitious  for  the  throne,  disliked  Tamasese  and  bore  a  strong 
friendship  for  his  kinsman,  Malietoa  Laupepa. 

Mataafa's  personality  was  very  striking,  combining  great 
vigor  with  a  kindly,  generous  nature.  He  possessed  a  clear 
sense  of  justice,  and  was  a  good  friend  and  a  bad  enemy. 
From  childhood  a  curse  rested  upon  this  ambitious  warrior. 
For  some  uncivil  act  he  committed  toward  his  elders  he  had 
been  denounced  by  a  relative  who,  as  a  prophet  of  evil 
fortune,  cast  upon  him  a  future  of  great  disappointment. 
Never  should  he  rule  Samoa,  yet  never  should  he  rest  from 
his  vain  efforts  to  reach  the  throne. 

IV 


During  the  earlier  eighties  the  plantations  of  the  German 
firm  in  the  vicinity  of  Apia  had  been  subject  to  petty  pilfer- 
ings  of  the  natives.  The  managers  of  the  compar-iy  had 
made  frequent  complaints  about  these  thefts;  the  (lerman 


THE  UNITED   STATES  AND   SAMOA  223 

Consul  had  demanded  of  Malietoa  that  he  should  warn  his 
subjects  more  positively  against  midnight  raids  upon  the 
German  fruit  trees.  A  number  of  light-fingered  citizens  had 
been  caught  in  the  act  of  making  away  with  an  armful  of  green 
cocoanuts  or  a  bunch  of  bananas;  they  had  been  duly  tried 
and  sentenced  to  imprisonment,  but  it  was  discovered  by  the 
watchful  Weber,  the  head  of  the  firm,  that  the  back  door  of 
the  jail  was  open;  Weber's  convicts  were  not  paying  the  full 
penalty  of  their  misdemeanors.  In  October,  1884,  the  German 
Consul  addressed  a  letter  to  King  Malietoa,  calling  his  atten- 
tion to  this  lapse  of  justice,  and  suggested  to  him  in  no 
uncertain  language  that  a  continuation  of  such  a  condition 
of  affairs  would  be  accepted  as  an  insult  to  the  German  Gov- 
ernment. The  Arcadian  simplicity  of  Samoan  life  did  not 
develop  that  fineness  of  discrimination  between  meum  and 
tuum  that  the  Teutonic  representative  in  Apia  believed 
should  be  observed.  The  king  no  doubt  felt  the  delicacy  of 
his  position;  it  required  more  tact  than  Malietoa  possessed 
to  serve  two  masters  at  the  same  time.  He  attempted  to 
reform  his  judiciary  at  a  ruinous  expense  of  popularity  among 
his  subjects,  but  his  reforms  were  not  sufficiently  complete 
to  meet  the  requirements  of  the  exacting  Germans;  so  Mr. 
Weber  of  the  firm  decided  to  constitute  himself  both  judge 
and  jailer  of  the  realm.  In  the  absence  of  the  German  Con- 
sul he  arranged  for  a  treaty  between  the  Berlin  and  the 
Samoan  governments  which  would  virtually  place  the  man- 
agement of  native  affairs  into  his  own  hands.  This  docu- 
ment he  placed  before  the  astonished  Malietoa,  with  a  demand 
that  he  sign  it  blindfolded,  or,  to  put  it  more  clearly,  before 
its  provisions  could  become  known  to  other  foreigners  in 
Apia.  Some  German  men-of-war  were  in  the  harbor.  The 
unfortunate  monarch  was  at  his  wits'  end.  He  hastily  ap- 
pealed to  the  representatives  of  England  and  the  United 
States  for  protection;  and  to  the  queen  of  England  he 
despatched  a  formal  application  for  immediate  annexation. 
The  Germans  in  Apia  were  outraged  by  this  display  of  inde- 
pendence on  the  part  of  the  king;  they  pressed  him  the 
harder  to  sign  the  paper,  and  demanded  an  abject  apology  for 


224  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

his  delay  and  impertinence  in  consulting  the  English  and 
Americans.  Sorely  harassed  by  threats,  Malietoa  yielded. 
In  November  he  and  his  companion,  Taraasese,  appeared  at 
the  German  consulate,  made  public  humiliation  in  the  dust, 
and  signed  Mr.  Weber's  treaty.  Doubtless  feeling  himself 
to  be  between  two  evils  (the  German  man-of-war  on  the  one 
hand  and  the  wrath  of  his  subjects  on  the  other),  he  appealed 
in  his  distress  to  the  Emperor  of  Germany  (December  29, 
1884):  — 

I  write  to  inform  your  Majesty  that  I  am  deeply  distressed 
on  account  of  the  troublesome  acts  done  by  subjects  of  your  coun- 
try in  Samoa. 

I  humbly  beseech  your  Majesty  to  listen  to  my  complaint. 

The  first  matter  of  complaint  of  which  I  have  to  inform  your 
Majesty  is  the  agreement  which  was  made  on  the  10th  of  Novem- 
ber between  the  Government  of  Germany  and  the  Government  of 
Samoa.  The  method  in  which  it  was  brought  about  was  very 
improper,  for  we  did  not  desire  to  make  it  because  we  were  not 
allowed  to  see  the  documents  so  that  we  could  consult  about  it 
and  consider  it. 

I  wrote  to  the  German  consul  to  ask  him  to  give  me  a  copy  of 
the  agreement,  in  order  that  we  should  thoroughly  understand  its 
meaning.  He  replied  that  he  refused  to  give  me  or  my  govern- 
ment a  copy  of  the  agreement  until  after  we  had  accepted  it. 

I  assented  to  the  agreement,  and  our  names,  Malietoa  and  Tupua, 
were  signed  to  it  on  account  of  our  intimidation  by  threats.  I 
also  inform  your  Majesty  of  our  withdrawal  from  the  agree- 
ment on  account  of  its  containing  many  impracticable  clauses. 

I  therefore  beg  your  Majesty  will  not  assent  to  that  agreement. 

I  also  appeal  to  your  Majesty  with  reference  to  the  troublesome 
acts  of  Mr.  Weber,  a  subject  of  your  country. 

He  is  continually  trying  to  cause  divisions  among  the  people  in 
order  to  bring  about  disturbances  and  war  in  Samoa.  I  have 
received  much  information  respecting  his  working  for  the  pur- 
pose of  causing  troubles  to  arise  in  Samoa  again. 

He  is  continually  scheming  and  offering  bribes  to  some  Samoan 
chiefs  to  induce  them  to  comply  with  his  wishes,  and  thus  cause 
a  rebellion  in  my  country. 

I  complain  to  your  Majesty  on  account  of  this  improper  con- 
duct of  Mr.  Weber,  so  that  he  may  be  compelled  to  desist  from 
acts  by  which  the  blood  of  the  people  of  my  country  may  be  shed. 


THE    UNITED   STATES  AND   SAMOA  225 

I  hope  and  pray  that  God  will  bless  your  Majesty  and  your 
Government. 

I  am,  your  Majesty, 

Malietoa,  King  op  Samoa. 

No  more  effective  state  paper  has  ever  been  written,  but 
the  German  Consul- General,  Herr  Steubel,  was  not  the  man 
to  permit  the  advantage  he  had  just  gained  to  slip  from  his 
grasp.  Resolving  upon  an  extreme  policy,  at  an  opportune 
moment  (emulating  the  example  of  a  former  American  Con- 
sul), he  hoisted  the  German  flag  over  Mulinuu  (January  23, 
1885),  and  nailed  to  a  tree  the  following  interesting  procla- 
mation :  — 

Let  all  the  people  of  Samoa  observe  during  the  long  period  that 
Malietoa  has  been  king,  the  Government  of  Germany  has  been 
treated  with  unkindness  and  injury,  and  all  agreements  that  have 
been  made  between  the  Governments  of  Germany  and  Samoa  have 
been  repeatedly  violated.  For  that  reason  I  must  now  make 
arrangements  necessary  for  the  protection  of  the  subjects  of  my 
government  and  their  possessions.  This  is  my  view  of  that  which 
is  necessary  to  be  done :  that  I  should  take  possession  of  the 
lands  of  the  village  and  district  of  Apia,  in  which  are  included 
Mulinuu  and  the  Harbor  of  Apia,  to  hold  possession  under  the 
supreme  control  (that  was  under  the  Government  of  Malietoa)  for 
the  Government  of  Germany.  This  is  the  sign  of  this  —  I  have 
hoisted  the  flag  of  His  Imperial  German  Majesty  in  Mulinuu. 
This  is  the  meaning  of  it  (the  hoisting  of  the  flag),  that  only  the 
Government  of  Germany  will  rule  for  the  present  over  that  por- 
tion of  territory. 

Samoans,  I  tell  you  now  plainly,  that  it  is  only  the  territory 
that  is  called  the  Municipality  that  is  taken  possession  of,  but 
no  other  portion  of  land  in  Samoa  is  taken  possession  of. 

It  is  good,  too,  that  you  should  be  well  acquainted  with  the  reason 
of  that  which  is  done.  It  is  no  unkindness  at  all  to  Samoa.  The 
German  Government  only  wish  for  Samoa  to  have  a  strong  gov- 
ernment that  shall  maintain  cordial  relations  with  the  Govern- 
ment of  Germany.  When  a  peaceful  solution  of  these  difficulties 
is  effected,  the  lands  now  taken  possession  of  will  be  given  up  again. 

I  beseech  you  to  be  at  peace  and  to  have  confidence  in  the 
Government  of  Germany  and  myself ;  then  Samoa  will  indeed  be 
prosperous. 

Dr.  Steubel,  Imperial  German  Consul. 


226  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

It  might  be  presumed  that  Dr.  Steubel  needed  rest  after 
such  an  effort,  but  those  lacking  in  humor  seem  never  to 
tire ;  besides,  this  was  Dr.  Steubel's  busy  day.  To  Malietoa, 
he  wrote :  — 

.  .  .  Already,  on  the  4th  of  November  [1884]  your  Highness 
wrote  to  me  that  the  prisoners  who  in  February,  last  year, 
escaped,  in  consequence  of  the  order  of  your  Government,  out  of 
the  German  prisons,  would  be  brought  back.  Subsequently  I  made 
an  agreement  [the  blindfold  episode  already  referred  to]  with 
your  Highness'  Government.  I  supposed  that  difficulties  which 
arose  formerly  would  l^e  removed  thereby.  Your  Highness'  Gov- 
ernment, however,  renewed  the  old  inimical  attitude  towards  Ger- 
many. Not  all  the  prisoners  were  brought  back,  and  those  who 
were  escaped  again  soon  after,  and  your  Highness'  Government 
did  not  think  of  taking  the  trouble  to  return  the  prisoners.  In  a 
letter  which  your  Highness  wrote  to  me  on  the  20th  of  Novem- 
ber you  say  that  it  is  generally  known  that  Samoa  was  to  be 
taken  by  force  by  the  German  Government. 

Since  then  the  followers  of  your  Highness  .  .  .  Seumanu  and 
Lauati  have  repeatedly,  in  meetings,  designated  Germany  as  a 
robber  land,  and  a  country  of  slavery,  and  as  a  country  without 
religion.  .  .  .  (Jermany  can  no  longer  look  upon  this  gtate  of 
affairs  with  equanimity.  .  .  . 

Hence  the  German  flag-raising  over  the  municipality.  To 
the  American  and  British  consuls,  who  had  at  once  protested 
against  Dr.  Steubel's  assumption  of  authority,  he  wrote  that 
by  way  of  reprisal  he  had  attached,  in  the  name  of  the  Impe- 
rial German  Government,  all  the  territory  forming  the 
municipality  of  Apia,  as  far  as  the  rights  of  sovereignty  of 
King  Malietoa  and  his  government  are  concerned,  and  that 
he  would  hold  the  same  as  security  for  the  due  fulfilment  of 
existing  treaty  obligations  by  the  Samoan  Government. 

Malietoa's  apparent  complacency  in  yielding  to  the  impor- 
tunities of  the  now  cordially  disliked  Germans  injured  him 
in  the  eyes  of  his  subjects.  Tamasese  hoped  to  profit  by  his 
disgrace,  for  ambition  had  flowered  in  his  breast.  The  vice- 
king  suddenly  announced  his  separation  from  Malietoa's 
government,  and  he  proceeded  at  once  to  set  up  his  own 
emblem  of  sovereignty  in  a  near-by  village.     A  German  mil- 


J 

THE  UNITED   STATES   AND   SAMOA  227 

itary  officer,  Captain  Brandeis,  arrived  on  the  scene  as  a 
clerk  of  the  German  firm.  He  took  up  his  residence  with* 
Tamasese,  and  began  the  process  of  tutoring  that  hopeful 
candidate  for  the  throne. 

In  far-away  Berlin,  the  Kaiser  may  possibly  have  been 
touched  by  Malietoa's  pathetic  letter, — at  all  events,  he  felt 
that  his  representatives  in  Samoa  had  gone  too  far.  The 
German  Government  quickly  disavowed  any  responsibility 
for  the  events  of  the  past  few  months  and  for  the  con- 
duct of  Consul  Steubel.  Of  the  improper  course  of  Mr. 
Weber  (in  reality  a  private  citizen)  it  fully  disapproved. 
Had  the  Germans  in  Apia  thereupon  promptly  restored  the 
^tatu  quo  of  November,  1884,  and  then  set  about  gaining 
their  desired  reforms  in  a  less  aggressive  manner,  possibly 
the  humbling  of  the  Samoan  Government  and  the  flag-raising 
incident  at  Mulinuu  would  have  blown  over  as  a  harmless 
political  squall;  but  they  were  not  so  disposed.  Dr.  Steubel 
kept  his  flag  waving  defiantly  for  twelve  months,  —  through- 
out the  entire  year  of  1885,  —  during  which  time  the  social 
relations  of  the  three  consuls  and  the  citizens  of  the  three 
powers  residing  at  Apia  were  greatly  strained.  The  Ameri- 
can and  English  residents  generally  gave  their  sympathy  to 
the  much-abused  Malietoa,  and  the  Germans  were  more  and 
more  openly  supporting  Tamasese.  Among  the  natives  mur- 
murings  of  discontent  were  heard  on  all  sides.  Two  parties 
were  formed  —  the  followers  of  Malietoa  and  the  followers  of 
Tamasese.  The  position  of  the  former  at  Mulinuu,  so  near 
the  irrepressible  Weber,  who  "  rested  not,"  became  too  deli- 
cate even  for  the  sensibilities  of  a  barbarian,  and  he  there- 
fore moved  into  Apia  proper,  and  raised  his  flag  in  more 
friendly  surroundings.  The  German  Consul  at  once  pulled 
it  down,  and  then  the  docile  Malietoa  quietly  moved  out  of 
the  foreign  concession  into  one  of  his  own  native  villages, 
and  there  once  more  raised  his  colors.  Protests  of  the  consuls 
became  the  order  of  the  day. 

In  April,  1886,  Admiral  Knorr,  commanding  a  squadron 
of  three  German  vessels,  arrived  in  port  and  opened  negotia- 
tions with  Tamasese,  significantly  ignoring  Malietoa,  whom 


\ 

228  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

he  addressed  simply  as  "  High  Chief."  Mistaking  the  object 
of  the  admiral's  mission,  Malietoa  addressed  to  him  a  letter 
reviewing  at  great  length  the  story  of  his  sorrows.  "  Your 
Excellency,"  he  concluded,  "let  the  righteous  dealing  and 
the  kind  regard  of  the  Government  of  Germany  be  manifest 
toward  our  islands,  so  feeble  and  so  few."  But  the  admiral's 
ear  belonged  to  Dr.  Steubel  and  not  to  Malietoa,  and  it  waa 
to  Tamasese  that  he  fired  a  royal  salute. 

The  luckless  Malietoa,  now  wholly  discouraged  and  believ- 
ing that  the  Germans  seriously  meant  to  crown  liis  rival,, 
directed  another  appeal  to  tlie  American  Consul  foi^  protec- 
tion ;  and  in  reply  to  this  the  sympathetic  Mr.  Greenebaume 
unfurled  the  American  colors  over  Apia,  and  proclaimed  an 
American  protectorate  (May  14,  1886).  An  American  and 
an  English  man-of-war  arrived ;  the  German  flag  was  fly- 
ing at  Mulinuu  over  a  proclamation  setting  forth  that  the 
municipality  of  Apia  was  under  German  control ;  the  Ameri- 
can flag  fluttered  over  Apia  above  a  document  which  warned 
all  passers-by  that  Samoa  was  an  American  possession. 
Tamasese  was  in  open  revolt,  with  G6i:man  encouragement 
behind  him.  Malietoa  was  gathering  about  him  his  clans  on 
the  other  side  of  Apia,  and  the  Americans  and  English  were 
giving  him  consolation  and  selling  him  arms.  The  outlook 
was  threatening. 


The  summary  action  of  Consul  Greenebaume  in  pro- 
claiming a  protectorate  over  Samoa  disturbed  the  State 
Department  at  home.  The  situation  seemed  to  call  for  the 
fulfilment  by  the  United  States  of  its  obligation  under  the 
treaty  of  1878,  to  use  its  good  offices  in  behalf  of  the  Samoan 
Government,  although  that  obligation  could  scarcely  be 
carried  to  the  extent  of  lending  its  flag  to  the  threatened 
ruler.  Instructions  were  accordingly  sent  by  the  United 
States  to  its  representatives  at  London  and  Berlin,  to  annouce 
that  the  protectorate  over  Samoa  set  up  by  Consul  Greene- 
baume was  unauthorized.  Recognizing,  however,  the  serious- 
ness of   the  situation  in  Apia,  and  desiring  to  remove  all 


THE   UNITED   STATES   AND   SAMOA  229 

causes  of  irritation  between  Germany  and  the  United  States, 
Secretary  Bayard  suggested  a  conference  to  the  German 
and  English  ministers  at  Washington.  This  was  made  with 
the  view  of  reaching  some  mutual  understanding  for  the 
reestablishment  of  order  in  Samoa.  The  Secretary  of  State 
cannot  be  said  to  have  gone  too  far  in  thus  seeking  to  relieve 
the  unfortunate  condition  of  affairs  in  Apia.  He  recognized 
the  dangers  of  a  civil  war  in  the  islands  where  American  and 
German  sympathies  were  so  keenly  arrayed  on  different  sides  ; 
and  he  probably  realized  the  difficulty  of  keeping  American 
residents  at  Apia  in  the  straight  and  narrow  path  of  neu- 
trality should  the  threatened  war  break  out.  He  met  with 
a  hearty  response  from  both  England  and  Germany,  both 
of  which  powers  probably  shared  with  him  a  belief  that  their 
unruly  subjects  in  Samoa  were  causing  altogether  too  much 
trouble. 

It  was  therefore  agreed  that  before  any  definite  steps 
should  be  taken,  a  commission,  composed  of  an  agent  from 
each  government,  should  visit  the  islands  for  the  purpose 
of  investigating  and  reporting  upon  their  political  and  social 
conditions ;  thus,  after  more  perfect  knowledge  had  been 
gained  of  the  needs  the  situation  might  call  for,  representa- 
tives of  the  interested  governments  would  meet  and  take 
such  action  as  seemed  necessary.  Mr.  Bates,  American,  Mr. 
Thurston,  English,  and  Mr.  Travers,  German,  visited  Samoa 
in  the  summer  of  1886  as  an  international  commission,  and 
their  reports  were  returned  to  their  respective  governments 
in  the  following  spring. 

News  of  the  action  of  the  three  powers  came  to  Apia 
none  too  soon.  The  tension  was  relieved  by  the  shifting  of 
responsibility  beyond  the  seas.  Preparations  had  to  be 
hastily  made  for  the  arrival  of  the  commissioners ;  the  Ger- 
man flag  came  down,  the  American  flag  was  folded  and  put 
away  for  another  occasion  ;  Tamasese  was  disowned  and  cast 
aside  by  his  German  protectors;  Malietoa  was  urged  into 
an  agreement  to  keep  the  peace,  which  he  was  pledged  to 
follow  unless  actually  attacked  by  the  rebel  Tamasese. 
Finally,    after   much   persuasion,   the    "  Representatives    of 


230  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

Malietoa  and  Ms  Government "  and  the  "  Representatives  of 
Tamasese  and  his  Party  "  were  induced  to  sign  an  agree- 
ment of  perpetual  peace,  to  live  "  in  friendship  and  cordial 
relations."  When  the  commissioners  stepped  ashore  on  the 
beach  at  Apia,  the  temple  of  Janus  was  closed ;  outwardly, 
at  least,  the  consuls  had  resumed  friendly  social  relations. 

The  reports  of  the  three  commissioners  were  somewhat 
tinged  by  the  prejudices  which  infected  the  air  of  Apia,  but 
in  essential  details  they  agreed.  The  unanimous  conclusion 
was  reached  that  the  natives  were  wholly  incapable  of  main- 
taining a  stable  or  efficient  government.  Their  interests,  as 
well  as  tlie  interests  of  foreigners  residing  and  doing  business 
in  Samoa,  would  be  better  served,  they  all  declared,  by  the 
establishment  of  a  form  of  government  in  which  the  three 
powers  might  exercise  8ui>ervi8ion.  Armed  by  these  docu- 
ments, the  Secretary  of  State  and  the  British  and  German 
ministers  at  Washington,  met  in  conference  (June  and  July, 
1887),  to  take  up  the  task  of  "preserving  order  in  Samoa." 

The  United  States  entered  into  these  negotiations  "to 
establish  peace  and  a  better  understanding  "  with  feelings  of 
some  hesitation,  if  not  of  diffidence,  as  if  constrained  into 
committing  a  second  error  in  order  to  mitigate  a  former 
mistake.  The  administration  had  no  desire  to  embarrass 
the  country  by  assuming  responsibility  for  good  government 
in  Samoa.  The  weak  and  helpless  little  nation  had  granted 
the  United  States  a  favor,  and  had  asked  in  return  the  merest 
shadow  of  American  protection;  the  time  had  come  when  the 
rights  and  the  independence  of  this  nation  were  threatened 
with  extinction,  and  the  good  offices  of  the  President  had 
been  invoked.  American  trade  interests  were  not  of  suf- 
ficient importance  to  warrant  a  very  large  share  of  attention 
to  the  social  or  political  affairs  of  Samoa. 

Germany,  whose  paramount  commercial  interests  gave  her 
a  livelier  regard  for  Samoan  affairs,  was  far  more  concerned 
in  the  political  conditions  of  the  islands,  and  she  was,  more- 
over, less  hampered  by  conservative  notions  in  her  foreign 
relations.  It  is  more  than  doubtful  if  she  was  genuinely 
interested  in  the  welfare  of  Samoa.     Her  desire  was  mani- 


THE   UNITED   STATES  AND  SAMOA  231 

festly  to  establish  some  form  of  governmental  machinery  in 
the  islands  that  would  not  operate  adversely  to  her  com- 
mercial interests. 

England  regarded  with  disfavor  Germany's  growing  influ- 
ence in  Polynesia,  and  entered  into  the  negotiations  with  the 
sole  idea  of  protecting  her  own  trade  in  that  part  of  the 
world.  She  may  have  desired  as  well  to  checkmate  some  of 
the  suspected  colonial  schemes  of  the  Kaiser. 

Discussions  at  the  conference  which  followed,  soon  de- 
veloped wide  divergencies  of  opinion.  The  German  Minister 
favored  a  scheme  to  place  the  management  of  Samoan  affairs 
in  the  hands  of  one  foreign  official,  who  should  be  chosen 
by  the  power  having  the  greatest  commercial  interests  in  the 
islands,  and  who  should  be  designated,  "adviser  to  the 
king."  This  would  of  course  establish  German  control; 
but  Herr  von  Alvesleben  contended  that  this  was  only 
proper  in  view  of  the  larger  German  investments  in  the 
group.  The  plan  proposed  by  the  Secretary  of  State  was 
that  of  an  executive  council,  composed  of  the  king,  the  vice- 
king,  and  three  foreigners  —  an  American,  an  English,  and  a 
I  German  subject ;  but  to  this  the  German  objected,  as  being 
no  solution  of  the  difficulty  whatever.  In  this  he  was  un- 
doubtedly correct,  as  subsequent  events  have  fully  demon- 
strated, for  the  trouble,  being  entirely  caused  by  the  rival 
interest  of  three  sets  of  foreigners,  could  in  no  wise  be 
relieved  by  the  addition  of  a  second  official  head  to  each 
[faction.  For  obvious  reasons  the  German  Minister's  plan, 
though  apparently  favored  by  the  English  Minister,  could 
not  be  accepted  by  the  United  States  because  of  its  somewhat 
false  position  of  intermediary.  Mr.  Bayard  declared  that 
the  German  proposition  was  not  in  accord  with  the  principles 
upon  which  they  were  to  proceed,  as  it  amounted  to  the 
reduction  of  Samoa  to  a  German  possession. 

Failing  to  come  to  a  conclusion,  the  conferences  were 
closed  for  the  time  being  (July  26,  1887),  with  the  under- 
standing that  the  political  affairs  of  the  islands  should 
remain  in  statu  quo  until  the  members  of  the  commission 
could  meet  again  after  having  consulted  further  with  their 


232  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

home  governments.  Thus  the  matter  rested,  it  being  believed 
in  Washington  that  the  question  would  be  readily  adjusted 
within  a  few  months,  when  the  commissioners  were  again  to 
meet. 

VI 

News  of  the  adjournment  of  the  conference  without  a  defi- 
nite conclusion  no  sooner  reached  Apia  than  the  old  reign  of 
dissension  began  anew,  and  so  vastly  complicated  became 
the  situation  in  those  turbulent  little  islands,  that  had 
not  the  greater  forces  of  nature  intervened  at  a  most  criti- 
cal moment,  it  is  possible  a  war  between  Germany  and  the 
United  States  might  have  resulted.  For  their  hasty  acts  of 
the  previous  year.  Consuls  Steubel  and  Greenebaume  had 
been  dismissed,  and  were  replaced  by  Herr  Becker  and  Mr. 
Harold  M.  Sewall  respectively.  The  former  entered  upon 
his  duties  as  German  Consul  with  a  determination  to  follow 
to  its  rational  conclusion  the  policy  Steubel  had  inaugurated; 
his  aim  was  to  complete  the  task  that  his  predecessor  had 
been  forced  to  abandon.  This  he  set  about  doing  with  a 
lofty  disregard  for  the  Washington  agreement  just  entered 
into  by  the  representatives  of  the  three  powers.  Malietoa 
had  already  been  marked  as  a  victim  by  Steubel,  on  account 
of  his  supposed  unfriendly  attitude  toward  the  Germans, 
but  circumstances  had  prevented  the  former  consul  from 
perfecting  his  plans  ;  he  was  still  recognized  as  the  lawful 
sovereign  by  England  and  the  United  States,  and  Tamasese 
had  perforce  been  abandoned  by  Steubel  at  a  moment  when 
his  scheming  had  almost  succeeded  in  making  him  king. 

Mr.  Becker  immediately  cast  about  him  to  discover  a  good 
excuse  for  stripping  the  unfortunate  Malietoa  of  the  last 
vestige  of  his  power.  Some  glaring  misdeed,  still  better  an 
atrocity,  was  needed.  It  was  found,  though  a  slender  one. 
About  six  months  before  this  time,  in  a  bar-room  brawl,  some 
German  sailors  had  fallen  into  an  altercation  with  a  few 
natives,  and  a  rough-and-tumble  fracas  ensued,  out  of  which 
all  parties  emerged  with  bruises.  The  natives  who  had 
participated   in   this  "riot"  were   found   guilty  of  assault 


THE   UNITED   STATES   AND   SAMOA  233 

by  the  German  munici^al-4^idg£,  and  although  the  event 
had  takeifpTace-^itHin  the  limits  of  Apia,  and  therefore 
without  the  jurisdiction  of  the  native  king,  Malietoa  was 
held  responsible  for  the  outrage  of  "  trampling  upon  the  Ger- 
man Emperor."  This  event  had  taken  place  previous  to  the 
Washington  conference,  but  at  the  time  it  was  not  seriously 
considered.  It  was  now  suddenly  revived.  Before  the  king 
could  more  than  catch  his  breath  to  reply,  Becker  declared 
war  upon  him  "  by  order  of  His  Majesty,  the  Emperor  of 
Germany."  Like  the  opportune  happenings  of  a  fairy  tale, 
four  German  men-of-war  appeared  in  the  harbor.  In  less 
than  a  month  from  the  closing  of  the  conference  in  Wash- 
ington, war  was  declared  by  Germany  upon  Malietoa,  martial 
law  was  proclaimed  in  Apia,  and  Tamasese  was  heralded  as 
king. 

Mr.  Sewall  and  the  English  Consul  at  once  came  forward 
to  protest :  — 

Whereas  the  Government  of  Germany  has  this  day  pro- 
claimed Tamasese  King  of  Samoa, 

Now,  therefore,  we,  the  undersigned  representatives  of  the 
United  States  of  America  and  Great  Britain,  hereby  give  notice 
that  we  and  our  governments  do  not  and  never  have  recognized 
Tamasese  as  King  of  Samoa,  but  continue  as  heretofore  to  recog- 
nize Malietoa. 

We  advise  all  Samoans  to  submit  quietly  to  what  they  cannot 
help ;  not  to  fight,  whatever  the  provocation,  but  to  await  peace- 
ably the  result  of  the  deliberations  now  in  progress,  which  alone 
can  determine  the  future  of  Samoa. 

The  stroke  having  now  been  given  in  earnest,  the  German 
Consul  determined  to  prosecute  his  campaign  with  the  utmost 
vigor.  In  the  hope  of  winning  recruits  by  means  of  oratory, 
Tamasese  stump  speakers  were  conveyed  on  German  ves- 
sels to  different  islands  to  harangue  the  natives  ;  in  certain 
towns  where  the  orators  were  coldly  received,  the  discourte- 
ous villagers  were  shelled  by  the  gunboats.  Upon  declara- 
tion of  war,  Malietoa  hastily  took  to  the  bush,  and  his 
supporters  began  to  rally  about  him.  Captain  Brandeis 
proceeded  to  fortify  Tamasese's  position  at  Mulinuu.     The 


234  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

chief  Mataafa  with  his  warriors  then  emerged  from  his  soli- 
tude and  went  to  Malietoa's  aid. 

With  such  important  and  exciting  events  in  progress,  it 
could  scarcely  be  expected  that  the  foreigners  in  Apia  should 
remain  calm.  As  Becker  made  no  concealment  of  the  object 
of  his  schemes,  —  to  get  rid  of  Malietoa  and  to  crown 
Tamasese  as  his  own  puppet  king,  —  the  American  and  Eng- 
lish spectators  soon  became  bluntly  outspoken  ;  the  employees 
of  the  German  firm  assumed  a  swaggering  demeanor ;  the 
Americans  and  English  used  insulting  language. 

The  first  object  of  the  German  Admiral,  as  ranking  officer 
among  the  Germans,  was  to  capture  Malietoa.  He  issued  an 
invitation  to  him  to  surrender,  coupled  with  threats  of  ven- 
geance upon  his  people  if  he  declined  the  invitation.  In  Sep- 
tember (1887),  the  thoroughly  cowed  king  answered  the 
siimmons  in  person,  having  first  turned  over  the  care  of  his 
people  to  his  powerful  ally,  Mataafa.  The  entrance  of  the 
sorrowful  Laupepa  into  Apia  as  a  prisoner  of  war  was  a  tear- 
ful event.     In  a  farewell  address  to  his  followers  he  said  :  — 

On  account  of  my  great  love  to  ray  country,  and  my  great 
affection  to  all  Samoa,  this  is  the  reason  that  I  deliver  up  my 
body  to  the  German  Government.  That  Government  may  do  as 
they  wish  with  me.  The  reason  of  this  is  because  I  do  not  desire 
that  the  blood  of  Samoa  shall  be  spilt  for  me  again.  But  I  do 
not  know  what  is  my  offence  which  has  caused  their  anger  to  me 
and  to  my  country.  .  .  .  Taumasanga,  farewell ;  Manono  and 
family,  farewell.  So,  also,  Salafai,  Tutuila,  Ansa,  and  Atua, 
farewell. 

To  Mr.  Sewall,  who  he  believed  should  have  more  vigor- 
ously exerted  the  "  good  offices "  heretofore  mentioned,  he 
wrote  :  — 

When  the  chief  Tamasese  and  others  first  moved  the  present 
troubles,  it  was  my  wish  to  punish  them  and  put  an  end  to  the 
rebellion,  but  I  yielded  to  the  advice  of  the  British  and  American 
consuls.  Assistance  and  protection  was  repeatedly  promised  to 
me  and  my  government  if  I  abstained  from  bringing  war  upon 
my  country.  Relying  upon  these  promises,  I  did  not  put  down 
the  rebellion.     Now  I  fiud  that  war  has  been  made  upon  me  by 


THE   UNITED   STATES  AND    SAMOA 


^ 


the  Emperor  of  Germany,  and  Tamasese  has  been  proclaimed  King 
of  Samoa.  I  desire  to  remind  you  of  the  promise  so  frequently 
made  by  your  government,  and  trust  that  you  will  so  far  redeem 
them  as  to  cause  the  lives  and  liberties  of  my  chiefs  and  people 
to  be  respected. 

As  a  hero,  then,  amid  the  lamentations  of  his  people,  Malie- 
toa  Laupepa  was  deported  in  exile  to  distant  lands.  For 
several  years  he  disappears  from  view. 

These  events  occurring  in  the  face  of  the  agreement  to 
leave  Samoa  matters  in  statu  quo  were  not  overlooked  at 
Washington.  The  action  of  the  Germans  was  clearly  in  con- 
tempt of  this  mutual  understanding.  There  is  a  positive- 
ness  in  German  manners,  which,  although  not  intended  to 
give  offence,  is  sometimes  as  irritating  as  an  unfriendly  act. 
The  Secretary  of  State  was  annoyed  by  the  dash  Mr.  Becker 
had  taken  into  forbidden  fields,  but  he  felt  more  offended  by 
the  arrogance  of  his  authority.  In  the  ensuing  correspond- 
ence, Bismarck  persistently  laid  the  blame  upon  the  American 
consuls,  one  and  all,  whose  conduct  in  Apia,  he  declared,  had 
always  been  hostile  to  German  interests.  Secretary  Bayard 
could  only  reply  that  it  was  the  German  and  not  the  Ameri- 
can consuls  who  had  brought  about  Samoa's  troubles. 

With  Malietoa  out  of  the  way,  the  main  obstacle  to  the 
success  of  Becker's  plans  was  removed.  Mataafa,  however, 
was  arming ;  but  Tamasese  was  already  armed,  the  alert 
Brandeis  having  looked  to  that.  The  next  step  was  to 
silence  the  American  and  English  consuls  who  were  openly 
hostile  to  his  schemes.  It  will  be  remembered  that  the  port 
of  Apia  and  a  narrow  strip  of  land  on  either  side  were  neu- 
tral territory  over  which  the  three  powers  exercised  the  right 
of  extraterritoriality.  The  municipality  was  governed  by  a 
tripartite  arrangement,  the  citizens  of  the  three  powers  pre- 
sumably sharing  about  equally  the  control  of  urban  affairs, 
and  enjoying  in  equal  proportion  the  spoils  of  office.  The 
judge  of  the  municipal  court  at  this  time  was  a  German  sub- 
ject whose  term  had  some  time  since  elapsed,  and  who  should 
have  been  succeeded  by  an  American,  according  to  the  stipu- 
lated system  of  rotation  in  office.     An  Anglo-Saxon  judge  was 


236  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

not  what  the  Germans  in  Apia  wanted  at  that  particular  junc- 
ture, so  Mr.  Becker  began  a  process  of  elbowing  out  the 
foreigners  from  the  councils  of  the  municipality.  To  ac- 
complish this  task  satisfactorily  required  some  very  skilful 
manoeuvring,  but  Mr.  Becker  was  fully  equal  to  the  occa- 
sion. For  some  weeks,  with  various  excuses,  he  absented 
himself  from  the  regular  consular  meetings,  thus  preventing 
the  necessary  quorum  for  the  consideration  of  municipal 
affairs.  Finally  appearing  at  an  appointed  meeting,  he  took 
advantage  of  the  fact  that  the  American  Consul,  Mr.  Sewall, 
was  not  present,  although  it  is  believed  he  knew  that  the 
belated  official  was  hastening  to  the  meeting.  He  quickly 
left  for  his  home  to  write  a  letter  to  Mr.  Sewall,  in  which  he 
said  that  he  regretted  to  be  obliged  to  consider  the  municipal 
government  to  be  in  abeyance,  "since  you  have  refused  to 
take  part  in  the  meeting."  By  resort  to  such  a  doubtful 
method,  he  succeeded  in  abrogating  the  neutrality  of  Apia, 
while  he  instantly  became  deaf  to  all  the  protests  and  de- 
nunciations showered  upon  him  by  the  indignant  Americans. 
He  duly  announced  that  Apia  was  Samoan  territory,  over 
which  Tamasese  ruled. 

The  German  flag  still  flying  at  Mulinuu  no  longer  tres- 
passed therefore  upon  neutral  territory ;  tlie  king  himself 
resided  in  a  German  house  on  German  land ;  the  king 
governed  Apia,  and  the  Germans  controlled  the  king.  To 
cap  the  climax,  Tamasese  appointed  a  German  judge  to  pre- 
side over  the  courts  of  Apia.  Captain  Brandeis  was  made 
Prime  Minister,  and  Mr.  Weber,  of  the  German  firm,  was 
the  power  behind  the  throne.  At  last  German  persistence 
was  crowned  with  full  and  complete  success. 

The  Tamasese- Brandeis  Government  continued  in  active 
operation  from  the  latter  part  of  1887  until  September  1888, 
when  its  career  drew  to  a  sanguinary  close.  After  the  excite- 
ments of  revolution  were  well  over,  and  the  ruffled  tempers 
of  the  foreigners  in  Apia  had  had  time  to  subside,  it 
was  found  that  the  new  government  was  not  a  wholly 
bad  one  after  all.  Brandeis  appears  to  have  been  a  man  of 
considerable    ability  and,   for  a    professional    instigator   of 


THE  UNITED   STATES   AND   SAMOA  237 

revolution,  one  possessing  a  fair  sense  of  justice.  It  seems 
to  have  been  his  aim  to  administer  his  government  with 
strict  impartiality  toward  the  business  interests  of  the 
several  nationalities.  Roads  were  built;  taxes,  though  some- 
what excessive,  were  well  applied,  and  many  needed  reforms 
were  instigated.  Indeed,  many  of  the  foreigners  in  Apia 
who  had  bitterly  opposed  the  change  gradually  became  recon- 
ciled to  the  new  conditions.  But  the  fault  of  the  Tamasese- 
Brandeis  Government  lay  in  its  origin.  In  the  nature  of 
things  it  could  not  last.  The  seizure  and  deportation  of 
Malietoa  never  ceased  to  rankle  in  native  breasts,  and  back 
in  the  forests  plots  were  continually  hatching  against  Tam- 
asese  and  German  rule.  No  government,  in  fact,  that  strictly 
enforced  its  decrees  could  long  remain  popular  with  the 
easy-going  Samoans.  From  day  to  day  dissatisfied  natives 
drifted  into  Mataafa's  camp,  for  Mataafa  had  Malietoa  blood 
in  his  veins,  and  stood  for  the  vindication  of  his  exiled 
kinsman. 

The  ambitious  Tamasese,  within  the  limits  of  his  circum- 
scribed powers,  like  the  beggar  on  horseback,  rode  too  hard. 
He  liad  gained  honors,  and  he  craved  distinction.  He  began 
assuming  honorific  titles,  finally  dubbing  himself  with  the 
highest  of  them  all,  the  sacred  name  of  "  Malietoa."  The 
allegiance  of  many  of  Tamasese's  own  best  supporters  was  at 
best  none  too  sure,  and  a  host  of  these  became  indignant 
with  their  monarch  for  this  unholy  folly.  The  clansmen  of 
Malietoa,  who  regarded  Tamasese  as  a  mere  usurper,  shielded 
by  German  forces,  felt  their  tenderest  sentiments  outraged. 
The  one  consistent  and  uncompromising  enemy  to  the  new 
regime  in  Apia  was  the  American  Consul,  Mr.  Sewall.  The 
Tamasese-Brandeis  Government  had  been  conceived  in  a  spirit 
of  unfriendliness  to  his  country,  and  had  been  planned  and 
executed  by  the  Germans  in  disregard  of  their  obligations. 
In  fact,  it  was  being  maintained  in  defiance  of  his  own 
protests,  and  the  complaints  of  his  Secretary  of  State.  He 
felt  himself  to  have  been  hoodwinked  in  the  abrogation  of 
the  neutrality  of  Apia,  and  he  could  not  forgive  Becker  for 
his  duplicity. 


^  OF   THE         /^ 

UMIX/CDOIT 


238  AMERICAN  DIPLOALA.TIC  QUESTIONS 

In  August,  1888,  Mataafa  suddenly  became  aggressive  and 
made  an  attack,  though  unsuccessful,  upon  Tamasese  at 
Mulinuu,  and  then  retired  to  marshal  his  strength  for  another 
assault.  Instantly  all  the  suppressed  antipathies  of  the  two 
parties  in  the  islands  rekindled,  —  the  Tamaseses  rallied 
about  the  king  at  Mulinuu  ;  Brandeis  dug  trenches  in  active 
preparation  to  meet  the  coming  assaults.  From  neighboring 
islands  the  sympathizers  of  Mataafa  came  in  their  canoes  to 
share  in  the  threatened  conflict.  In  Apia  the  price  of  arms 
and  ammunition  reached  a  fabulous  figure,  and  could  only 
then  be  bought  by  the  natives  upon  a  declaration  showing  on 
which  side  they  were  to  be  used. 

To  strike  terror  into  the  hearts  of  the  "  rebels,''  the  Ger- 
man warship  Adler  proceeded  to  bombard  native  villages 
along  the  coast  that  were  known  to  favor  Mtitaafa.  It  was 
then  that  Commander  Leary  of  the  U.  S.  S.  Adams  addressed 
a  letter  to  the  German  captain  which  was  calculated  to  remove 
all  doubt  as  to  which  side  in  the  coming  contest  he  and  the 
American  citizens  in  Apia  had  given  their  sympathies.  He 
said:  "The  revolutionists  had  an  armed  force  in  the  field, 
within  a  few  miles  of  this  harbor,  when  the  vessels  under  your 
command  transported  the  Tamasese  troops  to  a  neighboring 
island  with  the  avowed  intention  of  making  war  on  the  isolated 
homes  of  the  women  and  children  of  the  enemy.  Being  the 
only  other  representative  of  a  navfil  power  now  present  in 
this  harbor,  for  the  sake  of  humanity,  I  hereby  respectfully 
and  solemnly  protest  in  the  name  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  and  of  the  civilized  world  in  general,  against  the 
use  of  a  national  war  vessel  for  services  as  were  yesterday 
rendered  by  the  German  corvette  Adler.''  This  well-directed 
protest  was  followed  by  a  series  of  thrusts  on  the  part  of  Com- 
mander Leary  that  stung  the  German  Captain's  temper.  The 
best  of  jokes  may  be  pushed  too  far,  and  in  this  respect  Com- 
mander Leary  probably  transgressed.  His  final  offence,  by  in- 
viting through  inference  or  implication,  the  commander  of  the 
Adler  to  meet  him  in  combat,  in  no  way  relieved  the  tension. 
Upon  this  particular  occasion  the  German  man-of-war  had 
taken  position  to   bombard    a   native   village,   and    Leary 


THE   UNITED   STATES  AND   SAMOA  239 

steamed  in  between  him  and  the  shore,  announcing  that  if 
the  German  commander  intended  to  carry  out  his  purpose  he 
would  be  obliged  to  fire  through  the  Adams. 

In  September,  1888,  Mataafa,  having  been  crowned  king 
by  his  own  supporters,  led  another  attack  upon  the  gov- 
ernment forces  under  Tamasese  and  Brandeis  which  were 
intrenched  upon  either  side  of  Apia.  The  battle  of  Ma- 
tautu  (September  12)  raged  all  day  and  well  into  the  night, 
and  was  perhaps  the  greatest  battle  ever  fought  upon  the 
islands.  The  amount  of  ammunition  expended  is  said  to 
have  been  something  quite  extraordinary,  and  "the  noise 
deafening "  ;  when  the  smoke  cleared  away  the  government 
forces  were  found  to  have  been  driven  back  into  their 
stronghold  of  Mulinuu.  Only  about  forty  dead  were  left 
upon  the  field,  no  doubt  a  humiliating  disappointment  to 
both  sides. 

With  American  and  English  sympathy  avowedly  in  favor 
of  Mataafa  and  hostile  to  the  Germans,  social  relations  in 
Apia  were  rapidly  reaching  an  uncomfortable  stage.  Those 
ordinary  amenities  that  render  endurable  the  association 
of  men  of  opposing  interests  were  cast  aside.  Opportunities 
came  daily  for  the  commission  of  unfriendly  acts  which  served 
to  inflame  further  the  growing  enmity  of  Germans  and  Ameri- 
cans. For  example  ;  one  Scanlon,  an  American  half-cast, 
owned  a  house  near  Mulinuu  which  was  raided  by  Tamasese 
men,  more  for  the  purpose  of  adding  Scanlon's  pigs  to  their 
rations  than  on  account  of  any  especial  ill-feeling  toward 
Scanlon  himself.  The  matter  came  before  Commander 
Leary,  who  welcomed  an  incident  that  furnished  another  ex- 
cuse for  an  adventure.  With  military  pomp  and  a  show  of 
force  he  occupied  the  Scanlon  house  and  declared  his  inten- 
tion of  shelling  Tamasese  across  the  way.  The  Germans 
were  greatly  outraged  by  this  "meddling"  in  Samoan  affairs, 
but  they  nevertheless  advised  the  king  to  shift  his  quarters. 
It  was  thus  by  American  threats  that  Tamasese  and  his 
warriors  were  obliged  to  abandon  their  fortified  position  at 
Mulinuu  and  take  to  the  bush.  Then  it  may  be  said  the 
point  of  war  was  almost  reached  between  the  supporters  of 


240  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

the  two  native  factions,  —  the  Germans  and  Americans  in 
Apia.  So  critical  indeed  had  the  situation  become,  that  the 
various  consulates  were  converted  into  veritable  fortresses 
for  the  refuge  of  their  citizens. 

After  a  series  of  inconclusive  skirmishes  between  the 
forces  of  Mataafa  and  Tamasese,  Dr.  Knappe,  the  German 
Consul  (Becker  had  been  recalled),  decided  upon  a  final 
stroke,  —  to  disarm  and  probably  capture  Mataafa.  In  the 
small  hours  of  the  morning  of  December  18,  1888,  a  force  of 
150  marines  was  silently  landed  from  the  German  war  ves- 
sel and  was  proceeding  inland  when  suddenly  the  woods 
became  alive  with  Mataafa  warriors.  The  squad  of  blue- 
jackets only  retired  after  a  desperate  struggle,  leaving  50 
dead  and  wounded  in  the  jungle.  The  following  telegram 
reached  Washington  soon  after  :  — 

Three  war  ships  undertaken  to  disarm  Mataafa.  Landed  at 
night  force  to  prevent  retreat.  Mataafa's  men  tired  on  and  forced 
to  fight.  Germans  routed.  Twenty  killed,  thirty  wounded. 
Germans  swear  vengeance.  Shelling  and  burning  indiscrimi- 
nately regardless  of  American  property.  Protest  unheeded.  Na- 
tives exasperated.  Foreigners'  lives  and  property  in  greatest 
danger.  Germans  respect  no  neutral  territory.  Americans  in 
boats  flying.  American  flag  seized  in  Apia  harbor  by  armed 
German  boats,  but  released.  Admiral  with  squadron  necessary 
immediately. 

The  Mataafans  were  jubilant.  They  had  made  a  great 
and  valuable  discovery,  as  had  the  Caribs  of  Porto  Rico 
when  they  held  a  Spaniard  under  water  to  discover  whether 
or  not  white  men  bore  a  charmed  life. 

If  the  relations  between  the  Anglo-Saxons  and  Teutons  in 
Apia  had  been  bad  before,  they  now  became  worse.  Herr 
Knappe  accused  the  American  and  English  consuls  of  compli- 
city in  the  massacre  of  German  soldiers,  and  a  volume  of  native 
testimony  was  adduced  to  prove  the  charge.  Whatever  might 
be  the  value  of  a  native  oath,  it  is  certain  that  the  English 
Consul,  Mr.  de  Coetlogon,  did  not  give  a  signal  to  the 
natives  at  the  time  of  the  landing  of  marines  from  the  Adler, 


THE   UNITED   STATES   AND   SAMOA  241 

and  it  is  equally  certain  that  the  American  Vice-Consul, 
Mr.  Blacklock,  did  not  set  a  trap  for  the  luckless  German 
blue-jackets.  The  infuriated  Knappe,  goaded  to  desperation 
by  the  miscarriage  of  his  plans,  determined  upon  immediate 
revenge,  and  he  prepared  for  an  active  campaign  against 
Mataafa.  He  began  by  proclaiming  martial  law  over  Apia, 
including  Americans  and  English  under  its  operation. 
They  declined  to  heed  the  proclamation.  Such  were  the 
social  conditions  in  Apia  at  this  trying  period,  that  when 
the  British  Consul  protested  against  German  martial  law 
over  his  subjects.  Dr.  Knappe  replied:  "I  have  had  the 
honor  of  receiving  your  Excellency's  agreeable  communica- 
tion of  to-day.  Since,  on  the  ground  of  received  instructions, 
martial  law  has  been  declared  in  Samoa,  British  subjects,  as 
well  as  others,  fall  under  its  application.  I  warn  you,  there- 
fore, to  abstain  from  such  a  proclamation  as  you  announce  in 
your  letter.  It  will  be  such  a  piece  of  business  as  shall  make 
yourself  answerable  under  martial  law.  Besides,  your  proc- 
lamation will  be  disregarded." 

Accounts  of  the  desperate  condition  of  affairs  in  Apia 
needed  none  of  the  usual  colorings  of  sensational  journalism 
to  excite  the  people  of  the  United  States.  In  its  plain,  un- 
varnished recital  it  was  sufficient  to  create  alarm;  Germany 
had  broken  her  pledge;  the  American  flag  had  practically  been 
fired  upon.  War  with  Germany  was  seriously  discussed. 
The  truth  of  the  war  rumors  which  spread  over  the  country 
was  apparently  corroborated,  both  by  the  firm  attitude  of 
the  government  at  Washington,  and  by  the  immediate  reen- 
forcement  of  the  American  fleet  in  Samoa. 

In  answer  to  Vice-Consul  Blacklock's  stirring  cable. 
Admiral  Kimberly  was  hurriedly  sent  to  Apia.  He  ar- 
rived on  the  U.  S.  S.  Trenton,  in  March  (1889),  and  found 
a  formidable  array  of  warships  anchored  in  the  harbor, 
all  cleared  for  action  and  awaiting  developments.  Upon 
this  bellicose  scene,  a  bolt,  as  from  heaven,  fell.  The 
imagination  could  supply  no  more  dramatic  sequel  to  this 
gathering  of  warships.  A  hurricane  (March  16)  destroyed 
all  the  vessels  in  the  harbor  save  one,  the  Calliope  (English), 


242  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

which,  after  a  memorable  battle  against  the  elements,  suc- 
ceeded in  safely  steaming  out  to  sea.  In  the  common  dis- 
aster, all  belligerents  forgot  their  quarrels  and  animosities  ; 
Mataafans  hastened  to  the  relief  of  German  sailors,  and 
Tamaseses  heroically  rescued  Americans.  The  power  of 
Germany  and  of  the  United  States  in  Samoa  was  thus  sud- 
denly and  utterly  broken.  The  great  storm  cleansed  and 
sweetened  the  torrid  air  of  Apia.  Seemingly,  providence, 
according  to  its  own  methods,  had  undertaken  to  cure  the 
Samoan  distemper.  Before  this  terrible  catastrophe  had 
arrived,  however,  the  Samoan  imbroglio  had  again  fallen 
into  the  hands  of  the  three  powers  for  adjustment. 

VII 

It  is  pleasing  to  note  a  prevailing  calmness  of  tone  in  the 
official  correspondence  between  Washington  and  Berlin  dur- 
ing this  period  (1887-89),  relative  to  Samoa.  It  contrasts 
strongly  with  the  feverish  and  hysterical  temper  of  the  com- 
munications between  the  consuls  in  Apia,  and  in  letters  to 
their  home  governments.  Mr.  Bayard  and  Mr.  Blaine  on 
the  one  hand,  and  Prince  Bismarck  on  the  other,  were  con- 
tinually prodded  by  communications  from  Apia  sounding 
many  alarms  and  craving  sanction  for  many  deeds  of  doubt- 
ful propriety.  The  communications  passing  between  these 
premiers  indicate,  almost  without  exceptiou,  a  desire  for 
moderation.  Each  hopes  that  the  impetuosity  of  his  excited 
officials  in  Samoa  tnay  be  pardoned,  in  order  that  the  ques- 
tions at  issue  may  amicably  be  settled.  Between  the  lines 
of  these  formal  despatches  a  trace  of  weariness  may  often 
be  detected,  which  might  render  a  fairly  correct  reading, 
despite  the  actual  words  used,  to  be,  '*  They  are  at  it  again  ; 
will  they  never  stop  ?  Your  men  have  done  wrong  ;  control 
them  better,  and  I  shall  try  to  control  mine  ; "  and  finally, 
"  It  is  of  no  use  ;  we  must  ourselves  settle  their  difficulties, 
and  over  their  heads,  —  let  us  meet  for  the  purpose." 

In  October,  1887,  Mr.  Bayard  cabled  to  Berlin  that  the 
state  of  affairs  in  Samoa  "  is  very  distressing,  and  can  only 


THE   UNITED   STATES   AND   SAMOA  243 

be  made  worse  by  a  continuation  of  the  war "  ;  that  Mr. 
Sewall  has  been  instructed  to  "  preserve  a  strict  neutrality  "  ; 
and  suggests  the  "  advisability  of  the  immediate  election  of 
a  king  and  a  vice-king,  as  agreed  to  in  the  conference."  The 
reply  that  "  all  the  important  chiefs  who  had  assembled  had 
formally  recognized  Tamasese  as  king,"  indicates  a  miscon- 
ception in  Berlin  of  the  true  situation  in  Samoa.  "The 
conduct  of  Malietoa,"  said  Bismarck,  "  had  become  unbear- 
able, maltreating  the  Germans,  and  finally  permitting  out- 
rages upon  those  who  were  properly  celebrating  the  birthday 
of  the  emperor  [the  prince  referred  to  the  bar-room  brawl 
before  mentioned]  ;  that  the  German  Government  had  deter- 
mined to  deal  with  him  personally."  On  January  17,  1888, 
Mr.  Bayard  forwarded  to  the  United  States  Minister  in 
Berlin  a  long  communication,  reviewing  in  detail  the  events 
in  Samoa  following  the  adjournment  of  the  commission,  and 
complaining  of  the  course  of  the  German  representative  in 
Apia.  This  unwarranted  course  consisted  in  forcibly  creat- 
ing Tamasese  king,  in  abrogating  the  neutrality  of  the  port, 
and  in  ignoring  the  protests  of  the  American  Consul  —  all 
alleged  to  be  in  derogation  of  the  understanding  of  the  three 
powers  to  leave  the  situation  in  statu  quo  until  a  final 
settlement.     Mr.  Bayard  continued  :  — 

The  conclusion  at  which  I  am  forced  to  arrive  from  the  review 
of  recent  events  in  Samoa  is  that  the  present  unfortunate  situation 
there  is  due  not  to  any  action  on  the  part  of  the  representative 
of  the  United  States,  but  to  the  fomentation  by  interested  for- 
eigners of  native  dissensions,  and  to  the  desire  exhibited  in  a 
marked  degree  by  those  in  charge  of  local  German  interests  to  ob- 
tain personal  and  commercial  advantages  and  political  supremacy. 

Closing  the  despatch,  he  said  :  — 

Owing,  doubtless,  to  her  commercial  preponderance  in  the 
islands,  to  Germany  the  primary  object  has  seemed  to  be  the 
establishment  of  a  stronger  government.  To  the  United  States, 
the  object  first  in  importance  has  seemed  to  be  the  preservation 
of  native  independence  and  autonomy.  And  so  regarding  the 
matter,  this  Government,  while  not  questioning  Germany's  assur- 


244  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

ances  of  the  absence  of  any  intention  on  her  part  to  annex  or 
establish  a  protectorate  over  the  islands,  has  been  compelled  to 
dissent  from  propositions  which  seemed  to  subordinate  all  other 
considerations  to  the  strengthening  of  the  German  commercial 
and  landed  interests  in  the  islands,  and  correspondingly  to 
diminish,  if  not  entirely  to  destroy,  the  probability  of  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  Samoan  Government,  and  of  the  neutralization  of 
the  group,  at  least  in  respect  to  the  powers  now  immediately 
concerned. 


During  the  peaceful  continuance  of  the  Tamasese  Govern- 
ment, until  the  autumn  of  1888,  but  few  despatches  of  real 
importance  concerning  Samoan  matters  passed  between  the 
powers.  Both  England  and  the  United  States  felt  dissatis- 
fied with  the  situation  ;  and  while  resenting  the  action  of 
Germany  in  overturning  the  native  government  and  setting 
up  a  king  of  their  own  choosing,  they  appeared  to  be  adverse 
to  fuTther  interference,  so  long  as  affairs  in  the  islands  moved 
along  smoothly,  and  the  new  government  gave  reasonable 
satisfaction  to  all  parties.  In  the  autumn  of  1888,  however, 
when  Mataafa  entered  upon  the  scene  in  open  rebellion 
against  Tamasese  and  the  German  regime,  the  questions  of 
neutrality  and  of  German  aggression  were  reopened.  Mr. 
Bayard  wrote  to  Berlin,  November  21,  1888,  that  as  often 
stated  theretofore,  "the  desire  of  this  Government  is  to  see 
a  lawful  and  orderly  condition  of  affairs  established  in  Samoa, 
under  a  government  freely  chosen  by  the  Samoan  people. 
As  to  what  chief  may  be  at  the  head  of  that  government,  it 
is  to  this  government  a  matter  of  indifference.  ...  If  any 
cause  of  complaint  should  arise  out  of  differences  between 
the  consuls  at  Apia,  the  matter  should  be  taken  up  by  their 
respective  governments,  and  settled  at  once  directly  between 
them  and  not  be  left  to  be  the  subject  of  contention  in 
Samoa." 

As  the  revolution  progressed,  and  the  situation  in  Apia 
became  more  acute,  the  communications  between  the  powers 
took  on  a  slight  degree  of  petulance.  Count  Arco-Valley, 
the  German  Minister  in  Washington,  reported  to  the  State 
Department,  January  10,  1889,  that :  — 


THE   UNITED   STATES   AND   SAMOA  245 

The  German  forces  were  landed  after  the  German  commander 
had  given  notice  of  his  intention  to  the  commanders  of  the  Ameri- 
can and  British  men-of-war,  the  reason  for  landing  being  that  some 
German  plantations  were  in  danger. 

Upon  so  landing,  the  Germans  were  attacked  by  the  Samoans 
under  the  command  of  Klein  [a  newspaper  correspondent],  an 
American  citizen,  and  lost  fifty  men  killed  and  wounded.  A 
state  of  war  with  Samoa  is  therefore  announced  by  Germany,  and 
as  an  American  is  alleged  to  have  been  in  command  of  the  attack- 
ing Samoan  force.  Count  Arco  is  instructed  to  make  complaint  to 
the  United  States. 

Count  Arco  is  also  ordered  at  the  same  time  by  his  government 
to  say  that  the  treaty  rights  of  the  United  States  shall  be 
respected  under  all  circumstances,  and  all  the  rights  of  the  treaty 
powers. 

The  German  Government  also  begs  the  United  States  to  join 
them  in  an  active  way  to  restore  calm  and  quiet  in  the  island  — 
equally  for  the  three  treaty  powers. 

Mr.  Bayard  disclaimed  any  responsibility  for  Klein,  and 
called  Count  Arco-Valley's  attention  to  the  agreement  of  the 
three  powers  in  1887  to  leave  to  the  Samoans  the  free  election 
of  a  king  according  to  their  own  will  and  custom.  He  added 
(January  12,  1889):  — 

It  would  seem  most  opportune  if  such  an  election  could  now 
practically  be  held,  and  I  feel  assured  that  it  would  do  much 
towards  ending  the  turbulent  and  bitter  discontent  which  has  led 
to  the  shocking  internecine  warfare  among  these  islanders,  and 
finally  involved  them  in  a  deeply  regrettable  conflict  with  German 
forces,  which  is  sincerely  deplored  by  the  United  States. 

Prince  Bismarck  was  less  complaisant.  On  January  13, 
(1889),  he  wrote,  in  reference  to  the  midnight  raid  of  the 
German  blue-jackets:  — 

.  .  .  This  unprovoked  attack  is  said  to  have  taken  place 
under  the  leadership  of  an  American  named  Klein.  On  this 
occasion  more  than  fifty  German  soldiers  and  officers  were  killed 
and  wounded. 

In  consequence  of  this  we  have  been  transplanted  from  the  ter- 
ritory of  mediatorial  negotiations,  by  which  the  imperial  consul  in 


246  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

Apia  was  trying  to  reconcile  the  contending  parties,  and  for 
which  he  had  sought  the  cooperation  of  his  English  and 
American  colleagues,  into  a  state  of  war  with  the  assailants,  to 
our  regret. 

We  shall  carry  on  the  contest  which  has  been  forced  upon  us 
by  Mataafa  and  his  followers,  with  the  utmost  consideration  for 
English  and  American  interests.  Our  military  measures  have 
in  view  only  the  punishment  of  the  murderers  of  German 
soldiers  and  the  protection  of  our  countrymen  and  their  property. 
As  they,  on  their  part,  are  at  war  with  Tamasese,  our  interference 
will  necessarily  assume  the  character  of  assistance  to  Tama- 
sese. .  .  . 

The  words  "  unprovoked  attack  "  and  the  "  murder  *'  of 
German  soldiers,  are  especially  interesting,  in  the  light  of  the 
fact  that  the  armed  marines  were  admittedly  landed  with 
hostile  intent.  It  seems  almost  unworthy  of  the  man  of  blood 
and  iron  to  refer  to  the  defeat  of  his  troops  in  legitimate 
warfare  as  a  "murderous  crime."  What  if,  in  the  darkness 
of  that  night,  those  same  marines  had  succeeded  in  surpris- 
ing their  enemy,  and  had  fallen  upon  the  guard  of  Mataafa  ? 
Would  it  have  been  a  "murderous  crime"  or  merely  a 
"  regrettable  incident "  ? 

Count  Arco-Valley  complained  that  the  task  of  settling 
these  difficulties  by  amicable  arrangement  "has  been  ren- 
dered difficult  by  the  fact  that  the  officer  in  charge  of  the 
American  consulate  and  the  commander  of  the  American 
war  vessel  [Leary]  have,  during  the  present  revolution  on  the 
Samoan  Islands,  openly  taken  part  against  Chief  Tamasese, 
who  is  recognized  by  the  imperial  government,  and  have  sup- 
ported Mataafa."  In  this  the  count  may  not  have  been  so 
very  far  from  the  truth,  and  Mr.  Bayard  in  his  reply  was  also 
substantially  correct  in  saying  that  "  neither  of  these  officers 
has  assumed  on  behalf  of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States,  to  recognize  Chief  Mataafa,  or  to  do  any  act  contrary  to 
the  rival  claims  of  Chief  Tamasese,  other  than  to  take  neces- 
sary steps  to  protect  Americans  and  their  interest  in  those 
islands."  In  the  same  communication  (January  18,  1889) 
he  sounded) the  key-note  of  the  American  policy  in  Samoa  as 
follows :  — 


THE   UNITED    STATES   AND   SAMOA  247 

Deep  as  is  the  regret  felt  by  this  Government  for  the  lament- 
able conflicts  which  have  lately  taken  place  between  Germans  and 
the  adherents  of  one  of  the  native  factions  in  Samoa,  and  however 
sincere  our  hope  that  the  unfortunate  occurrence  may  be  satisfac- 
torily settled,  this  Government  continues  to  feel  it  to  be  its  duty 
to  maintain  its  attitude  of  consistent  neutrality,  and  not  abandon 
the  belief  professed  and  acted  upon  for  three  years  or  more,  that 
the  best  assurance  of  peace  and  guaranty  for  the  equal  protection 
of  the  rights  of  the  three  treaty  powers  in  Samoa  will  be  found 
in  permitting  and  assisting  the  natives  freely  to  choose  their  own 
king,  who  should  be  recognized  by  the  three  powers  and  assisted 
by  them  in  the  administration  of  good  government. 

In  closing  the  letter,  he  urged  that :  — 

The  objection  to  Tamasese  is  wholly  on  the  part  of  the  pre- 
ponderating number  of  his  own  countrymen  who  deny  that  he  was 
ever  chosen  by  popular  will,  or  that  he  is  acceptable  to  them  ;  to 
insist,  therefore,  upon  his  rule  is  to  substitute  the  will  of  foreign- 
ers for  the  Samoan  native  government  for  which  the  majority 
have  manifested  their  strong  desire  and  which  the  treaty  powers 
had  certainly  agreed  to  respect. 

When  news  of  Dr.  Knappe's  proclamation  of  martial  law 
reached  Washington  and  Berlin,  Secretary  Bayard  protested 
vigorously,  and  Bismarck  realized  that  his  energetic  officer 
in  Apia  was  over  zealous.  On  February  1  he  addressed 
the  State  Department:  — 

When  the  state  of  war  was  declared  against  Mataafa  the 
commander  of  the  German  squadron  issued  a  proclamation  by 
which  the  foreigners  established  in  Samoa  were  subjected  to  mar- 
tial law.  International  law  would,  to  a  certain  extent,  not  pre- 
vent such  a  measure,  but  as  Prince  Bismarck  is  of  the  opinion  that 
our  military  authority  has  gone  too  far  in  this  instance,  the  mili- 
tary commander  has  received  telegraphic  orders  to  withdraw  the 
part  of  his  proclamation  concerning  foreigners. 

In  negotiation  with  Mataafa  our  consul  at  Samoa  has  asked 
that  the  administration  of  the  islands  of  Samoa  might  be  tempo- 
rarily handed  over  to  him,  which  demand  not  being  in  conformity 
to  our  previous  promises  regarding  the  neutrality  and  indepen- 
dence of  Samoa,  Mr.  Knappe  has  been  ordered  by  telegram  to 
withdraw  immediately  his  demand. 


248  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

This  seemed  indeed  to  be  a  very  large  concession  from 
Prince  Bismarck;  clearly  he  was  not  in  accord  with  Dr. 
Knappe's  scheme  to  gain  political  control  of  the  group,  or, 
if  so,  he  disapproved  of  the  consul's  methods.  Becker  and 
Knappe  had  played  a  high-handed  game  in  Samoa,  and  had 
lost,  and  Bismarck  seems  to  have  become  weary  of  the  sham 
that  was  being  conducted  in  the  name  of  Germany.  On 
February  4,  he  instructed  the  minister  in  Washington  to 
represent  to  the  Secretary  of  State  that :  — 

The  present  situation  in  Samoa  regarding  the  interests  of  the 
three  treaty  powers  renders  it  necessary  to  renew  the  attempt  to 
bring  the  future  of  those  islands  to  an  understanding. 

The  position  of  the  three  treaty  powers  in  the  civiHzed  world 
makes  it  their  duty  to  stop  the  bloody  combat  accompanied  by 
barbarous  customs  of  those  not  numerous  tribes,  for  whose  wel- 
fare, according  to  the  judgment  of  the  civilized  world,  it  is  a  duty 
of  the  treaty  powers  to  provide. 

Prince  Bismarck,  in  consequence,  considers  it  a  duty  of  the  par- 
ticipating governments  to  put  an  end,  by  the  agreement  of  the 
treaty  powers,  to  the  troubles  which  have  originated  in  Samoa, 
and  by  restitution  of  peace  among  the  Sanioans  themselves,  and 
so  make  an  end  of  future  bloodshed  and  the  horrors  of  a  civil  war 
conducted  with  barbarous  cruelty  among  the  natives. 

The  best  remedy  seems  to  be  a  resumption  of  the  consultation 
which  took  place  between  the  representatives  of  Germany,  Eng- 
land, and  the  United  States,  in  the  year  1887,  at  Washington,  and 
at  that  time  adjourned  without  any  possibility  of  their  represent- 
atives coming  to  any  agreement. 

In  consequence,  I  have  been  requested  by  Prince  Bismarck  to 
propose  to  you  to  resume  with  Germany  and  the  British  Govern- 
ment the  consultation  regarding  the  Samoan  question.  .  .  . 

Thus  Germany  opened  the  door  and  the  United  States  most 
willingly  entered.  Mr.  Bayard's  reply  was  ready  the  follow- 
ing day  (February  5th) :  "  The  President  .  .  .  requests  me 
to  say  that  he  fully  shares  in  the  desire  expressed  by  the  prince 
chancellor  to  bring  the  blessings  of  peace  and  order  to  the 
remote  and  feeble  community  of  semi-civilized  people  inhabit- 
ing the  islands  of  Samoa;  and  that  he  clearly  recognizes  the 
duty  of  the  powerful  nations  of  Christendom  to  deal  with  these 


THE   UNITED   STATES  AND  SAMOA  249 

people  in  a  spirit  of  magnanimity  and  benevolence."  "The 
sooner  this  conference  can  be  resumed,  the  better,"  he  added. 

John  A.  Kasson  of  Iowa,  William  Walter  Phelps  of  New 
Jersey,  and  George  H.  Bates  (the  former  commissioner  to 
Samoa)  were  appointed  United  States  commissioners  to  meet 
in  Berlin  similarly  qualified  plenipotentiaries  of  Germany 
and  Great  Britain.  The  spirit  of  their  instructions  was 
embodied  in  two  short  sentences :  "  The  obligation  of  the 
United  States  in  the  South  Pacific  is  to  protect  the  rights 
and  interests  of  American  citizens  who  may  be  residents 
there,  and  engaged  in  lawful  pursuits.  We  have  no  desire  to 
dominate. "    The  commission  was  instructed  by  Mr.  Blaine : — 

First,  To  ask  the  restoration  of  the  status  quo.  While 
the  President  was  unwilling  to  consider  that  action  of  Ger- 
many, which  immediately  followed  the  suspension  of  the 
conferences  at  Washington,  as  intentionally  derogatory  either 
to  the  dignity  or  the  interests  of  the  other  treaty  powers,  yet 
he  could  not  but  regard  it,  under  the  circumstances,  as  an 
abrupt  breach  of  the  joint  relations  of  the  three  powers. 

Second,  To  seek  for  the  organization  of  a  stable  govern- 
mental system  for  the  islands,  whereby  native  independence 
and  autonomy  should  be  preserved  free  from  the  control  or 
the  preponderating  influence  of  any  foreign  government ; 
and  also  free  "  from  all  occasions  of  trouble  arising  from  and 
fostered  into  mischievous  activity  by  the  avarice  and  eager- 
ness of  competing  merchants  and  land  speculators,  and  the 
irregular  conduct  of  foreign  officials,  who  are,  perhaps  natur- 
ally and  excusably,  but  most  injudiciously  sympathetic  with 
the  prejudices  and  immediate  interests  of  their  resident 
countrymen." 

Third,  To  effect  some  system  of  adjustment  and  registry 
of  land  claims. 

Fourth,  To  seek  the  adoption  of  some  form  of  regulations 
for  the  importation  and  sale  of  fire-arms  and  alcoholic  liquors, 
that  fatal  combination  where  peace  is  desired. 

Fifth,  To  use  discretionary  powers  in  adjusting  the  ques- 
tions of  neutrality  and  government  in  the  municipality  of 
Apia. 


250  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

The  commission  met  in  Berlin,  April  29,  1889.  Prince 
Bismarck  was  chosen  to  preside  over  the  meetings,  which 
continued  until  June  14,  on  which  day  the  General  Act  of 
Berlin  was  signed  by  the  plenipotentiaries.  During  the 
course  of  the  discussion  (at  the  5th  session,  on  May  22d), 
Mr.  Kasson  introduced  the  subject  of  restoring  the  status  quo 
in  Samoa.  Prince  Bismarck  replied  that  the  principle  of 
election  in  the  choice  of  a  king  by  the  natives  was  acceptable 
to  him,  but  that  he  was  bound  to  make  one  exception  in  the 
person  of  Mataafa,  on  account  of  the  outrages  committed  by 
his  adherents,  and  under  his  authority,  upon  dead  and  wounded 
German  sailors  lying  on  the  field  of  action.  Sir  Edward  Malet, 
(English)  thought  the  exception  fair  and  reasonable,  and  sug- 
gested that  as  Malietoa  had  been  released  by  Germany,  "  we, 
therefore,  propose  that  in  the  interest  of  the  peace  and  the 
prosperity  of  the  islands,  it  should  be  intimated  to  the 
Samoan  people  that  if  they  will  take  Malietoa  as  king,  such 
act  on  the  part  of  the  Samoans  shall  receive  the  sanction  of 
the  treaty  powers." 

This  seemed  to  all  parties  a  good  solution  of  the  difficulty. 
With  two  rival  chieftains  in  the  field  (Mataafa  and  Tama- 
sese),  it  was  felt  that  if  the  first  selection  of  a  ruler  under 
the  new  system  were  left  to  the  natives,  it  would  cer- 
tainly lead  to  a  renewal  of  civil  war.  As  Mataafa  was 
persona  non  grata  to  the  Germans,  and  Tamasese's  influence 
among  the  natives  was  waning,  the  restored  Malietoa  ap- 
peared to  be  the  logical  candidate.  His  former  popu- 
larity in  the  islands  would  no  doubt  be  enhanced  by  the 
martyrdom  he  had  suffered  in  his  country's  cause,  and  he 
was  moreover  entirely  acceptable  to  the  three  treaty  powers. 
Sir  Edward  Malet's  proposal  was  referred  to  a  committee  on 
revision,  and  subsequently  adopted. 

This  first  restriction  in  the  "  autonomous  "  scheme  of  gov- 
ernment for  Samoa  proved  a  mistake,  as  future  events 
showed.  It  would  probably  have  been  wiser  in  the  end  had 
Bismarck  overcome  his  very  natural  prejudice  to  Mataafa 
and  permitted  the  natives  from  the  beginning  a  freer  rein 
in  the  choice  of  their  king. 


THE   UNITED    STATES   AND   SAMOA  251 

The  treaty  as  finally  ratified  provided  an  elaborate  system 
of  government  for  the  islands,  and  the  United  States  stood 
pledged,  for  the  first  time  in  its  history,  to  share  the  respon- 
sibilities of  good  government  in  another  nation  and  to  assume, 
in  a  measure,  the  role  of  protector. 

It  will  be  seen  that  a  variety  of  causes,  leading  step  by 
step,  in  the  settlement  of  the  Samoan  difficulty,  induced  the 
United  States  to  ignore  those  precedents  which  the  Avisdom 
of  its  earlier  statesmen  had  established.  American  trade 
relations  in  Samoa  were  comparatively  insignificant,  and  the 
number  of  American  citizens  residing  there  was  ridiculously 
small.  From  a  political  point  of  view,  the  Samoans  were 
like  children,  and  it  was  recognized,  both  at  Washington  in 
1887,  and  at  Berlin  in  1889,  that  a  purely  native  government 
could  not  maintain  itself.  No  two  of  the  powers  would 
consent  to  invest  the  other  with  exclusive  control,  so  the  only 
possible  solution  of  the  problem  seemed  to  be  a  tripartite 
agreement  to  establish  and  support  some  form  of  government 
at  Apia  in  which  all  three  powers  would  participate. 

But  just  there  lay  the  weakness,  perhaps  the  folly,  of  the 
American  attitude  toward  the  whole  question  ;  it  was  fear 
that  the  rule  of  another  nation  in  Samoa  would  operate 
adversely  to  the  private  interests  of  American  citizens  in 
Apia.  It  would  have  been  far  more  economical,  if  expense 
is  a  consideration,  to  have  bought  outright  all  the  American 
private  interests  in  the  islands,  or  indeed,  from  a  sentimental 
standpoint,  if  the  sense  of  ownership  is  pleasant,  to  have 
bargained  with  Germany  and  England  for  American  annexa- 
tion of  the  group.  Possibly  an  altruistic  desire  to  promote 
the  happiness  and  welfare  of  the  natives  by  aiding  them  in 
the  establishment  of  good  government  may  have  influenced 
the  United  States  to  some  extent,  but  this  supposition  will  not 
bear  too  close  analysis.  Nations  do  not  scatter  the  seeds  of 
philanthropy  broadcast,  but  are  far  more  likely  to  plant  their 
crops  where  the  soil  is  good  or  the  position  is  advantageous 
for  military  or  other  good  reasons.  At  all  events,  the  United 
States  drifted  out  of  an  old  channel  into  a  new  one.  In 
signing  the  treaty  of  Berlin,  the  American  nation  entered 


252  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

into  an  "  entangling  alliance  "  with  foreign  powers  that  at 
once  involved  it  in  foreign  political  affairs  that  concerned  it 
the  very  least. 

In  substance  the  General  Act  of  Berlin  provides  as  fol- 
lows :  — 

Article  I 

A  declaration  respecting  the  independence  and  neutrality  of  the 
islands  of  Samoa,  and  assuring  to  the  res2yective  citizens  and  subjects 
of  the  signatory  powers  equality  of  rights  in  said  islands,  and  pro- 
viding for  the  immediate  restoration  of  peace  and  order  therein. 

It  is  declared  that  the  islands  of  Samoa  are  neutral  territory, 
in  which  the  citizens  and  subjects  of  the  three  signatory  powers 
have  equal  rights  of  residence,  trade,  and  personal  protection. 
The  three  powers  recognize  the  independence  of  the  Samoan 
Government  and  the  free  right  of  the  natives  to  elect  their  chief 
or  king  and  choose  their  form  of  government  according  to  their 
own  laws  and  customs.  Neither  of  the  powers  shall  exercise  any 
separate  control  over  the  islands  or  the  government  thereof. 

It  is  further  declared,  with  a  view  to  the  prompt  restoration 
of  peace  and  good  order  in  the  said  islands,  and  in  view  of  the 
difficulties  which  would  surround  an  election  in  the  present  dis- 
ordered condition  of  their  government,  that  Malietoa  Laupepa,  who 
was  formally  made  and  appointed  king,  on  the  12th  day  of  July, 
1881,  and  was  so  recognized  by  the  three  powers,  shall  again  be 
so  recognized  hereafter  in  the  exercise  of  such  authority  imless 
the  three  powers  shall  by  common  accord  otherwise  declare;  and 
his  successor  shall  be  duly  elected  according  to  the.  laws  and 
customs  of  Samoa. 

Article  II 

A  declaration  respecting  the  modification  of  existing  treaties  and 
the  assent  of  the  Samoan  Government  to  this  act. 

Article  III 

A  declaration  respecting  the  establishment  of  a  supreme  court  of 
justice  for  Samoa  and  defining  its  jurisdiction. 

Section  1.  A  supreme  court  shall  be  established  in  Samoa, 
to  consist  of  one  judge,  who  shall  be  styled  chief  justice  of 
Samoa,  and  who  shall  appoint  a  clerk  and  a  marshal  of  the 
court.  .  .  . 


THE    UNITED   STATES   AND   SAMOA  253 

Section  2.  With  a  view  to  secure  judicial  independence  and 
the  equal  consideration  of  the  rights  of  all  parties,  irrespective  of 
nationality,  it  is  agreed  that  the  chief  justice  shall  be  named 
by  the  three  signatory  powers  in  common  accord;  or,  failing 
their  agreement,  he  may  be  named  by  the  King  of  Sweden  and 
Norway.  He  shall  be  learned  in  law  and  equity,  of  mature 
years,  and  of  good  repute  for  his  sense  of  honor,  impartiality, 
and  justice. 

His  decision  upon  questions  within  his  jurisdiction  shall  be. 
final.  He  shall  be  appointed  by  the  Samoan  Government  upon 
the  certificate  of  his  nomination  as  herein  provided.  He  shall 
receive  an  annual  salary  of  six  thousand  dollars  ($6000.00) 
in  gold,  or  its  equivalent,  to  be  paid  the  first  year  in  equal  pro- 
portions by  the  three  treaty  powers,  and  afterwards  out  of 
the  revenues  of  Samoa  apportioned  to  the  use  of  the  Samoan 
Government,  upon  which  his  compensation  shall  be  the  first 
charge.  .  .  . 

Section  4.  The  supreme  court  shall  have  jurisdiction  of  all 
questions  arising  under  the  provisions  of  this  general  act,  and  the 
decision  or  order  of  the  court  thereon  shall  be  conclusive  upon  all 
residents  of  Samoa.  The  court  shall  also  have  appellate  jurisdic- 
tion over  all  municipal  magistrates  and  officers. 

Section  6.  In  case  any  question  shall  hereafter  arise  in  Samoa 
respecting  the  rightful  election  or  appointment  of  king  or  of  any 
other  chief  claiming  authority  over  the  islands,  or  respecting  the 
validity  of  the  powers  which  the  king  or  any  chief  may  claim  in 
the  exercise  of  his  office,  such  question  shall  not  lead  to  war,  but 
shall  be  presented  for  decision  to  the  chief  justice  of  Samoa,  who 
shall  decide  it  in  writing,  conformably  to  the  provisions  of  this 
act  and  to  the  laws  and  customs  of  Samoa  not  in  conflict  there- 
with ;  and  the  signatory  governments  will  accept  and  abide  by 
such  decision. 

Section  7.  In  case  any  difference  shall  arise  between  either  of 
the  treaty  powers  and  Samoa  which  they  shall  fail  to  adjust  by 
mutual  accord,  such  difference  shall  not  be  held  cause  for  war,  but 
shall  be  referred  for  adjustment  on  the  principles  of  justice  and 
equity  to  the  chief  justice  of  Samoa,  who  shall  make  his  decision 
thereon  in  writing. 

Section  9.  Upon  the  organization  of  the  supreme  court  there 
shall  be  transferred  to  its  exclusive  jurisdiction:  — 

(1)  All  civil  suits  concerning  real  property  situated  in  Samoa, 
and  all  rights  affecting  the  same. 

(2)  All  civil  suits  of  any  kind  between  natives  and  foreigners 
or  between  foreigners  of  different  nationalities. 


264  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

(3)  All  crimes  and  offences  committed  by  natives  against  for- 
eigners or  committed  by  such  foreigners  as  are  not  subject  to  any 
consular  jurisdiction.  .  .  . 

Section  10.  The  practice  and  procedure  of  common  law,  equity, 
and  admiralty,  as  administered  in  the  courts  of  England,  may  be 
—  so  far  as  applicable  —  the  practice  and  procedure  of  this  court ; 
but  the  court  may  modify  such  practice  and  procedure  from  time 
to  time  as  shall  be  required  by  local  circumstances.  The  court 
shall  have  authority  to  impose,  according  to  the  crime,  the  pun- 
ishment established  therefor  by  the  laws  of  the  United  States,  of 
England,  or  of  Germany,  as  the  chief  justice  shall  decide  most 
appropriate ;  or,  in  the  case  of  native  Samoans  and  other  natives 
of  the  South  Sea  Islands,  according  to  the  laws  and  customs  of 
Samoa. 

Section  11.  Nothing  in  this  article  shall  be  so  construed  as  to 
affect  existing  consular  jurisdiction  over  all  questions  arising  be- 
tween masters  and  seamen  of  their  respective  national  vessels.  .  .  . 

Article  IV 

A  declaration  respecting  titles  to  land,  in  Samoa  and  restraining 
the  disposition  thereof  by  natives,  and  providing  for  the  investigation 
of  claims  thereto  and  for  the  registration  of  valid  titles.  .  .  . 

Section  2.  In  order  to  adjust  and  settle  all  claims  by  aliens  of 
titles  to  land,  or  any  interest  therein  in  the  islands  of  Samoa,  it 
is  declared  that  a  commission  shall  be  appointed,  to  consist  of 
three  (3)  impartial  and  competent  persons,  one  to  be  named  by 
each  of  the  three  treaty  powers,  to  be  assisted  by  an  officer,  to  be 
styled  natives'  advocate,  who  shall  be  appointed  by  the  chief 
executive  of  Samoa,  with  the  approval  of  the  chief  justice  of 
Samoa.  .  .  . 

Article  V 

A  declaration  respecting  the  municipal  district  of  Apia,  providing 
a  local  administration  therefor,  and  defining  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
municipal  magistrate.  .  .  . 

Article  VI 

A  declaration  respecting  taxation  and  revenue  in  Samoa. 

Section  1.  The  port  of  Apia  shall  be  the  port  of  entry  for  all 
dutiable  goods  arriving  in  the  Samoan  Islands ;  and  all  foreign 
goods,  wares,  and  merchandise  landed  on  the  islands  shall  be  there 
entered  for  examination.  .  .  . 


THE   UNITED   STATES   AND   SAMOA  255 

Article  VII 

A  declaration  respecting  arms  and  ammunition  and  intoxicating 
liquors,  restraining  their  sale  and  use.  .  .  . 

Article  VIII 

General  dispositions. 

Section  1.  The  provisions  of  this  act  shall  continue  in  force 
until  changed  by  consent  of  the  three  powers.  Upon  the  request 
of  either  power  after  three  years  from  the  signature  hereof,  the 
powers  shall  consider  by  common  accord  what  ameliorations,  if 
any,  may  be  introduced  into  the  provisions  of  this  general  act. 
In  the  meantime,  any  special  amendment  may  be  adopted  by  the 
consent  of  the  three  powers,  with  the  adherence  of  Samoa.  .  .  . 

The  assent  of  Samoa  to  this  general  act  shall  be  attested  by  a 
certificate  thereof  signed  by  the  King  and  executed  in  triplicate, 
of  which  one  copy  shall  be  delivered  to  the  consul  of  each  of  the 
signatory  powers  at  Apia  for  immediate  transmission  to  his 
Government.  .  .  . 

It  will  be  observed  that  the  first  article  of  the  act  sets 
forth  the  recognition  of  the  ''  independence  of  the  Samoan 
Government  and  the  free  right  of  the  natives  to  elect  their 
chief  or  king  and  choose  their  form  of  government  according 
to  their  own  laws  and  customs."  The  act  then  proceeds  to 
evolve  a  system  of  "autonomous  government"  for  the  patient 
Samoans  as  follows :  First,  the  king  is  to  be  elected  and  sup- 
ported by  the  natives  (salary  later  fixed  at  il800  a  year) ; 
then  in  the  same  clause  it  is  recited  that  the  powers  will 
select  the  king.  Next  comes  a  chief  justice  to  be  appointed 
by  the  three  powers  jointly  at  a  salary  of  $6000 ;  he  is  pro- 
vided with  a  clerk  and  a  marshal,  whose  compensation  is  to 
be  derived  from  official  fees.  The  jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme 
Court,  which  is  both  original  and  appellate,  covers  all  ques- 
tions arising  under  the  general  act,  and  all  questions  con- 
cerning the  powers  of  the  king.  This  court  hears  differences 
between  native  Samoans,  reviews  the  quarrels  of  foreigners, 
and  exercises  a  right  of  appellate  jurisdiction  over  all  land 
titles  and  litigation  arising  therefrom.    In  addition  to  this  and 


256  AMERICAN   DIPLOxMATIC   QUESTIONS 

to  the  police  courts  of  the  municipality  of  Apia,  duly  pro- 
vided for,  the  consuls  of  the  three  nations  represented  in 
Samoa  continued  to  maintain  judicial  functions  according  to 
the  various  laws  of  extraterritoriality. 

The  business  of  the  islands  is  conducted  at  Apia,  at  which 
port  the  vessels  that  keep  alive  tli«  trade  of  the  nation  arrive 
and  depart,  and  it  is  there  that  the  bulk  of  the  revenues  is  col- 
lected. Accordingly  a  municipal  council  with  a  chairman  or 
president  is  established.  The  president  draws  #5000  a  year. 
He  is  the  chief  executive  of  the  district,  and  advises  the  king 
"in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  general  act,  and  not 
to  the  prejudice  of  the  rights  of  either  of  the  three  treaty 
powers."  This  council  has  upon  its  table  the  affairs  of  the 
municipal  district  of  Apia,  which  in  fact  must  virtually  be 
the  affairs  of  Samoa,  as  it  collects  the  customs  revenue  as  well 
as  the  taxes  at  the  only  point  of  export  and  import  in  the 
nation,  and  where  the  great  majority  of  the  tax-payers  reside. 
The  council  appoints  its  own  subordinate  officers  for  the  dis- 
trict. All  its  legislative  acts,  however,  are  inoperative  and 
of  no  effect  until  approved  by  the  consuls  of  the  three 
treaty  powers  in  Samoa. 

A  land  commission  is  established  for  the  examination  of  all 
claims  and  titles  to  real  property,  their  holdings  being  subject 
to  review  by  the  Supreme  Court. 

The  salaries  of  all  these  officials,  none  of  whom,  excepting 
the  king,  were  likely  to  be  native  islanders,  are  to  be  paid  the 
first  year  by  the  contracting  powers,  and  thereafter  from  the 
native  treasury. 

Besides  this  corps  of  officials  and  their  lists  of  rules  and 
regulations,  the  act  provides  a  system  of  revenue  containing 
a  schedule  of  export  and  import  duties,  and  embracing  a  code 
of  laws  covering  internal  taxation. 

On  the  face  of  the  treaty  it  plainly  appears  that  the  gov- 
ernment provided  for  Samoa  by  the  three  powers  was  a  joint 
protectorate  pure  and  simple, — that  the  words  "autonomous 
government"  contained  in  the  paper  were  devoid  of  all  mean- 
ing, while  the  act  itself,  in  recognizing  the  "  independence  of 
the  Samoan  Government,  and  the  free  right  of  the  natives  to 


THE   UNITED   STATES   AND   SAMOA  257 

elect  their  chief  or  king  and  choose  their  form  of  govern- 
ment according  to  their  own  laws  and  customs,"  was  a  farce. 
There  is  no  word  in  the  treaty  that  left  to  the  king  any  actual 
power  in  his  own  realm.  Every  function  of  legislative  or 
judicial  government  was  to  be  performed  by  foreigners,  who 
were  appointed,  and  maintained  if  need  be  by  the  power  of 
foreigners.  The  nation's  revenues  were  to  be  collected,  held 
and  disbursed  by  the  agents  of  the  three  contracting  powers ; 
and  finally,  the  consular  representatives  of  the  three  powers, 
whose  sanction  is  necessary  to  every  legislative  act,  mani- 
festly controlled  the  nation's  policy.  An  examination  of  the 
treaty  therefore  discloses  the  fact  that  instead  of  securing  to 
the  native  Samoans  an  autonomous  government,  as  it  pur- 
ported to  do,  it  simply  stationed  a  cordon  of  foreigners  about 
the  native  king  who  should  conduct  the  business  of  the  nation 
in  a  manner  not  prejudicial  to  the  interests  of  their  home  gov- 
ernments ;  and  lastly  it  confirmed  in  the  consuls  their  supe- 
rior rights  over  all  to  control  the  destinies  of  the  islands. 

VIII 

When  the  fury  of  the  famous  hurricane  was  spent,  the  war 
clouds  that  had  hung  low  over  Samoa  for  more  than  a  year 
dispersed,  and  the  islands  were  left  distressed,  but  in  peace. 
News  of  the  efforts  of  the  three  powers  at  Berlin  to  solve  the 
Samoan  social  problems  had  reached  Apia,  and  all,  natives 
and  foreigners  alike,  remained  expectant,  —  the  latter  no 
doubt  vastly  relieved.  Tamasese's  straw  palace  fell,  and  that 
disappointed  monarch,  bereft  of  German  support,  sulked  in 
silence  in  his  native  village.  The  German  and  American 
flags  were  lowered,  and  the  angry-worded  proclamations  were 
torn  down  to  be  burned  and  forgotten.  Dr.  Knappe,  the 
Orlando  Furioso  of  the  islands,  was  replaced  by  the  more 
astute  Dr.  Steubel.  The  once  popular  Malietoa  Laupepa, 
released  from  political  bondage,  returned  from  his  long  exile 
in  the  Cameroons  to  find  his  power  and  prestige  belonging  to 
another,  his  old  ally  and  kinsman,  Mataafa.  Mataafa  had 
fought  in  the  trenches,  and  had  suffered  and  bled  for  the 


258  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

cause  of  Samoa  against  the  aggressions  of  the  "invincible 
strangers."  He  was  the  hero  of  the  wars,  and  richly  deserved 
all  honors.  But  when  the  Berlin  treaty  reached  Samoa,  it 
was  Malietoa,  to  the  amazement  of  the  natives,  who  was  re- 
commended as  sovereign.  The  two  chiefs  found  themselves 
in  a  most  embarrassing  and  aggravating  attitude  of  rivalry. 
Probably  no  other  candidates  for  royal  honors  in  the  world 
would  have  kept  the  peace  under  such  circumstances.  These 
two  remarkable  persons  began  a  contest  of  civility,  each 
pressing  upon  the  other  the  acceptance  of  the  crown.  It 
was  only  by  the  extraordinary  complaisance  of  Mataafa  (a 
rare  piece  of  good  fortune  for  the  foreigners  who  stood  by 
the  treaty)  that  Malietoa  was  at  last  accepted  as  king,  and 
Mataafa,  the  Warwick,  was  content  with  the  lesser  dignity 
of  vice-king. 

The  Samoans  in  due  time  gave  their  formal  adherence  to 
the  treaty,  and  the  foreigners  in  Apia  celebrated  the  event. 
Chief  Justice  Cedarcranz  (appointed  by  the  King  of  Sweden) 
and  Baron  Senfft  von  Pilsach,  the  president  of  the  municipal 
board,  arrived,  and  took  up  the  burden  of  their  duties.  The 
land  commission  set  to  work  upon  its  seemingly  endless  task, 
and  the  wheels  of  the  massive  governmental  machine  were 
set  in  motion.  For  about  one  year  all  went  well,  or  at  least 
apparently  so;  but  the  seeds  of  dissatisfaction  were  in  the 
soil  and  were  maturing  slowly.  Now  and  then  the  natives 
betrayed  rebellious  symptoms,  —  the  powers,  they  cried, 
recognize  our  independence  and  sovereignty,  and  accord  us 
the  right  to  elect  our  own  king  according  to  our  own  fashion, 
—  a  fair  election  would  make  Mataafa  king;  we,  the  majority, 
want  Mataafa,  why  must  we  be  saddled  with  Malietoa,  who 
is  not  our  choice  ?  The  Supreme  Court  entered  upon  the 
usual  routine  of  judicial  duties,  issuing  warrants  and  other 
writs,  which  were  duly  served  upon  the  people  according  to 
civilized  custom,  but  which  were  as  duly  misunderstood  and 
disregarded  by  the  natives.  The  tax  gatherers  under  the 
foreign  regime  appeared  on  time  to  collect  the  governmental 
dues,  but  they  entered  empty  houses. 

The  relation  of  the  native  kings  to  the  official  foreigners 


THE   UNITED   STATES  AND   SAMOA  259 

was  far  from  satisfactory.  Malietoa's  salary,  out  of  which  he 
paid  all  his  own  expenses,  amounted,  all  told,  to  scarcely  195 
a  month  —  a  beggarly  allowance  for  even  a  Samoan  prince 
— while  the  monthly  stipends  of  the  chief  justice,  the  presi- 
dent of  the  municipality,  the  chief  of  police  and  the  private 
secretary  of  the  chief  justice  were,  respectively,  1500,  1415, 
f  140,  and  ^100  a  month,  —  in  all  11155.  The  difference  was 
too  apparent.  The  natives  had  so  often  tasted  the  bitter 
fruits  of  deceit  in  their  dealings  with  foreigners,  that  sus- 
picion quite  naturally  stole  into  their  minds  that  they  were 
again  being  duped.  The  treaty  in  one  sentence  accorded 
them  rights  which  in  the  next  sentence  it  took  away.  The 
government  was  almost  entirely  an  alien  one  which  they,  the 
natives,  were  obliged  to  maintain  upon  a  scale  of  generous 
salaries.  They  realized  that  their  own  king,  the  only 
native  officer,  was  a  mere  figurehead.  As  an  additional 
oause  of  grievance  they  were  being  taxed  to  support  a  gov- 
ernment not  of  their  own  creation,  and  were  being  promptly 
prosecuted  by  the  courts  if  they  failed  to  pay.  It  also 
appeared  that  the  land  commission  was  confirming  too  many 
dubious  titles  in  the  German,  English,  and  American  traders 
to  seem  entirely  just  to  the  Samoans  —  surely,  they  were 
being  plucked. 

While  Malietoa  was  nominally  king,  all  the  pomp  and 
ceremony  of  that  Gilbertian  office,  as  well  as  the  manage- 
ment of  the  few  affairs  left  to  the  native  government,  fell  to 
the  share  of  Mataafa.  The  latter  having  the  stronger  per- 
sonality of  the  two,  and  being  all  the  time  conscious  of  the 
moral  support  of  the  people,  regarded  the  venerable  Malietoa 
as  "  his  poor  brother,"  and  maintained  toward  his  superior 
an  attitude  of  friendly  and  good-humored  contempt.  On  May 
31,  1891,  Mataafa  departed  from  the  company  of  his  col- 
league and  took  up  his  abode  at  Malie,  a  town  some  miles 
to  the  west  of  Apia,  where  he  continued  to  live  in  royal 
manner  attended  by  retainers  and  entertained  by  the  visit- 
ing delegations  of  chieftains  from  all  parts  of  the  kingdom. 
To  the  apprehensive  foreigners  of  Apia  the  departure  of 
Mataafa  from  his  post  of  duty  by  the  side  of  Malietoa  at 


260  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

Mulinuu  was  no  less  than  a  signal  for  a  revolutionary  out- 
break. The  government  officials  trooped  en  masse  to  Malie, 
to  persuade  the  disaffected  monarch  to  return ;  and  though 
they  plied  him  with  argument,  he  politely,  but  none  the 
less  firmly,  declined  to  resume  his  former  status  of  vice- 
king.  In  Apia  preparations  were  again  made  for  war ;  but 
to  the  forbearance  of  Mataafa  himself,  be  it  said,  peace  was 
maintained, —  this,  too,  in  spite  of  tlie  fact  that  the  govern- 
ment declared  Mataafa  a  rebel,  and  his  estates  confiscated. 

The  position  of  the  latter  at  Malie  was  an  anomalous  one. 
While  enjoying  the  outward  signs  of  royalty,  and  to  all  in- 
tents and  purposes  exercising  the  offices  of  a  ruler  over  the 
native  peoples,  he  conducted  himself,  nevertheless,  in  a 
manner  wholly  consistent  with  the  scheme  of  government 
established  by  the  powers.  He  recognized  Malietoa  as  king, 
obliged  his  followers  to  pay  their  proper  dues  into  the  legiti- 
mate treasury,  and  he  sent  his  subjects,  when  arrested  for 
any  cause,  to  the  Apia  courts  for  trial.  Still  his  attitude 
was  an  ominous  one,  and  a  nervous  apprehension  rested  over 
Apia,  lest  at  some  unexpected  moment  the  rebel  forces 
would  sweep  into  the  city.  That  such  an  occurrence  did 
not  take  place  surprised  every  one. 

As  might  very  naturally  be  expected,  such  unsatisfactory 
relations  between  the  two  rulers  could  not  long  continue. 
Malietoa  became  jealous  and  threatening  ;  Mataafa  gradually 
became  offensive.  On  December  6,  1892,  United  States 
Vice-Consul  Blacklock,  reporting  upon  the  condition  of 
affairs  in  the  islands,  wrote  :  — 

Ever  since  Mataafa's  establishment  at  Malie  he  has  endeavored 
to  gather  strength,  and  there  is  not  the  slightest  doubt  had  he 
been  successful  in  getting  sufficient  following,  he  would  have 
made  war  upon  Malietoa.  He  has  done  everything  in  opposing  the 
Government  except  making  war;  he  has  defied  its  courts,  ob- 
structed its  officials  in  the  execution  of  their  duties,  harbored 
refugees  from  justice,  succored  and  supported  prisoners  escaped 
from  prison,  and  at  the  present  moment  is  living  in  open  defiance 
of  the  King  and  Government  and  all  the  laws  of  the  country, 
keeping  up  an  armed  force  and  plundering  foreigners'  plantations 
for  subsistence.      Time  and  again  have  white  officials,  who  went 


THE   UNITED    STATES   AND   SAMOA  261 

to  Malie  with  warrants  for.  the  arrest  of  offenders,  been  driven 
away  by  Mataafa's  soldiers,  and  warned  against  attempting  any 
arrest  under  penalty  of  death. 

The  expediency  of  sending  war  vessels  to  Apia  to  assist  the 
government  in  enforcing  its  decrees  became  a  subject  of  cor- 
respondence in  Washington,  for  the  situation  in  the  islands 
changing  from  bad  to  worse,  the  question  had  arisen  as  to 
the  advisability  of  taking  active  measures  to  disarm  Mataafa. 
June  19,  1893,  Mr.  Gresham  wrote  to  Sir  Julian  Paunce- 
fote  :  — 

The  Government  of  the  United  States,  while  heretofore  in- 
clined to  confine  its  action  to  participation  in  the  maintenance  of 
the  system  of  government  devised  by  the  General  Act  to  the  ex- 
ecution of  the  process  of  the  supreme  court  and  to  keeping  up 
such  naval  representation  in  Samoan  waters  as  should  suffice  for 
the  protection  of  American  life  and  property  in  those  islands,  is 
now  prepared  to  go  further,  in  view  of  the  reported  rebellious 
attitude  of  Mataafa  and  his  followers,  and  will  join  in  an  active 
demonstration  for  the  purpose  of  surrounding  and  disarming  them. 

Sir  Julian  in  reply,  a  few  days  later,  reported  that  ''  Her 
Majesty's  Government  will  heartily  cooperate  with  the  other 
two  treaty  powers  in  the  manner  and  for  the  purposes 
mentioned." 

Accordingly,  with  the  ready  consent  of  Germany,  another 
man-of-war  episode  took  place  in  Samoa  (July  18,  1893). 
Before  the  arrival  of  the  U.  S.  S.  Philadelphia^  which  had 
been  hastily  despatched  to  the  islands  to  assist  in  the  dem- 
onstration, Mataafa  surrendered  to  the  combined  German 
and  English  forces  and  was  deported,  as  had  formerly  been 
Malietoa,  to  the  Marshall  Islands,  where,  with  a  number  of 
chiefs  who  bore  him  company,  he  was  maintained  in  exile 
at  the  joint  expense  of  the  three  powers. 

With  the  powerful  Mataafa  out  of  the  way,  and  Malietoa 
consequently  strengthened  in  his  position  as  king,  the  govern- 
ment should  have  prospered.  In  the  early  part  of  1894,  an 
uprising  of  Tamaseseites  disturbed  the  repose  of  the  king, 
but  the  three  consuls,   and  king    Malietoa  stood  together 


262  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

through  the  crisis.  The  revolution,  after  a  series  of  skir- 
mishes, and  a  vast  deal  of  parleying,  came  to  a  close  in  Sep- 
tember. This  revolt  was  led  by  young  Tamasese,  the  son  of 
the  former  king,  and  a  new  candidate  for  royal  honors.  Its 
object  was  the  overthrow  of  Malietoa :  because  "  he  has  done 
much  evil";  because  "it  is  now  more  than  twenty  years 
since  he  has  become  king  and  he  has  done  nothing  for  these 
islands  " ;  and  because  "  Samoa  is  completely  drained  by  the 
payment  of  taxes."  The  latter  reason  was  perhaps  the  urgent 
one,  for  according  to  most  reliable  authorities,  any  tax  at  all 
is  too  much  for  the  Saraoan  natives.  This  rebellion  was 
suppressed  with  a  severity  which  called  from  Robert  Louis 
Stevenson,  then  residing  at  Vailima,  the  bitterest  reproaches 
upon  the  three  powers.  Still  another  of  those  distressing 
man-of-war  episodes  took  place,  in  which  native  villages 
were  shelled  and  defenceless  women  and  children  killed. 
The  ferocity  of  white  men  seems  at  times  to  be  little  less 
than  that  of  more  primitive  people. 

IX 

After  a  period  of  a  few  years  the  "  autonomous  govern- 
ment" of  Samoa,  as  provided  by  the  Berlin  treaty,  was 
found  to  be  a  failure.  At  first  the  evident  friction  between 
parts  of  the  governmental  machine  had  been  charitably 
overlooked,  as  the  result  of  newness,  and  it  was  hoped,  when 
once  the  pace  was  set,  the  system  would  prove  satisfactory. 
As  time  progressed,  all  who  were  in  a  position  to  know  became 
convinced  that  the  scheme  adopted  for  the  islands  was  not 
only  ineffective  but  actually  pernicious.  The  discord  which 
seemed  inevitable  among  the  various  heads  of  that  triple 
dominion  soon  became  manifest.  The  authority  of  the  chief 
justice  and  that  of  the  president  of  the  municipality  came 
into  more  or  less  conflict.  Tlie  land  commission  toiled 
faithfully,  but  with  exasperating  interruptions,  while  its 
decrees  bred  dissensions  as  they  displeased  this  or  that  fac- 
tion in  Apia.  The  three  consuls  and  the  numerous  officials 
of  different  nationalities  interpreted  the  provisions  of  the 


THE   UNITED   STATES  AND   SAMOA  263 

Berlin  Act  as  best  suited  their  own  or  their  country's  political 
and  commercial  interests.  It  is  not  surprising,  therefore, 
that  the  old  racial  enmities  cropped  out  anew.  It  became 
apparent,  even  to  its  most  radical  supporters,  that  the  treaty 
government  could  never  fulfil  expectations.  The  natives 
soon  came  to  ignore  the  authorities.  The  process  of  the 
Supreme  Court  was  seldom  served,  and  when  served,  it  was 
of  little  avail.  The  influence  of  King  Malietoa  gradually 
declined,  until  the  last  vestige  of  his  power  as  native  ruler  of 
Samoa  left  him  king  in  name  only.  The  government  had  no 
authority  whatever  outside  the  settlement  of  Apia,  and  even 
within  the  little  municipality  itself,  its  impotent  character, 
combined  with  its  cumbersome  structure,  made  it  seem  like 
the  creation  of  a  comic  opera.  The  testimony  of  travellers, 
the  reports  of  consuls,  and  the  dismal  complaints  of  the 
natives  operated  in  a  very  short  time  to  prejudice  the  admin- 
istration in  Washington  against  the  maintenance  of  the 
Berlin  Act. 

At  one  of  the  sessions  of  the  conference  in  Berlin  (1889), 
Count  Bismarck  had  said,  with  full  approval  of  the  other  pleni- 
potentiaries, that  the  arrangements  would  "  be  limited  to  a 
period  of  three  or  five  years,  to  put  them  to  the  test."  The 
act  also  provided  for  amendment  (Art.  8,  Sec.  1)  after  three 
years  from  date  of  signature  —  "  the  powers  shall  consider, 
by  common  accord,  what  ameliorations,  if  any,  may  be  intro- 
duced into  the  provisions."  Taking  advantage  of  these 
provisions,  meetings  presided  over  by  Robert  Louis  Steven- 
son were  held  in  Apia  in  1892,  to  adopt  proposals  for  cer- 
tain desirable  ^changes  in  the  act.  These  proposals  were 
forwarded  to  the  three  signatory  powers,  with  the  expressed 
hope  that  "  they,  the  powers,  might  be  willing  to  consider 
the  opinion  of  persons  on  the  spot,  and  intimately  acquainted 
with  the  interests  involved."  The  American  Consul,  Mr. 
Sewall,  also  represented  to  the  government  in  Washington 
the  pressing  need  of  that  *' revision  of  the  Berlin  Act"  which 
was  contemplated  when  it  was  originally  executed.  The 
United  States  Government  alone  appears  to  have  been  moved 
by  the  Stevenson  memorial,  for  it,  at  least,  made  some  effort 


264  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

to  bring  about  a  convention  for  reconsideration  of  the  act. 
Both  Germany  and  Great  Britain  declined  to  entertain  the 
proposition,  and  the  unsatisfactory  governmental  system,  as 
originally  adopted  at  Berlin,  continued  to  exist,  to  the  dis- 
tress of  the  natives,  and  to  the  annoyance  of  all  concerned. 

Referring  to  the  many  troubles  of  Samoa  since  the  Berlin 
Act  had  gone  into  force.  President  Cleveland  said  in  1893, 
"This  incident,  and  the  events  leading  up  to  it  [American 
interposition  in  Samoa],  signally  illustrate  the  impolicy  of 
entangling  alliances  with  foreign  powers." 

The  next  year  President  Cleveland  repeated  his  views  upon 
the  subject :  — 

The  present  government  has  utterly  failed  to  correct,  if  indeed 
it  has  not  aggravated,  the  very  evils  it  was  intended  to  prevent. 
It  has  not  stimulated  our  commerce  with  the  islands.  Our  par- 
ticipation in  its  establishment  against  the  wishes  of  the  natives 
was  in  plain  defiance  of  the  conservative  teachings  and  warnings 
of  the  wise  and  patriotic  men  who  laid  the  foundations  of  our  free 
institutions,  and  I  invite  an  expression  of  the  judgment  of  Con- 
gress on  the  propriety  of  steps  being  taken  by  this  Government 
looking  to  the  withdrawal  from  its  engagements  with  the  other 
powers  on  some  reasonable  terms  not  prejudicial  to  any  of  our 
existing  rights. 

In  December,  1895,  the  President  was  moved  once  more  to 
touch  upon  the  Samoan  matter  in  his  third  annual  message 
to  Congress :  — 

In  my  last  two  annual  messages  I  called  the  attention  of  the 
Congress  to  the  position  we  occupied  as  one  of  the  parties  to  a 
treaty  or  agreement  by  which  we  became  jointly  bound  with  Eng- 
land and  Germany  to  so  interfere  with  the  government  and  con- 
trol of  Samoa  as  in  effect  to  assume  the  management  of  its  affairs. 
On  the  9th  of  May,  1894,  I  transmitted  to  the  Senate  a  special 
message  .  .  .  and  emphasizing  the  opinion  I  have  at  all  times 
entertained,  that  our  situation  in  this  matter  was  inconsistent  with 
the  mission  and  traditions  of  our  government,  in  violation  of  the 
principles  we  profess,  and  in  all  its  phases  mischievous  and  vexa- 
tious. I  again  press  this  subject  upon  the  attention  of  the  Con- 
gress, and  ask  for  such  legislative  action  or  expression  as  will  lead 
the  way  to  our  relief  from  obligation  both  irksome  and  unnatural. 


THE   UNITED   STATES   AND   SAMOA  265 

Notwithstanding  the  dissatisfaction  felt  in  Samoa  and  in 
the  capitals  of  all  three  of  the  contracting  powers  (espe- 
cially in  Washington,  where  more  conservative  ideas  of 
foreign  relations  existed  than  in  either  London  or  Berlin), 
no  further  attempt  was  ever  made  to  alter  the  Berlin  Act. 
The  Samoans  continued  to  complain ;  the  foreigners  in  the 
islands  controlled  their  jealousies  as  best  they  could,  and  all 
waited  and  hoped  for  some  change.  Relief  came  suddenly 
and  in  a  most  unexpected  manner. 

In  1898  news  of  the  death  of  one  of  the  chiefs  who  had 
accompanied  Mataafa  in  his  exile  to  the  Marshall  Islands  dis- 
tressed the  Samoan  natives.  A  large  majority  were  dissatis- 
fied with  the  rule  of  Malietoa  Laupepa,  as  they  had  condemned 
the  manner  in  which  that  monarch  had  been  thrust  upon 
them.  They  had  never  ceased  to  hope  that  justice  would 
yet  be  done  their  favorite  chieftain,  the  great  Mataafa.  The 
fear  lest  he,  too,  might  succumb  to  the  unhealthy  climate  of 
the  Marshalls,  and  suffer  the  disgrace  of  dying  in  exile, 
brought  about  a  persistent  clamor  for  his  pardon,  and  for  his 
restoration  to  his  own  people.  Even  Laupepa,  his  rival, 
joined  in  the  petition  to  the  powers  for  the  pardon  and 
return  of  Mataafa.  The  old  hero  was  released,  and  he  soon 
after  reappeared  in  his  native  province,  amid  the  rejoicings 
of  his  devoted  followers.  He  was  under  strict  promise  to 
keep  the  peace,  and  to  respect  the  rights  of  King  Malietoa 
Laupepa  —  there  should  be  no  more  revolutions. 

Mataafa  had  scarcely  arrived  in  Samoa  when  King  Malietoa 
Laupepa  died.  This  was  in  August,  1898.  According  to 
Samoan  customs,  there  is  no  direct  succession  to  the  crown, 
nor  can  the  king  appoint  his  successor.  The  manner  of 
selecting  a  ruler  is  peculiar.  Only  those  belonging  to  certain 
clans  or  families  are  eligible ;  and  of  these,  the  one  who  has 
had  bestowed  upon  him,  by  the  people  of  his  own  or  of  other 
provinces,  a  certain  number  of  honorific  titles,  is  accepted  as 
monarch  over  all.  It  usually  happens  that  the  bestowal  of 
honors  is  carried  to  an  unwarrantable  degree  during  an 
election  period,  and  numberless  disputes  arise  between 
claimants  as  to  the  authority  of  a  tribe  to  grant  titles,  and 


266  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

the  rights  of  the  recipients  to  receive  them.  Thus  the  last 
step  in  a  Samoan  election,  according  to  native  custom,  is  a 
war  of  succession. 

With  the  throne  left  vacant  by  Laupepa's  death,  three 
candidates  for  royal  honors  at  once  presented  themselves: 
Mataafa,  the  veteran,  fresh  from  his  enforced  retirement ; 
Malietoa  Tanu,  a  young  boy,  son  of  the  dead  king ;  and 
Tamasese,  who,  it  will  be  recalled,  had  been  created,  by  the 
Germans,  king  of  Samoa  in  opposition  to  Malietoa  Laupepa, 
in  1888.  Each  aspirant  was  of  royal  blood  —  i.e.  belonged 
to  families  who  were  eligible  to  the  kingship,  and  had,  there- 
fore, substantial  claims  for  the  honor  of  succeeding  Laupepa. 
Tamasese  had  a  comparatively  small  following  of  several 
hundred  men.  Tanu  was  popular  in  Apia,  and  was  supported 
by  many  foreigners,  especially  by  the  Americans  and  English, 
and  supposedly  by  the  Protestant  missionaries  ;  Mataafa  had 
practically  the  solid  backing  of  all  native  Samoa.  He  was 
the  popular  idol.  Delegations  of  natives  from  all  parts  of 
the  island  rallied  to  his  support.  Thousands  of  his  adherents 
came  to  Apia  in  the  hope  of  witnessing  the  triumph  of  their 
favorite  chief,  and  to  assist  in  the  ceremonies  of  his  anoint- 
ment as  king.  The  result  of  the  native  election  (November 
14,  1898)  was  in  favor  of  Mataafa,  both  Tanu  and  Tamasese 
showing  a  pitiful  weakness  in  face  of  the  overwhelming 
strength  of  the  Mataafa  party.  Tamasese  had  been  induced 
at  the  last  moment  to  withdraw  in  favor  of  Tanu.  The 
latter,  despite  the  inequality  of  the  contest,  and  no  doubt 
influenced  by  his  foreign  friends  and  supporters,  decided 
to  contest  the  election  with  Mataafa.  He  maintained  that 
Mataafa  was  not  eligible  to  the  office,  owing  to  the  fact 
that  he  had  suffered  exile,  and  that  he  had  returned  to 
Samoa  only  with  the  express  understanding  that  he  should 
never  seek  to  gratify  his  royal  ambitions. 

The  sixth  section  of  the  third  article  of  the  Berlin  Act 
provides  that :  — 

In  case  any  question  shall  hereafter  arise  in  Samoa  respecting 
the  rightful  election  or  appointment  of  King  or  of  any  other  chief 
claiming  authority  over  the  islands  .  .  .  such  question  shall  nofc 


THE   UNITED   STATES  AND  SAMOA.  267 

lead  to  war,  but  shall  be  presented  for  decision  to  the  chief  justice 
of  Samoa,  who  shall  decide  it  in  writing,  conformably  to  the  pro- 
visions of  this  Act  and  to  the  laws  and  customs  of  Samoa  not  in 
conflict  therewith ;  .  .  . 

The  choosing  of  a  king,  therefore,  fell  at  last  to  the  Supreme 
Court,  according  to  the  stipulations  of  the  tripartite  Berlin 
Act ;  but  the  selection  of  a  ruler  from  the  candidates  was, 
nevertheless,  to  be  made  by  the  court  in  strict  accordance 
with  the  laws  and  customs  of  Samoa.  William  L.  Chambers, 
an  American,  was  chief  justice,  under  authority  of  the  three 
signatory  powers,  and  upon  him,  therefore,  fell  the  responsi- 
bilities of  the  occasion.  An  excited  popular  interest,  both 
native  and  foreign,  became  inflamed  during  the  period  of  the 
trial.  The  Teutonic  element  in  Apia  warmly  espoused  the 
cause  of  Mataafa,  and  his  case  was  vigorously  conducted  in 
court  by  Herr  von  Bulow,  a  German  lawyer  well  versed  in 
Samoan  traditions. 

The  American  and  English  residents  suspected  that  the 
lively  German  interest  in  Mataafa's  success  was  owing  to 
some  secret  understanding  with  that  chief  by  which,  in  the 
event  of  his  election  as  king  of  Samoa,  he  was  to  submit  him- 
self to  the  will  of  the  German  Government,  and  even  aid  in 
securing  for  it  the  ultimate  control  of  the  islands.  Indeed, 
at  that  very  time,  rumors  were  rife  in  Apia  that  Germany 
contemplated  a  decisive  movement  toward  that  end.  The 
usual  jealousies  and  racial  antipathies  in  Apia  were  there- 
fore greatly  stimulated.  The  Germans  did  not  conceal  their 
desire  ultimately  to  win  Samoa  for  themselves  ;  but  for  the 
present  they  had  no  hesitancy  in  asserting  that  Mataafa  had 
been  rightfully  and  properly  elected  king,  and  that  they  sup- 
ported him  solely  through  a  sense  of  justice.  Mataafa,  it  will 
be  remembered,  was  the  former  arch  enemy  of  the  Germans. 
He  was  in  command  of  those  forces  which,  in  the  political 
disturbances  of  1887-88,  had  ambushed  and  killed  some  fifty 
German  marines  from  the  Adler.  This  act  had  called  down 
upon  him  the  denunciations  of  the  German  Government,  and 
had  left  him  barred  from  ruling  over  Samoa  by  a  protocol  of 
the  Berlin  Act,  —  a  condition  insisted  upon,  as  already  stated, 


268  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

by  Count  Bismarck  before  the  signing  of  that  instrument. 
The  attitude  of  the  Germans  in  suddenly  befriending  their 
former  enemy  in  Samoa  served  all  the  more  to  arouse 
American  and  English  suspicion  in  their  motives. 

It  was  upon  the  operation  of  this  protocol  that  the  Tanu 
party  based  its  claims  in  court ; — but  thereupon  Herr  Rose, 
the  German  Consul-General,  came  forward  and  officially 
withdrew  his  government's  objection  to  Mataafa  upon  that 
score.  Seemingly,  then,  Tanu  was  left  without  ground  to 
stand  upon.  The  eligibility  of  Mataafa  having  been  acknowl- 
edged by  the  Germans,  —  the  only  party  who  might  rationally 
object  to  his  choice,  —  and  his  eligibility  having  been  accepted 
by  Judge  Chambers  in  writing,  the  result  of  the  judicial  in- 
vestigation seemed  to  be  fully  assured  in  Mataafa's  favor. 
Pending  the  trial,  an  agreement  was  signed  by  the  representa- 
tives of  Tanu,  binding  themselves  and  their  clients  to  abide  by 
the  decision  of  the  chief  justice.  Mataafa,  firmly  convinced 
of  his  rights,  refused  to  enter  upon  such  an  agreement. 

"After  a  trial  of  eleven  days  of  patient  investigation," 
wrote  Judge  Chambers  afterward  to  his  brother  in  New 
York,  "  two  sessions  each  day  and  a  hard  study  every  night 
of  Samoan  genealogies,  customs,  titles,  and  practices,  I  came 
to  the  conclusion,  from  a  legal  and  conscientious  point  of 
view,  besides  upon  the  treaty  and  the  laws  and  customs  of 
Samoa  not  in  conflict  therewith,  that  Tanu,  the  son  of  the  late 
King  Malietoa,  and  who,  by  the  gift  of  the  people,  had  been 
endowed  with  the  name  of  Malietoa,  was  the  duly  elected 
king."   By  the  same  decision  Tamasese  was  created  vice-king. 

Judge  Chambers'  decision  was  based,  first,  upon  the  pro- 
tocol, which,  he  held,  for  all  time  barred  Mataafa,  and  there- 
fore left  no  other  candidate  in  the  field  but  the  young  Tanu  ; 
and,  secondly,  upon  the  fact  that  upon  3^oung  Tanu  only  had 
been  conferred,  by  the  natives,  the  requisite  number  of  hono- 
rific titles  which,  according  to  their  custom,  would  entitle 
him  to  the  kingship.  The  indignation  of  the  Germans,  and 
of  the  majority  of  natives,  was  very  great  when  the  result 
of  the  trial  was  proclaimed  ;  indeed,  when  the  opinion  was 
first  read,  December  31,  1898,  a  riot  was  only  averted  by 


THE   UNITED   STATES  AND   SAMOA  269 

an  armed  force  of  marines  landed  from  an  English  man-of- 
war, —  a  demonstration  in  which  the  justice  was  himself 
fully  prepared  to  join. 

The  decision  was  at  once  accepted  by  the  English  and 
American  consuls-general,  Messrs.  Maxse  and  Osborn,  but 
was  indignantly  scorned  by  the  German  Consul,  Herr  Rose. 
With  the  Germans  solidly  opposed  to  the  ruling  of  the  court, 
and  in  open  and  avowed  sympathy  with  the  defeated  party, 
Mataafa  was  encouraged  to  resist  this  decree  of  the  court. 
Conditions  were  favorable  for  a  revolt.  A  German  vessel 
was  in  the  harbor,  and  Mataafa's  wai-^^prs  were  restless  and 
hard  to  restrain;  for  weeks  they  had  been  preparing  to 
defend  the  cause  of  their  chief,  and  the  moment  was  now 
at  hand.  It  Was  a  period  '(^;  intense  excitement,  and  the 
Mataafans  felt  that  their  leader  had  been  greatly  wronged. 
For  one  day  only  was  there  hesitancy  and  suspense,  and 
then  the  Mataafa  forces  broke  from  their  camp  at  Mulinuu 
and  swept  into  Apia,  headed,  as  the  Americans  alleged,  by 
German  officers,  one  detachment  of  the  "rebels"  actually 
being  led  by  the  president  of  the  municipality,  Herr 
Johaness  Raffel.  The  Tanu  supporters  could  not  withstand 
the  "  rebel "  assault ;  they  fled  in  every  direction,  many 
taking  refuge  upon  the  British  gunboats  at  anchor  in  the 
harbor,  while  the  chief  justice  was  himself  obliged  to  seek 
safety  in  flight.  Mataafa  was  at  once  in  control,  aritl,  with 
some  pomp,  crowned  himself  king. 

In  the  midst  of  this  confusion,  the  three  consuls  succeeded 
in  effecting  a  truce  (January  5,  1899),  by  the  unanimous 
acceptance  of  the  Mataafa  Government  as  the  "  Provisional 
government  of  Samoa,"  which  it  was  expected  would  at  least 
keep  the  peace  until  a  way  out  of  the  difficulties  could  be 
decided  upon.  The  text  of  this  consular  agreement  took  the 
form  of  the  following  proclamation :  — 

Owing  to  the  events  of  the  last  few  days  and  to  the  urgent  neces- 
sity of  establishing  a  strong  provisional  government  for  Samoa, 
we,  the  undersigned  consular  representatives  of  the  three  treaty 
powers,  declare  as  follows  :  — 

1.   The  Mataafa  party,  represented  by  the  High  Chief  Mataafa 


270  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

and  the  following  thirteen  chiefs  .  .  .  who  lately  acted  in  be- 
half of  said  party,  and  who  are  now  in  de  facto  possession  of  the 
government,  are  recognized  to  be  the  provisional  government  of 
Samoa,  pending  instructions  from  the  three  powers. 

2.  The  President  [of  the  Municipality]  to  be  the  Executive  of 
the  said  Provisional  Government. 

3.  Nothing  in  this  proclamation  shall  be  taken  as  modifying  or 
abrogating  the  rights  of  the  three  treaty  powers  in  Samoa,  either 
individually  or  collectively,  or  of  their  Consular  representatives 
as  now  existing. 

Given  at  Apia  this  4th  day  of  January,  1889. 

EosE, 
^  Imp.  Gov.  Consul  Gen. 

L.  W.  OSBORN,  '} 

U.  S.  Con.  Gen.        ; 
Ernest  G.  B.  Mj^xse, 
H.  B.  M.  Consul. 

So  far  as  the  affairs  of  Apia  were  concerned,  the  presi- 
dent of  the  municipality,  Herr  Raffel,  was  thereby  placed  in 
control  as  the  executive  officer  of.^  the  provisional  govern- 
ment. 

This  action  was  a  decided  victory  for  the  German  Consul, 
Herr  Rose,  as  it  gave  the  color  of  virtue  to  the  revolution 
against  the  legally  chosen  Tanu.  With  Herr  Raffel  in  con- 
trol, and  with  the  sympathy  of  nearly  all  Samoa  behind  them^ 
the  Germans  in  Apia  were  in  a  position  to  bring  about  peace 
with  the  probable  acceptance  of  King  Mataafa  by  the  powers. 
To  accomplish  these  ends,  moderation  and  a  very  keen 
appreciation  of  what  was  fitting  and  proper  to  do  under 
the  circumstances  were  necessary.  However,  both  Herr 
Raffel  and  Consul  Rose,  being  men  of  uncertain  temper  and 
somewhat  wanting  in  tact,  permitted  their  better  judg- 
ment to  be  so  far  overcome  by  the  excitements  of  the  moment 
that  the  very  next  day  after  the  proclamation  they  seized 
the  courthouse,  barred  the  doors,  and  issued  a  notice  that  the 
Supreme  Court  had  adjourned  until  further  notice  from 
the  provisional  government.  In  reply  to  this  startling  notice. 
Captain  Sturdee,  of  the  English  man-of-war.  Porpoise,  upon 
which  the  chief  justice  had  taken  refuge,  issued  a  statement 
to  the  effect  that  the  Supreme  Court  having  been  "  illegally 


THE   UNITED   STATES   AND   SAMOA  271 

closed  by  the  provisional  government,  and  the  orders  of  the 
chief  justice  posted  at  the  courthouse  torn  down  by  armed 
troops  of  the  government,  the  chief  justice,  supported  by 
the  United  States  Consul  General  and  Her  British  Majesty's 
Consul,  under  the  protection  of  the  armed  forces  of  the  Por- 
poise^ will  hold  a  court  to-day  at  noon.  If  resistance  is  met, 
which  it  is  hoped  will  not  be  the  case,  fire  will  be  opened  to 
support  the  rights  of  these  two  great  powers." 

Thereupon  Herr  Raffel,  no  doubt  recalling  the  words  of 
Louis  XIV,  declared  himself  to  he  the  Supreme  Court,  and  en- 
couraged by  the  German  Consul,  he  took  formal  possession 
of  the  building  in  the  name  of  the  provisional  government. 
According  to  his  threat,  Captain  Sturdee  sent  ashore  his 
marines,  who  accompanied  Mr.  Chambers  to  the  courthouse 
and  assisted  him  in  taking  forcible  possession  of  the  prem- 
ises. In  this  attempt  to  oust  the  Germans,  personal  encount- 
ers between  high  officials  took  place,  and  Mr.  Chambers 
resumed  his  seat  amid  the  mingled  cheers  and  jeers  of  the 
divided  spectators.  An  indignant  German  resident  Elated 
the  sanctity  of  the  courthouse  by  wilfully  smashing  its 
windows,  whereupon  justice  Chambers  ordered  him  to  be 
arrested,  fined  and  committed  to  jail.  Herr  Raffel  there- 
upon released  his  compatriot,  and  the  German  Consul  pro- 
tested against  the  action  of  the  American  judge  in  fining 
a  German  subject.  The  American  and  English  consuls 
returned  sharp  answers  to  Herr  Rose,  and  thereafter  even 
the  semblance  of  peaceful  relations  ceased  between  the  rival 
factions.  As  among  the  natives  themselves,  war  between 
the  whites  in  Apia  was  virtually  declared,  and  the  marines 
from  the  English  and  German  gunboats  in  the  harbor  were 
quite  ready  to  respond  to  any  call.  In  the  meantime,  Mat- 
aafa  with  a  force  of  several  thousand  warriors  held  Mulinuu, 
the  royal  seat,  and  bade  defiance  to  all  who  should  seek  to 
dislodge  him.  In  Apia  a  reign  of  terror  was  inaugurated; 
throughout  the  island  a  season  of  riot  and  pillage  began. 

When  tidings  of  this  new  Samoan  upheaval  reached  the 
outer  world,  the  three  treaty  powers  seemed  at  a  loss  to  know 
just  how  to  act.     The  occasion  was  an  auspicious  one  for  the 


272  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

American  press  to  open  an  assault  upon  Germany.  Criti- 
cism of  Germany  was  at  that  moment  acceptable  to  all  par- 
ties, as  the  Admiral  Diedrich  episode  at  Manila  Bay  was  still 
fresh  in  mind.  The  history  of  German  intrigue  in  Samoa 
was  fully  reviewed  in  highly  colored  accounts,  and  the  story 
of  the  lively  careers  of  consuls  Steubel  and  Knappe  were 
glowingly  rehearsed  to  demonstrate  Germany's  hostile  atti- 
tude toward  the  United  States.  In  these  proceedings  was 
found  another  link  in  that  chain  of  evidence  which  proved 
the  enmity  of  Germany.  The  German  Government,  it  was 
insisted,  should  be  called  upon  to  answer  for  a  gross  viola- 
tion of  the  Berlin  Act.  That  Consul  Rose  and  President 
Raff  el  were  wholly  in  the  wrong  there  could  be  no  doubt, 
for  had  they  not  refused  to  accept  the  final  decision  of  the 
Supreme  Court,  in  violation  of  treaty  regulations  ;  had  they 
not  furthermore  encouraged  the  defeated  party  into  open 
revolt  against  the  law  of  the  land;  had  they  not  seized  the 
courthouse,  broken  the  jail,  and  were  they  not  to  be  charged 
with  having  instituted  a  reign  of  anarchy  ?  The  valor  of 
the  Americans  and  English  in  upholding  the  decision  of  the 
chief  justice  against  great  odds  was  highly  commended,  and 
a  desire  was  generally  manifested  for  a  warship  to  be  sent 
at  once  to  the  scene. 

The  German  side  of  the  case  was  simply  that  the  decision 
of  Chief  Justice  Chambers  was  biassed,  and  decidedly  unjust ; 
indeed,  it  was  so  outrageous  it  could  not  be  tolerated.  In 
justification  of  their  conduct  the  Germans  insisted  that  they 
had  only  sought  to  prevent  the  imposition  of  a  weakling  upon 
the  people  who  was  not  the  choice  of  the  Samoans,  and  whose 
succession  to  the  throne  would  inevitably  lead  to  war.  They 
charged  the  missionary  party  with  complicity  (Mataafa  being 
a  Catholic),  and  Justice  Chambers  with  corruption.  If  they 
had  exceeded  the  bounds  of  propriety  in  their  methods  to 
relieve  the  situation  in  Apia,  it  was  because  of  their  zeal  to 
right  a  wrong  as  quickly  as  possible. 

Much  anxiety  was  nevertheless  felt  upon  all  sides  lest  the 
signatory  powers  would  seek  to  uphold  the  acts  of  their 
agents  in  Samoa,  and  thus  expand  the  disturbances  in  the 


THE   UNITED   STATES   AND   SAMOA  273 

islands  into  an  international  quarrel.  Obviously  the  course 
of  wisdom  lay  in  disregarding  the  recent  happenings  in  Apia, 
and  proceeding  at  once  to  a  review  of  Justice  Chambers' 
decision. 

Germany  first  relieved  the  tension  by  a  disavowal  of  the 
course  which  had  been  followed  by  her  consul-general  in 
Apia,  and  by  the  bestowal  of  a  reprimand  upon  Herr  Raffel, 
which  caused  that  indignant  official  to  resign  his  position. 
The  Parliamentary  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs  announced 
that  England  was  awaiting  further  information  before  recog- 
nizing Mataafa  as  king  of  Samoa.  This  evidence  of  a  con- 
ciliatory policy  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain  further  eased 
the  situation. 

The  first  move  of  the  United  States  after  a  hasty  diplo- 
matic parley  in  Washington  between  Secretary  Hay  and 
the  representatives  of  Great  Britain  and  Germany  (where 
assurances  were  given  that  the  matters  would  be  peaceably 
settled)  was  to  despatch  a  war  vessel  with  a  commander  of 
high  rank  to  the  scene.  Accordingly  the  U.  S.  S.  Philadel- 
phia^ Admiral  Kautz  in  command,  was  immediately  ordered 
to  Samoa,  arriving  at  Apia  on  the  9th  of  March,  1899. 
The  admiral  was  instructed  to  enforce  order,  but  to  take  no 
decided  steps  in  upholding  either  party  without  urgent 
necessity. 

The  situation  that  Admiral  Kautz  discovered  upon  his 
arrival  in  Apia  was  a  troublesome  one  with  which  to  deal. 
An  official  deadlock  existed.  Mataafa  warriors  were  active, 
and  desultory  fighting  continued  in  all  the  islands.  The  ad- 
miral, as  senior  naval  officer  in  the  harbor,  called  a  meeting 
of  the  three  consuls  and  of  the  naval  commanders  then  in 
port.  A  two  days'  conference  was  held,  as  a  result  of  which 
Admiral  Kautz  issued  a  proclamation  on  March  11,  setting 
forth  that  "it  is  agreed  that  the  so-called  provisional  gov- 
ernment, under  the  High  Chief  Mataafa  and  thirteen  other 
chiefs  can  have  no  legal  status  under  the  Berlin  treaty,  and 
can  therefore  not  be  recognized  by  the  consular  and  naval 
representatives."  TJie  proclamation  ordered  Mataafa  and  his 
ivarriors  to  disperse  quietly  to  their  homes ;  it  also  upheld 


274  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

the  decree  of  Chief  Justice  Chambers,  and  ordered  that  the 
chiefs  of  the  Tanu  party,  who  had  been  deported  to  other 
islands,  should  be  returned  to  their  own  homes ;  it  ordered 
that  the  decrees  of  the  court  should  be  respected,  and  ended 
in  a  threat  that  unless  these  things  should  be  done,  military 
force  would  be  employed  to  carry  out  the  purposes  of  the 
instrument. 

Admiral  Kautz,  no  doubt,  assumed  that  a  majority  vote  of 
the  consuls  was  sufficient  to  authorize  any  such  proceeding 
—  an  opinion  which  was  not  shared  by  the  German  Consul. 
The  latter  held  that  unanimity  of  consular  agreement  was 
required  to  order  the  dissolution  of  the  provisional  govern- 
ment. Two  days  later  he  met  the  admiral's  proclamation 
by  a  counter-proclamation  which  gave  — 

Notice  to  all  Samoans  :  By  the  proclamation  of  the  Admiral 
of  the  United  States,  dated  March  11,  it  was  made  known  that 
the  three  Consuls  of  the  signatory  powers  of  the  Berlin  treaty,  as 
well  as  the  three  commanders  of  men-of-war,  had  been  unanimous 
in  deciding  to  recognize  no  more  the  provisional  government  com- 
posed of  Mataafa  and  thirteen  chiefs. 

I,  therefore,  make  known  to  you  that  this  proclamation  is  quite 
false.  I,  the  German  Consul  General,  continue  to  recognize  the 
provisional  government  of  Samoa  until  I  have  received  contrary 
instructions  from  my  government. 

Rose,  German  Consul  General. 

Apia,  March  13,  1899. 

Instead  of  dispersing,  as  ordered  by  Admiral  Kautz,  the 
Mataafa  party  became  more  aggressively  defiant  and  bold. 
They  occupied  and  fortified  positions  within  the  neutral  area 
of  the  municipality.  More  Tanu  supporters  were  cap- 
tured and  deported  to  other  islands.  The  triumph  of 
Mataafa  seemed  to  be  complete  when  Admiral  Kautz  inter- 
fered by  force  of  arms.  His  ultimatum  to  the  rebellious 
chieftain  to  cease  hostilities  carried  with  it  the  threat  of  a 
bombardment  to  begin  at  one  o'clock,  Mareh^l5.  Wlien 
that  moment  arrived,  the  Mataafans  refused  to  yield  their 
positions  in  Apia,  and  the  shelling  process  began.  Ameri- 
can and  English  marines  were  landed,  and  fought  side  by 


THE   UNITED   STATES  AND   SAMOA  275 

side,  the  Germans  taking  no  part.  The  war  was  carried  on 
in  all  the  islands.  The  Philadelphia^  and  the  English  vessels, 
Porpoise  and  Royalist^  began  a  systematic  bombardment  of 
the  coast  villages  which  were  known  to  be  in  sympathy  with 
Mataafa.  This  method  of  warfare  upon  the  defenceless 
natives,  the  women  and  children  of  the  villages  along  the 
coast,  had  been  roundly  denounced  by  Captain  Leary  when 
the  Germans  had  adopted  the  same  tactics  against  Laupepa 
and  Mataafa  in  1888 ;  and  it  is  difficult  to  find  justification 
for  it  at  any  time,  whatever  may  be  the  provocation.  To 
fire  upon  non-combatants  is  not  only  opposed  to  all  rules  of 
civilized  warfare,  but  in  these  particular  cases  it  would  seem 
to  be  the  refinement  of  inhumanity.  The  worst  offence  of 
the  natives  was  the  desire  to  elect  a  king  according  to  their 
own  custom,  —  a  privilege  accorded  them  in  the  treaty,  and 
for  some  mysterious  reason  denied  them.  In  one  encounter 
(April  1),  a  squad  of  American  and  English  sailors,  led  by 
several  officers  from  the  Philadelphia^  were  surprised  by 
Mataafans,  and  a  number  killed  and  decapitated,  including 
two  American  officers. 

Mataafa  was,  however,  soon  obliged  to  retire  from  Mulinuu, 
and  Tanu  was  thereupon  crowned  king  (March  23)  in  the 
presence  of  some  natives  and  the  American  and  English 
officials.  Mataafa  continued  in  open  rebellion,  with  head- 
quarters in  the  bush,  and  a  number  of  engagements  of  more 
or  less  importance  ensued.  During  the  latter  part  of  April 
news  reached  Apia  of  the  appointment  by  the  three  signatory 
powers  of  an  investigating  commission.  Only  then  was  a 
truce  declared.  Both  parties  rested  upon  their  arms,  and 
in  a  sullenly  expectant  mood  the  opposing  foreign  factions 
in  Apia  consented  to  await  the  coming  of  the  commission. 

As  soon  as  it  was  possible,  the  diplomacy  of  the  three 
interested  nations  was  brought  to  bear  upon  the  situation. 
Fortunately  all  three  powers  assumed  an  unexpectedly  com- 
plaisant attitude,  and  in  that  quarter  where  calmness  and 
forbearance  were  least  expected  they  were  most  readily  forth- 
coming. In  a  speech  before  the  Reichstag,  on  the  14th  of 
April,  Herr  von  Bulow  declared  that  it  "would  be  simply 


276  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

criminal  to  let  loose  war  between  three  great  and  civilized 
nations"  because  of  such  a  quarrel.  From  Germany,  the 
traditional  offender  in  Samoa,  came  a  proposition  for  a  Joint 
High  Commission,  representing  the  three  powers,  to  proceed 
at  once  to  the  scene  of  disturbance.  The  proposed  commis- 
sion should  restore  order  in  the  islands,  ascertain  the  causes 
of  the  present  trouble,  and  report  to  their  home  government 
its  recommendations  for  future  legislation. 

No  more  promising  method  of  a  settlement  could  be 
devised.  The  United  States  and  Great  Britain  at  once 
accepted  the  proposition  from  Berlin,  and  general  satisfac- 
tion was  felt  when  the  State  Department  announced  the 
appointment  of  such  a  commission.  The  personnel  of  the 
commission  inspired  confidence,  and  the  fact  that  the  German 
and  English  members  were  selected  by  their  respective  gov- 
ernments from  among  the  diplomats  residing  in  Washington, 
and  who  were  presumably  in  touch  with  American  opinion 
on  the  subject,  gave  further  promise  of  a  satisfactory  con- 
clusion. The  commission  departed  from  San  Francisco 
April  25,  on  the  U.  S.  S.  Badger^  arriving  in  Apia  on  May 
13. 

The  three  commissioners  were,  —  for  the  United  States, 
Judge  Bartlett  Tripp,  of  South  Dakota  (elected  Chairman) ; 
for  Great  Britain,  Sir  Charles  Eliot,  Second  Secretary  of  the 
British  Embassy  at  Washington  ;  and  for  Germany,  Baron 
Speck  von  Sternberg,  First  Secretary  of  the  German 
Embassy  in  Washington. 

The  commission  carried  full  authority  to  establish  a  pro- 
visional government  in  Samoa,  and  to  enforce  order.  All 
officials  under  the  Berlin  tre^aJty*  or  those  representing  their 
governments  in  Apia,  were  instructed  to  surrender  their 
authority  to  the  commission.  Thus  by  acquiring  full  juris- 
diction over  the  islands,  the  commission  would  not  be 
hampered  in  the  fulfilment  of  the  more  important  duties 
with  which  it  was  charged.  These  duties  were  a  careful 
inquiry  into  the  social  and  political  condition  of  the  islands ; 
an  examination  of  rival  claims  to  the  throne,  and  a  review 
of  the  chief  justice's  decision.     The  commission  was  further 


THE   UNITED   STATES  AND   SAMOA  277 

charged  to  make  investigation  into  the  causes  that  led  to 
the  recent  riots  and  disturbances,  as  well  as  to  the  bombard- 
ments that  followed  on  the  part  of  the  American  and  English 
war  vessels,  and  to  the  various  arrests  and  acts  of  violence 
which  had  taken  place.  Finally,  the  commission  was  in- 
structed to  "  consider  the  provisions  which  might  be  neces- 
sary for  the  future  government  of  the  islands  or  for  the 
modification  of  the  final  act  of  Berlin,"  and  report  ac- 
cordingly. 

On  their  arrival,  the  commissioners  found  a  condition 
of  nervous  excitement  existing  in  Apia.  Mataafan  forces 
surrounded  the  municipality ;  native  and  white  soldiers 
patrolled  the  streets  of  the  town,  six  men-of-war  lay  at 
anchor  in  the  harbor,  and  all  business  was  suspended.  Their 
reception  by  the  usually  demonstrative  natives,  as  well  as  by 
the  whites,  was  unexpectedly  cold.  This  lack  of  cordiality 
was  owing  to  the  fact  that  the  natives  distrusted  the  com- 
petency or  ability  of  a  committee  wholly  ignorant  of  Samoan 
customs  to  satisfactorily  adjust  their  difficulties.  The  com- 
mission lost  no  time  in  entering  upon  its  double  task.  The 
first  step  was  to  disarm  the  natives,  which  was  successfully 
accomplished  within  two  weeks  by  promises  of  restoration  of 
the  arms  or  their  equivalent  in  money  after  peace  had  been 
secured.  After  a  series  of  meetings  with  the  residents, 
native  and  foreign,  the  commission  reached  the  conclusion 
that  the  decision  of  the  chief  justice  was  valid.  "The 
decision  declaring  Tanu  to  be  king  was  the  law  of  Samoa, 
and  all  who  refused  obedience  to  it  violated  not  the  decision 
alone,  but  the  treaty  upon  which  it  was  based  "  wrote  Mr. 
Tripp.     Hence,  a  vindication  of  Admiral  Kautz. 

The  provisional  government  of  Mataafa  and  Herr  Raffel 
which  had  been  inaugurated  by  the  three  consuls  in  January, 
having  ceased  to  exist,  the  commission  declared  Tanu  to  be 
king  ;  but  that  young  man,  already  wearied  of  the  uncertain 
glories  of  political  life,  and  being,  moreover,  ambitious  to 
adopt  the  career  of  a  missionary,  promptly  abdicated  !  Then 
^  arose  the  question  as  to  the  advisability  of  abolishing  the 
kingship.     The  various  islands  were  canvassed,  and  many 


278  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

meetings  held  with  chiefs  in  various  parts  of  the  group, 
which  resulted  in  a  discovery  that  the  larger  sentiment  of 
natives  and  foreigners  favored  the  plan  of  the  commission 
to  do  away  entirely  with  that  office.  In  the  wisdom  of  this 
reform  both  Tanu  and  Mataafa  agreed,  the  latter  chief  no 
doubt  concluding  to  abandon  his  struggle  against  what  now 
seemed  to  him  to  be  the  decrees  of  fate.  Another  provisional 
government  was  thereupon  established  consisting  of  the 
three  consuls,  with  the  president  of  the  municipality,  Dr. 
Solf  (Herr  Raff  el  had  resigned),  as  adviser.  Pledges  of 
peace  between  the  rival  native  factions  were  secured,  and 
harmony  reigned  when  the  commission  departed  upon  the 
homeward  journey,  July  18.  Mr.  Chambers  left  the  islands, 
Mr.  Osborn  was  designated  Chief  Justice,  and  Dr.  Solf  re- 
mained president  of  the  municipal  council.  There  was 
no  king. 

Before  leaving  the  islands  the  commissioners  reached  an 
agreement  recommending  a  new  form  of  government  for 
Samoa.  Their  conclusions  were  embodied  in  a  i^reliminary 
draft  of  treaty  before  the  three  powers  for  the  amendment  or 
the  modification  of  the  Berlin  Act.  Accompanying  the  draft 
of  treaty  was  a  joint  report  explanatory  of  the  proposed 
reforms. 

The  conclusions  of  the  commissioners  had  been*  arrived  at 
in  a  logical  manner.  First,  the  ills  of  Samoa  and  the  evils 
which  caused  them  were  investigated  and  classified,  and  then 
to  each  category  of  evils  were  proposed  such  remedies  as 
seemed  to  the  commission  best  calculated  to  remove  or  at 
least  to  minimize  them.  These  "  evils  "  were  grouped  under 
four  heads. 

1.  Those  evils  which  appear  inevitably  to  attend  the 
election  of  a  king  in  Samoa,  and  his  subsequent  efforts  to 
exert  his  authority. 

2.  Those  evils  due  to  the  rivalry  of  foreign  nationalities  and 
to  the  disposition  of  the  whites  to  take  sides  in  native  politics. 

3.  A  class  of  evils  having  origin  in  the  fact  that  there  is' 
no  law  or  government  in  the  islands  outside  of  Apia  other 
than  native  customs. 


THE  UNITED   STATES  AND   SAMOA  \,  279 

4.  The  evils  arising  from  the  insufficient  enforcement  of 
the  customs  regulations  allowing  the  distribution  of  arms 
among  the  natives. 

To  offset  these  four  prime  causes  of  dissension  in  Samoa, 
the  joint  report  proposed,  —  first,  the  abolition  of  the  king- 
ship. That,  it  was  believed,  could  be  effected  without  even 
the  regrets  of  the  natives.  The  office  was  a  "  comparatively 
modern  institution,"  of  which  it  was  "  impossible  to  say  any 
good  whatever."  In  place  of  the  kingship  a  "system  of  na- 
tive government  analogous  to  that  which  works  successfully 
in  Fiji "  was  proposed.  This  system  of  nativfe  government 
contemplated  a  division  of  the  islands  into  administrative 
districts,  corresponding  to  those  recognized  by  Samoan  usage, 
and  over  each  of  which  a  native  chief  would  preside.  These 
chiefs  were  to  meet  annually  in  council ;  native  courts  would 
be  established  with  jurisdiction  over  minor  crimes,  and  in 
accordance  with  native  laws  and  customs. 

The  second  class  of  evils  which  found  origin  in  the  jeal- 
ousies of  the  foreign  factions  in  Apia  were  recognized  to  be 
the  most  difficult  of  all  to  meet.  Hostility  among  the 
foreigners  "permeates  all  departments  of  life."  "The 
traders  on  the  one  side  combined  against  those  on  the  other. 
.  .  .  The  municipal  council  is  divided."  Reforms  were 
declared  never  to  be  judged  upon  their  merit,  but  always 
"by  party  considerations,"  —  all  officers  were  found  to  be 
partisans.  As  a  cure  for  these  evils  three  measures  were 
proposed  :  (a)  the  appointment  of  an  administrator  to  be 
chosen  by  a  neutral  power,  and  who  should  possess  a  large 
measure  of  authority  ;  (5)  the  appointment  of  three  dele- 
gates by  the  signatory  powers  to  assist  the  administrator  and 
also  to  exercise  such  consular  powers  as  may  become  neces- 
sary. They,  together  with  the  administrator,  form  a  "  legis- 
lative council";  (c)  the  abolition  of  consular  jurisdiction 
and  the  consequent  abandonment  of  extraterritoriality,  there 
being  no  real  need  of  three  separate  judicial  systems  in  the 
island.  "  Hitherto  consular  jurisdiction  has  been  a  powerful 
means  of  embittering  internal  strife  in  Apia.  Each  nation- 
ality has  its  own  law,  and  the  consul  who  administers  that 


280  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

law  was  popularly  regarded  not  as  an  impartial  judge  but 
as  the  protector  of  his  own  nationality.  We  believe  that  by 
abolishing  this  outward  sign  of  separate  internal  institutions, 
and  by  submitting  all  nationalities  to  one  court  and  one  law, 
a  great  advance  will  be  made  in  the  direction  of  removing 
petty  rivalries  and  jealousies,  and  restoring  good  relations 
between  the  various  white  colonies." 

To  meet  the  third  class  of  evils  —  the  lawlessness  prevail- 
ing outside  the  municipality  of  Apia  —  the  joint  report 
proposed  the  enlargement  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  chief 
justice  over  all  the  islands,  so  as  to  include  all  cases  be- 
tween natives  and  foreigners. 

The  strict  enforcement  of  customs  regulations  according 
to  law  it  was  believed  would  remedy  the  evils  of  the  fourth 
class,  and  such  reform  was  therefore  urged. 

In  brief,  the  recommendations  of  the  commission  for  the 
alteration  of  the  Berlin  Act  were  for  the  abolition  of  the  king- 
ship and  of  consular  jurisdiction,  the  extension  of  the  juris- 
diction of  the  Supreme  Court  and  the  establishment  of  native 
courts,  the  creation  of  a  neutral  administrator  of  large 
authority  and  the  appointment  of  a  tripartite  council  which 
should  act  as  a  legislative  council,  each  councillor  being 
charged  at  the  same  time  with  consular  duties. 

These  recommendations  were  made  as  offering  the  best 
possible  solution  of  the  difficulties  so  long  as  the  three  inter- 
ested nations  should  continue  to  maintain  their  positions  in 
Samoa,  but  the  commissioners  frankly  admitted  that  no 
wholly  satisfactory  arrangement  could  be  made  while  the 
triple-dominion  continued. 

We  do  not  think  it  will  ever  be  possible  to  do  away  with  this 
state  of  things  under  a  tripartite  administration,  and  we  take  this 
opportunity  of  recording  our  opinion  that  the  only  natural  and 
normal  plan  of  government  for  these  islands,  and  the  only  system 
which  can  assure  permanent  prosperity  and  tranquillity,  is  a  gov- 
ernment by  one  power.  We  regard  it,  however,  as  beyond  our 
province  to  make  any  but  a  general  statement  on  such  a  subject, 
and  we  have  endeavored  to  amend  existing  arrangements  in  such 
a  manner,  that  they  may  prove,  if  not  entirely  satisfactory,  at 
least  workable. 


THE    UNITED   STATES   AND   SAMOA  281 

The  action  of  the  Joint  High  Commission  was  generally 
approved  in  the  United  States.  Those  who  had  followed 
the  course  of  Samoan  history  found  in  the  proposed  abolition 
of  the  kingship  the  removal  of  the  chief  cause  of  dissension 
in  the  islands.  Most  of  the  quarrels  in  Apia  had  no  doubt 
originated  in  the  more  or  less  open  attempts  of  one  or  another 
foreign  faction  to  create  a  puppet  king,  who  would  do  the 
bidding  of  his  masters.  With  this  source  of  dissension 
removed,  the  rival  factions  would  have  far  less  cause  of 
disagreement. 

In  October,  1899,  negotiations  were  begun  in  Washington 
for  a  joint  consideration  of  the  proposals  made  by  the  com- 
mission, and  for  the  amendment  or  alteration  of  the  Berlin 
Act.  In  Samoa,  the  probable  partition  of  the  group  had 
for  some  time  been  hinted  at,  the  current  opinion  being 
that  Germany  would  insist  upon  the  retention  of  Upolu, 
and  that  Great  Britain  would  take  the  larger  but  less 
important  island  of  Savaii.  Neither  Great  Britain  nor  the 
United  States  seems  to  have  contemplated  such  action  at  this 
particular  moment,  nor  to  have  considered  the  possibility  at 
that  time  of  abrogating  in  toto  the  Berlin  Act.  From  Ger- 
many again  came  the  rational  proposition  of  the  hour.  All 
three  powers  had  been  impressed  by  the  assertion  of  the 
Joint  Commission  that  "  the  only  system  of  government  that 
can  assure  permanent  prosperity  and  tranquillity  is  a  govern- 
ment of  one  power";  but  the  difficulty  lay  in  making  a  sat- 
isfactory arrangement  to  that  end.  Indeed  a  division  of  the 
islands  among  the  three  powers  appeared  to  both  England  and 
the  United  States  a  hopeless  accomplishment,  however  desir- 
able such  a  solution  of  the  difficulties  might  be.  The  rival 
interests  of  Germany  and  Great  Britain  in  the  Pacific  seemed 
to  preclude  any  such  action  —  at  least  upon  a  thoroughly 
friendly  basis.  However,  the  German  foreign  office  in- 
sisted that  the  time  for  partition  had  come,  and  upon 
no  other  basis  could  the  Samoan  difficulty  be  adjusted. 
Ultimate  apportionment  of  the  islands  was  inevitable,  and 
no  time,  it  maintained,  could  be  more  appropriate  than 
the   present  for  such  action.      The   tripartite   government 


282  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

had  proved  a  failure  and  a  source  of  danger  in  the  past ; 
it  would  likely  be  the  same  in  the  future,  were  it  permitted 
to  exist. 

In  a  scheme  of  partition  the  interests  of  the  United  States 
clearly  entitled  her  to  the  retention  of  Tutuila  and  its  valu- 
able harbor  of  Pago- Pago,  and  perhaps  to  no  more ;  but  the 
interests  of  Germany  and  Great  Britain  in  the  Pacific  were 
far  more  complex  ;  neither  power  could  well  retire  from  Apia. 
In  the  first  attempts  to  reach  a  conclusion  in  the  matter  of 
partition  of  the  islands,  it  became  very  apparent  that  the 
group  was,  after  all,  too  small  for  a  satisfactory  division,  and 
the  question  soon  narrowed  itself  down  to  whether  Great 
Britain  or  Germany  should  retire  from  Samoa,  in  considera- 
tion of  benefits  to  be  granted,  and  leave  the  other  in  sole 
possession.  The  extent  of  land  owned  in  Samoa  by  the 
Germans  greatly  exceeded  the  holdings  of  other  nationalities. 
Their  investments  were  larger,  their  trade  greater.  They 
had  been  the  first  to  exploit  the  islands  commercially,  and 
had  always  taken  a  more  direct  and  active  interest  in  the 
government  and  politics  of  the  Samoans.  Their  claim  to  the 
group  was  probably  stronger  than  that  of  England. 

An  understanding  was  reached  in  November,  and  it  was 
quite  fitting  that-  Great  Britain  agreed  to  withdraw  entirely 
from  the  islands.  By  Anglo-German  treaty,  signed  Novem- 
ber 14  (1899),  Germany  retained  full  possession  of  all  the 
islands  of  the  Samoan  group  west  of  longitude  171°  W. 
This  included  the  entire  group,  with  the  exception  of  Tutuila 
and  some  near-by  smaller  islands  of  little  or  no  importance. 
As  a  compensation  for  her  abandonment  of  all  Samoan  claims, 
Great  Britain  accej)ted  from  Germany  the  latter's  rights  in 
the  Tongan  Islands,  a  group  lying  several  hundred  miles  south 
of  Samoa ;  England  also  received  the  German  islands  of 
Choiseul  and  San  Isobel,  of  the  Solomon  group.  Germany 
also  made  certain  other  concessions  to  England  in  Africa. 

On  December  2  (1899),  a  treaty  was  accordingly  signed 
in  Washington  by  the  representatives  of  the  three  powers. 
As  this  document  marks  the  final  episode  of  American 
complicity  in  Samoan  affairs,  it  is  quoted  in  full. 


THE   UNITED   STATES   AND   SAMOA  283 

A  Convention  signed  at  Washington,  December  2, 1899,  between 
the  United  States,  Germany,  and  Great  Britain,  to  adjust  amicably 
the  questions  between  the  three  Governments  in  respect  to  the 
Samoan  group  of  islands. 

The  President  of  the  United  States  of  America,  His  Imperial 
Majesty  the  German  Emperor,  King  of  Prussia,  and  Her  Majesty 
the  Queen  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland, 
Empress  of  India,  desiring  to  adjust  amicably  the  questions  which 
have  arisen  between  them  in  respect  to  the  Samoan  group  of 
Islands,  as  well  as  to  avoid  all  future  misunderstanding  in  respect 
to  their  joint  or  several  rights  and  claims  of  possession  or  juris- 
diction therein,  have  agreed  to  establish  and  regulate  the  same  by 
a  special  convention;  and  whereas  the  Governments  of  Germany 
and  Great  Britain  have,  with  the  concurrence  of  that  of  the 
United  States,  made  an  agreement  regarding  their  respective 
rights  and  interests  in  the  aforesaid  group,  the  three  Powers 
before  named  in  furtherance  of  the  ends  above  mentioned  have 
appointed  respectively  their  Plenipotentiaries  as  follows : 

The  President  of  the  United  States  of  America,  The  Honorable 
John  Hay,  Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States ; 

His  Majesty  the  German  Emperor,  King  of  Prussia,  His  Ambas- 
sador Extraordinary  and  Plenipotentiary,  Herr  von  Holleben ;  and 

Her  Majesty  the  Queen  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  Empress 
of  India, the  Right  Honorable  Lord  Pauncefote  of  Preston,  G.  C.  B., 
G.  C.  M.  G.,  Her  Brittanic  Majesty's  Ambassador  Extraordinary 
and  Plenipotentiary : 

who,  after  having  communicated  each  to  the  other  their  respec- 
tive full  powers,  which  were  found  to  be  in  proper  form,  have 
agreed  upon  and  concluded  the  following  articles : 

Article  I 

The  general  Act  concluded  and  signed  by  the  aforesaid  Powers 
at  Berlin  on  the  14th  day  of  June,  a.d.  18$9,  and  all  previous 
treaties,  conventions  and  agreements  relating  to  Samoa,  are 
annulled. 

Article  II 

Germany  renounces  in  favor  of  the  United  States  of  America 
all  her  rights  and  claims  over  and  in  respect  to  the  Island  of 
Tutuila  and  all  other  islands  of  the  Samoan  group  east  of  Longi- 
tude 171°  west  of  Greenwich. 


284  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

Great  Britain  in  like  manner  renounces  in  favor  of  the  United 
States  of  America  all  her  rights  and  claims  over  and  in  respect 
to  the  Island  of  Tutuila  and  all  other  islands  of  the  Samoan  group 
east  of  Longitude  171°  west  of  Greenwich. 

Keciprocally,  the  United  States  of  America  renounce  in  favor 
of  Germany  all  their  rights  and  claims  over  and  in  respect  to  the 
Islands  of  Upolu  and  Savaii  and  all  other  Islands  of  the  Samoan 
group  west  of  Longitude  171°  west  of  Greenwich. 

Article  III 

It  is  understood  and  agreed  that  each  of  the  three  signatory 
Powers  shall  continue  to  enjoy,  in  respect  to  their  commerce  and 
commercial  vessels,  in  all  the  islands  of  the  Samoan  group  privi- 
leges and  conditions  equal  to  those  enjoyed  by  the  sovereign 
Power,  in  all  ports  which  may  be  open  to  the  commerce  of  either 
of  them. 

Article  IV 

The  present  Convention  shall  be  ratified  as  soon  as  possible, 
and  shall  come  into  force  immediately  after  the  exchange  of 
ratifications. 

In  faith  whereof,  we,  the  respective  Plenipotentiaries,  have 
signed  this  Convention  and  have  hereunto  afl&xed  our  seals. 

Done  in  triplicate,  at  Washington,  the  second  day  of  December, 
in  the  year  of  Our  Lord,  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  ninety- 
nine. 

John  Hay       [seal.] 

HOLLEBEN  [seal.] 

Pauncefote    [seal.] 

The  treaty  was  ratified  by  the  Senate,  January  16,  1900. 

The  trials  of  the  Samoans,  which  they  had  endured  for  many 
years  under  the  administration  of  three  jealous  protectors, 
are  ended.  Whether  they  will  in  future  fare  better  or  worse 
under  the  single  rule  of  Germany  is  a  matter  that  concerns 
only  them  and  Germany,  —  Jhe  United  States  is  happily 
relieved  from  all  further  responsibility  in  the  matter.  The 
entangling  alliance  so  freely  criticised  by  President  Cleve- 
land and  by  Secretary  Gresham  has  been  broken,  not  because 
of  Washington's  advice,  but  because  it  proved  burdensome 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  SAMOA  285 

and  dangerous  to  the  peace  of  the  United  States.  After  a 
trial  of  ten  years  the  outcome  of  the  Berlin  Act  may 
be  viewed  in  the  light  of  Mr.  Gresham's  prophesy.  The  first 
departure  of  the  United  States  from  a  traditional  and  well- 
established  policy  of  avoiding  entangling  alliances,  was 
not  a  successful  venture.  No  evidence  can  be  found  of 
detriment  suffered  before,  nor  of  substantial  advantages 
afterward  gained,  to  demonstrate,  in  this  particular  case,  the 
wisdom  in  the  change  of  that  national  policy  of  non-inter- 
ference. The  responsibilities  imposed  upon  the  United  States, 
as  a  party  to  the  Berlin  Act,  brought  only  vexatious  cares, 
expense,  the  loss  of  several  naval  vessels,  and  many  lives. 
Several  times  it  threatened  to  involve  the  country  in  war. 

Among  the  assets,  if  there  are  any,  may  possibly  be  counted 
the  acquisition  of  Tutuila,  and  its  valuable  harbor  of  Pago- 
Pago  ;  but  the  acquisition  of  this  can  hardly  be  ascribed  to 
the  results  of  the  Berlin  treaty.  American  rights  in  this 
harbor  antedated  that  treaty,  and  were  held  in  abej^ance  so 
long  as  the  triple  dominion  existed.  United  States'  trade  with 
Samoa  is  at  best  very  small,  and  its  increase  in  the  decade 
from  1889  to  1899  was  but  a  meagre  return  for  the  amount 
of  energy  expended  in  its  behalf. 

The  disposition  of  the  islands,  according  to  the  recent 
treaties,  is  wholly  satisfactory  to  all  parties.  Germany  has 
a  coveted  satisfaction  of  ruling  supreme  over  Samoa  (barring 
Tutuila).  A  strong  national  sentiment,  possibly  the  out- 
growth of  an  early  interest  felt  in  colonial  expansion  in  the 
South  Seas,  has  placed  the  German  valuation  upon  Samoa  far 
in  excess  of  its  real  value.  For  the  gratification  of  this  sen- 
timent, Germany  was  willing  to  give  England  substantial 
compensation  elsewhere,  with  which  compensation  England 
is  apparently  perfectly  content. 

The  United  States  has  acquired  all  it  has  ever  desired  or 
really  needed  in  Samoa,  —  a  valuable  harbor  and  coaling 
station.  None  of  the  islands  secured  by  the  treaty  are  suf- 
ficiently large  or  populous  to  present  any  troublesome  prob- 
lem for  their  government.  The  island  of  Tutuila  has  a  total 
superficial  area  of  something  over  two  hundred  square  miles, 


286  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

and  has  an  estimated  population  of  about  three  thousand. 
The  natives  are  peaceful,  unarmed,  and  well  disposed  to  the 
United  States.  The  harbor  of  Pago-Pago  is  an  ideal  one, 
said  to  be  the  best  in  the  Pacific;  it  is,  moreover,  susceptible 
of  easy  defence.  Its  strategic  value  is  very  great.  Several 
much  smaller  islands  to  the  east  and  south  of  Tutuila  (of  no 
particular  importance)  fall  to  the  share  of  the  United  States  ; 
but  as  these  are  of  no  real  value  to  any  one  except  their 
own  native  inhabitants,  they  are  not  likely  to  become  a 
burdensome  care. 

Contracts  have  been  made  for  the  improvement  of  Pago- 
Pago  harbor,  for  coal-sheds,  docks,  etc.     On  February  12, 
1900,  the  President  formally  placed  the  island  of  Tutuila 
under  the  administration  of  the  Navy  Department,  and  Com-   «r 
mander  B.  R.  Tilley,  U.  S.  N.,  became  first  military  governor.   • 

Here,  the  "  Samoan  episode  "  closes.  ^ 


IV 
THE   MONKOE   DOCTRINE 


4f  IV 

THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE 

The  instinct  of  self-preservation  is  the  first  law  of  nature. 
As  a  natural  law  governing  all  living  creatures,  it  takes 
precedence  over  the  social  or  artificial  regulations  of  man- 
kind. Under  whatever  municipal  code  an  individual  exists, 
he  may  freely  ignore  it  when  necessary  to  preserve  his  life  ; 
his  only  solicitude,  if  placed  on  trial,  need  be  to  prove  that 
his  alleged  wrongful  acts  were  committed  in  self-defence. 
And  so  it  is,  to  a  certain  extent,  with  nations.  Like  indi- 
/Viduals,  they  stand  before  the  public  law  —  the  law  of 
^nations  —  with  definite  rights  and  duties.  First  and  fun- 
damentally, they  possess  the  right  of  sovereignty  and  inde- 
pendence, and  a  freedom  of  action  that  is  limited  only  by 
the  obligation  to  respect  similar  rights  in  other  nations. 
As  in  the  case  of  individuals,  the  exercise  of  their  own 
rights  must  be  without  injury  to  others. 

The  international  law  permits  one  nation  to  violate  the 
sovereignty  of  another  in  but  few  exceptional  instances. 
Thus,  for  humanity's  sake,  a  continued  course  of  cruelty 
or  needless  bloodshed  on  the  part  of  any  one  power  may 
arouse  international  concern  and  justify  intervention.  But 
any  act  intending  to  destroy  the  existence  of  a  nation  or  to 
limit  its  sovereignty,  when  committed  under  the  plea  of  self- 
defence,  must  find  its  justification  in  a  code  higher  than 
international  law.  In  the  common  law,  homicide  in  self- 
defence  is  justifiable.  In  this  respect,  therefore,  there  is  a 
distinction  between  the  common  and  the  public  laws,  the 
latter  not  yet  having  fully  come  to  recognize  self-defence 
as  a  justifiable  cause  of   action.     But  though   the   public 

289 


290  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

law  has  not  distinctly  provided  for  acts  committed  under 
the  plea  of  self-preservation,  it  is  constrained  to  tolerate 
them. 

The  propriety  of  all  defensive  acts  must  be  judged  by  the 
peculiar  circumstances  surrounding  them,  for  it  is  obviously 
impossible  to  frame  definite  and  specific  rules  to  govern  all 
cases,  as  it  is  impossible  to  measure,  with  accuracy,  the  amount 
of  danger  that,  at  any  given  time,  may  threaten  a  state  from 
without. 

It  may  be  said,  therefore,  that  the  duty  of  states  to  respect 
the  sovereignty  of  their  neighbors  is  subordinated  to  their 
^iiatural  right  of  self-preservation,  —  all  social  laws  being  in 
abeyance  when  existence  is  in  question.  History  furnishes  . 
a  long  list  of  infringements  upon  the  sovereignty  of  states  I 
by  others  which,  appearing  to  have  been  committed  in  a 
spirit  of  self-protection,  have  been  allowed  to  pass  as  excus- 
able. Such  extreme  cases  as  the  actual  invasion  of  foreign 
territory,  in  order  to  protect  persons  or  property,  to  suppress 
insurrection,  or  to  put  down  race  rebellions,  are  upon  record, 
and  often  they  have  been  regarded  as  entirely  proper.  Thus, 
under  certain  circumstances,  one  state  may  actually  assert 
its  sovereignty  to  the  extent  of  using  violence  to  accomplish 
ends  within  the  territory  of  another,  and  still  not  run  coun- 
ter to  the  dictates  of  law.  The  doctrine  of  self-protection 
may  take  such  extremes,  but  it  is  unfortunate  that  some 
international  arbiter  has  not  yet  been  constituted  to  deter- 
mine the  good  faith  of  the  nation  or  nations  so  intervening. 
In  Europe  the  greater  nations  exercise  a  watchfulness  over 
each  other  by  a  quasi  agreement,  expressed  or  implied^ 
known  as  the  "Balaftce  of  Power,"  whereby  all  are  pledged 
to  prevent  any  one  power  from  encroaching  too  greatly  upon 
another,  and  thereby  unduly  acquiring  a  strength  and  influ- 
ence that  might  prove  dangerous  to  the  welfare  of  the  others. 
To  this  general  policy  may  be  attributed  the  present  integrity 
of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  In  the  same  manner  was  Belgium 
established,  and  now  upheld  and  maintained  as  an  inviolable 
state ;  for  such  reasons  have  the  Balkan  states  been  shifted 
to  and  fro  at  the  will  of  the  greater  powers. 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  291 

It  is  impossible  to  anticipate  what  course  of  action  may 
suddenly  be  made  necessary  by  national  complications, 
and  it  would  be  useless,  therefore,  to  attempt  a  definition 
of  all  the  extraordinary  powers  a  sovereign  state  may  exert 
in  a  moment  of  extreme  danger.  Suffice  it  to  say,  it  may 
doajiythingji  thills  reasonable  bonnris  ;  the  consciousness  of 
right  that  exists  in  all  hearts  will  give  sanction,  provided  it 
is  clear,  and  above  all  doubt,  that  the  danger  is  real  and  that 
the  act  done  is  in  good  faith,  and  not  prosecuted  beyond  the 
strict  requirements  of  self-defence. 

The  celebrated  Monroe  Doctrine  of  the  United  States  finds 
its  origin  and  its  justification  in  principles  of  a  similar  char- 
acter. In  this  instance  there  was  no  actual  intervention,  — 
no  overt  act  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  in  derogation 
of  what,  in  the  public  law,  had  been  accepted  as  the  sov- 
ereign rights  of  other  nations.  In  this  case  Mr.  Monroe  did 
not  choose  to  wait  until  the  actual  commission  of  threatened 
acts  which,  in  his  judgment,  would  endanger  the  integrity 
and  peace  of  the  United  States,  but  gave  notice  to  the 
European  powers  that  certain  enumerated  acts,  if  perpe- 
trated, would  be  resisted  by  forcible  intervention  by  his 
government.  The  doctrine  in  its  character  is  rather  prophy- 
lactic than  curative, — preventive  rather  than  remedial. 

In  so  far  as  the  Monroe  Doctrine  forbids  other  sovereign 
powers  to  do  what  properly  belongs,  as  of  right,  to  all  sov- 
ereign powers,  it  can  find  no  place  in  international  law.  It 
is  useless  to  seek,  through  ingenious  argument,  to  invest  it 
with  the  sanction  of  an  international  code.  It  was  purely 
and  simply  one  of  those  measures  of  self-defence  which,  fall- 
ing outside  the  legal  prerogatives  of  a  sovereign  state,  is 
justified  among  civilized  nations  only  by  virtue  of  an  extreme 
necessity.  This  has  been  essentially  the  American  view.  It 
is  quite  certain  that  the  other  civilized  nations  of  the  world 
have  not  accepted  the  principles  enunciated  in  this  doctrine 
as  a  part  of  the  public  law,  nor  do  they  admit  that  its  exist- 
ence is,  or  ever  was,  necessary  to  the  safety  of  the  United 
States.  In  fact,  the  many  protests  from  abroad  clearly 
indicate  that  the  world  in  general  has  regarded  this  national 


292  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

policy  of  the  United  States  as  wholly  beyond  the  public  law 
or  the  requirements  of  national  self-defence. 

In  respect  to  colonization,  all  authorities  seem  to  agree  that 
territory,  unoccupied  and  belonging  to  no  one,  may  be  appro- 
priated and  held  by  any  nation  when  its  subjects  enter  it 
with  the  intention  of  remaining.  So  far  as  the  Monroe  Doc« 
trine  relates  to  colonization,  the  question  at  once  arises  — 
was  there  any  territory  properly  res  nullius^  or  belonging  ta 
no  one,  in  either  of  the  American  continents  when  President 
Monroe  issued  his  edict  against  colonization  in  1823  ?  If 
not,  the  interdict  was  useless  ;  if  there  were  territory  capable 
of  appropriation  at  that  time,  the  declaration,  under  the  inter- 
national code,  was  clearly  illegal.  It  proposed  a  third  requi- 
site to  the  right  of  colonization,  to  wit;  the  consent  of  the 
United  States.  No  amount  of  argument  can  reconcile  the 
proposition  with  the  public  law,  nor  can  any  considerations 
of  self-defence  invest  it  with  strict  legal  authority.  If  such 
were  the  case,  the  United  States  would  be  justified  in  seizing 
Canada,  and  Great  Britain  would  be  wrong  in  seeking  to 
defend  a  colony  tliat  threatened  the  United  States  with  a 
contiguous  boundary  line  of  three  thousand  miles. 

Now,  to  what  length  a  nation  may  go  in  throwing  off  its^ 
obligations  to  respect  the  sovereignty  of  its  neighbors  on  the 
score  of  self-preservation,  or  even  of  protection  or  immunity 
against  less  serious  attack,  is  a  question  of  politics  rather 
than  of  law.  In  the  nature  of  things  there  can  be  no  exact 
and  ascertainable  measure  of  danger  or  of  security  ;  it  is- 
manifestly  difficult  to  say  at  just  what  point  one  may  bid 
another  come  no  nearer. 

Bearing  in  mind,  then,  that  forcible  intervention  in  the 

i  affairs  of  other  nations  is  excusable  only  when  committed  in- . 

J  self-defence  and  when  the  danger  is  real,  imminent,  and  di- 

^  rect,  —  not  speculative  and  contingent,  —  and  only  when  the- 

interference  is  itself  actually  necessary,  and  is  kept  within 

the  limited  bounds  authorized  by  the  circumstances  of  the 

case,  and,  furthermore,  when  the  interference  is  not  resorted 

to  with  a  view  of  aggression  or  spoliation,  —  then,  and  from 

such  standpoint  only,  can  the  so-called  "  legal  aspects "  of 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  293 

the  Monroe  Doctrine  be  examined.  Was  the  United  States 
threatened  from  abroad  in  1823  ?  If  so,  do  the  dangers 
which  threatened  the  United  States  in  1823,  and  called  into 
being  the  principles  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  threaten  the 
country  now  ?  Would  a  new  colony  of  European  origin  in 
South  America  be  a  menace  to  the  best  interests  of  the  United 
States  to-day  ?  If  a  doctrine  that  found  its  origin  in  a  genu- 
ine call  for  self-preservation  is  no  longer  upheld  and  sustained 
by  that  necessity,  is  its  continuance  as  a  national  policy  longer 
justified  ? 

The  widest  divergence  of  opinion  is  to  be  found  in  the 
'^United  States  upon  this  subject,  no  two  writers  to-day  agree- 
ing precisely  upon  the  propriety,  the  wisdom,  or  the  value  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  a  defensive  measure.  Indeed,  all 
phases  of  the  doctrine,  from  its  alleged  origin  in  the  political 
conditions  of  our  earlier  national  existence,  its  authorship, 
its  applications,  in  fact,  its  very  meaning,  have  furnished 
ground  for  endless  discussion.  Suffice  it  to  say,  the  princi- 
ples  invojved  grew  out  of  certain  conditions  of  our  national 
•growth,  and  the  doctrine  was  then  invoked  as  a  defensive 
measure  to  meet  what  seemed  to  be  a  menace  to  our  institu- 
tions. That  which  sprang  out  of  an  emergency  has  become 
a  vital  principle  in  the  foreign  policy  of  the  United  States  ; 
indeed,  it  seems  to  have  become  a  sort  of  fetish  for  national 
worship,  —  the  ignis  fatuus  of  American  politics.  Created 
as  it  was  to  meet  the  exigencies  of  the  time,  it  has  been 
expanded  into  a  national  determination  that  the  new  world 
must  be  kept  sacred  from  all  European  colonization  or  use. 
In  the  course  of  changing  administrations,  and  with  the  conse- 
quent changes  of  opinion  at  the  White  House  and  the  Capi- 
tol, the  doctrine  has  too  often  been  distorted  from  its  original 
meaning,  and  sometimes  used  to  serve  the  ends  of  party 
warfare.  It  has  been  quoted  as  authority  for  constituting 
the  United  States  Government  the  guardian  and  protector 
of  all  the  nations  of  the  American  continents.  By  some  it  is 
limited  to  defensive  measures  ;  by  others  its  interpretation 
woul4  justify  all  sorts  of  forcible  aggression.  From  a  mere 
right  to  protect  ourselves,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  been 


294  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

converted  into  a  right  to  annex  Cuba  and  any  other  of  the 
West  India  Islands.  In  it  is  found  the  right  to  construci 
the  Nicaragua  Canal  on  foreign  soil,  and  subject  its  shores  t( 
American  jurisdiction  ;  for,  by  seizing  and  controlling  these 
outposts,  and,  in  fact,  all  other  contiguous  or  adjacent  lands 
it  is  urged  that  the  United  States  would  be  following  a  con 
sistent  policy  of  self-defence.  There  is  a  danger  that  the 
more  powerful  and  formidable  the  United  States  becomes 
and  the  more  grasping  and  insatiate  its  policy  of  expansion 
the  more  unrestrained  will  become  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Il 
may,  in  time,  be  too  frequently  construed  to  justify  acts  whicl 
never  entered  the  conceptions  of  its  author. 


A  clearer  understanding  of  the  principles  embodied  in  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  may  be  obtained  by  glancing- at  a  few  inci 
dents  in  the  history  of  our  foreign  relations  from  the  ending 
of  the  Revolutionary  War  (1783),  to  the  close  of  Presideni 
Monroe's  administration  (1824). 

Although  the  Monroe  Doctrine  itself,  as  announced  ir 
1823,  was  ostensibly  a  defensive  measure  against  the  threat 
ened  aggressions  of  a  powerful  European  alliiihce,  there  car 
be  no  doubt  that  it  was  also  the  announcement  of  a  general 
policy  that  had  been  gradually  forming  in  the  Americar 
mind  for  a  number  of  years.  This  sentiment  was  the  natural 
outgrowth  of  the  antagonism  between  the  principles  of  demo- 
cratic government,  as  adopted  in  the  United  States,  and  the 
opposing  doctrines  of  monarchical  government,  which  ob- 
tained upon  the  continent  of  Europe. 

When  the  Revolutionary  struggle  was  over,  and  Englan(3 
had  acknowledged  the  independence  of  the  United  States 
(treaty  November  30,  1783),  the  newly  created  nation  was 
exhausted  and  disorganized  ;  its  resources  were  small,  and 
the  country  was  great  only  in  its  future  possibilities.  The 
territory  it  occupied  was  a  mere  strip  along  the  eastern 
coast  of  the  vast  and  little-known  American  continent. 
On  its   entire  northern  frontier  lay   English  colonies  that 


THE  MONROE   DOCTRINE  295 

were  more  than  passively  unfriendly ;  British  fortifications 
and  hostile  Indians  along  the  lakes  and  upper  Ohio  River 
impeded  expansion  to  the  vrest.  On  the  south  and  the 
southwest,  France  and  Spain  overshadowed  the  pioneer 
republic  in  extensive  domain. 

Under  these  conditions,  the  earlier  American  statesmen 
were  tempted  to  profit  by  the  rivalries  of  European  nations, 
and  thus  obtain  by  foreign  alliances,  the  strength  necessary 
to  carry  the  republic  through  the  critical  period  of  infancy. 
A  single  venture  in  this  direction  (the  treaty  with  France, 
of  1778)  taught  the  fathers  a  useful  lesson.  It  was  but  a 
few  years  later  that  France,  finding  herself  involved  in  war 
with  Great  Britain,  promptly  called  upon  the  United  States 
to  fulfil  her  treaty  obligations.  This  the  United  States  was 
unable  to  do.  To  invite  another  war  with  England  would 
have  been  suicidal ;  to  remain  neutral  was  to  offend  France. 
In  either  case,  the  legitimate  result  of  meddling  in  the  affairs 
of  Europe  seemed  to  be  war ;  and  although  actual  war  was 
in  this  instance  avoided,  a  bitter  party-spirit,  aroused  by 
French  sympathizers,  produced  dissensions  threatening  the 
peace  of  the  nation.  From  the  first,  however,  the  wiser 
statesmen  of  the  period  realized  not  merely  the  advisabilityvi 
but  the  necessity,  of  holding  aloof  from  all  foreign  entangle-j 
ments.  This  sound  principle  found  its  best  expression  in 
Washington's  farewell  address,  and  long  continued  to  be  the 
watchword  of  succeeding  administrations,  and  the  corner- 
stone of  the  nation's  foreign  policy.  Each  President  in  turn 
guarded  this  vital  principle  of  non-intervention,  and  the 
young  nation  greatly  prospered  in  its  career,  paying  no 
tribute  to  the  demands  of  needless  war.  Underlying  the 
reasons  usually  given  for  maintaining  an  isolated  political 
position  in  the  world,  namely,  the  weakness  of  the  country, 
and  its  physical  inability  to  cope  with  the  older  European 
nations,  a  subtle  motive  is  easily  traced.  It  was  felt  that  the 
system  of  popular  government  inaugurated  by  the  United 
States  would  be  watched  with  some  apprehension  by  the 
crowned  heads  of  Europe.  If  the  experiment  in  constitu- 
tional  government   should   prove   successful,   its   effect   on 


296  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

European   forms  of   government  was  obvious.     Indeed,  ir 
some  of  the  European  nations  a  decided  hostility  had  already 
been  manifested  against  tyrannical  institutions.     The  belie] 
that  absolutism  was  divinely  ordained,  or  that  it  represented 
the  best  form   of    government,    was   being   rudely   shaken 
•     throughout  Europe.     Royalty  was  naturally  suspicious  of  al: 
movements  toward  popular  institutions,  and  the  fear  that  mon- 
archical Europe  would  regard  somewhat  sullenly  the  success 
of  democracy  in  America,  was  not  unreasonable.     Here,  then, 
was  a  source  of  danger  to  be  guarded  against ;   the  liberty  sc 
dearly  bought  was  truly  worth  the  price  of  eternal  vigilance, 
A  double  peril  was  therefore  presented  to,jthe  struggling 
young  nation  at  the  very  beginning :   First,  the  danger  ol 
being   tempted    into    unfortunate    alliances    with    strongei 
■■^  powers  ;   and  secondly,  that  of   unprovoked  attack  by  th( 
^    forces  of  monarchical  government  from  purely  political  mo 
tives.     In  those  days  royalty  commanded  stronger  armiei 
and  navies  than  the  United  States  could  possibly  support, 
«  The   ideas  of  popular  sovereignty  and  the   divine   right  ol 
I  kings  were  essentially  antagonistic  ;  and  the.  notion  that  tin 
crowned  heads  of  the  old  world  might  seek  to  strangle  th( 
infant  giant  of  the  new,  was  not  altogether  unreasonable. 

Mr.  Jefferson  expressed  this  apprehension  as  early  as  1785 
when  he  wrote  to  Monroe  from  Paris,  urging  him  to  add  hit 
"  testimony  to  that  of  every  thinking  American,  in  order  tc 
satisfy  our  countrymen  how  much  it  is  in  their  interest  tc 
preserve  uninfected  by  contagion  those  peculiarities  in  theii 
government  and  manners  to  which  they  are  indebted  foi 
those  blessings."  In  his  second  annual  address  of  December 
1798,  John  Adams  said  :  — 

To  the  usual  subjects  of  gratitude  I  cannot,  omit  to  add  one  ol 
the  first  importance  to  our  well  being  and  safety ;  I  mean  that 
spirit  which  has  arisen  in  our  country  against  the  menaces  and 
aggression  of  a  foreign  nation.  A  manly  sense  of  national  honor, 
dignity,  and  independence  has  appeared  which,  if  encouraged  and 
invigorated  by  every  branch  of  the  government,  will  enable  us  tc 
view  undismayed  the  enterprises  of  any  foreign  power  and  be- 
come the  sure  gatmdation  of  national  prosperity  and  glory. 

/ 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  297 

But  it  was  Jefferson  who  grasped  the  idea  of  foreign  an- 
tipathy more  definitely,  perhaps,  than  had  any  of  his  contem- 
poraries. Although  a  strict  constructionist,  he  violated  his 
convictions  of  constitutional  interpretation  and  purchased  the 
Louisiana  territory  to  keep  it  out  of  the  hands  of  France  or 
England,  either  of  which  he  regarded  as  a  dangerous  neigh- 
bor. ''  Previous,  however,  to  this  period,"  he  urged  upon  a 
hesitating  Congress  "  we  had  not  been  unaware  of  the 
danger  to  which  our  peace  would  be  perpetually  exposed 
whilst  so  important  a  key  to  the  commerce  of  the  Western 
country  remained  under  foreign  power."  This  sudden, 
acquisition  of  a  large  contiguous  territory,  bringing  into  the^ 
nation  an  empire  to  be  settled  and  prepared  for  statehood, 
strengthened  the  bonds  of  the  federation,  and  gave  fresh 
vigor  to  the  Republic.  It  also  furnished  additional  reason 
for  the  strict  observance  of  the  principles  of  non-interfer- 
ence, and  for  redoubled  watchfulness  against  all  manner  » 
of  foreign  aggression.  With  new  cares  and  responsibilities,  | 
these  principles  developed  still  more  rapidly,  and  found  final 
expression  in  President  Monroe's  famous  message  twenty 
years  later. 

The  purchase  of  Louisiana  gave  to  the  United  States  a 
color  of  title  to  the  Spanish  province  of  West  Florida,  and 
existing  conditions  at  home  and  in  Spain  made  it  likely  that 
the  United  States  could  acquire  this  valuable  strip  of  coast 
land.  The  title  in  question  was  perhaps  less  complete  than 
the  determination  to  secure  it ;  for  after  a  proclamation  to 
the  effect  that  the  United  States  would  hold  the  territory 
pending  future  settlement.  President  Madison  addressed  the 
Senate,  January  3,  1811,  as  follows :  — 

Taking  into  view  the  tenor  of  these  several  communications, 
the  posture  of  things  with  which  they  are  connected,  the  intimate 
relation  of  the  country  adjoining  the  United  States  eastward  of 
the  river  Perdido  to  their  security  and  tranquillity,  and  the  pecul- 
iar interest  they  otherwise  have  in  its  destiny,  I  recommend  to 
the  consideration  of  Congress  the  seasonableness  of  a  declaration 
that  the  United  States  could  not  see  without  serious  inquietude 
any  part  of  a  neighboring  territory  in  which  they  have  in  differ- 


298      .  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

ent  respects  so  deep  and  so  just  a  concern  pass  from  the  hands  of 
Spain  into  those  of  any  other  foreign  power.  .  .  .  The  wisdom  of 
Congress  will  at  the  same  time  determine  how  far  it  may  be  expe- 
dient to  provide  for  the  event  of  a  subversion  of  the  Spanish 
authorities  within  the  territory  in  question,  and  an  apprehended 
occupancy  thereof  by  any  other  foreign  power. 

Two  months  later  Congress  indorsed  the  policy  of  the 
President  in  a  resolution  declaring :  — 

Taking  into  view  the  peculiar  situation  of  Spain  and  of  her 
American  provinces,  and  considering  the  influence  which  the  des- 
tiny of  the  territory  adjoining  the  southern  boundary  of  the 
United  States  may  have  upon  their  security,  tranquillity,  and  com- 
merce, .  .  .  the  United  States,  under  the  peculiar  circumstances 
of  the  existing  crisis,  cannot,  without  a  serious  inquietude,  see  any 
part  of  the  said  territory  pass  into  the  hands  of  any  other  foreign 
power. 

Here  then  was  a  shadow  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  cast  before. 
The  "  destiny  "  of  the  Republic  was  proving  itself;  it  figured 
here  as  a  factor  in  determining  a  question  of  foreign  policy. 
The  acquisition  of  East  Florida  (the  remaining  portion  of 
the  old  Spanish  province  that  constitutes  in  part  the  present 

(state  of  that  name)  was  made  in  quite  the  same  spirit,  i.e.  to 
remove  the  liability  of  attack  from  contiguous  territory.  In 
point  of  fact,  Florida  had  long  been  a  refuge  for  outlaws  : 
it  was  the  rallying-point  for  many  filibustering  expeditions, 
both  Spanish  and  English,  against  the  United  States.  In  the 
War  of  1812  it  had  been  used  by  England  as  a  base  of  hostile 
operations.  The  resolutions  of  Congress  of  1811  could  with 
equal  propriety  be  applied  to  the  case  of  East  Florida. 
General  Jackson  was  sent  to  clear  the  way  for  annexation  — 
a  task  he  accomplished  in  his  own  vigorous  way. 

In  relation  to  these  earlier  accessions  of  territor3%  the 
spirit  and  purpose  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  apparent, 
though  ill  defined  and  crudely  expressed.  The.  nation,  how- 
ever,  had  not  yet  reached  that  point  of  development  and 
strength  when  even  in  self-defence,  it  could  proclaim  a  policy 
seemingly  antagonistic  to  European  interests.  When  the 
War  of  1812  had  closed  the  United  States  entered  upon  a 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  299 

new  era.  Old  party  lines  were  dissolving,  and  the  violent 
issues  of  the  past  twenty  years  were  obsolete.  The  formative 
period  of  its  existence  was  over,  the  experiment  of  demo- 
cratic government  was  succeeding  admirably.  The  nation 
had  greatly  expanded  in  territory  and  wealth,  and  was 
assuming  a  degree  of  self-confidence,  a  sense  of  power,  that 
enabled  it  to  study  its  own  foreign  policies  in  a  calm,  philo- 
sophic light,  and  to  speak  of  them,  if  need  be,  more  authori- 
tatively. For  forty  years  a  nebulous  public  sentiment  had 
been  steadily  approaching  the  positive  form  it  subsequently 
took  ;  in  1823  a  definite  threat  coming  from  without,  it  sud- 
denly crystallized  into  a  clearly  and  an  openly  expressed 
policy. 

II  \^ 

The  immediate  causes  leading  to  the  enunciation  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  in  18^3  are  to  be  found  in  a  series  of 
events  beginning  with  the  revolutionary  movements  in  South 
and  Central  America  and  culminating  in  the  threat  on  the 
part  of  a  European  alliance  of  strong  powers  to  intervene 
in  behalf  of  Spain  and  in  the  interests  of  monarchical 
government. 

The  operations  of  Napoleon  in  Spain  had  left  that  already 
palsied  nation  in  a  deplorable  condition  of  helplessness. 
Profiting  by  her  weakness,  her  American  dependencies 
began,  one  after  another  (from  1812  to  1820)  to  set  up 
their  own  standards,  and  establish  themselves  as  independent 
republics.  In  the  South  American  struggles  for  freedom. 
North  American  sympathy  was  strongly  aroused.  Neutrality 
was  duly  proclaimed,  but  material  aid  was  continually  fur- 
nished by  citizens  of  the  United  States  to  the  South  and 
Central  Americans,  while  frequent  expressions  of  sympathy 
were  mader  by  Congress.  Even  before  the  colonies  had 
actually  revolted,  and  while  absolutism  in  Spain  was  receiv- 
ing a  thrust  from  the  French  army,  Jefferson,  watching  the 
contest  from  afar,  understood  well  the  import  of  events  and 
the  probable  effect  on  the  cause  of  popular  government.  He 
wrote  to  Governor  Claiborne  (October  29,  1808) :  — 


300  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

The  truth  is  that  the  patriots  of  Spain  have  no  warmer  friends 
than  the  administration  of  the  United  States ;  but  it  is  our  duty 
to  say  nothing  and  to  do  nothing  for  or  against  either.  If  they 
succeed  we  shall  be  well  satisfied  to  see  Cuba  and  Mexico  remain 
in  their  present  dependence,  but  very  unwilling  to  see  them  in 
that  of  either  France  or  England,  politically  or  commercially. 
We  consider  their  interests  and  ours  as  the  same,  and  that  the 
object  of  both  must  be  to  exclude  all  European  influence  from 
this  hemisphere. 

In  this  statement  from  high  authority  the  historian 
Schouler  finds  the  germ  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  When 
the  Spanish  dependencies  began  to  declare  their  indepen- 
dence, and  the  grasp  of  the  Old  World  upon  the  new  one 
began  to  loosen,  Jefferson's  bold  statement  found  active 
support  in  all  directions.  Henry  Clay,  the  leader  of  his 
party  in  Congress,  exerted  himself  to  the  limit  of  his 
oratorical  powers  in  the  "emancipation  of  South  America." 
The  continual  assaults  upon  the  administration  of  Monroe 
by  this  opposition  leader  may  have  caused  the  President 
to  recognize  the  independence  of  the  revolted  colonies  sooner 
than  he  otherwise  would  have  done,  although  it  is  clear  from 
the  words  of  nearly  all  his  annual  messages,  that  Monroe 
had  his  heart  in  the  success  of  freedom's  cause  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere  quite  as  fully  as  had  Clay,  but  he 
moved  more  cautiously  and  with  far  more  deliberation  than 
the  eloquent  and  impetuous  member  from  Kentucky.  In 
the  autumn  of  1817,  the  first  year  of  Monroe's  presidency, 
he  sent  a  commission  to  South  America  for  the  purpose  of 
investigating  the  political  conditions  and  of  determining  if 
there  were  any  bona  fide  revolutionary  governiuenta.  worthy 
of  recognition.  The  commission  was  composed  of  men 
well-known  for  their  radical  views  of  republicanism,  yet  in 
this  respect  they  differed  in  regard  to  the  proper  course  to  be 
pursued  by  the  United  States  in  the  matter  of  recognizing 
the  sovereignty  of  the  seceding  Spanish  colonies. 

In  the  midst  of  cabinet  discussions  regarding  this  ques- 
tion, news  suddenly  came  from  abroad  (during  the  early 
part  of  1818)  that  a  movement  had  been   inaugurated  in 


THE. MONROE   DOCTRINE  301 

Europe  to  intervene  in  the  affairs  of  South  America.  Fur- 
ther confirmation  of  these  first  reports  came  from  several 
foreign  ministers  resident  in  Washington.  John  Quincy 
Adams,  the  Secretary  of  State,  instantly  became  alive  to  the 
situation,  and  somewhat  curtly  announced  that  "  if  the  Euro- 
pean alliance  undertook  to  settle  matters  which  concerned 
us  so  closely,  and  without  consulting  us,  they  should  not  be 
surprised  if  we  acted  without  consulting  them."  Monroe 
shared  in  these  apprehensions  of  the  Secretary  of  State  and 
feared  that  the  rumors  of  a  European  combination  to  aid 
Spain  in  maintaining  her  old-time  supremacy  in  the  Americas 
might  prove  true.  Mr.  Adams  at  once  sounded  the  British 
Minister  in  regard  to  England's  attitude  toward  the  South 
American  question ;  indeed,  the  President  desired  Great 
Britain  to  join  with  the  United  States  then  and  there  in 
recognizing  the  independence  of  the  South  American  colo- 
nies, y^^ 

Across  the  Atlantic,  the  American  Minister  in  London, 
Ricliard  Rush,  was  instructed  to  watch  closely  the  intentions  ^ 
of  the  reported  European  alliance,  one  of  the  alleged  objects 
of  which  was  to  interfere  in  behalf  of  Spain  in  America. 
Rush  approached  the  English  Premier,  Castlereagh,  whose 
sympathies  were  thought  to  be  with  the  European  alliance, 
though  the  commercial  interests  of  his  country  called  for 
a  greater  freedom  of  trade  with  the  West  Indies  and  Central 
America  than  Spain  had  been  willing  to  grant.  Castlereagh, 
however,  believed  this  end  could  be  effected  by  European 
mediation,  and  that  by  securing  to  Spain  her  complete 
supremacy  over  her  colonies,  she  might  be  coerced  into 
adopting  more  liberal  trade  regulations  as  a  just  compen- 
sation for  services  rendered.  Rush  could  not  succeed  in 
winning  over  the  conservative  Castlereagh  to  his  original 
proposition,  that  of  checking  all  future  juggling  with  the 
question  by  a  prompt  acknowledgment  of  the  independence 
of  South  America. 

Great  relief  was  felt  in  Washington  upon  the  declaration  i 
of  the  allied  powers  of  Europe,  whose  interference  in  South  ( ' 
America  was  so  much  feared  by  Monroe  and  his   cabinet, 


302  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

that  they  did  not  contemplate  using  force  to  subjugate  the 
revolting  Spanish  colonies.  In  his  annual  message  of 
November  16,  1818,  President  Monroe  said  :  — 

From  the  view  taken  of  this  subject,  founded  on  all  the  informa- 
tion that  we  have  been  able  to  obtain,  there  is  good  cause  to  be 
satisfied  with  the  course  heretofore  pursued  by  the  United  States 
in  regard  to  this  contest,  and  to  conclude  that  it  is  proper  to 
adhere  to  it,  especially  in  the  present  state  of  affairs. 

Only  two  months  later,  however,  the  President  called 
together  his  cabinet  to  discuss  the  subject  of  recognizing  the 
independence  of  Buenos  Ayres,  a  measure  he  proposed  and 
defended  vainly  against  the  adverse  counsels  of  his  advisory 
board.  About  this  time  Adams  refers  in  his  diary  (May  29, 
1819)  to  an  episode  that  again  places  on  record  his  views 
relating  to  the  policy  of  the  United  States  toward  foreign 
interference  in  the  affairs  of  the  American  states.  The 
Russian  Minister,  Mr.  Poletica,  had  been  instructed  from 
Petersburg  to  use  all  his  influence  with  the  administration  to 
keep  the  United  States  from  rupturing  the  bonds  of  amity 
that  existed  between  them  and  Spain.  The  snapping  of 
tender  ties  of  course  related  to  the  recognition  of  the  South 
American  states,  and  Mr.  Poletica  went  so  far  as  to  intimate 
that  unless  the  United  States  followed  a  policy  in  harmony 
with  the  aims  of  the  EuropeaVi  alliance  she  would  find  her- 
self, however  unwilling,  obliged  in  the  end  to  "follow  the 
impulse  of  Europe  combined." 

I  related  to  him  [Mr.  Poletica]  all  that  has  been  done  by  us 
concerning  the  South  American  question ;  told  him  we  were  con- 
vinced that  Buenos  Ayres  at  least  would  maintain  her  indepen- 
dence of  Spain ;  that  sooner  or  later  they  must  be  recognized  as 
an  independent  power ;  that  we  had  thought  that  the  time  would 
before  now  have  arrived  when  they  might  justly  claim  this  as  a 
right,  but  from  the  time  when  we  learnt  that  the  allies  had 
determined,  that  whatever  might  be  the  event  of  their  mediation, 
not  to  use  force  against  the  South  Americans,  the  President  had 
concluded  that  we  might  also  forbear  to  take  an  immediate, 
decisive  part  in  their  favor. 

At  the  opening  of  Congress  in  December,  1819,  nothing 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  303 

further  had  been  done  toward  the  recognition  of  the  South 
American  states.  The  President  said  in  his  annual  message 
(December  7,  1819)  :  — 

This  contest  has  from  its  commencement  been  very  interesting 
to  other  powers,  and  to  none  more  so  than  to  the  United  States 
A  virtuous  people  may  and  will  confine  themselves  within  the  limit 
of  a  strict  neutrality  ;  but  it  is  not  in  their  power  to  behold  a  con- 
flict so  vitally  important  to  their  neighbors  without  the  sensibility 
and  sympathy  which  naturally  belong  to  such  a  case. 

At  the  reading  of  the  next  annual  message,  November  4, 
(1820),  the  situation  was  little  changed.  No  further  threats 
from  the  European  alliance  having  come  across  the  sea,  the 
United  States  had  not  been  moved  to  act.  The  President 
said ;  — 

No  facts  are  known  to  this  Government  to  warrant  the  belief 
that  any  of  the  powers  of  Europe  will  take  part  in  the  contest, 
whence  it  may  be  inferred,  considering  all  circumstances  which 
must  have  weight  in  producing  the  result,  that  an  adjustment  will 
finally  take  place  on  the  basis  proposed  by  the  colonies.  To  pro- 
mote that  result  by  friendly  counsels  with  other  powers,  includ- 
ing Spain  herself,  has  been  the  uniform  policy  of  this  Govern- 
ment. 

Henry  Clay  never  ceased  his  attacks  upon  the  administra- 
tion for  what  he  considered  its  almost  criminal  negligence  in 
abandoning  the  great  cause  of  liberty.  By  extending  our 
recognition  of  their  sovereignty  it  would  not  only  give  en- 
couragement to  the  states  struggling  to  free  themselves  from 
the  clutches  of  tyranny,  but  it  would  give  as  well  "additional 
tone,  and  hope,  and  countenance  to  the  friends  of  liberty 
throughout  the  world."  Clay  saw  deeper  reasons  why  the 
United  States  should  lend  a  hand  to  her  Southern  neighbors. 
In  a  great  speech  at  Lexington  in  1821,  he  said:  — 

It  was  evident  after  the  overthrow  of  Bonaparte  that  the 
alliance,  by  which  that  event  was  unexpectedly  brought  about, 
would  push  the  principle  of  legitimacy,  a  softer  and  covered  name 
for  despotism,  to  the  uttermost  extent.     Accordingly,  the  present 


304  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

generation  has  seen,  with  painful  feeling,  Congress  after  Congress 
assembling  in  Europe  to  decide  without  ceremony,  the  destiny  and 
affairs  of  foreign  independent  states.  And  if  we,  the  greatest 
offender  of  all  against  the  principle  of  legitimacy,  had  not  been 
brought  under  their  jurisdiction,  and  subjected  to  their  parental 
care,  we  owed  the  exemption  to  our  distance  from  Europe  and  to 
the  known  bravery  of  our  countrymen.  But  who  can  say,  that 
has  observed  the  giddiness  and  intoxication  of  power,  how  long 
this  exemption  will  continue  ?  It  had  seemed  to  him  desirable 
that  a  sort  of  counterpoise  to  the  holy  alliance  should  be  found  in 
the  two  Americas  in  favor  of  national  independence  and  liberty, 
to  operate  by  the  force  of  example  and  by  moral  influence ;  that 
here  a  rallying-point  and  an  asylum  should  exist  for  freemen  and 
for  freedom. 

Adams  agreed  with  Clay  in  the  broad  principles,  but  dif- 
fered with  him  only  in  the  course  the  United  States  should 
practically  adopt  before  occasion  called  more  loudly  for  ac- 
tion. He  told  Mr.  Clay  that  h*e  never  doubted  the  final  issue 
of  the  struggle  in  South  America,  and  that  he  believed  it  to 
be  better  policy  to  take  no  active  part.  "  The  principle  of 
neutrality,"  he  continued,  "to  all  foreign  wars  was,  in  my 
opinion,  fundamental  to  the  continuance  of  our  liberties  and 
our  Union."  Wishing  well  to  the  cause  of  freedom  in  South 
America,  he  had  yet  to  see  better  evidences  that  the  South 
Americans  meant  to  establish  "  free  or  liberal  institutions  of 
government." 

As  events  turned  out,  Clay's  vision  seems  to  have  proved 
the  clearer,  but  Adams'  conservative  action  was  probably  the 
wiser.  However,  no  more  alarming  threats  from  abroad 
came,  and  our  recognition  of  the  South  American  states  was 
not  effected  until  May,  1822. 

The  previous  year  Spain  had  ratified  the  treaty  ceding  the 
Floridas,  and  with  that  vexed  question  off  the  programme, 
the  State  Department  found  itself  greatly  relieved.  With 
these  pressing  details  out  of  the  way,  the  administration  was 
free  to  turn  its  attention  to  a  more  remote  but  much  more 
important  matter.  The  solicitude  of  the  President  and 
Secretary  Adams  was  at  once  directed  to  the  consideration 
of  permanent  opposition  to  European  intervention  in  the 


THE  MONROE   DOCTRINE  805 

Americas.  As  already  noted,  the  idea  had  been  more  or  less 
steadily  evolving  for  a  number  of  years,  and  had  found 
occasional  expression  as  one  circumstance  or  another  had 
inspired  it  in  the  writings  and  speeches  of  Jefferson,  Madi- 
son, Adams,  and  Clay,  and  members  of  Congress.  At  last 
the  nation  had  arrived  at  the  point  when  its  own  sense  of 
power,  that  gratifying  feeling  of  self-confidence,  gave  the 
assurance  of  weight  to  any  foreign  policy  it  might  choose  to 
adopt,  and  especially  in  reference  to  such  matters  as  related 
purely  to  the  advancement  of  Western-world  interests.  With 
one  exception  the  newly  created  states  of  Central  and  South 
America,  established  republican  forms  of  government,  and  it 
seemed  more  than  ever  to  be  true  that  the  political  world 
was  dividing  itself  into  two  camps,  —  the  one  in  Europe  fol- 
lowing the  older  conservative  ideas  of  government,  and  the 
other  in  the  Western  Hemisphere  embracing  the  more  pro-\ 
gressive  ideas  of  j;^epublicanism. 

The  President  and  his  cabinet  were  fully  aware  of  the 
natural  antagonism  between  tliese  diametrically  opposing 
political  systems.  Already  from  an  alliance  of  powerful  mon- 
archs,  murmurings  of  hostility  to  popular  government  had 
come  from  abroad.  No  direct  conflict  was  in  prospect,  but  it 
was  well  to  prepare  for  it.  In  his  annual  message  of  Decem- 
ber 3,  1822,  President  Monroe  went  to  work  upon  that  struc- 
ture whose  foundations  had  already  been  laid  and  cemented, 
and  which,  in  the  following  year,  he  completed  in  all  its 
towering  proportions. 

Whether  we  reason  from  the  late  wars  [in  Europe]  or  from  those 
menacing  symptoms  which  now  appear  in  Europe,  it  is  manifest 
that  if  a  convulsion  should  take  place  in  any  of  those  countries  it 
will  proceed  from  causes  which  have  no  existence  and  are  utterly 
unknown  in  these  states,  in  which  there  is  but  one  order,  that  of 
the  people,  to  whom  the  sovereignty  exclusively  belongs.  Should 
war  break  out  in  any  of  those  countries,  who  can  foretell  the 
extent  to  which  it  may  be  carried  or  the  desolation  which  it  may 
spread  ?  Exempt  as  we  are  from  these  causes,  our  internal  tran- 
quillity is  secure ;  and  distant  as  we  are  from  the  troubled  scene, 
and  faithful  to  first  principles  in  regard  to  other  powers,  we 
might   reasonably  presume  that  we  should  not  be  molested  by 


306  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

them.  This,  however,  ought  not  to  be  calculated  on  as  certain. 
Unprovoked  injuries  are  often  inflicted,  and  even  the  peculiar 
felicity  of  our  situation  might  with  some  be  a  cause  for  excitement 
and  aggression.  .  .  .  The  United  States  owe  to  the  world  a  great 
example,  and,  by  means  thereof,  to  the  cause  of  liberty  and 
humanity  a  generous  support. 

The  following  year  the  anticipated  threat  from  Europe 
came.  The  allied  sovereigns  aimed  a  blow  at  the  new 
exponents  of  democracy,  and  the  protesting  answer  of  the 
United  States  was  given  sharp  and  clear  in  the  President's 
message  (1823). 


^ 


III 


After  the  fall  of  Napoleon  at  Waterloo,  the  four  powers 
I  Austria,  Russia,  Prussia,  and  England,  that  had  previously 
allied  themselves  for  the  purpose  of  opposing  the  advance 
of  the  "man  of  destiny,"  met  by  their  representatives  in 
Paris,  in  the  fall  of  1815,  and  there  renewed  their  politi- 
cal ties  by  a  fresh  treaty  (November  20).  In  this  conven- 
tion the  four  allied  monarchs,  expressing  their  desire  to  "  fix 
beforehand  the  principle  which  they  proposed  to  follow  in 
order  to  guarantee  Europe  from  dangers  by  which  she  may 
still  be  menaced,"  adopted  four  resolutions  :  first,  to  pre- 
vent Napoleon  from  regaining  power ;  second,  to  maintain 
the  government  of  France  ;  third,  to  keep  their  army  of 
occupancy  in  France  safe  from  attack  ,  and  fourth,  to  meet 
again  at  the  expiration  of  three  years  in  order  to  consult 
farther,  and  "  take  such  measures  as  should  then  seem  to 
be  best  fitted  to  preserve  the  peace  and  happiness  of 
Europe." 

This  quadruple  alliance  has  been  erroneously  referred  to 
I  by  authors  as  the  "Holy  Alliance."  The  real  "Holy  Alli- 
ance "  was  quite  a  different  combination,  and  originated  in 
this  way.  The  Czar  of  Russia  was  much  elated  by  the  defeat 
of  Napoleon.  To  him  the  triumph  of  the  allies  —  of  which 
he  was  one  —  over  this  seemingly  invincible  foe,  appeared  to 
be  no  less  than  a  direct  act  of  God  to  save  the  righteous. 


THE   MONROE  DOCTRINE  307 

and  to  confound  the  wicked.  He  became  so  impressed  with 
the  truth  of  this  remarkable  manifestation  of  Divine  Provi- 
dence, that,  in  order  to  better  merit  the  favors  of  the  Su- 
preme Being,  he  determined,  thereafter,  to  rule  his  empire 
strictly  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  the  Christian 
religion,  and  still  further,  to  induce  his  neighbors  to  do  like- 
wise. In  this  happy  resolve  the  king  of  Prussia  and  the 
Emperor  of  Austria  joined  with  the  Czar,  and  the  league 
was  christened  the  "  Holy  Alliance."  England,  when  invited, 
declined  to  become  a  party,  —  Castlereagh,  the  English  Secre- 
tary for  Foreign  Affairs,  reporting  to  the  ministry  that  the 
Czar  was  no  doubt  mentally  unbalanced.  Even  Metternich 
called  the  treaty  "verbiage."  At  all  events,  the  league  was 
formed,  the  signers  declaring  that  they  "  in  consequence  of 
the  great  events  [those  leading  to  the  defeat  of  Napoleon] 
.  .  .  and  of  the  blessings  which  it  has  pleased  Divine 
Providence  to  shed  upon  those  states.  .  .  .  Declare  solemnly, 
that  the  present  act  has  no  other  object  than  to  show  .  .  . 
their  unwavering  determination  to  adopt  for  the  only  rule 
of  their  conduct  .  .  .  the  precepts  of  their  holy  religion,  the 
precepts  of  justice,  of  charity,  and  of  peace.  ..."  The 
three  sovereigns  would  "  remain  united  by  the  bonds  of  a 
true  and  indissoluble  fraternity."  Considering  themselves 
"only  the  members  of  one  Christian  nation,"  they  looked 
upon  themselves  as  "  delegated  by  Providence  to  govern 
three  branches  of  the  same  family,  to  wit :  Austria,  Prussia, 
and  Russia."  They  confessed  that  there  was  really  no  other 
sovereign  than  ''Him  to  whom  alone  power  belongs  of  right," 
etc.  The  title  of  the  league  is  derived  from  the  closing  para- 
graph of  the  treaty  (September  26,  1815)  :  — 

Article  III.  —  All  powers  which  wish  solemnly  to  profess  the 
sacred  principles  which  have  delegated  this  act,  and  who  shall 
acknowledge  how  important  it  is  to  the  happiness  of  nations,  too 
long  disturbed,  that  these  truths  shall  henceforth  exercise  upon 
human  destinies  all  the  influence  which  belongs  to  them,  shall 
be  received  with  as  much  readiness  as  affection,  into  this  Holy 
Alliance. 

Into  this  combination  France,  Spain,  Naples  and  Sardinia 


308  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

entered.  The  Holy  Alliance  accomplished  nothing,  and  there 
is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  its  members  intended  to  use 
other  than  their  own  good  examples  to  accomplish  the  ends 
in  view.  It  was  a  foolish  pledge,  conceived  in  a  moment  of 
religious  fervor,  and  as  completely  disregarded  in  the  practi- 
cal lives  of  the  signers  as  though  it  had  never  been  made. 
There  is  no  evidence  whatever,  tending  to  show  that  the  allies 

(had  combined  for  the  purpose  of  opposing  the  growth  of  lib- 
eralism.    It  is  the   other   league,  —  the    Quadruple   league 

^ /  tb4t   had  organized   to  defeat  Napoleon,  and  that   had  re- 
/  iiewed  its  bonds  in  the  treaty  of  Paris,  November  20, 1815, 

/\y — wherein  the  propaganda  of  absolutism  was  afterward  born. 
Now  it  so  happened  that  this  quadruple  alliance,  a  few 
years  later,  quite  lost  its  original  identity.  England  had 
withdrawn  from  it,  and  France  and  Spain  had  entered. 
With  the  fall  of  Napoleon,  the  original  purposes  for  its 
existence  naturally  became  extinct ;  but  instead  of  dis- 
solving, the  alliance  continued  to  live,  and  to  take  to  itself 
entirely  new  objects  and  ideals  in  accordance  with  the  chang- 
ing political  conditions  in  Europe.  Now  because  these  new 
ideas  seemed  to  be  in  harmony  with  the  vague  ideas  expressed 
in  the  Czar's  Christian  Family  Compact  of  September  26, 1815, 
the  alliance  took  shelter  under  the  wing  of  that  forgotten 
association,  and  borrowing  its  title,  which,  to  the  zealous 
monarchs  appeared  a  good  one,  plumed  itself  the  "  Holy 
Alliance." 

Napoleon  had  stood  before  the  world  as  an  exponent  of 
liberal  ideas,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  he  tilled  the 
thrones  of  Europe  with  his  relatives  and  created  himself 
Emperor  of  France.  Upon  his  tinal  defeat  and  exile,  a  re- 
vival of  absolutism  set  in  throughout  Europe,  except,  per- 
haps, in  England,  where  liberal  ideas  had  gained  too  firm  a 
footing  ever  to  be  uprooted  by  the  mere  changing  tides  of 
popular  sentiment.  In  France,  the  same  people,  who  fifteen 
or  twenty  years  before  had  idolized  Benjamin  Franklin,  the 
apostle  of  democracy,  and  who  had  followed  Napoleon  in  his 
march  against  absolutism,  now  welcomed  the  restoration  of 
the  Bourbons  with  wild  acclaim. 


THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE  309 

Everywhere  royalist  mobs  tore  clown  the  emblems  of 
popular  govermnent ;  friends  of  liberalism  were  silenced  or 
shot ;  the  nation  was  purged  of  its  democratic  sentiments,  and 
absolutism  was  rampant.  The  Bourbons  were  resurrected, 
and  with  great  pomp  and  ceremony  Louis  XVIII  was 
crowned  king.  In  Austria,  the  reaction  was  equally  pro-\ 
nounced.  Metternich,  the  uncompromising  enemy  of  progres-  \ 
sive  ideas,  earnestly  exerted  himself  to  stamp  out  every  vestige 
of  liberalism,  both  at  home  and  abroad.  He  induced  Ferdi- 
nand, king  of  Sicily,  to  withdraw  his  promises  of  granting 
a  constitution  to  his  people,  and  created  himself  the  moral 
protector  of  the  precious  doctrines  of  divine  right. 

In  Spain  this  same  reaction  against  constitutional  govern-  > 
ment  was  tarried  to  a  most  astonishing  extent.  Ferdinand 
VII  reentered  Spain  in  1814,  and  was  received  by  the  people 
with  the  most  extravagant  demonstrations  of  welcome.  He 
immediately  proceeded  to  undo,  with  the  heartiest  approval 
of  his  subjects,  all  that  had  ever  been  previously  accomplished 
in  Spain  in  Ihe  way  of  progress.  The  constitution  was  burned 
in  the  marXet-place  of  Madrid  ;  the  Cortes  was  dissolved  and 
abolished,  and  all  of  its  decrees  were  declared  void.  Those 
suspected  of  liberal  taint  were  exiled,  and  their  writings 
destroyed.  The  prisons  were  crowded  with  those  who 
failed  to  manifest  proper  enthusiasm  in  the  backward  move- 
ment. The  lands  of  the  Church  were  restored,  the  clergy 
exempted  from  taxation,  and  the  inquisition  reestablished. 
The  remarkable  feature  of  this  movement  in  Spain  lies  in  the 
fact  that  it  found  its  heartiest  support  in  those,  who,  so  few 
years  before,  had  eagerly  clamored  for  constitutional  govern- 
ment. In  the  short  space  of  two  years  Spain  fell  back  into 
1  the  lap  of  the  dark  ages,  but  her  transatlantic  colonies 
\  breathed  a  purer  atmosphere.     They  were  already  in  revolt. 

In  Russia  and  in  Prussia  the  general  conversion  against  con- 
stitutional government  had  not  been  so  marked,  possibly 
because  the  political  pendulum  had  not  swung  so  far  in  the 
other  direction,  and  the  returning  swing  was  correspondingly 
short.  The  political  systems  of  these  two  nations,  however, 
were  wholly  autocratic. 


310  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

Such  was  the  color  of  political  creeds  in  Europe  when  the 
ambassadors  of  the  four  powers  forming  the  Quadruple  Alli- 
ance, in  accordance  with  their  agreement  of   1815,  met  in 
I  conference  at  Aix  la  Chapelle,  October  1818.     At  this  meet- 
I  ing  it  was  decided  to  withdraw  the  allied  army  of  occupa- 
1  tion    from    France,   that   country   having   been   thoroughly 
won  back  to  the  principles  of  absolutism,  and  having  ^  legiti- 
mist on  the  throne.     France  was  therefore  taken  into  the  alli- 
ance that  was  originally  formed  against  her,  making  thereby 
a  quintuple  alliance.     At  Aix,  the  allies  made  a  declaration 
that  the  tranquillity  of  Europe  depended  largely  upon  the 
united  action  and  watchfulness  of  the  five  sovereigns  com- 
posing the  league,  and  that  the  league  "  has  no  other  object 
than  the  maintenance  of  peace  and  the  guarantee  of  those 
transactions  on  which  the  peace  was  founded  and  consoli- 
dated."    "The  repose  of  the  world  will  be  constantly -mir 
motive."     Thus  it  will  appear  that  the  allies  had  virtually] 
constituted  themselves  into  a  society  for  the  regulation  ofj 
European   politics.     The  league  had  not  yet  declared  the 
specific  object  of  suppressing  all  popular  movements  against 
absolutism,  but  the  reactionary  movement  in  that  direction 
throughout  Europe  had  left  its  impress  upon  the  hearts  of 
the  legitimate  rulers,  and,  barring  the  English,  the  five  rulers 
I  in  question  were  firm  adherents  to  the  theory   that   royal 
I  power  is  based  on  divine  right. 

The  exact  meaning  in  the  declaration  of  the  allies  at  Aix 
was  not  altogether  clear,  but  it  pointed  in  the  direction  of 
assuming  control  of  all  European  political  affairs,  and  of 
insuring  monarchical  institutions.  To  this  the  English  cabi- 
net looked  askance,  remembering  that  "  we  have  a  parlia- 
ment and  a  public,  to  whom  we  are  responsible,  and  that  we 
cannot  permit  ourselves  to  be  drawn  into  views  of  policy 
which  are  wholly  incompatible  with  the  spirit  of  our  govern- 
ment." Soon  after  the  adjournment  at  Aix,  the  allies  were 
called  upon  to  act,  and  therefore  to  interpret,  the  true  mean- 
ing of  their  vague  declarations.  It  then  became  fully  evi- 
dent that  they  considered  themselves  the  guardians  of 
Europe,  —  of   its   peace,  its   progress,   its   religion,  and   its 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  311 

morals ;  that  it  had  become  a  society  whose  main  object  was 
the  perpetuation  of  monarchical  institutions,  and  that  its 
paramount  duty  was  to  suppress,  wherever  found,  all  popular 
movements  against  such  forms  of  government. 

Great  popular  movements  recur  in  the  lives  of  nations  with 
a  strange  regularity.  Like  the  waves  of  the  sea,  with  corre- 
sponding depressions  between,  these  movements  hurl  them- 
selves against  the  bulwarks  of  conservatism,  and  as  quickly 
subside.  So  have  the  waves  of  liberalism  risen  and  fallen  in 
Europe  ;  but,  as  in  the  swelling  tides  of  the  ocean,  each  suc- 
ceeding wave  reaches  a  higher  point.  The  tremendous 
enthusiasm  in  Spain  that  greeted  the  reestablishment  of 
Ferdinand  VII  when  at  its  very  climax,  in  1820,  suddenly 
cooled.  The  revolt  of  her  American  colonies  had  begun 
about  eight  years  before,  and  had  depleted  Spain  of  her 
resources.  The  last  dollar  had  been  squeezed  from  the  treas- 
ury, the  last  available  man  had  been  forced  into  the  army, 
the  last  ship  had  sailed  away  with  arms  and  ammunition, 
and  all  to  no  purpose.  In  1820,  the  last  regiment  that  could 
be  mobilized  for  transatlantic  service  rebelled,  and  in  a 
moment  all  Spain  was  in  a  ferment  of  revolution  against  the 
tyranny  and  oppression  of  Ferdinand.  An  incoming  wave 
of  liberalism  swept  over  Spain,  over  Naples  and  Sicily,  then 
over  Portugal,  and  threatened  to  inundate  France.  Ferdi- 
nand was  forced  to  grant  a  constitution  to  the  people,  and 
absolutism  in  Naples,  Sicily,  and  Portugal  collapsed.  Fright- 
ened by  the  signs,  Louis  XVIII  hastily  called  upon  the  allies 
to  meet,  which  they  accordingly  did  at  Troppau,  October, 
1820.  The  English  ambassador  at  Troppau  was  a  silent 
spectator;  the  French  envoys  quarrelled  among  themselves, 
and  the  original  founders  of  the  alliance  —  Russia,  Prussia, 
and  Austria  —  were  left  to  act  as  they  saw  fit.  Now,  if  the 
rulers  of  peoples  receive  their  right  to  govern  through  Divine 
Grace,  and  if  they  are  the  agents  of  God,  whose  mission  on 
earth  is  to  govern  the  children  ot  men  according  to  the  will 
of  Heaven,  then  it  must  necessarily  follow  that  all  attempts 
to  depose  a  legitimate  monarch  are  wicked.  All  liberal 
movements,   therefore,  are  unholy  ;    all  revolutions  against 


/ 


312  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

the  old  hereditary  families  are  sacrilegious.  Such  was  the 
line  of  argument  advanced  at  the  conference.  -Ihajthree 
powers  declared  that,  having  crushed  out  the  arch  fiend 
of  military  tyranny  and  oppression  (Napoleon),  they  now 
found  themselves  called  upon  to  "put  a  curb  on  a  force  no 
less  tyrannical,  and  no  less  detestable  —  that  of  revolt  and 
crime." 

Suiting  their  actions  to  their  words,  the  allies  called  upon 
the  aged  king  of  Naples  to  meet  them  in  Leybach  in  January, 
1821,  and  take  council  with  them  concerning  the  suppression 
of  a  revolution  which  had  forced  him  to  accept  a  constitution 
and  a  parliament.  While  that  old  monarch  was  theorizing 
in  Leybach,  the  king's  son  joined  the  popular  party  against 
him.  The  allies  sent  an  Austrian  army  into  Italy  which  de- 
feated the  prince,  suppressed  the  rebellion  and  restored  the 
old  king  upon  the  throne  of  Naples  as  an  absolute  ruler. 
Insurrections  in  Piedmont  and  in  Greece  were  in  the  same 
manner  crushed  by  the  forces  of  the  allies. 

At  Leybach,  a  new  declaration  of  principles  was  issued, 
which  was,  in  effect,  a  repetition  of  the  Troppau  circular. 
It  announced  that  they  (the  allies)  had  "  taken  the  people  of 
Europe  into  their  holy  keeping,  and  that,  in  future,  all  useful 
and  necessary  changes  in  the  legislation  and  administration 
of  states  must  emanate  alone  from  the  free  will,  the  reflected 
and  enlightened  impulse  of  those  whom  God  has  rendered 
responsible  for  power." 

The  next  year  the  allies  met  in  Vienna,  adjourning  thence 
I  to  Verona  (October,  1822),  when  the  matter  of  the  Spanish 
revolution  was  taken  into  most  serious  consideration.  Spain 
was  distressed  by  civil  dissensions,  Ferdinand  had  been  driven 
into  reassembling  the  Cortes,  and  the  cause  of  liberalism  was 
again  advancing.  It  appeared  more  and  more  improbable 
that  the  exhausted  nation  could  succeed  in  holding  her  trans- 
V  atlantic  colonies,  all  of  which  were  in  revolt,  and  most  of 
which  had,  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  already  acquired  their 
independence.  Ferdinand  begged  the  aid  of  the  alliance  to 
regain  his  American  possessions,  and  the  great  powers  hesi- 
tated.    Russia,    Prussia   and    Austria,    which   stood   firmly 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  *  313 

by  their  anti-liberal  doctrines,  declared  they  would  never 
recognize  the  seceded  colonies  until  Spain  herself  had 
don^e"Io7 

English  sentiment  had  not  yielded  to  the  principles  of  the 
allies.  The  notions  of  divine  right  were  distasteful  to  a  people 
who  had  prospered  for  centuries  under  constitutional  govern- 
ment, and  the  principle  of  forcible  intervention  adopted  by 
the  allies  seemed  to  the  English  ministry  to  be  wholly  im- 
proper. In  the  course  adopted  by  the  allies  toward  the 
revolutionary  movements  in  Italy,  England  had  no  interests 
directly  affected,  but  she  had  nevertheless  protested  against 
the  unwarrantable  interference  of  the  powers  in  the  affairs  of 
Naples.  But  in  the  proposed  movement  against  liberalism  in 
Spain,  to  be  discussed  by  the  allied  agents  of  the  powers  at 
Verona,  England  had  a  more  direct  and  more  substantial 
interest. 

In  earlier  days,  Spain's  economic  policy  with  her  trans- 
atlantic colonies  had  been  a  rigidly  exclusive  one,  but  during 
their  revolt,  many  of  the  tightly  drawn  commercial  lines  had 
been  cut,  and  old  barriers  of  trade  broken  down.  English 
merchants  had  greatly  profited  thereby,  and  within  a  few 
years  they  had  built  up  a  large  and  growing  trade  in  South 
America  and  the  West  Indies.  In  a  continuance  of  these 
favorable  conditions  lay  the  motive  of  England's  action.  At 
the  time  of  the  meeting  of  the  allies  at  Verona,  the  statesmen 
of  England  had  about  decided  to  send  commercial  agents,  if 
not  consular  representatives,  to  the  larger  cities  of  South 
America  —  a  course  of  action  which  ill  accorded  with  the 
policy  of  the  allies  toward  South  America.  England  was 
not  prepared,  on  the  other  hand,  to  go  to  the  extremity  of 
recognizing  the  independence  of  the  new  states  at  once,  as 
the  United  States  had  done  the  previous  year ;  yet  to  prevent 
a  revival  of  commercial  exclusion  in  the  Spanish  colonies, 
England  was  willing  to  take  decided  action.  England  be- 
lieved that  if  Spain  could  subdue  her  rebellious  colonies,  she 
would  be  compelled  at  last  to  grant  them  commercial  free- 
dom ;  yet  influenced  by  representations  and  petitions  of  her 
own  commercial  classes,   England   was  perfectly  willing  to 


314  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

see  the  colonists  secure  their  independence,  in  the  belief  that 
political  relations  could  be  equally  well  established  with  them.  yC 

"Again  the  English  had/'  wrote  M.  Beaumarchais,  author 
of  "La  Doctrine  de  Monroe"  (p.  6),  "the  rare  good  fortune 
of  finding  their  own  particular  interests  conform  to  the 
noble  cause  of  liberty,  and  they  furthered  well  their  real 
purposes  by  posing  before  Europe,  either  hesitating  or  hos- 
tile, as  disinterested  champions  of  Justice  and  Right." 

Lord  Castlereagh,  the  Prune  Minister,  was  chosen  to 
represent  England  at  the  Congress  of  Veronaj_.and  the 
ambassador  drew  his  own  instfucfidnsi  which  were  to  oppose 
strenuously  any  proposed  intervention  in  Spanish  affairs. 
He  further  instructed  himself  to  make  known  the  intention 
of.  his  country  to  follow  her  own  commercial  interests  by 
sending  diplomatic  agents  to  South  America. 

The  death  of  Castlereagh,  before  the  meeting  of  the  allies, 
brought  Mr.  Canning  forward  as  Prime  Minister,  and  he 
appointed  the  Duke  of  Wellington  in  Castlereagh's  place  to 
represent  England  at  the  Congress.  At  Verona  the  allies 
signed  a  secret  treaty  (November  22,  1822)  to  which  only 
the  names  of  Metternich,  Chateaubriand,  Bernstet  (Prussia) 
and  Nesselrode  appear.  The  first  two  articles  of  this  instru- 
ment are  of  especial  interest. 

The  undersigned,  specially  authorized  to  make  some  additions 
to  the  treaty  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  after  having  exchanged  their 
respective  credentials,  have  agreed  as  follows :  — 

Article  L — The  high  contracting  powers,  being  convinced 
that  the  system  of  representative  government  is  equally  as  in- 
compatible with  the  monarchical  principles  as  the  maxim  of  the 
sovereignty  of  the  people  with  the  divine  right,  engage  mutually, 
;in  the  most  solemn  manner,  to  use  all  their  efforts  to  put.aii.^d__ 
\  to  the  system  <^f  rop|.pgQ,nta.tiv.^  governments,  in  whatever  country 
it  may  exist  in  EuropI,  andto'  prevent  its  being  introduced  in 
those  countries  where  it  is  not  yet  known. 

Article  II.  —  As  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  liberty  of  the 
press  is  the  most  powerful  means  used  by  the  pretended  sup- 
porters of  the  rights  of  nations,  to  the  detriment  of  those  Princes, 
the  high  contracting  parties  promise  reciprocally  to  adopt  all 
proper  measures  to  suppress  it,  not  only  in  their  own  states,  but 
also  in  the  rest  of  Europe. 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  315 

It  will  be  noted  that  in  this  treaty  of  November  22,  1822, 
in  which   England    took   no   part,  the   allies,  "make  some 
additions  to  the   Treaty  of   the   Holy  Alliance."      Thus  it 
appears  how  these  four  powers  (the  original  Quadruple  Alli- 
ance), by  assuming  to  amend  a  treaty  not  originally  of  their  ' 
^wnTniaking,  had  appropriated  to  themselves  the  title  and 
doctrines  of  the  former  Holy  Alliance.      One  important  step 
was  taken^  at  Verona.     The    Congress  adjourned  with  the 
understanding  that  France,  in  the  name  of  the  Holy  allies, 
should  send  an  army  into  Spain,  "  to  put  an  end  to  the  system 
of   representative    government "   which  was   struggling  for   )  o^ 
existence  beyond  the  Pyrenees.     A  French  army,  under  the\  ^<^ 
Due  d'Angouleme,  crossed  the  frontier,  and  after  a  feeble  c^ 
resistance  from  the  revolutionists,  restored  Ferdinand  to  a  |     t 
despotic  throne  (April,  1822).     The  next  step  of  the  allies  ^\ 


t 


seemed  to  be  reasonably  certain,  —  a  movement  against  South 
American  revolutionists.      Their  efforts  against  liberalism 
in  Europe  had  been  eminently  successful,  as  demonstrated 
in  Naples,  in  Sicily,  in  Piedmont,  and  lastly  in  Spain.     Fer- 
dinand,  having   been    reinstated   upon   his   throne,   begged-^  (p 
lustily  for  help  to  subjugate  his  colonies,  both  in  the  interest      ^ 
of  Spain  and  in  the  cause  of  absolutism.     The  advisability 
of  taking  such  a  step  had  already  been  broached  at  Vienna, 
and  freely  discussed  at  Verona.     Reports  of  these  contem- 
plated movements  in  the  Americas  had  reached  Washington,   ""x^ 
and  had  impressed  the  administration  with  a  deep  feeling  of 
concern.     It  was  feared  that  France  might  demand  Cuba  as    ' 
a  price  for  restoring  Ferdinand,  and  it  was   quite    certain      4 
that  if  the  allies  did  interfere  in  America,  the  newly  created  M  f 
republics  would  inevitably  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  more   \X 
powerful  European  nations.  \  In  order  to  determine  upon  a     \ 
course   of  action  relative  to  Spain's  seceding  colonies,  the      I 
allies  agreed  to  meet  again  in  the  autumn  of  1823.     In  the      I 
meantime,  however,  the  activity  of  Canning  had  marshalled 
the  forces  that  opposed  the  ideas  and  projects  of  the  Holy 
Alliance,  and  suddenly  and  unexpectedly  to  the  allies,  there 
came  from  Washington  a  warning  to  stop.     As  they  devel- 
opeTi  in  strength  and  resources,  the  people  of   the  United 


\ 


lt 


316  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

States  had  for  many  years  been  preparing  a  mine  to  be  sprung 
when  the  proper  time  came.  It  was  Canning  who  signalled 
the  danger  from  abroad ;  it  was  Adams  who  placed  the 
charge  in  position  and  adjusted  the  fuse,  and  it  was  Monroe 
who  applied  the  match.  The  statement  that  the  United 
States  would  resist  the  advance  of  the  allies  into  the  new 
world,  as  hinted  in  President  Monroe's  Message  of  1823, 
together  with  the  knowledge  that  England's  sympathy  was 
pledged  to  the  United  States,  was  quite  sufficient  to  check 
any  designs  which  the  Alliance  may  have  devised  to  stifle 
the  cause  of  liberalism  and  constitutional  government  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere. 

IV 

When  Canning  became  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  he 
was  perplexed  in  regard  to  the  proper  attitude  he  should 
take  toward  the  struggling  Spanish-American  colonies. 
England's  commercial  classes  inclined  toward  the  indepen- 
dence of  these  newly  created  republics  ;  but  true  to  her 
conservative  notions,  as  well  as  to  treaty  pledges  to  Spain, 
England  was  unprepared,  even  in  her  own  interest,  to  welcome 
immediately  the  seceded  Spanish  colonies  into  the  brother- 
hood of  sovereign  states.  An  unwillingness  to  leap  as  far 
as  her  strength  will  permit  is  a  characteristic  of  British 
foreign  relations,  yet  in  this  particular  instance,  a  leap  too 
far  might  have  proved  a  leap  into  the  dark,  as  the  strength 
of  all  combined  Europe  seemed  to  favor  the  reduction  of 
Spanish- America  in  the  cause  of  absolutism  ;  such  a  political 
error  might  have  isolated  Great  Britain.  Canning  was  will- 
ing to  go  much  further  in  this  direction  than  had  been  his 
more  temporizing  predecessor.  Lord  Castlereagh.  He  pro- 
tested vigorously  against  the  proposed  interference  of  Europe 
in  America.  He  was  willing  tiiat  the  new  states  should 
remain  Spanish  or  be  free,  indeed  it  is  said  that  he  almost 
preferred  them  to  return  under  a  modified  Spanish  rule  ; 
but  in  order  to  satisfy  the  requirements  of  English  com- 
mercial interests,  they  must,  under  no  circumstances,  pass 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  317 

under  other  European  sovereignty.  "Neither  justice,  nor 
humanity,  nor  the  interests  of  Europe  or  of  America,"  he 
said  to  Polignac,  "  allow  that  the  struggle  .  .  .  should  be  taken 
up  afresh  by  other  hands."  Again,  England  was  far  in 
advance  of  continental  Europe  in  the  development  of  consti- 
tutional government  ;  having  progressed  in  her  ideas  favor- 
able to  popular  suffrage,  she  too,  it  may  reasonably  be  inferred, 
viewed  with  some  disfavor  the  resubjugation  of  a  people 
who  had  practically  acquired  their  emancipation  from  the 
tyranny  of  absolute  monarchy.  Mr.  Canning  was,  in  no 
sense  of  the  word,  an  enthusiastic  admirer  of  the  people  of 
the  United  States.  From  his  own  writings,  expressions  are 
not  wanting  indicating  an  actual  aversion  for  the  keen,  ag- 
gressive people  across  the  Atlantic,  but  in  the  impending 
danger  that  threatened  both,  the  one  commercially,  the 
other  politically,  he  turned  to  the  United  States.  He  well 
knew  that  the  people  of  the  United  States  sympathized  with 
the  Spanish  colonies  in  their  struggles  for  freedom  ;  indeed, 
they  had  already  recognized  several  of  them  as  sovereign 
states.  He  knew,  also,  that  Americans  regarded  the  advance 
of  despotism  and  the  action  of  the  allies  with  no  little  sus- 
picion and  disfavor.  Why  not,  therefore,  utilize  this  senti-  j 
ment  to  his  own  advantage  ?  He  began  his  reconnoitering 
tactics  at  once  by  seeking  Mr.  Rush,  the  American  Minister, 
in  London.  On  August  16,  1823,  while  discussing  with 
Mr.  Rush  matters  connected  with  the  northwest  boundary 
of  the  United  States,  the  conversation  drifted  into  Spanish 
affairs.  Mr.  Rush  spoke  of  a  recent  statement  made  by 
Mr.  Canning,  to  the  effect  that  England  disclaimed  all 
intention  of  seizing  any  Spanish  colony,  and  hoped  France 
entertained  no  such  purpose.  Mr.  Canning  seized  the  occa- , 
sion  to  sound  the  American  Minister  as  to  what  he  believed  j 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  would  say  to  a  project 
of  going  hand  in  hand  with  England  in  order  to  prevent 
France,  or  the  other  powers  of  the  alliance,  from  interfering 
in  Spanish  America.     Mr.  Rush  wrote  :  — 

He  did  not  think  that  concert  of  action  would  become  neces- 
sary, fully  believing  that  the  simple  fact  of  our  two  countries 


318  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

being  known  to  hold  the  same  opinion  would,  by  its  moral  effect, 
put  down  the  intention  on  the  part  of  France,  if  she  entertained 
it.  This  belief  was  founded,  he  said,  upon  the  large  share  of  the 
Maritime  power  of  the  world  which  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States  shared  between  them,  and  the  consequent  influence  which 
the  knowledge  of  their  common  policy  on  the  question  involving 
such  important  maritime  interests,  present  and  future,  could  not 
fail  to  produce  on  the  rest  of  the  world. 

Without  instructions  from  home,  Mr.  Rush  did  not  feel 
at  liberty  to  commit  himself  upon  so  important  a  matter. 
Several  days  after  this  conversation,  Mr.  Canning  wrote  to 
Mr.  Rush  that  his  government  had  nothing  to  conceal  on 
the  subject.  It  conceived  the  recovery  of  the  colonies  by 
Spain  to  be  hopeless,  and  the  recognition  of  them  to  be  a 
question  only  of  time  and  circumstance.  He  asserted  that 
the  English  Government  was  "by  no  means  disposed  to 
throw  any  impediment  in  the  way  of  an  arrangement  between 
them  and  the  mother  country  by  amicable  negotiations." 
England,  he  maintained,  desired  for  herself  no  part  of  their 
territory,  but  he  added,  "  it  could  not  see  any  part  of  them 
transferred  to  any  other  power  with  indifference." 

Such  being  England's  views,  urged  Mr.  Canning,  why 
not,  if  the  United  States  acceded,  publish  them  to  the  world  ? 
"  A  proceeding  of  such  a  nature,"  he  continued,  "  would  be 
at  once  the  most  effectual  and  the  least  offensive  mode  of 
intimating  the  joint  disapprobation  of  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  of  any  projects  which  might  be  cherished  by 
any  European  power,  of  a  forcible  enterprise  for  reducing 
the  colonies  to  subjugation  on  the  behalf  or  in  the  name  of 
Spain  ;  or  of  the  acquisition  of  any  part  of  them  to  itself  by 
cession  or  by  conquest."  Mr.  Canning  supplemented  his 
note  by  another  a  few  days  later,  calling  Mr.  Rush's  atten- 
tion to  the  fact  that  additional  reasons  for  haste  had  devel- 
oped. France  expected  shortly  to  accomplish  her  military 
objects  in  Spain,  and  notice  had  been  sent  to  England  that 
when  this  was  done  "  a  proposal  would  be  made  for  a  Con- 
gress in  Europe,  or  some  other  concert  and  consultation, 
specifically  on  the  affairs  of  South  America." 


THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE  319 

Mr.  Rush  still  hesitated  to  answer,  fearing  to  complicate 
the  United  States  in  the  political  broils  of  Europe,  —  a  most 
undesirable  step,  he  believed,  for  his  country  to  take  ;  more- 
over, he  felt  certain  that  the  President  would  sanction  no 
such  radical  departure  from  the  fundamental  principles  of 
American  politics.  He  cautiously  replied  to  the  British 
Secretary  that  he  could  safely  say  the  United  States  agreed 
with  Mr.  Canning  in  all  he  had  said  concerning  the  future 
status  of  the  Spanish  colonies.  He  concluded,  however, 
with  the  following  vigorous  words  :  "  We  should  regard  as 
unjust,  and  fruitful  of  highly  disastrous  consequences,  any  at- 
tempt on  the  part  of  any  European  power  to  take  possession 
of  them  by  conquest,  by  cession,  or  on  any  other  ground  or 
pretext."  Lack  of  instructions  from  Washington  did  not 
warrant  him  in  joining  with  Mr.  Canning  in  an  open  declara- 
tion to  that  effect.  A  little  later,  Mr.  Rush  wrote  to  Can- 
ning, that  his  government  "would  regard  as  objectionable 
any  interference  whatever  in  the  affairs  of  Spanish  America, 
unsolicited  by  the  late  provinces  themselves,  and  against 
their  will.  It  would  regard  the  convening  of  a  Congress 
to  deliberate  upon  their  affairs  as  a  measure  uncalled-for, 
and  indicative  of  a  policy  highly  unfriendly  to  the  tranquil- 
lity of  the  world.  It  could  never  look  with  insensibility 
upon  such  an  exercise  of  European  jurisdiction  over  com- 
munities now  of  right  exempt  from  it,  and  entitled  to 
regulate  their  own  concerns  unmolested  from  abroad." 

Mr.  Canning  continued  to  urge  Mr.  Rush  to  join  him  in 
an  open  declaration,  because  the  congress  of  the  powers  would 
soon  meet,  and  England  was  desirous  of  arming  herself  before- 
hand with  an  American  declaration,  in  order  that  she  might 
not  enter  the  lists  alone  and  single-handed  against  the  designs 
of  the  allies.  Mr.  Rush  still  hesitated.  Communication 
with  the  United  States  required  many  weeks,  and  by  that 
time  an  answer  from  Washington  would  be  of  little  avail. 
Again  the  British  Secretary  prodded  Mr.  Rush.  "They 
[United  States]  were  the  first  power  established  on  that 
continent,  and  now  confessedly  the  leading  power  ;  "  they 
were  connected  with  South  America  by  their  geographic 


320  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

position,  and  with  Europe  by  their  relations.  Was  it  possi- 
ble that  they  could  with  indifference  see  their  fate  deter- 
mined by  Europe  ?  Had  not  a  new  epoch  arrived  in  the 
relative  position  of  the  United  States  toward  Europe,  which 
Europe  must  acknowledge?  Were  the  great  political  and 
commercial  interests  which  hung  upon  the  destiny  of  the  new 
continent  to  be  canvassed  and  adjusted  on  the  Eastern  Hemi- 
sphere without  the  cooperation  or  even  knowledge  of  the 
United  States  ?  These  were  flattering  suggestions  to  Mr. 
Rush;  and  finally  moved  by  such  representations  he  consented 
to  rely  upon  his  general  power  as  a  Minister  Plenipotentiary, 
and  to  take  the  desired  stand  with  Mr.  Canning,  provided 
England  would  first  recognize  the  independence  of  the  South 
American  states.  To  this  Canning  would  not  agree,  and  the 
I  project  of  ajpint  American  and  English  statement  fell  through. 
Annoyed  by  his  failure  to  secure  the  cooperation  of  the 
United  States,  Canning  decided  to  proceed  alone.  Turn- 
klg_tQ_Ji!rance,  he  made  known  to  the  French  Ambassador, 
Prince  Polignac,  England's  determination  to  oppose  the 
interference  of  the  allied  powers  in  Spain's  behalf  to  sub- 
/due  her  colonies.  .  To  his  surprise,  no  doubt,  Polignac 
/  declared  that  France  entertained  no  such  intention,  and, 
furthermore,  that  France  fully  agreed  with  England  in  that 
the  South  American  states  were,  to  all  intents  and  pur- 
poses, free  and  should  not  be  molested.  Polignac  further 
disclaimed  any  intention  on  the  part  of  his  government 
to  seek  any  exclusive  commercial  advantage  in  Spanish 
America.  To  Canning  these  statements  of  Polignac  were 
too  extraordinary  to  be  true ;  he  distrusted  the  French 
diplomat,  as  the  latter  appears  to  have  distrusted  the  Eng- 
lishman, so  Rush  was  not  made  acquainted  by  Canning  with 
the  results  of  the  Polignac  conferences  in  time  to  forward 
them  to  Washington  before  the  end  of  the  year  (1823).  As 
it  was  largely  against  France  that  the  animus  of  the  Monroe 
declaration  was  directed,  it  is  not  unlikely  that  had  such  a 
disclaimer  from  Polignac  reached  President  Monroe  before 
his  message  had  been  framed,  its  tone  might  have  been  con- 
siderably modified. 


THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE  321 

When  Rush's  despatches  relating  his  interviews  with 
Canning  reached  Washington  in  September  (1823)  the 
President  was  plunged  into  a  sea  of  doubt  and  perplexity. 
He  fully  realized  the  importance  of  the  question  as  he  saw 
plainly  the  approach  of  the  dreaded  clash  ;  it  was  the  spirit 
of  absolutism,  angered  and  jealous,  which  was  seeking  to 
arrest  the  progress  of  democracy  in  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere. To  him  the  subjugation  of  the  South  American 
colonies  by  France,  or  by  the  combined  forces  of  the  Holy 
allies,  pointed  directly  to  the  absorption  of  those  colonics 
by  the  great  powers  and  their  forcible  return  to  the  sway 
of  imperialism.  It  meant  the  hedging  in  of  the  United! 
States  by  its  natural  enemies,  and  the  possible  overthrow  off 
republican  institutions  at  home.  He  was  determined  from/ 
the  first  to  act,  but  in  just  what  manner  was  the  question. 
To  unite  with  Great  Britain  in  a  joint  declaration  to  the 
powers  for  the  furtherance  of  any  end  whatever,  would  be  to 
enter  upon  an  entangling  alliance ;  indeed,  to  subvert  a  sacred 
policy  of  his  cduritry."^  To  issue  a  declaration  such  as  the 
occasion  called  for  would  involve  an  interference  in  the  affairs 
of  foreign  nations,  and  if  issued  alone  by  the  United  States 
it  might  avail  nothing  against  the  forces  of  combined  Europe. 

Jefferson  was  then  in  retirement  at  Monticello,  removed 
from  the  cares  and  vexations  of  public  life,  but  to  this  aged 
statesman,  Monroe  turned  for  advice.  To  Madison  as  well, 
also  in  retirement  at  his  Virginia  home,  the  President  for- 
warded copies  of  the  Rush- Canning  correspondence,  solicit- 
ing his  counsel  in  this  critical  matter.  The  replies  of  these 
two  men  are  valuable  historical  documents.  That  of  Jeffer- 
son is  as  follows  :  — 

Monticello,  October  24,  1823. 

Dear  Sir, — The  question  presented  by  the  letters  you  have 
sent  me,  is  the  most  momentous  which  has  ever  been  offered  to 
my  contemplation  since  that  of  Independence.  That  made  us  a 
nation,  this  sets  our  compass  and  points  the  course  which  we  are 
to  steer  through  the  ocean  of  time  opening  on  us.  And  never 
could  we  embark  on  it  under  circumstances  more  auspicious. 
Our  first  and  fundamental  maxim  should  be,  never  to  entangle 


*  322  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

ourselves  in  the  broils  of  Europe.  Our  second,  never  to  suffer 
j  Europe  to  intermeddle  with  cis- Atlantic  affairs.  America,  North 
and  South,  has  a  set  of  interests  distinct  from  those  of  Europe, 
and  peculiarly  her  own.  She  should  therefore'have  a  system  of 
her  own,  separate  and  apart  from  that  of  Europe.  While  the 
last  is  laboring  to  become  the  domicil  of  despotism,  our  endeavor 
should  surely  be,  to  make  our  hemisphere  that  of  freedom.  One 
nation,  most  of  all,  could  disturb  us  in  this  pursuit;  she  now  offers 
to  lead,  aid,  and  accompany  us  in  it.  By  acceding  to  her  propo- 
sition, we  detach  her  from  the  band  of  despots,  bring  her  mighty 
weight  into  the  scale  of  free  government,  and  emancipate  a  con- 
tinent at  one  stroke,  which  might  otherwise  linger  long  in  doubt 
and  difficulty.  Great  Britain  is  the  nation  which  can  do  us  the 
'  most  harm  of  any  one,  or  all  on  earth ;  and  with  her  on  our  side 
we  need  not  fear  the  whole  world.  With  her  then,  we  should 
most  sedulously  cherish  a  cordial  friendship ;  and  nothing  would 
tend  more  to  knit  our  affections  than  to  be  fighting  once  more, 
side  by  side,  in  the  same  cause.  Not  that  I  would  purchase  even 
her  amity  at  the  price  of  taking  part  in  her  wars.  But  the  war 
in  which  the  present  proposition  might  engage  us,  should  that  be 
,  its  consequence,  is  not  her  war,  but  ours.  Its  object  is  to  intro- 
duce and  establish  the  American  system,  of  keeping  out  of  our 
land  all  foreign  powers,  of  never  permitting  those  of  Europe  to| 
intermeddle  with  the  affairs  of  our  nations.  It  is  to  maintain  our' 
own  principle,  not  to  depart  from  it.  And  if,  to  facilitate  this, 
we  can  effect  a  division  in  the  body  of  the  European  powers,  and 
draw  over  to  our  side  its  most  powerful  member,  surely  we  should  . 
do  it.  But  I  am  clearly  of  Mr.  Canning's  opinion,  that  it  will  ^ 
prevent  instead  of  provoke  war.  With  Great  Britain  withdrawn 
from  their  scale  and  shifted  into  that  of  our  two  continents,  all 
Europe  combined  would  not  undertake  such  a  war.  For  how 
would  they  propose  to  get  at  either  enemy  without  superior 
fleets?  Nor  is  the  occasion  to  be  slighted  which  this  proposi- 
tion offers,  of  declaring  our  protest  against  the  atrocious  violar 
tions  of  the  rights  of  nations,  by  the  interference  of  any  one  in 
the  internal  affairs  of  another,  so  flagitiously  begun  by  Bonaparte, 
and  now  continued  by  the  equally  lawless  Alliance,  calling  itself 
Holy.  .      . 

I  could  honestly,  therefore,  join  in  the  declaration  proposed, 
that  we  aim  not  at  the  acquisition  of  any  of  those  possessions, 
that  we  will  not  stand  in  the  way  of  any  amicable  arrangement 
between  them  and  the  mother  country ;  but  that  we  will  oppose,  \ 
with  all  our  means,  the  forcible  interposition  of  any  other  power,  1 
as  auxiliary,  stipendiary,  or  under  any  other  form  of  pretext,  and 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  323 

most  especially,  their  transfer  to  any  power  by  conquest,  cession, 
or  acquisition  in  any  other  way.  I  should  think  it,  therefore, 
advisable,  that  the  Executive  should  encourage  the  British  govern- 
ment to  a  continuance  in  the  dispositions  expressed  in  these  let- 
ters, by  an  assurance  of  his  concurrence  with  them  as  far  as  his 
authority  goes ;  and  that  as  it  may  lead  to  war,  the  declaration  of 
which  requires  an  act  of  Congress,  the  case  shall  be  laid  before 
them  for  consideration  at  their  first  meeting,  and  under  the  rea- 
sonable aspect  in  which  it  is  seen  by  himself. 

Madison's  reply  is  no  less  interesting,  and  merits  free 
quotation :  — 

Oct.  30,  1823. 

Dear  Sir,  —  I  have  just  received  from  Mr.  Jefferson  your  let- 
ter to  him,  with  the  correspondence  between  Mr.  Canning  and  Mr. 
Rush,  sent  for  his  and  my  perusal,  and  our  opinions  on  the  sub- 
ject of  it. 

From  the  disclosures  of  Mr.  Canning  it  appears,  as  was  other- 
wise to  be  inferred,  that  the  success  of  France  against  Spain 
would  be  followed  by  an  attempt  of  the  Holy  allies  to  reduce  the 
revolutionized  colonies  of  the  latter  to  their  former  dependence. 

The  professions  we  have  made  to  these  neighbors,  our  sympa- 
thies with  their  liberties  and  independence,  the  deep  interest  we 
have  in  the  most  friendly  relations  with  them,  and  the  conse- 
quences threatened  by  a  command  of  their  resources  by  the  Great 
Powers,  confederated  against  the  rights  and  reforms  of  which  we 
have  given  so  conspicuous  and  persuasive  an  example,  all  unite  in 
calling  for  our  efforts  to  defeat  the  meditated  crusade.  It  is  par- 
ticularly fortunate  that  the  policy  of  Great  Britain,  though  guided 
by  calculations  different  from  ours,  has  presented  a  cooperation 
for  an  object  the  same  with  ours.  With  that  cooperation  we  have 
nothing  to  fear  from  the  rest  of  Europe,  and  with  it  the  best 
assurance  of  success  to  our  laudable  views.  There  ought  not, 
therefore,  to  be  any  backwardness,  I  think,  in  meeting  her  in  the 
way  she  has  proposed ;  keeping  in  view,  of  course,  the  spirit  and 
forms  of  the  Constitution  in  every  step  taken  in  the  road  to  war, 
which  must  be  the  last  step  if  those  short  of  war  should  be  with- 
out avail. 

It  cannot  be  doubted  that  Mr.  Canning's  proposal,  though  made 
with  the  air  of  consultation  as  well  as  concert,  was  founded  on  a 
pre-determination  to  take  the  course  marked  out,  whatever  might 
be  the  reception  given  here  to  his  invitation.  But  this  considera- 
tion ought  not  to  divert  us  from  what  is  just  and  proper  in  itself. 


324  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

Our  cooperation  is  due  to  ourselves  and  to  the  world;  and  whilst 
it  must  ensure  success  in  the  event  of  an  appeal  to  force,  it  doubles 
the  chance  of  success  without  that  appeal.  .  .  . 


In  November  (1823)  the  cabinet  meetings  began,  and  it 
may  well  be  imagined  that  the  principal  topic  of  interest  was 
the  subject  of  the  Holy  Alliance  and  its  suspected  Western 
schemes ;  just  how  to  express  the  defiance  of  the  United 
States  in  the  most  judicious  and  practical  manner,  brought 
forth  considerable  divergence  of  opinion. 

In  the  cabinet  were  John  Quincy  Adams,  Secretary  of 
State,  Calhoun,  Southard  and  Wirt.  Mr.  Calhoun  advised 
following  the  advice  of  Jefferson,  and  giving  to  Mr.  Rush 
discretionary  powers  to  join  with  Great  Britain  in  the  decla- 
ration referred  to.  To  this  proposition  Adams  vigorously 
objected,  in  which  opinion  he  was  supported  by  the  Presi- 
dent, who,  according  to  Mr.  Adams'  own  diary,  "was  averse 
to  any  course  which  should  have  the  appearance  of  taking  a 
position  subordinate,  to  that  of  Great  Britain."  Mr.  Monroe 
then  suggested  the  idea  of  sending  a  special  representative 
to  the  proposed  congress  of  the  allies  to  protest  against  all 
interference  in  South  America,  but  this  plan  found  no  favor 
in  the  cabinet.  On  November  13,  Adams  entered  in  his 
diary  :  — 

I  find  him  yet  altogether  unsettled  in  his  own  mind  as  to  the 
answer  to  be  given  to  Mr.  Canning's  proposals,  and  alarmed  far 
beyond  anything  that  I  could  have  conceived  possible,  with  the 
fear  that  the  Holy  Alliance  are  about  to  restore  immediately  all 
South  America  to  Spain.  Calhoun  stimulates  the  panic,  and  the 
news  that  Cadiz  has  surrendered  to  the  French  has  so  affected  the 
President  that  he  appeared  entirely  to  despair  of  the  cause  of 
South  America.  .  .  . 

To  Addington,  the  British  Minister  in  Washington,  who 
pressed  him  for  an  answer  to  Canning's  proposition,  the 
Secretary  said  that  the  measure  "  was  of  such  magnitude, 
such  paramount  consequence  as  involving  the  whole  future 
policy  of  the  United  States    .    .    .    that  the  President  was 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  325 

anxious  to  give  it  the  most  deliberate  consideration,  and  to 
take  the  sense  of  his  whole  cabinet  upon  it." 

News  suddenly  arrived  announcing  the  success  of  the 
French  troops  in  Spain,  of  the  fall  of  Cadiz,  and  the  restora- 
tion of  Ferdinand  to  absolute  power,  which,  according  to 
Adams'  diary,  thoroughly  dejected  the  President,  and  caused 
widespread  alarm  throughout  the  country.  The  press  viewed 
the  situation  somewhat  hysterically,  and  popular  feeling 
turned  decidedly  in  favor  of  an  English  alliance.  Adams 
held  firmly  to  his  original  position  that  the  United  States 
should  stand  alone.  He  seemed  to  doubt  Canning's  sincerity; 
it  perhaps  appeared  to  him,  who  was  more  familiar  than  his 
colleagues  with  the  methods  of  foreign  diplomacy,  that  pos- 
sibly Canning  had,  after  all,  by  his  cries  of  wolf,  only  been 
trying  to  frighten  the  IJnited  States  into  guaranteeing  Cuba 
to  Spain.  Somewhat  caustically  he  wrote  in  his  diary  :  "I 
soon  found  the  source  of  the  President's  despondency  with 
regard  to  South  American  affairs.  Calhoun  is  perfectly 
moon-struck  by  the  surrender  of  Cadiz,  and  says  '  the  Holy 
allies,  with  ten  thousand  men,  will  restore  all  Mexico  and 
all  South  America  to  the  Spanish  dominion.'" 

Calhoun's  proposition  to  instruct  Mr.  Rush  to  act  in 
conjunction  with  Mr.  Canning  "  in  case  of  any  sudden 
emergency  of  danger,"  was  accepted  by  the  President, 
though  in  opposition  to  the  views  of  the  Secretary  of  State. 
A  draft  of  instructions  was  actually  drawn  up  by  the  unwill- 
ing Adams,  and  was  brought  before  the  cabinet,  much  amended 
and  interlined,  for  examination.  Mr.  Adams  then  insisted 
that  if  the  United  States  must  join  Great  Britain  in  such  a 
movement,  or  in  such  a  declaration  of  principles,  the  English 
Government  should  first  acknowledge  the  independence  of 
the  South  American  states.  The  United  States,  he  insisted, 
having  acknowledged  the  independence  of  the  Spanish- 
American  states,  "  had  a  right  to  object  to  the  interference 
of  foreign  powers  in  the  affairs  of  those  territories.  To 
Great  Britain,  it  might  be  objected  that  although  possessing 
the  option,  she  had  no  distinct  right  so  to  do.  She  regarded 
those  territories  as  still  dependencies  of  Spain,  and  in  that 


326  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

character  she  might  allow,  not  only  Spain,  but  pro  re  nata 
other  powers,  as  allies  of  Spain,  to  interfere  in  reducing 
them  by  force,  to  obedience.  Such  a  proceeding  was  im- 
possible to  the  United  States,  from  the  mere  fact  of  their 
recognition  of  the  independence  of  the  territories  in 
question." 

While  discussion  was  proceeding  in  the  cabinet  over  the 
form  of  instructions  to  be  sent  to  Mr.  Rush,  a  new  phase 
of  the  question  suddenly  developed  and  called  for  con- 
sideration. 

Baron  Tuyll,  the  Russian  Minister  in  Washington,  read  to 
Mr.  Adams  certain  despatches  he  had  received  from  Count 
Nesselrode.  One  of  these  was  the  exhibition  of  "  passionate 
exultation  at  the  counter  revolution  in  Portugal  and  the 
impending  success  of  the  French  army  in  Spain ;  an  *  lo 
Triomphe '  over  the  fallen  cause  of  [popular]  revolution,  with 
sturdy  promises  of  determination  to  keep  it  down.  .  .  ." 
Mr.  Adams  believed  the  expression  of  these  sentiments  called 
for  some  sort  of  answer  from  the  United  States.  "  My  pur- 
pose would  be,"  declared  Mr.  Adams  "  in  a  moderate  and  con- 
ciliatory manner,  but  with  a  firm  and  determined  spirit,  to 
declare  our  dissent  from  the  principles  avowed  in  those  com- 
munications, to  assert  those  upon  which  our  own  government 
is  founded,  and  while  disclaiming  all  intention  of  attempting 
to  propagate  them  by  force,  and  all  interference  in  the  polit- 
ical affairs  of  Europe,  to  declare  our  expectation  and  hope 
that  the  European  powers  will  equally  abstain  from  the 
attempt  to  spread  their  principles  in  the  American  hemi- 
sphere, or  to  subjugate  by  force  any  part  of  these  continents 
to  their  will."  The  President  agreed  with  Mr.  Adams  in 
this  respect,  and  at  the  next  meeting  of  the  cabinet  he  read, 
from  a  rough  draft,  the  annual  message  to  Congress  he  was 
preparing  to  deliver  to  that  body  on  December  2.  In  this 
draft  he  had  inserted  not  only  his  views  upon  the  matters 
in  question,  but  had  also  added  some  lines  covertly  intended 
for  the  Czar  as  a  reply  to  Nesselrode's  despatches  to  Baron 
Tuyll.  Of  this  preliminary  draft  of  the  message  Mr.  Adams 
wrote  in  his  diary  under  date  of  November  21,   1823 :  — 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  327 

...  Its  introduction  was  in  a  tone  of  deep  solemnity  and  of 
high  alarm,  intimating  that  this  country  is  menaced  by  imminent 
and  formidable  dangers,  such  as  would  probably  soon  call  for 
their  most  vigorous  energies  and  the  closest  union.  It  then  pro- 
ceeded to  speak  of  the  foreign  affairs,  chiefly  according  to  the 
sketch  I  had  given  him  some  days  since,  but  with  occasional  vari- 
ations. It  then  alluded  to  the  recent  events  in  Spain  and  Por- 
tugal, speaking  in  terms  of  the  most  pointed  reprobation  of  the 
late  invasion  of  Spain  by  France.  It  also  contained  a  broad  ac- 
knowledgment of  the  Greeks  as  an  independent  nation ,  and  a 
recommendation  to  Congress  to  make  an  appropriation  for  send- 
ing a  minister  to  them. 

The  members  of  the  cabinet  generally  accepted  the  draft 
of  the  message  with  approval,  but  Adams  objected  to  its.  y 
whole  tone  as  one  of  combined  fear  and  aggression.  It  ap- 
peared  to  him  to  be  the  cry  of  an  alarmist ;  it  breathed  an 
air  of  direct  defiance  which  he  believed  to  be  wholly  un- 
necessary; and  at  last  it  might  precipitate  a  war, —  the  most 
unfortunate  of  possibilities.  Adams  desired  to  "take  the 
ground  of  earnest  remonstrance  against  the  interference  of 
\the  European  powers  by  force  with  South  America,  but  to 
disclaim  all  interference  on  our  part  with  Europe  ;  to  make 
an  American  cause,  and  adhere  inflexibly  to  that."  He 
wished  particularly  to  avoid  mention  of  the  allies,  or  refer-  ^ 
ence  in  hostile  manner  to  any  nation,  his  idea  being  solely 
the  enunciation  of  a  principle. 

Notwithstanding  Adams'  desire  to  deal  circumspectly  with 
personalities  in  public  utterances,  he  still  clung  to  the  idea 
of  issuing  a  manifesto  of  some  sort  to  Baron  Tuyll  in  answer 
to  the  Russian  despatches.  A  comment  in  his  diary  upon  a 
paper  he  had  prepared  for  this  purpose  and  had  introduced 
in  the  cabinet  meeting  of  November  25,  is  a  valuable  ex- 
tract as  showing  not  only  his  own  views  at  the  moment,  but 
also  to  what  extent  he  was  the  real  author  of  the  "  decla- 
ration "  in  the  President's  message  to  appear  later. 

"  The  paper  itself,"  he  wrote,  "  was  drawn  to  correspond  ex- 
actly with  a  paragraph  of  the  President's  message  which  he  had 
read  me  yesterday,  and  which  was  entirely  conformable  to  the 


328  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

system  of  policy  which  I  have  earnestly  recommended  for  this 
emergency.  It  was  also  intended  as  a  firm,  spirited,  and  yet  con- 
ciliatory answer  to  all  the  communications  lately  received  from 
the  Russian  Government,  and  at  the  same  time,  an  unequivocal 
answer  to  the  proposals  made  by  Canning  to  Rush.  It  was  meant 
also  to  be  eventually  an  exposition  of  the  principles  of  this  gov- 
ernment, and  a  brief  development  of  its  political  system  as  hence- 
forth to  be  maintained :  essentially  republican  —  maintaining  its 
own  independence,  and  respecting  that  of  others ;  essentially  pa- 
cific —  studiously  avoiding  all  involvements  in  the  combinations 
of  European  politics,  cultivating  peace  and  friendship  with  the 
most  absolute  monarchies,  highly  appreciating  and  anxiously  de- 
sirous of  retaining  that  of  the  Emperor  Alexander,  but  declaring 
that,  having  recognized  the  independence  of  the  South  American 
States,  we  could  not  see  with  indifference  any  attempt  by  Euro- 
pean powers  by  forcible  interposition  either  to  restore  the  Spanish 
doniinion  on  the  American  continents,  or  to  introduce  monarchical 
principles  into  those  countries,  or  to  transfer  any  portion  of  the 
ancient  or  present  American  possessions  of  Spain  to  any  other 
European  power." 

Only  a  week  before  the  message  of  the  President  was  due, 
the  question  of  how  to  proceed  against  the  threatened 
dangers  from  Europe  was  by  no  means  settled  ;  indeed, 
Adams  seems  to  have  had  the  only  clear  conception  of  the 
true  necessities  of  the  occasion.  The  form  of  instructions  to 
Rush  was  not  determined  upon ;  the  President's  draft  of 
message  met  with  the  vigorous  opposition  of  the  Secretary 
of  State,  and  Adams'  suggestion  of  a  manifesto  to  Baron 
Tuyll  found  no  supporters  in  the  cabinet.  Monroe  considered 
Adams'  sentiments  in  his  proposed  letter  to  Baron  Tuyll  to 
be  too  vigorous,  and  to  Europe,  too  offensively  republican ; 
they  might  even  estrange  Great  Britain,  whose  friendship  in 
the  impending  crisis  was  absolutely  essential.  Calhoun  also 
doubted  the  necessity  or  even  the  advisability  of  publishing 
"  so  ostentatious  a  display  of  republican  principles."  Adams 
defended  his  manifesto  by  urging  that  "  as  the  Holy  allies 
had  come  to  edify  and  instruct  us  with  their  principles,  it 
was  due  in  candor  to  them  and  in  justice  to  ourselves,  to  re- 
turn the  compliment."  Again  Calhoun  averred  that  as  the 
President's  message,  which  covered  this  very  subject,  was 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  329 

directed  to  the  people  of  the  United  States  and  not  to  any 
foreign  sovereign,  it  would  be  less  likely  to  give  offence. 
Southard  agreed  with  Mr.  Adams.  "  If  the  Czar  and  the 
Holy  allies  choose  to  sing  to  us  the  praises  of  despotism," 
he  said,  "  they  cannot  take  umbrage  at  our  chorus  for  free 
institutions,  even  though  directed  to  them." 

Up  to  this  time  (about  a  week  before  the  convening  of 
Congress),  Mr.  Wirt,  the  Attorney  General,  who  had  been 
absent  from  these  important  cabinet  meetings,  now  appeared 
upon  the  scene,  and  with  a  mind  uninfluenced  by  the  former 
spirited  discussions,  he  proceeded  to  examine  Mr.  Adams' 
draft  of  manifesto  from  a  purely  common-sense  point  of  view. 
Might  it  not,  after  all,  seem  to  be  mere  bombast,  for  if  the 
allies  should  actually  begin  hostile  operations  against  South 
America,  would  the  United  States  back  up  Mr.  Adams'  dec- 
laration with  men  and  guns  ?  To  this  Adams  could  only 
reply,  "  It  is,  and  has  been  to  me,  a  fearful  question." 
Upon  that  point  he  said  in  his  diary  :  — 

My  paper  and  the  paragraph  would  certainly  commit  us  as  far 
as  the  Executive  constitutionally  could  act  on  this  point ;  and  if 
we  take  this  course,  I  should  wish  that  a  joint  resolution  of  the 
two  Houses  of  Congress  should  be  proposed  and  adopted  to  the 
same  purport. 

Five  days  before  the  annual  message  became  due,  the  situ- 
ation in  the  cabinet  was  still  one  of  confusion.  Adams  in- 
sisted upon  pouring  hot  shot  into  the  Czar  by  a  letter  to  Tuyll 
containing  a  most  thorough  indorsement  of  republican  insti- 
tutions. To  this  the  President  still  demurred,  fearing  that 
England  might  take  offence  at  the  rabid  republicanism  of  the 
document,  and  withdraw  from  her  position  of  harmony  with 
the  United  States.  Monroe  was  conservative,  and  Adams 
extreme  ;  but  on  the  other  hand,  the  President  desired  in  his 
message  to  score  France  and  the  Holy  allies  both  for  their 
interference  in  Spain  and  their  contemplated  interference  in 
America.  He  wished  to  recognize  the  independence  of 
Greece,  to  all  of  which  Adams  objected,  insisting  that  he 
should  "  disclaim  all  intention  of  interfering  with  these,  and 


330  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

make  the  stand  altogether  for  an  American  cause ;  and  that 
at  the  same  time,  the  answer  to  be  given  to  the  Russian  com- 
munications should  be  used  as  the  means  of  answering  also 
the  proposals  of  Mr.  George  Canning,  and  of  assuming  the 
attitude  to  be  maintained  by  the  United  States  with  ref- 
erence to  the  designs  of  the  Holy  Alliance  upon  South 
America."  At  this  point  their  relative  positions  were  re- 
versed, the  President  assuming  a  bold  and  defiant  attitude, 
and  his  Secretary  counselling  him  to  follow  a  more  conserva- 
tive course.  Mr.  Wirt  did  not  believe  that  the  people  of 
the  United  States  sympathized  with  the  South  Americans 
sufficiently  to  fight  for  their  cause,  in  which  case  he  ques- 
tioned the  propriety  of  issuing  any  menace  whatever, —  at 
least  he  thought  the  temper  of  our  own  people  should  first 
be  ascertained  by  consulting  Congress.  Calhoun  supported 
the  President ;  the  people  would  fight,  he  believed,  and 
should  fight  rather  than  permit  tlie  Spanish  colonies  to  be 
reduced  by  the  allies ;  but  he  objected  to  Adams'  plan  of 
manifesto  to  Baron  Tuyll,  to  which,  on  the  other  hand. 
Southard  and,  strangely  enough,  the  cautious  Wirt  gave 
full  approval. 

All  of  this  wrangling  seems  now  to  have  been  quite  need- 
less, for  it  really  made  but  little  difference  whether  the  prin- 
ciples the  administration  wished  to  proclaim  to  the  world 
should  find  expression  in  a  letter  to  the  Russian  Ambassador 
or  should  be  embodied  in  the  President's  message  to  Con- 
gress. Almost  at  the  very  last  moment.  President  Monroe 
seems  to  have  adopted  the  changes  in  the  draft  of  message 
so  urgently  insisted  upon  by  Mr.  Adams.  The  message,  as 
finally  prepared,  expressed  sympathy  with  the  constitutional 
manifestos  of  Spain  and  Greece  ;  but  it  disclaimed  all  in- 
tention of  interfering  abroad,  and  refrained  from  censuring 
either  France  or  the  Holy  allies. 

The  protest  against  interference  on  the  part  of  the  allies 
in  South  America  constitutes,  however,  only  one  part  of 
the  "Monroe  Doctrine."^  In  the  same  message,  though  in 
a  preceding  part  of  the  document,  occurs  another  exposition 
of  a  foreign  policy,  which  the  President  took  occasion  to 


THE    MONROE   DOCTRINE  331 

propose  as  one  worthy  of  future  recognition  by  the  United 
States.  This  related  to  the  attitude  which,  for  its  own 
safety,  the  United  States  should  thereafter  assume  toward 
all  foreign  schemes  of  colonization  upon  the  American  con- 
tinents. It  was  a  policy  embodying  a  principle  so  thor- 
oughly in  harmony  with  the  general  view  announced  by. 
the  President  in  reference  to  foreign  aggressions  in  the 
western  world,  that  it  has  been  accepted  as  a  part  of  the 
"Monroe  Doctrine." 

In  the  early  part  of  the  century,  an  American  exploring 
expedition  had  descended  the  Columbia  River  to  its  mouth, 
and  visiting  the  coastal  regions  of  Oregon,  had  established 
over  a  very  considerable,  though  ill-defined  region  of  terri- 
tory, an  American  claim  of  title.     Spain  also  had  territorial 
claims  along   the  Pacific  coast,  as  far  north  as  Vancouver 
Island,  which,  however,  she   yielded  to  the  United    States 
(north  of  42°)  by  treaty  of  1819.     English  claims  in   the 
northwest  were  exceedingly  indefinite,  but  all  cause  of  fric- 
tion between  England  and  the  United  States,  arising  from  a 
disputed  boundary  lines  on  the  Pacific  coast,  was  removed  by  i 
the  agreement  of  1818,  leaving  for  a  term  of  years  the  terri-.j 
tory  claimed  by  both  parties  free  and  open  to  the  subjects  of 
each.     Far  to  the  north  and  west,  an  immense  and  vaguely 
bounded  territory,  belonged  to  Russia.     Even  in  those  early 
days,  some  trade  relations  existed  between  citizens  of   the 
United  States  and  the  native  Alaskan  Indians.     Misunder- 
standings arose,  and  Russia  took  occasion  in  a  correspond-: 
ence  which  followed,  to  make  known  her  claims  along  thej 
Pacific  coast  of  North  America,  from  Bering  Straits  to  thel 
mouth  of  the  Columbia  River.     In  1816,  a  Russia^n  chartered! 
company  made  settlements  and  established  a  regular  trading- 
post  near  San  Francisco.     This  advance  of  the  Russians,  far 
to  the  south,  caused  some  dissatisfaction  in  Washington;  but 
so  doubtful  were  all  territorial  titles  along  the  Pacific  coast 
in  those  early  days,  that  no  positive  stand  was  made  against 
this  Russian  advance.     In  1821,  however,  Alexander,  Em- 
peror of  Russia,  issued  an  ukase,  in  which  he  announced  his 
claim  to  the  northwest  coast  of  America,  down  to  the  51st 


332  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

degree  of  latitude,  and  forbade  the  approach  within  one  hun- 
dred miles  of  his  shores  by  any  foreign  vessel.  This  extraor- 
dinary assumption  of  marine  jurisdiction  met  with  instant 
protests  from  both  Washington  and  London.  Mr.  Adams 
bestirred  himself  to  gather  arguments  to  disprove  this  exag- 
gerated claim  of  Russia,  which  Mr.  Poletica,  the  Russian 
Minister  in  Washington,  sought  to  defend  upon  the  grounds 
"  of  first  discovery,  first  occupation,  and  upon  that  which 
results  from  a  peaceable  and  uncontested  possession  of  more 
than  half  a  century."  Mr.  Poletica  was  succeeded  by  Baron 
Tuyll,  who  brought  the  discussion  to  a  close  by  asking  that 
the  matter  be  settled  in  St.  Petersburg  by  negotiation  with 
Mr.  Middleton,  the  American  Minister  at  that  capital.  Mr. 
Adams,  in  July,  1823,  told  Baron  Tuyll  "  that  we  should 
coiitest  the  right  of  Russia  to  any  territorial  establishment 
on  this  continent,  and  that  we  should  assume  distinctly  the 
principle  that  American  continents  are  no  longer  subjects  for 
any  European  colonial  establishments."  He  then  instructed 
Mr.  Middleton  that :  — 

There  can,  perhaps,  be  no  better  time  for  saying  frankly  and 
/explicitly,  to  the  Russian  Government,  that  'the  future  peace  of 
I  the  world,  and  the  interest  of  Russia  herself,  cannot  be  promoted 
'  by  Russian  settlements  upon  any  part  of  the  American  continent. 
With  the  exception  of  the  British  establishments  north  of  the 
United  States,  the  remainder  of  both  the  American  continents 
must  henceforth  be  left  to  the  management  of  American  hands. 
It  cannot  possibly  be  the  purpose  of   Russia  to  form  extensive 
colonial  establishments  in  America.     The  new  American  repub- 
lics will  be  as  impatient  of  a  Russian  neighbor  as  the  United 
States ;  and  the  claim  of  Russia  to  territorial  possession,  extend- 
ing to  the  51st  parallel  of  north  latitude,  is  equally  incompatible 
with  British  pretensions. 

The  very  same  day  he  wrote  to  Mr.  Rush,  acquainting 
him  with  the  latest  phases  of  the  northwest-territory  dis- 
pute.    He  said: —  /  ' 

A  necessary  consequence  of  this  state  of  things  [independence 
of  the  Spanish  American  colonies]  will  be,  that  the  American 
continents,  henceforth,  will  no  longer  be  subjects  of  colonization. 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  338 

Occupied  by  civilized  independent  nations,  they  will  be  accessible 
to  Europeans  and  to  each  other  on  that  footing  alone,  and  the 
Pacific  Ocean  in  every  part  of  it  will  remain  open  to  the  naviga- 
tion of  all  nations  in  like  manner  with  the  Atlantic. 

Incidental  to  the  condition  of  national  independence  and 
sovereignty,  the  rights  of  anterior  navigation  of  their  rivers  will 
belong  to  each  of  the  American  nations  within  its  own  territories. 

The  application  of  colonial  principles  of  exclusion,  therefore, 
cannot  be  admitted  by  the  United  States  as  lawful  upon  any  part 
of  the  northwest  coast  of  America,  or  as  belonging  to  any  Euro- 
pean nation. 

Fortunately  the  dispute  was  amicably  settled  by  the  nego- 
tiations in  St.  Petersburg.  In  the  treaty  of  1824,  Russia 
accepted  the  parallel  of  54°  40'  as  the  southern  limit  of  her 
American  territory. 

The  statement  of  Mr.  Adams,  that  the  American  conti- 
nents would  no  longer  be  subject  to  colonization,  was  seized 
upon  by  President  Monroe.  It  dovetailed  perfectly  with  the 
policy  he  and  his  cabinet  had  determined  upon  as  a  check 
against  the  Holy  Alliance. 

The  words  of  the  annual  message  of  December  2,  1823, 
which  constitute  the  "  Monroe  Doctrijie  "  are  as  follows,  — 
those  aimed  at  Russia  coming  first :  -^ 

At  the  proposal  of  the  Russian  Imperial  Government,  made 
through  the  minister  of  the  Emperor  residing  here,  a  full 
power  and  instructions  have  been  transmitted  to  the  minister 
of  the  United  States  at  St.  Petersburg  to  arrange  by  amicable 
negotiation  the  respective  rights  and  interests  of  the  two  nations 
on  the  northwest  coast  of  this  continent.  A  similar  proposal  had 
been  made  by  His  Imperial  Majesty  to  the  Government  of  Great 
Britain,  which  has  likewise  been  acceded  to.  The  Government 
of  the  United  States  has  been  desirous  by  this  friendly  proceed- 
ing of  manifesting  the  great  value  which  they  have  invariably 
attached  to  the  friendship  of  the  Emperor  and  their  solicitude 
to  cultivate  the  best  understanding  with  his  Government.  In  the 
discussions  to  which  this  interest  has  given  rise  and  in  the  arrange- 
ments by  which  they  may  terminate  the  occasion  has  been  judged 
proper  for  asserting,  as  a  pr?">ic?^Ze  in  which  the  rights  and  interests 
of  the  United  States  are  involved,  that  the  American  continents,  by 
the  free  and  independent  condition  which  they  have  assumed  and 


\ 


334  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

maintain^  are  henceforth  not  to  he  considered  as  subjects  for  future 
colonization  by  any  European  powers.  ^ 

After  a  digression  upon  other  topics,  the  President  turns 
to  the  subject  of  the  threatened  interference  in  South 
America  by  the  allied  powers  of  Europe :  — 

"It  was  stated  at  the  commencement  of  the  last  session  that 
a  great  effort  was  then  making  in  Spain  and  Portugal  to 
improve  the  condition  of  the  people  of  those  countries,  and 
that  it  appeared  to  be  conducted  with  extraordinary  modera- 
tion. It  need  scarcely  be  remarked  that  the  result  has  been 
so  far  very  different  from  what  was  then  anticipated.  Of 
events  in  that  quarter  of  the  globe,  with  which  we  have  so 
much  intercourse  and  from  which  we  derive  our  origin,  we 
have  always  been  anxious  and  interested  spectators.  The 
citizens  of  the  United  States  cherish  sentiments  the  most 
friendly  in  favor  of  the  liberty  and  happiness  of  their  fellow- 
men  on  that  side  of  the  Atlantic.  In  the  wars  of  the  Euro- 
pean powers  in  matters  relating  to  themselves  we  have  never 
taken  any  part,  nor  does  it  comport  with  our  policy  so  to  do. 
It  is  only  when  our  rights  are  invaded  or  seriously  menaced 
that  we  resent  injuries  or  make  preparation  for  our  defence. 
With  the  movements  in  this  hemisphere  we  are  of  necessity 
more  immediately  connected,  and  by  causes  which  must  be 
obvious  to  all  enlightened  and  impartial  observers.  The 
political  system  of  the  allied  powers  is  essentially  different 
in  this  respect  from  that  of  America.  This  difference  pro- 
ceeds from  that  which  exists  in  their  respective  Governments ; 
and  to  the  defence  of  our  own,  which  has  been  achieved  by 
the  loss  of  so  much  blood  and  treasure,  and  matured  by  the 
wisdom  of  their  most  enlightened  citizens,  and  under  which 
we  have  enjoyed  unexampled  felicity,  this  whole  nation  is 
devoted.  We  owe  it  therefore,  to  candor  and  to  the  amicable 
relations  existing  between  the  United  States  and  those  powers 
to  declare  that  we  should  consider  any  attempt  on  their  part  to 
extend  their  system  to  any  portion  of  this  hemisphere  as  danger- 

1  Italics  not  in  the  message. 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  335 

ous  to  our  peace  and  safety.  With  the  existing  colonies  or 
dependencies  of  any  European  power  we  have  not  interfered 
and  shall  not  interfere.  But  with  the  Governments  who  have 
1  declared  their  independence  and  maintained  it,  and  whose 
'  independence  we  have,  on  great  consideration  and  on  just 
I  principles,  acknowledged,  we  could  not  view  any  interposition 
jfor  the  purpose  of  oppressing  them,  or  controlling  in  any 
other  manner  their  destiny,  by  any  European  power  in  any 
other  light  than  as  the  manifestation  of  an  unfriendly  dis- 
position towai'd  the  United  States.  In  the  war  between  those 
new  Governments  and  Spain  we  declared  our  neutrality  at 
the  time  of  their  recognition,  and  to  this  we  have  adhered, 
and  shall  continue  to  adhere,  provided  no  change  shall  occur 
which,  in  the  judgment  of  the  competent  authorities  of  this 
Government,  shall  make  a  corresponding  change  on  the  part 
of  the  United  States  indispensable  to  their  security. 

"  The  late  events  in  Spain  and  Portugal  show  that  Europe 
is  still  unsettled.  Of  this  important  fact  no  stronger  proof  can 
be  adduced  than  that  the  Allied  Powers  should  have  thought 
it  proper,  on  any  principle  satisfactory  to  themselves,  to  have 
interposed  by  force  in  the  internal  concerns  of  Spain.  To 
what  extent  such  interposition  may  be  carried,  on  the  same 
principle,  is  a  question  in  which  all  independent  powers  whose 
governments  differ  from  theirs  are  interested,  even  those 
most  remote,  and  surel}^  none  more  so  than  the  United 
States.  Our  policy  in  regard  to  Europe,  which  was  adopted 
at  an  early  stage  of  the  wars  which  have  so  long  agitated  that 
quarter  of  the  globe,  nevertheless  remains  the  same,  which  is, 
not  to  interfere  in  the  internal  concerns  of  any  of  its  Pow- 
ers ;  to  consider  the  government  de  facto  as  the  legitimate 
government  for  us;  to  cultivate  friendly  relations  with  it, 
and  to  preserve  those  relations  by  a  frank,  firm,  and  manly 
policy,  meeting,  in  all  instances,  the  just  claims  of  every 
power,  submitting  to  injuries  from  none.  But  in  regard  to 
these  continents  circumstances  are  eminently  and  conspicu- 
ously different.  It  is  impossible  that  the  allied  powers 
should  extend  their  political  system  to  an}^  portion  of  either 
continent  without  endangering  our  peace  and  happiness  ;  nor 


336  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

can  any  one  believe  that  our  southern  brethren,  if  left  to 
themselves,  would  adopt  it  of  their  own  accord.  It  is  equally- 
impossible,  therefore,  that  we  should  behold  such  interposi- 
tion in  any  form  with  indifference.  If  we  look  to  the  com- 
parative strength  and  resources  of  Spain  and  those  new 
Governments,  and  their  distance  from  each  other,  it  must  be 
obvious  that  she  can  never  subdue  them.  It  is  still  the  true 
policy  of  the  United  States  to  leave  the  parties  to  them- 
selves, in  the  hope  that  other  powers  will  pursue  the  same 
course."^ 


Reviewing  the  course  of  events  that  culminated  in  the  dec- 
larations of  President  Monroe  in  his  annual  message  to  Con- 
gress of  1823,  several  facts  are  to  be  noted  :  — 

1.  The  United  States  by  adopting  a  republican  form  of 
government  brought  upon  itself  the  enmity  of  absolutism. 

2.  Physical  weakness  obliged  it  to  follow  a  policy  of  polit- 
ical isolation.  Intermeddling  in  the  affairs  of  others  was 
likely  to  invite  troubles,  and  the  young  republic  could  not 
endure  the  strain  of  useless  wars.  By  frequent  expressions 
of  its  statesmen  the  nation  substantially  pledged  itself  to 
abstain  from  interference  with  the  concerns  of  Europe. 

3.  With  this  determination  to  hold  aloof  from  the  politi- 
cal affairs  of  the  old  world,  a  dominant  feeling  prevailed,' 
that  the  old  world  should  not  interfere  in  the  affairs  of 
the  new. 

4.  It  became  apparent  in  the  summer  of  1823  that  certain 
powers  of  Europe,  allied  together  for  the  purpose  of  suppress- 
ing rebellion  and  perpetuating  the  theories  of  divine  right  of 
kings,  were  about  to  extend  the  scope  of  their  operations 
to  South  America,  by  aiding  Spain  in  crushing  rebellion  in 
her  colonies. 

5.  George  Canning,  the  English  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  was  embarrassed  as  to  the  proper  course  to  pursue  in 
relation  to  the  South  American  colonies  of  Spain.  British 
commercial  interests  demanded  the  recognition  of  the  new 

1  Italics  not  in  message. 


THE   MONROE  DOCTRINE  ^37 

states,  while  other  considerations  opposed  such  a  course. 
Finding  a  solution  of  the  difficulty  in  American  cooperation 
against  the  Holy  Alliance,  he  sought  to  enlist  the  United  States 
in  a  plan  he  had  devised  to  oppose  the  scheme  of  the  allies. 

6.  Interference  on  the  part  of  the  allies  in  South  and 
Central  America,  it  was  feared,  would  lead  to  territorial 
grants  to  them,  followed,  in  all  probability,  by  the  estab- 
lishment of  monarchical  rule,  and  eventually  the  overthrow 
of  republican  institutions  in  all  the  new  world,  including 
the  United  States. 

7.  Previous  to  1823,  Russia  had  by  proclamation  and  ac- 
tual settlement  sought  to  acquire  title  to  portions  of  the 
Pacific  coast  of  North  America,  claimed  by  both  England 
and  the  United  States.  Pending  negotiations  for  settlement 
of  these  difficulties,  the  President  took  occasion  to  express  in 
his  message  of  1823,  his  belief  that  thenceforth  the  United 
States  could  permit  no  European  colonization  in  North  or 
South  America. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  includes  several  distinct  statements, 
as  follows :  — 

(a)  The  American  continents  are  henceforth  not  to  be 
considered  as  subjects  for  future  colonization  by  any  Euro- 
pean powers. 

(5)  The  political  system  of  the  allied  powers  is  essentially 
and  radically  different  from  that  of  America,  and,  being  de- 
voted to  the  defence  of  our  own  system,  we  owe  it  in  can- 
dor to  those  powers  to  declare  that  we  should  ''  consider  any 
attempt  on  their  part  to  extend  their  system  to  any  portion 
of  this  hemisphere  as  dangerous  to  our  peace  and  safety." 

(tf)  Having  acknowledged  the  independence  of  certain 
governments  (in  America),  we  could  not  view  interposi- 
tion on  the  part  of  any  European  power,  for  the  purpose  of 
oppressing  or  otherwise  controlling  them,  in  any  other  light 
than  as  a  manifestation  of  unfriendly  disposition  toward  the 
United  States. 

(df)  The  foreign  policy  of  the  United  States  would  remain 
the  same;  that  is,  not  to  interfere  in  the  internal  affairs  of 
any  European  power. 


338  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

(g)  Circumstances  being  radically  different  on  these  con- 
tinents, it  is  impossible  that  the  allied  powers  should  extend 
their  political  systems  into  either  of  them  without  endanger- 
ing our  peace  and  happiness ;  therefore  it  is  impossible  that 
we  should  behold  such  interposition  with  indifference. 

Barring  the  first  statement  in  regard  to  colonization,  which 
expressly  lays  down  a  principle  for  future  guidance,  the 
declaration  was  a  defensive  measure,  directed  against  the 
threatened  interference  of  the  Europeari  powers  constituting 
the  Holy  Alliance.  There  has  since  been  endless  discussion 
as  to  whether  the  President  intended  by  these  words  to 
establish  a  principle  that  should  ever  afterward  be  followed 
by  the  people  of  the  United  States.  Whether  the  President 
intended  this  or  not,  the  principles  enunciated  at  that  time 
have  frequently  been  appealed  to  since,  and  the  "  doctrine  '* 
itself  has  been  accepted  as  the  corner-stone  of  America's 
foreign  policy.  There  can  be  little  doubt,  however,  that 
President  Monroe  had  no  intention  of  proclaiming  to  the 
world  an  inviolable  principle  for  all  time  to  come.  Being 
confronted  by  a  definite  threat,  he  met  it  by  a  definite  state- 
ment. He  mentions  in  his  message  the  particular  reasons 
for  his  opposition  to  the  "  Allied  Powers,"  and  refers  in  par- 
ticular to  "  these  powers  "  constituting  the  Holy  Alliance,  as 
the  object  of  his  attack,  because  they  represent,  and  seek  to 
perpetuate,  a  system  of  government  from  the  evil  influences' 
of  which  we  had  escaped  and  the  revival  of  which  we  regarded 
with  abhorence. 

Monroe's  biographer,  Daniel  C.  Oilman,  says  :  — 

It  appears  to  me  probable  that  Monroe  had  but  little  conception 
of  the  lasting  effect  which  his  words  would  produce.  ...  It  was 
because  he  pronounced  not  only  the  opinion  then  prevalent,  but 
a  tradition  of  other  days,  which  had  been  gradually  expanded, 
that  his  words  carried  with  them  the  sanction  of  public  law. 

The  message  was  received  in  the  United  States  with  feel- 
ings of  deepest  satisfaction. .  The  danger  had  been  squarely 
met,  and  the  people  were  relieved  in  the  knowledge  that  the 
President  could  be  depended  upon  to  act  properly  should  the 
anticipated  crisis  occur.     The  spirit  of  the  doctrine  had  been 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  339 

struggling  for  expression  for  a  number  of  years,  and,  in 
voicing  it,  the  President  touched  a  chord  \y}^^oh  yihraf^rl  in 
tX^  every  American  heart.  From  all  political  parties  the  admin- 
istration received  the  warmest  nommpnflatipn.  while  a  most 
friendly  feeling  made  itself  apparent  throughout  the  United 
States  toward  England,  which  had  now  become  a  silent  politi- 
cal partner.  In  England  that  portion  of  the  message  which 
related  to  interference  in  America  on  the  part  of  the  allied 
powersoif  Europe  was  enthusiastically renpivp,r|-  and  the  Eng- 
lish press  was  fulsom^^Jja  ita  Txcaise  of  Prp«irlf^|if,  Monroe. 
The  British  (jrovernment  felt  relieved  of  a  burden  by  the 
positive  attitude  of  the  United  States.  The  message  had 
come  at  a  most  opportune  moment ;  the  allies  were  pressing 
Great  Britain  to  meet  them  in  convention  at  Paris,  with- 
a  view  of  settling  the  Spanish-American  question.  Mr. 
Canning,  though  hesitating  to  isolate  his  country  from  the 
rest  of  Europe,  knew  that  the  proposed  settlement  would  be 
unsatisfactory  to  England.  Mr.  Monroe's  message  relieved 
the  situation  and  settled  the  matter  in  just  the  way  Great 
Britain  desired.  Canning  afterward  boasted,  "I  called,  the 
New  World  into  existence  to  redress  the  balance  of  the  Old." 
/  The  other  part  of  the  message,  ^_^]nting-  i  r  1  iii  iiiii  'rf 
'  was  not  so  acceptable  to  Great  Britain.  There  being  at 
that  time  much  uncertainty  as  to  the  extent  and  ownership 
of  unoccupied  land  in  the  great  Northwest,  Canning  main- 
tained that  England  "could  not  acknowledge  the  right  of 
any  power  to  proclaim  such  a  principle,  much  less  to  bind 
other  countries  to  the  observance  of  it.  If-  we  were  to  be 
repelled  from  the  shores  of  America,  it  Avould  not  matter  to 
us  whether  that  repulsion  were  effected  by  the  Ukase  of 
Russia,  excluding  us  from  the  sea,  or  by  the  new  doctrine 
of  the  President,  prohibiting  us  from  the  land.  But  we 
cannot  yield  obedience  to  either."  The  declaration  was  "very 
extraordinary  " ;  one  which  His  Majesty's  Government  was 
"  prepared  to  combat  in  the  most  unequivocal  manner."  The 
right  of  colonization  was  one  that,  as  heretofore,  may  be  exer- 
cised "without  affording  the  slightest  umbrage  to  the 
United  States." 


340  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

The  powers  of  Continental  Europe  were  surprised  and 
indignant ;  Monroe  was  a  dictator  of  the  worst  character, 
while  the  United  States  was  an  upstart  nation,  that  main- 
tained unwarrantable  pretensions,  and  sought  to  establish 
wholly  inadmissible  principles  in  contempt  of  the  civilized 
nations  of  the  world.  The  declaration  of  this  presumptuous 
people  should  be  resisted  by  all  powers  possessing  interests 
in  the  AVestern  Hemisphere.  But  just  back  of  the  out- 
stretched wings  of  the  noisy  American  eagle,  France  and 
Russia  believed  they  detected  the  British  lion.  If  Eng- 
land had,  after  all,  joined  the  allies  in  their  schemes,  it 
is  much  to  be  doubted  whether  the  President's  message  of 
1823  would  have  seriously  embarrassed  them  in  tlie  ultimate 
perfection  of  their  Spanish  American  plans  ;  but  the  realiza- 
tion that  Great  Britain,  with  her  powerful  navy,  endorsed, 
in  the  main,  the  sentiments  of  President  Monroe,  cast  a 
gloom  over  the  propagandists  of  divine  right,  and  the  great 
South  American  project  was  abandoned. 

Although  the  Colombian  Congress  resolved  that  the  doc- 
trine of  the  North  American  President  was  "  an  act  eminently 
just  and  worthy  of  the  classic  land  of  liberty,"  the  message 
does  not  seem  to  have  been  welcomed  with  loud  acclaim  in 
South  America.  Events  following  soon  after  convinced  the 
people  of  Spanish  America  —  suspicious  by  nature,  and  at 
heart  distrustful  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  —  that  the  United 
States  did  not  intend  to  uphold  the  doctrine,  and  that  if  it 
were  meant  as  a  promise  of  protection  to  them,  it  was  false. 

Soon  after  the  reading  of  the  President's  annual  message, 
Henry  Clay,  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  caused 
to  be  introduced  the  following  resolution  :  — 

Resolved  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the 
United  States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled,  That  the  people 
of  these  states  would  not  see,  without  serious  inquietude,  any 
forcible  intervention  by  the  allied  Powers  of  Europe,  in  behalf 
of  Spain,  to  reduce  to  their  former  subjection  those  parts  of  the 
continent  of  America  which  have  proclaimed  and  established  for 
themselves,  respectively,  independent  governments,  and  which 
have  been  solemnly  recognized  by  the  United  States. 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  341 

This  attempt  to  place  the  seal  of  Congressional  approval 
upon  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  give  it  thereby  a  more 
authoritative  character,  failed  in  less  than  two  months  after 
its  enunciation  by  the  executive.  Several  reasons  have  been 
assigned  for  this  failure ;  one  is,  that  Congress  considered  the 
alleged  threats  of  the  allies  as  empty  vaporings,  unworthy  of 
notice  ;  another  is,  that  members  of  Congress,  believing  the 
danger  to  be  past,  were  unwilling,  in  the  absence  of  clear 
evidence  of  hostile  intentions  from  abroad,  to  lay  down  a 
principle  so  wide  and  sweeping  in  its  character,  and  one  that 
might  possibly  be  regarded  by  friendly  nations  as  offensive. 
Still  another  reason  is  advanced  why  Mr.  Clay's  resolution 
was  consigned  to  the  table.  Mr.  Clay  was  well  known  to 
be  a  candidate  for  the  presidency.  His  strength  was  great 
throughout  the  South  and  the  West,  and  his  influence  as 
Speaker  in  the  House  was  a  powerful  one.  John  Quincy 
Adams  also  was  looking  in  the  same  direction  as  Mr.  Clay ; 
General  Jackson  was  a  possible  candidate,  and  the  same  may 
be  said  of  Calhoun.  The  ''  Monroe  Doctrine  "  carried  within 
it  the  elements  of  unbounded  popularity ;  its  champion  in 
Congress  might  become  a  political  hero.  The  opponents  of 
Clay  therefore  combined  against  him,  and  he  found  himself 
in  the  awkward  attitude  of  fathering  a  measure  which  was 
doomed  in  advance.  He  yielded  to  necessity,  and  consented 
to  the  shelving  of  his  resolution. 

Mr.  Poinsett  of  South  Carolina  also  moved  a  similar  reso- 
lution, which  met  the  same  fate,  but  political  jealousy  can 
hardly  be  charged  for  the  failure  of  Mr.  Poinsett's  motion. 

In  his  last  annual  message  to  Congress,  the  following  year 
(December  7,  1824),  President  Monroe  again  took  occasion 
to  reaffirm  the  policy  announced  in  his'^previous  message.    ' 

.  .  .  Separated  as  we  are  from  Europe -by  the  great  Atlantic 
Ocean,  we  can  have  no  concern  in  the  wai^s  or  the  European  Gov- 
ernments nor  in  the  causes  which  produce  them.  The  balance 
of  power  between  them,  into  whicnever  scale  it  may  turn  in  its 
various  vibrations,  cannot  affect  us.  It  is  the  interest  of  the 
United  States  to  preserve  the  most  friendly  relations  with  every 
power  and  on  conditions  fair,  equal,  and  applicable  to  all.     But 


342  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

in  regard  to  our  neighbors  our  situation  is  different.  It  is  impos- 
sible for  the  European  governments  to  interfere  in  their  concerns, 
especially  in  those  alluded  to,  which  are  vital,  without  affecting 
us;  indeed,  the  motive  which  might  induce  such  interference  in 
the  present  state  of  the  war  between  the  parties,  if  a  war  it  may 
be  called,  would  appear  to  be  equally  applicable  to  us.  It  is  grati- 
fying to  know  that  some  of  the  powers  with  whom  we  enjoy  a 
very  friendly  intercourse,  and  to  whom  these  views  have  been 
communicated,  have  appeared  to  acquiesce  in  them.  .  .  . 

An  occasion  was  about  to  be  presented  to  the  United 
States  Government  which  would  indicate  the  extent  to  which 
the  country  was  willing  to  go  in  pledging  its  material  sup- 
port to  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  In  the  negotiations  and 
debates  relative  to  an  invitation  from  the  South  American 
states  to  send  delegates  to  a  general  Congress  of  the 
Americas,  every  shade  of  sentiment  touching  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  is  found.  So  widely  divergent  were  opinions  in 
Congress  upon  this  subject,  that  the  doctrine,  after  running 
the  gantlet  of  the  Senate  and  House,  emerged  sadly  dis- 
figured. But  in  these  debates,  as  with  Clay's  resolution, 
a  series  of  political  considerations  became  involved.  The 
reluctance  of  Congress  on  this  occasion  to  endorse  the  policy 
was,  after  all,  scarcely  a  test  of  popular  sentiment  on  the 
subject. 

VI.    PANAMA  CONGRESS 

Simon  Bolivar  was  the  Washington  of  South  America. 
It  was  his  voice  that  stirred  the  people  to  patriotic  ardor ; 
it  was  his  martial  skill  that  brought  them  victory,  and  won 
for  them  the  prizes  of  liberty.  His  statue  adorns  the  public 
squares  of  South  American  cities  ;  his  memory  is  revered 
from  Panama  to  Buenos  Ayres  ;  he  is  declared  to  be  the 
hero,  the  liberator  of  South  America.  At  his  instance,  the 
states  of  Colombia  in  1822  (then  New  Granada)  began  mak- 
ing treaties  of  alliance,  offensive  and  defensive,  with  other 
South  American  states,  whose  independence  from  Spain  had 
been  practically  won.     In  that  and  the  following  year,  the 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  343 

various  independent  states  of  South  America  formed  a  feder- 
ation, bound  together  by  the  closest  ties  of  friendship  and 
common  interest. 

The  central  object  of  this  confederation  was  to  maintain 
independence  by  mutual  aid  and  support,  and  to  shield  them- 
selves against  all  harmful  foreign  influence.  Like  their 
North  American  neighbor,  they  had  watched  with  consider- 
able apprehension  the  threatened  movement  of  the  European 
allies  to  aid  Spain  in  their  resubjugation,  and  they  recognized 
the  necessity  of  standing  firmly  together.  It  was  therefore 
agreed  among  them  that  "  a  general  assembly  of  the  American 
states  shall  be  convened,"  for  the  purpose  "  of  cementing  .  .  . 
intimate  relations,"  and  Panama  was  suggested  as  a  convenient 
meeting  place.  There  seems  to  have  been  no  original  inten- 
tion on  the  part  of  these  "  formerly  Spanish  "  provinces  to 
ask  the  United  States  to  cooperate  with  them  when  they  made 
their  treaties  of  alliance,  but  the  publication  of  President 
Monroe's  message,  of  December,  1823,  with  its  encouraging 
words  for  all  newly  created  republics  in  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere, seemed  clearly  to  entitle  the  United  States  to  a 
voice  in  their  proposed  Congress,  should  such  a  desire  mani- 
fest itself  at  Washington.  In  the  spring  of  1825,  the* 
ministers  of  Colombia  and  Mexico,  Messrs.  Salazar  and 
Obregon,  cautiously  approached  the  Secretary  of  State  with 
a  proposition  from  their  respective  governments,  to  the  effect 
that,  should  the  United  States  desire  to  participate,  her  dele- 
gates would  find  welcome  at  the  Congress  of  the  Americas, 
soon  to  convene  at  Panama.  This  invitation  came  imme- 
diately after  the  inauguration  of  President  Adams  (March, 
1825).  The  President  was  known  to  be  a  hearty  supporter 
of  the  principles  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  ;  he  had  been 
Secretary  of  State  under  Monroe,  and  had  enjoyed,  as  such, 
the  full  confidence  of  the  President  during  the  preparation 
of  his  famous  message.  The  Secretary  of  State  was  Henry 
Clay,  and  he  had  always  been  the  champion  in  Congress 
of  the  South  American  states  ;  indeed,  some  of  his  greatest 
speeches  had  been  made  in  their  cause.  It  was  then  reason- 
able to  suppose  that  the  administration  would  be  favorable 


344  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

to  this  plan  of  a  general  Congress.  Knowing  now  that 
Adams,  to  a  very  large  extent,  was  the  real  author  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  one  looks  with  considerable  interest  to 
the  reply  of  the  President  to  Messrs.  Salazar  and  Obregon, 
because  it  is,  from  the  highest  source,  an  official  and  authori- 
tative interpretation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  During  the 
cabinet  discussions  of  1823,  when  the  phrasing  of  that  por- 
tion of  the  President's  message  relating  to  foreign  affairs 
Vas  under  discussion,  and  Mr.  Adams  was  urging  the  ac- 
ceptance of  his  own  copy,  Mr.  Wirt,  the  Attorney  General, 
had  asked  him  if  he  intended  that  the  country  should  sus- 
tain, by  force  of  arms,  the  somewhat  aggressive  policy  he 
advocated.  Mr.  Adams  could  only  then  reply  that  that 
very  question  had  given  him  no  little  concern,  and  he  could 
not  fully  answer  it.  Now  the  same  question  was  subtly 
asked  by  South  America,  —  Would  the  United  States  confer 
with  those  who  had  joined  in  arms  against  European  aggres- 
sion, or  perhaps,  would  she  go  a  step  further,  and  ally  her- 
self with  them  ? 

The  President  replied  to  the  invitation  of  the  two  minis- 
ters through  Mr.  Clay,  saying  :  — 

That  of  course  the  United  States  could  not  make  themselves 
a  party  to  the  existing  war  with  Spain.  The  President  believed 
such  a  Congress  as  was  proposed  might  be  highly  useful  in  set- 
tling several  important  disputed  questions  of  public  law,  and  in 
arranging  other  matters  of  deep  interest  to  the  American  conti- 
nent, and  strengthening  the  friendship  and  amicable  intercourse 
between  the  American  powers ;  but,  before  such  a  Congress  assem- 
bled, certain  conditions  should  be  complied  with,  namely,  the 
fixing  of  the  subjects  to  be  discussed  at  the  Congress,  the  powers 
to  be  given  to  the  commissioners,  and  the  mode  of  organizing  the 
Congress.  .  .  . 

A  cautious  reply.  In  the  following  November  (1825), 
these  same  diplomatic  agents  of  Colombia  and  Mexico  re- 
ported to  Mr.  Clay,  renewing  their  invitation  upon  this 
occasion,  by  formal  notes  from  their  home  governments. 
They   stated   that  while   it   was    impossible   to  enumerate, 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  345 

definitely,  all  the  topics  which  would  likely  be  presented  for 
consideration,  at  the  proposed  Panama  Congress,  they  could 
at  least  state  that  the  discussions  would  include  the  manner  of 
resistance  to  any  attempted  colonization  by  European  powers 
on  the  American  continent,  and  would  include  also  the 
methods  of  resistance  against  possible  interference  in  behalf 
of  Spain  against  her  former  colonies.  They  would  also  dis- 
cuss certain  matters  of  international  law,  the  abolition  of  the 
slave  trade,  and  the  independence  of  Haiti.  Numerous  other 
subjects  were  to  be  brought  up,  which  more  particularly  con- 
cerned the  South  American  states,  and  which  the  United 
States  delegates  would  not  be  required  or  expected  to  discuss. 
It  was  particularly  appropriate,  as  these  representatives  be- 
lieved, for  the  American  states  to  assemble  in  Congress,  in 
order  to  consider  their  own  interests  —  the  nations  of  the 
Old  World  had  long  since  been  doing  the  same  thing. 

Mr.  Clay  thought  that  the  ministers  who  extended  this 
invitation  to  the  United  States  had  not  even  yet  been  suffi- 
ciently explicit  as  to  all  preliminary  arrangements,  to  satisfy 
the  President.  The  President  wished  to  know  exactly  to 
what  extent  discussions  at  Panama  might  go,  and  just  how 
far  the  United  States  might  be  placed  under  obligations  by 
the  resolutions  adopted  at  the  Congress.  Both  Adams  and 
Clay  felt  the  necessity  of  caution.  It  is  far  safer  to  declare 
a  policy  than  to  pledge  oneself  to  abide  by  it.  The  Presi- 
dent deliberated  well ;  he  believed  that  preliminary  matters 
could  be  satisfactorily  arranged  later,  so  he  dismissed  the 
plenipotentiaries  from  Colombia  and  Mexico,  with  the  state- 
ment that  he  would  send  commissioners  to  the  Congress  at 
Panama,  if  the  Senate,  which  was  shortly  to  convene,  would 
consent. 

In  his  annual  message  the  following  month  (December  6, 
1825),  the  President  spoke  of  the  proposed  Panama  Congress, 
and  of  the  invitation  to  the  United  States  to  participate. 
"  The  invitation  has  been  accepted,"  he  wrote,  "  and  minis- 
ters on  the  part  of  the  United  States  will  be  commissioned  to 
attend  at  those  deliberations,  and  to  take  part  in  them,  so  far 
as  may  be  compatible  with  that  neutrality,  from  which  it  is 


346  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

neither  our  intention,  nor  the  desire  of  the  other  American 
states,  that  we  should  depart." 

To  the  Colombian  and  Mexican  ministers,  the  President 
had  said  he  would  send  delegates  to  the  Congress,  "  should 
the  Senate  of  the  United  States  .  .  .  give  their  advice  and 
consent "  ;  to  the  Senate  he  simply  said,  "  Ministers  on  the 
part  of  the  United  States  will  he  commissioned  to  attend." 

It  was  generally  supposed  to  be  the  custom,  as  well  as 
within  the  law,  for  the  executive,  in  the  creation  of  a  new 
mission,  simply  to  nominate  envoys  for  the  purpose,  in  which 
case,  if  the  Senate  did  not  agree  with  the  President  in  the 
expediency  of  the  suggested  mission,  it  could  exercise  its 
authority  by  declining  to  confirm  the  nominations.  The 
President's  numerous  political  enemies  in  the  Senate  chose 
to  avail  themselves  of  this  opportunity  to  attack  the  adminis- 
tration, and  a  bitter  discussion  of  the  constitutional  right 
of  the  President  to  create  the  mission  to  Panama  followed. 
On  December  26  (1825),  the  President  sent  a  special  mes- 
sage to  Congress  on  the  subject,  in  which  he  remarked  :  — 

Although  this  measure  was  deemed  to  be  within  the  constitu- 
tional competency  of  the  Executive,  I  have  not  thought  proper 
to  take  any  step  in  it  before  ascertaining  that  my  opinion  of  its 
expediency  will  concur  with  that  of  both  branches  of  the  Legisla- 
ture, first,  by  the  decision  of  the  Senate  upon  the  nominations  to 
be  laid  before  them,  and,  secondly,  by  the  sanction  of  both  Houses 
to  the  appropriations,  without  which  it  cannot  be  carried  into 
effect. 

In  defence  of  his  policy  he  went  on  to  say  :  — 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  United  States  neither  intend  nor  are 
expected  to  take  part  in  any  deliberations  of  a  belligerent  char- 
acter ;  that  the  motive  of  their  attendance  is  neither  to  contract 
alliances  nor  to  engage  in  any  undertaking  or  project  importing 
hostility  to  any  other  nation. 

The  President  further  suggested  that  the  South  American 
nations  *'  in  the  infancy  of  their  independence  "  and  through 
mere  inexperience,  had  failed  in  some  of  their  duties  to  other 
nations ;  that  through  the  friendly  means  of  a  general  Con- 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  347 

gress,  such  mistakes  against  the  United  States  might  be  cor- 
rected. In  this  document  from  the  White  House,  a  number 
of  other  reasons  were  urged  —  all  seemingly  sufficient  to  the 
President  —  that  the  United  States  should  be  represented 
in  a  general  Congress  of  the  Americas.  The  following  sig- 
nificant words  are  noteworthy  :  — 

An  agreement  between  all  the  parties  represented  at  the  meet- 
ing that  each  will  guard  by  its  own  means  against  the  establish- 
ment of  any  future  Em-opean  colony  within  its  borders  may  be 
found  advisable.  This  was  more  than  two  years  since  announced 
by  my  predecessor  to  the  world  as  a  principle  resulting  from  the 
emancipation  of  both  the  American  continents.  It  may  be  so 
developed  to  the  new  southern  nations  that  they  will  all  feel  it 
as  an  essential  appendage  to  their  independence. 

The  message  closes  with  the  nomination  of  Richard  C. 
Anderson  of  Kentucky,  and  John  Sargent  of  Pennsylvania, 
"  to  b^  envoys  extraordinary  and  ministers  plenipotentiary 
to  the  assembly  of  the  American  nations  at  Panama." 

A  storm  of  disapproval  met  the  reading  of  this  message. 
In  the  Senate  many  expressed  indignation  at  the  President's 
assumption  in  nominating  delegates  to  the  Panama  conven- 
tion, without  first  having  asked  the  consent  of  Congress,  and 
were  moved  to  expressions  of  greater  wrath  by  the  Presi- 
dent's bold  assertion  of  his  constitutional  right  to  send  such 
envoys  as  he  proposed.  They  railed  against  his  "  patroniz- 
ing effrontery  "  in  asking  if  Congress  did  really  concur  in 
his  opinion  of  the  expediency  of  the  Panama  mission,  when 
he  had  already  signified  his  intention  to  send  delegates. 

A  bitter  prejudice  was  engendered  in  both  branches  of  Con- 
gress, against  the  President's  project,  quite  aside  and  apart 
from  the  merits  of  the  question  itself. 

There  were  also  many  in  Congress  who  did  not  favor 
sending  commissioners  to  Panama,  for  any  reason  whatever, 
as  they  distrusted  the  volatile  character  of  the  Spanish 
descendants ;  and  as  they  doubted  their  capacity  for  self- 
government,  they  wished  to  have  no  political  connections  with 
them.     It  would  be  unwise,  they  said,  to  entangle  ourselves 


348  AiMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

in  their  affairs,  —  we  should  be  free  to  use  our  own  discre- 
tion how  and  when  to  apply  our  recently  advanced  foreign 
policy.  The  United  States,  they  urged,  had  nothing  to  gain 
and  everything  to  lose  by  sending  representatives  to  such  a 
gathering. 

In  reviewing  the  long  and  particularly  acrimonious  debate 
aroused  by  the  President's  special  message  of  December  26, 
one  can  hardly  fail  to  be  struck  by  the  persistency  and 
vindictiveness  of  the  opposition.  It  seems  indeed  to  have 
been  out  of  all  proportion  to  the  importance  of  the  issue.  A 
hidden  cause  for  so  much  venom  may  be  found  in  the  fact 
that  the  enemies  of  the  measure  were  all  from  the  South,  and 
represented  slave-holding  constituents.  The  Spanish- Amer- 
ican states  liad  abolished  the  institution  of  slavery,  and  were 
desirous  of  conferring  with  the  United  States  at  Panama,  as 
intimated  by  Messrs.  Salazar  and  Obregon,  upon  the  pro- 
priety of  abolishing  the  slave  trade.  Haiti  was  a  negro  repub- 
lic, a  nation  of  former  slaves,  and  these  southern  members 
of  Congress  wished  no  official  notice  to  be  taken  of  them,  and 
they  resented  the  suggestion  of  conferring  with  them  in  any 
manner  whatever.  Randolph,  Hayne,  Van  Buren,  Buchanan, 
Polk,  Calhoun  and  Burton,  led  an  opposition  that  seemed 
invincible ;  "  other  states  will  do  as  they  please,"  said  Hayne, 
"  but  let  us  take  the  high  ground  that  these  questions  belong 
to  a  class  which  the  peace  and  safety  of  a  large  portion  of 
our  Union  forbids  us  to  discuss.  Let  our  government  direct 
all  our  ministers  in  South  America  and  Mexico  to  protest 
against  the  independence  of  Haiti;  but  let  us  not  go  into 
council  on  the  slave  trade  and  Haiti."  White,  of  Tennessee, 
exclaimed,  "Let  us  cease  to  talk  of  slavery  in  this  House, 
let  us  cease  to  negotiate  upon  any  subject  connected  with 
it."  Shadows  of  coming  events  were  here  cast  before. 
Calhoun  appointed  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs,  and 
he  selected  its  members  with  a  purpose.  The  committee 
returned  an  unanimous  report,  to  the  effect  that  it  was 
not  expedient  for  the  United  States  to  be  represented  at 
Panama.  The  Senate  then  went  a  step  farther,  and  passed  a 
resolution  censuring  the  President. 


THE    MONROE   DOCTRINE  349 

On  the  15th  of  March  (1826),  Mr.  Adams,  still  undismayed, 
sent  a  special  message  to  the  House  of  Representatives,  in 
which  he  sought  to  demonstrate  to  that  body  the  great  im- 
portance of  the  Panama  mission.  The  message  is  too  redo- 
lent of  the  flowers  of  rhetoric,  but  it  is  a  remarkably  vigorous 
paper.  Here  and  there  occur  expressions  that  throw  con- 
siderable light  upon  Adams'  conception  of  the  extent  and 
scope  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  which,  coming  from  a 
joint  author  of  the  doctrine  itself,  are  of  great  value :  — 

But  objects  of  the  highest  importance,  not  only  to  the  future 
welfare  of  the  whole  human  race,  but  bearing  directly  upon  the 
special  interests  of  this  Union,  will  engage  the  deliberations  of  the 
Congress  of  Panama  whether  we  are  represented  there  or  not. 
Others,  if  we  are  represented,  may  be  offered  by  our  plenipotenti- 
aries for  consideration  having  in  view  both  these  great  results  — 
our  own  interests  and  the  improvement  of  the  condition  of  man 
upon  earth.  It  may  be  that  in  the  lapse  of  many  centuries  no 
other  opportunity  so  favorable  will  be  presented  to  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  to  subserve  the  benevolent  purposes 
of  Divine  Providence;  to  dispense  the  promised  blessings  of  the 
Redeemer  of  Mankind ;  to  promote  the  prevalence  in  future  ages  o^ 
peace  on  earth  and  good  will  to  man,  as  will  now  be  placed  in  their 
power  by  participating  in  the  deliberations  of  this  congress.  .  .  . 

The  late  President  of  the  United  States,  in  his  message  to 
Congress  of  the  2d  December,  1823,  while  announcing  the  nego- 
tiation then  pending  with  Russia,  relating  to  the  northwest  coast 
of  this  continent,  observed  that  the  occasion  of  the  discussions  to 
which  that  incident  had  given  rise  had  been  taken  for  asserting 
as  a  principle  in  which  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  United 
States  were  involved  that  the  American  continents,  by  the  free 
and  independent  condition  which  they  had  assumed  and  main-/ 
tained,  were  thenceforward  not  to  be  considered  as  subjects  for' 
future  colonization  by  any  European  power.  The  principle  had! 
first  been  assumed  in  that  negotiation  with  Russia.  It  rested 
upon  a  course  of  reasoning  equally  simple  and  conclusive.  With 
the  exception  of  the  existing  European  colonies,  which  it  was  in 
nowise  intended  to  disturb,  the  two  continents  consisted  of  several 
sovereign  and  independent  nations,  whose  territories  covered  their 
whole  surface.  By  this  their  independent  condition  the  United 
States  enjoyed  the  right  of  commercial  intercourse  with  every  part 
of  their  possessions.     To  attempt  the  establishment  of  a  colony  in 


350  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

those  possessions  would  be  to  usurp  to  the  exclusion  of  others  a 
commercial  intercourse  which  was  the  common  possession  of  all. 
It  could  not  be  done  without  encroaching  upon  existing  rights  of 
the  United  States.  The  Government  of  Russia  has  never  dis- 
puted these  positions  nor  manifested  the  slightest  dissatisfaction 
at  their  having  been  taken.  Most  of  the  new  American  Republics 
have  declared  their  entire  assent  to  them,  and  they  now  propose, 
among  the  subjects  of  consultation  at  Panama,  to  take  into  con-, 
sideration  the  means  of  making  effectual  the  assertion  of  thatf 
principle,  as  well  as  the  means  of  resisting  interference  from! 
abroad  with  the  domestic  concerns  of  the  American  Governments. 

In  alluding  to  these  means  it  would  obviously  be  premature  at; 
this  time  to  anticipate  that  which  is  offered  merely  as  matter  for 
consultation,  or  to  pronounce  upon  those  measures  which  have 
been  or  may  be  suggested.  The  purpose  of  this  Government  is  to 
concur  in  none  which  would  import  hostility  to  Europe  or  justly 
excite  resentment  in  any  of  her  States.  Should  it  be  deemed 
advisable  to  contract  any  conventional  engagement  on  this  topic, 
our  views  would  extend  no  further  than  to  a  mutual  pledge  of  the 
parties  to  the  compact  to  maintain  the  principle  in  application  to 
its  own  territory^  and  to  permit  no  colonial  lodgments  or  establish- 
ment of  European  jurisdiction  upon  its  own  soil ;  and  with  respect 
to  the  obtrusive  interference  from  abroad — if  its  future  charac- 
ter may  be  inferred  from  that  which  has  been  and  perhaps  still  is 
exercised  in  more  than  one  of  the  new  States  —  a  joint  declaration 
of  its  character  and  exposure  of  it  to  the  world  may  be  probably 
all  that  the  occasion  would  require.  .  .  . 

The  condition  of  the  islands  of  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  is  of 
deeper  import  and  more  immediate  bearing  upon  the  present  in-« 
terests  and  future  prospects  of  our  Union.  The  correspondence 
herewith  transmitted  will  show  how  earnestly  it  has  engaged  the 
attention  of  this  Government.  The  invasion  of  both  those  islands 
by  the  united  forces  of  Mexico  and  Colombia  is  avowedly  among 
the  objects  to  be  matured  by  the  belligerent  States  at  Panama. 
The  convulsions  to  which,  from  the  peculiar  composition  of  their 
population,  they  would  be  liable  in  the  event  of  such  an  invasion, 
and  the  danger  therefrom  resulting  of  their  falling  ultimately 
into  the  hands  of  some  European  power  other  than  Spain,  will 
not  admit  of  our  looking  at  the  consequences  to  which  the  Con- 
gress at  Panama  may  lead  with  indifference. 


After  giving  assurances  that  the  "  assembly  will  be  in  its 
nature  diplomatic  and  not  legislative  —  merely  consultative,'* 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  351 

Mr.  Adams  takes  up  the  question  of  whether  "  the  measure 
might  not  have  a  tendency  to  change  the  policy  hitherto  in- 
variably pursued  by  the  United  States  of  avoiding  all  entan- 
gling alliances  and  all  unnecessary  foreign  connections." 
"  Mindful  of  the  advice  given  by  the  father  of  our  country," 
he  declares  that  the  counsel  of  Washington  in  that  instance, 
"like  all  counsels  of  wisdom,"  was  founded  upon  the  fact 
that  "  Europe  had  a  set  of  primary  interests  "  all  her  own, 
and  having  but  a  remote  relation  to  us,  could  only  involve 
us  in  needless  dispute,  did  we  concern  ourselves  about  them, 
but  now,  having  "more  than  realized  the  anticipations  of 
this  admirable  political  legacy,"  by  our  growth  and  expan- 
sion we  have  arrived  at  a  point  when  "  America  has  a  set  of 
primary  interests  which  have  none  or  a  remote  relation  to 
Europe ;  that  the  interference  of  Europe,  therefore,  in  those 
concerns  should  be  spontaneously  withheld  by  her  upon  the 
same  principles  that  we  have  never  interfered  with  hers, 
and  that  if  she  should  interfere,  as  she  may,  by  measures 
which  may  have  a  great  and  dangerous  recoil  upon  ourselves, 
we  might  be  called  in  defence  of  our  own  altars  and  firesides 
to  take  an  attitude  which  would  cause  our  neutrality  to  be 
respected,  and  choose  peace  or  war,  as  our  interest,  guided  by 
justice,  should  counsel."  Following  the  same  idea  he  con- 
tinues :  — 

To  the  question  which  may  be  asked,  whether  this  meeting 
and  the  principles  which  may  be  adjusted  and  settled  by  it  as 
rules  of  intercourse  between  the  American  nations  may  not  give 
umbrage  to  the  holy  league  of  European  powers  or  offence  to 
Spain,  it  is  deemed  a  sufficient  answer  that  our  attendance  at 
Panama  can  give  no  just  cause  of  umbrage  or  offence  to  either, 
and  that  the  United  States  will  stipulate  nothing  there  which 
can  give  such  cause.  Here  the  right  of  inquiry  into  our  pur- 
poses and  measures  must  stop.  The  holy  league  of  Europe  itself 
was  formed  without  inquiring  of  the  United  States  whether  it 
would  or  would  not  give  umbrage  to  them.  The  fear  of  giving 
iimbrage  to  the  holy  league  of  Europe  was  urged  as  a  motive  for 
denying  to  the  American  nations  the  acknowledgment  of  their 
independence.  That  it  would  be  viewed  by  Spain  as  hostility  to 
her,  was  not  only  urged,  but  directly  declared  by  herself.     The 


352  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

Congress  and  Administration  of  that  day  consulted  their  rights 
and  duties  and  not  their  fears.  Fully  determined  to  give  no 
needless  displeasure  to^  any  foreign  power,  the  United  States  can 
estimate  the  probability  of  their  giving  it  only  by  the  right  which 
any  foreign  state  could  have  to  take  it  from  their  measures. 
Neither  the  representation  of  the  United  States  at  Panama  nor 
any  measure  to  which  their  assent  may  be  yielded  there  will  give 
to  the  holy  league  or  an}'  of  its  members,  nor  to  Spain,  the  right 
to  take  offence ;  for  the  rest  the  United  States  must  still,  as  here- 
tofore, take  counsel  from  their  duties  rather  than  their  fears. 

Considering  the  lukewarmness  with  which  Mr.  Adams,  as 
Secretary  of  State,  had  approached  the  subject  of  acknowl- 
edging the  independence  of  the  South  American  states,  and 
considering  his  extreme  caution  and  reserve  as  President  in 
accepting  the  invitation  to  participate  in  the  Panama  Con- 
gress, one  may  wonder  at  the  zeal  displayed  in  his  appeals 
to  Congress  to  send  representatives  to  the  isthmus.  He 
threw  himself  against  the  opposition  of  Congress  with  all  liis 
strength  ;  he  made  the  matter  a  personal  one,  as  though  the 
refusal  of  Congress  to  approve  his  scheme  amounted  to  no 
less  than  an  insult,  and  a  personal  affront  to  him.  Whatever 
may  have  induced  him  to  experience  so  decided  a  change  of 
heart,  suspicion  will  remain  that  a  reason  of  some  weight 
is  to  be  found  in  the  very  obstacle  itself,  —  the  opposition  of 
Congress.  Thoroughly  aroused  by  the  thrusts  of  his  polit- 
ical enemies,  now  considered  his  personal  enemies,  the  Presi- 
dent was  moved  to  great  earnestness  as  he  penned  this 
message.  Seemingly  in  a  spirit  of  inspiration  he  concluded 
the  paper. 

That  the  Congress  at  Panama  will  accomplish  all,  or  even  any, 
of  the  transcendent  benefits  to  the  human  race  which  warmed 
the  conceptions  of  its  first  proposer  it  were  perhaps  indulging  too 
sanguine  a  forecast  of  events  to  promise.  It  is  in  its  nature  a 
measure  speculative  and  experimental.  The  blessing  of  heaven 
may  turn  it  to  the  account  of  human  improvement ;  accidents 
unforeseen  and  mischances  not  to  be  anticipated  may  baffle  all  its 
high  purposes  and  disappoint  its  fairest  expectations.  But  the 
design  is  great,  is  benevolent,  is  humane. 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  353 

It  looks  to  the  melioration  of  the  condition  of  man.  It  is 
congenial  with  that  spirit  which  prompted  the  declaration  of  our 
independence,  which  inspired  the  preambjp  of  our  first  treaty 
with  France,  which  dictated  our  first  treaty  with  Prussia  and 
the  instructions  under  which  it  was  negotiated,  which  filled  the 
hearts  and  fired  the  souls  of  the  immortal  founders  of  our 
Revolution. 

The  long  acrimonious  debate  in  the  Senate  was  closed 
March  14,  1826,  by  the  appointment  of  Messrs.  Anderson 
and  Sargent  as  Ministers  Plenipotentiary.  The  President 
had  triumphed  then  in  the  Upper  House,  but  at  a  great  cost 
of  ill  feeling.  The  Lower  House  read  his  message,  and  in 
ten  days  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  placed  before 
the  House  the  resolution  that,  "  it  is  expedient  to  appro- 
priate the  funds  necessary  to  enable  the  President  of  the 
United  States  to  send  ministers  to  the  Congress  of  Panama.'' 
The  Ways  and  Means  Committee  immediately  reported  a 
bill  making  the  necessary  appropriations  to  defray  the  ex- 
penses connected  with  the  mission. 

The  debate  in  the  House  was,  perhaps,  less  bitter  than  it 
had  been  in  the  Senate,  but  the  same  opposition  to  the  meas- 
ure developed  that  had  characterized  the  discussions  of  the 
Upper  House.  The  Southern  members  arrayed  themselves 
solidly  against  a  project  that,  in  their  estimation,  led  the 
United  States  into  forming  embarrassing  alliances  with  South 
Americans,  —  a  project  that  might  induce  the  United  States 
to  take  action  with  foreign  nations  upon  the  slave  trade,  and 
that  might  disgrace  their  country  by  undue  familiarity  with 
the  negro  republic  of  Haiti.  Already  the  Southern  mem- 
bers sought  to  taboo  any  discussion  touching  upon  slavery. 
Daniel  Webster  came  to  the  President's  rescue  by  warmly 
defending  the  message  of  March  15.  He  insisted  that  it 
was  not  the  duty  of  the  House,  nor  their  constitutional  right 
to  decide  "  what  shall  be  discussed  by  particular  ministers, 
already  appointed,  when  they  shall  meet  the  ministers  of 
other  powers,"  —  that  matter,  he  maintained,  belonged  to 
executive  discretion  and  responsibility.  It  was  for  the 
House  only  to  vote  the  necessary  appropriation.  He  declared 
2a 


354  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

that  he  looked  "...  on  the  message  of  December,  1823,  as 
forming  a  bright  page  in  our  history.  I  will  neither  help  to 
erase  it  or  tear  it  out ;  nor  shall  it  be  by  any  act  of  mine 
blurred  or  blotted.  It  did  honor  to  the  sagacity  of  the  gov- 
ernment, and  I  will  not  diminish  that  honor.  It  elevated 
the  hopes  and  gratified  the  patriotism  of  the  people.  Over 
those  hopes  I  will  not  bring  a  mildew  ;  nor  will  I  put  that 
gratified  patriotism  to  shame." 

The  force  of  Daniel  Webster's  logic  did  not  convince 
the  members  from  the  South.  The  necessary  appropriation 
bill  was  finally  passed,  but  a  heavy  tail  to  the  kite  was 
attached  by  the  following  resolution  :  — 

It  is  therefore  the  opinion  of  this  House  that  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  ought  not  to  be  represented  at  the  Congress 
of  Panama  except  in  a  diplomatic  character,  nor  ought  they  to 
form  any  alliance,  offensive  or  defensive,  or  negotiate  respecting 
such  an  alliance  with  all  or  any  of  the  South  American  republics ; 
nor  ought  they  to  become  parties  with  them,  or  either  of  them,  to 
any  joint  declaration  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  the  interfer- 
ence of  any  of  the  European  powers  with  their  independence  or  form 
of  government,  or  to  any  compact  for  the  purpose  of  preventing 
colonization  upon  the  continents  of  America,  but  that  the  people 
of  the  United  States  should  be  left  free  to  act,  in  any  crisis  in  such 
a  manner  as  their  feelings  of  friendship  toward  these  republics 
and  as  their  own  honor  and  policy  may  at  the  time  dictate. 

The  way  being  at  last  cleared,  on  May  8  (1826),  Mr.  Clay, 
the  Secretary  of  State,  instructed  the  two  envoys :  — 

"  The  assembly  of  a  Congress  at  Panama,  composed  of  dip- 
lomatic representatives  from  independent  American  nations, 
will  form  a  new  epoch  in  human  affairs."  With  the  idea 
before  them  that  the  republican  nations  of  the  New  World 
should  meet  to  examine  and  pass  upon  their  own  interests, 
which  were  now  distinct  and  separate  from  the  interests  of 
the  Old  World,  the  commissioners  were  to  devise  means  of 
preserving  peace  in  future  among  the  American  nations. 
They  were  to  assist  in  the  revision  of  a  number  of  vaguely 
expressed  or  unsatisfactory  principles  of  international  law, 
especially  as  related  to  the  sea  —  "  to  propose  a  joint  decla- 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  355 

ration  of  the  several  American  states,  each,  however,  acting 
for  and  binding  only  itself,  that  within  the  limits  of  their 
respective  territories  no  new  European  colony  will  here- 
after be  allowed  to  be  established." 

On  the  question  of  the  interoceanic  canal,  should  it  come 
before  them  for  consideration,  they  were  to  take  tlie  stand 
that  —  "  If  the  work  should  ever  be  executed  so  as  to  admit 
of  the  passage  of  sea  vessels  from  ocean  to  ocean,  the  bene- 
fits of  it  ought  not  to  be  exclusively  appropriated  to  any  one 
nation,  but  should  be  extended  to  all  parts  of  the  globe  upon 
the  payment  of  a  just  compensation  or  reasonable  tolls." 

The  Congress  of  Panama  assembled  on  the  22d  of  June,  \ 
1826,  but  neither  of  the  American  representatives  was  pres-  | 
ent.  Mr.  Anderson,  one  of  the  commissioners,  was  Minister 
at  Bogota  at  the  time  of  his  appointment  to  Panama ;  he 
died  on  his  way  to  attend  the  meeting.  The  other  Ameri- 
can delegate,  Mr.  Sargent,  had  been  so  long  delayed  by  the 
lengthy  debate  in  Congress  over  the  expediency  of  his  mis- 
sion that  he  was  unable  to  effect  his  departure  from  the 
United  States  in  time  to  be  present. 

The  Panama  Congress  proved  to  be  a  fiasco ;  neither  the  i 
United  States,  Chili,  Brazil,  nor  Buenos  Ayres  was  repre- 
sented, and  without  the  cooperation  of  these,  the  largest  and  I 
most  important  states  of  the  Western  Hemisphere,  the  reso- 
lutions of  the  Congress  necessarily  reached  a  "  lame  and  im- 
potent conclusion."  The  more  soul-inspiring  and  magnificent 
the  utterances  of  the  few  delegates  present  at  the  convention, 
the  more  ridiculous  they  appeared.  A  treaty  of  perpetual 
union  and  confederation,  a  sort  of  offensive  and  defensive 
alliance,  was  entered  into  by  the  delegates  —  the  purpose 
being  to  pledge  all  the  American  states  to  aid  each  other  in 
maintaining  their  own  integrity.  Of  all  the  states  repre- 
sented, Colombia  alone  ratified  the  treaty.  Indeed,  had  the 
delegates  of  the  United  States  been  in  attendance  at  the  con- 
ference, they  could  not  have  subscribed  to  the  resolutions 
that  were  adopted. 

A  resolution  to  meet  again  the  following  year  in  ^u^iH^e.^ 
Amnjiiua  was  only  responded  to  by  the  two  United  States 


356  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

delegates.  These  men,  with  bulky  instructions  in  their 
pockets,  found  themselves  alone  at  the  appointed  time  and 
place.  Their  sense  of  humor  was  no  doubt  severely  taxed. 
In  fact,  the  South  and  Central  American  states  had  already 
begun  their  careers  of  civil  strife;  they  had  neither  the  time 
nor  inclination  to  deliberate  over  matters  relating  to  the 
common  welfare. 

As  the  Panama  Congress  proved  to  be  a  hopeless  failure, 
chief  interest  in  the  event,  as  previously  suggested,  is  to  be 
found  solely  in  the  numerous  interpretations  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  which  it  elicited.  The  many  opinions  —  coming 
directly  from  President  Adams  and  his  Secretary  of  State, 
Mr.  Clay,  from  the  most  prominent  statesmen  of  the  country, 
and  as  embodied  in  tlie  resolutions  of  both  Houses  of  Con- 
gress—  throw  a  flood  of  light  upon  the  contemporaneous 
construction  of  the  doctrine. 

Although  in  these  Panama  debates  the  principles,  enun- 
ciated by  President  Monroe,  were  more  or  less  overshadowed 
by  other  political  considerations,  yet  enough  was  said  bearing 
directly  upon  the  interpretation  of  the  doctrine  to  illustrate 
the  views  of  the  statesmen  of  the  period  on  the  subject. 

First  and  foremost,  Adams,  no  doubt  the  actual  author 
of  that  part  of  the  doctrine  bearing  upon  future  colonization 
by  European  powers  in  the  Western  Hemisphere,  and  prob- 
ably a  joint  author  of  the  rest  of  the  message  included  in 
the  "  Doctrine,"  was  the  one  who,  of  all  others,  could  speak 
most  authoritatively  upon  the  subject.  In  reference  to  the 
enunciations  of  his  predecessor  in  office,  he  said :  "  Our 
views  would  extend  no  further  than  to  a  mutual  pledge  of 
the  parties  to  the  compact  to  maintain  the  principle  in  appli- 
cation to  its  own  territory,  and  to  permit  no  colonial  lodge- 
ments or  establishments  of  European  jurisdiction  upon  its 
own  soil."  The  hesitation  of  the  President  to  accept  the 
invitation  of  the  South  Americans,  and  afterward  his  insis- 
tence that  the  functions  of  the  plenipotentiaries  should  be 
diplomatic  only,  and  in  no  sense  legislative  or  binding  upon 
the  government,  shows  definitely  that  he  was  not  of  a  mind 
to  pledge  the  country  to  execute  a  policy  which  he  had  him- 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  357 

self  taken  so  prominent  a  part  in  framing.  This,  too,  was  in 
spite  of  the  fact  that  he  believed  the  Americas  had  a  system 
and  interests  of  their  own,  removed  from  and  perhaps  op- 
posed to  those  of  Europe.  When  called  upon  to  act,  there- 
fore, President  Adams  narrowed  his  former  position  and 
declared  a  new  doctrine.  "  Let  every  state  defend  the  integ- 
rity of  its  own  territory."  That,  after  all,  was  a  useless 
suggestion. 

Clay  followed  the  sentiment  of  his  chief,  —  the  United 
States  should  not  be  obliged  to  guarantee  the  execution  of 
the  principles  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

The  Senate  and  House  passed  resolutions,  reaffirming  the 
policy  of  non-interference,  asserting  the  broad  principle 
that  the  people  of  the  United  States  should  be  left  free  to 
act,  in  any  crisis,  as  their  own  honor  and  policy  might  dic- 
tate. Monroe  Doctrine  or  no  Monroe  Doctrine,  in  case  of 
foreign  aggression,  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
should  always  be  at  liberty  to  follow  the  course  of  action 
that  the  necessities  of  the  occasion  called  for.  There  should 
be  no  fixed  rule  to  govern  future  contingencies  and  embarrass 
the  nation.  Daniel  Webster  seems  to  have  voiced  the  ma- 
jority opinion  of  Congress  during  this  Panama  debate,  when 
he  said :  — 

It  [Monroe's  Declaration]  did  not  commit  us,  at  all  events,  to 
take  up  arms  on  any  indication  of  hostile  feeling  by  the  powers 
of  Europe  towards  South  America.  If,  for  example,  all  the  states 
of  Europe  had  refused  to  trade  with  South  America  until  her  states 
should  return  to  their  former  allegiance,  that  w^ould  have  furnished 
no  cause  of  interference  to  us.  Or  if  an  armament  had  been  fur- 
nished by  the  allies  to  act  against  provinces  the  most  remote  from 
us,  as  Chili  or  Buenos  Ayres,  the  distance  of  the  scene  of  action 
diminishing  our  apprehension  of  danger,  and  diminishing  also  our 
means  of  effectual  interposition,  might  still  have  left  us  to  con- 
tent ourselves  with  remonstrance.  But  a  very  different  case 
would  have  arisen,  if  an  army,  equipped  and  maintained  by  these 
powers,  had  been  landed  on  the  shores  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico, 
and  commenced  the  war  in  our  own  immediate  neighborhood. 
Such  an  event  might  justly  be  regarded  as  dangerous  to  ourselves, 
and,  on  that  ground,  call  for  decided  and  immediate  interference 


358  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC    QUESTIONS 

by  us.  The  sentiments  and  the  policy  announced  by  the  declara- 
tion, thus  understood,  were,  therefore,  in  strict  conformity  to  our 
duties  and  our  interest. 

In  this  same  debate,  James  K.  Polk,  member  from  Ten- 
nessee, declared :  — 

When  the  message  of  the  late  President  of  the  United  States 
was  communicated  to  Congress  in  1823,  it  was  viewed,  as  it  should 
have  been,  as  the  mere  expression  of  opinion  of  the  Executive, 
submitted  to  the  consideration  and  deliberation  of  Congress,  and 
designed  probably  to  produce  an  effect  upon  the  councils  of  the 
Holy  Alliance,  in  relation  to  their  supposed  intention  to  interfere 
in  the  war  between  Spain  and  her  former  colonies.  That  effect 
it  probably  had  an  agency  in  ])roducing ;  and  if  so,  it  has  performed 
its  office.  The  President  had  no  power  to  bind  the  nation  by  such 
a  pledge. 

With  the  close  of  the  year  1826,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is 
found  to  be  limited  by  the  following  qualifications :  — 

1.  No  future  colonization  on  the  Western  Hemisphere 
by  the  European  powers  can  be  permitted  to  take  place. 
The  United  States  will  ask  the  new  Spanish-American 
republics  to  adopt  this  rule  so  far  as  their  own  territory  is 
concerned. 

•2.  The  United  States  shall  remain  free  to  adopt  any 
course  its  honor  and  policy  may  dictate  touching  alliances 
with  foreign  nations  and  touching  the  practical  operation  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

3.  The  republics  of  the  New  World  have  a  set  of  primary 
interests  of  their  own,  but  the  United  States  will  not  join 
with  any  of  them  in  a  declaration  against  interference  from 
abroad. 

In  short,  therefore,  the  statesmen  of  the  day  believed  the 
primary  object  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  had  been  accomplished 
—  the  Holy  Alliance  was  dead,  and  Russia  had  abandoned 
her  West  coast  colonization  schemes.  The  measure  being 
protective  only,  its  principles  might  revive  as  occasion  called 
them  into  life ;  but  it  was  distinctly  to  be  understood  that, 
beyond  a  point  of   self-defence,  the  United  States  had  no 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  359 

intention  of  assuming  a  role  of  guardianship  over  the  Western 
Hemisphere,  nor  of  constituting  herself  the  protector  of 
South  America. 

VII.    SPANISH  AMERICA   AND  CUBA 

From  the  close  of  the  administration  of  John  Quincy 
Adams,  in  1829,  to  the  beginning  of  Polk's  administration, 
in  1845,  there  occurred  a  series  of  events  connected  with 
Spanish-American  interests  which  apparently  called  for 
action  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  Government  involv-. 
ing  the  principles  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  but  which  were,t 
nevertheless,  permitted  to  pass  unnoticed.  It  has  been  said 
that  during  that  period  the  doctrine  was  dormant.  All 
attempts  to  secure  legislative  action  upon  the  subject  failed 
in  Congress,  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  remembered  only 
as  the  policy  of  a  past  administration.  It  was,  however, 
universally  endorsed  as  a  good  policy  to  revive,  should  occa- 
sion demand  it.  In  those  days  the  words  of  President 
Monroe  did  not  apparently  receive  the  broad  interpretation 
that  has  been  given  to  them  in  more  recent  years.  The 
attitude  of  the  country  toward  Europe,  during  this  period, 
was  one  that  would  likely  have  been  assumed,  even  had  no 
Holy  Alliance  ever  threatened  to  meddle  in  American  affairs, 
and  had  no  defiant  message  been  sent  back  across  the  sea. 
The  position  assumed  by  all  those  who  controlled  the  forei 
policy  of  the  United  States  was  simply  one  of  self-defence, 
and  in  the  absence  of  definite  threats  from  abroad,  the 
doctrine  was  not  invoked. 

The  feelings  of  cordial  sympathy  in  the  United  States 
toward  South  Americans,  which  had  been  so  freely  extended 
when  those  people  were  struggling  for  their  liberty,  sensibly  ir^ 
cooled  when  Spanish  America  finally  succeeded  in  severing 
its  political  relations  with  Spain.  In  a  very  short  time  the 
South  American  states  gave  evidence  of  a  woful  lack  of 
political  stability.  Any  sort  of  permanent  confederation 
among  the  various  states  was  soon  shown  to  be  impossible. 
A  regular  succession  of  revolutions  distressed  the  land,  and 


iirs, 

sea.  1^ 

ngn  1^ 

nee,  f 


360  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

the  insatiate  cupidity  and  reckless  extravagance  of  their 
political  leaders  augured  ill  for  the  perpetuation  of  repub- 
lican government  in  South  America. 

Although  the  Monroe  Doctrine  had  been  intended  by  its 
authors  only  as  a  defensive  measure  for  the  United  States, 
South  Americans  clamored  for  its  application  whenever  they 
encountered  difficulties  with  Europe.  /  Believing,  as  they  did, 
that  the  doctrine  was  promulgated  as  much  for  their  bene- 
fit as  for  the  NcSrth  Americans,  they  loudly  denounced  the 
United  States  as  a  monster  of  bad  faith,  when  the  latter  re- 
fused to  become  a  party  to  their  quarrels  or  declined  to  give 
them  material  aid,  or  even  the  full  quota  of  sympathy  which 
they  felt  to  be  their  due. 

In  1829,  the  Malavinas  Islands  (Falklands),  which  be- 
longed to  England,  were  seized  upon  by  the  Buenos  Ayrean 
authorities,  who,  as  successors  of  Spain,  claimed  a  right  to 
the  group.  The  following  year,  the  attention  of  the  United 
States  was  drawn  to  the  fact  by  tlie  arrest  of  some  North 
American  seal  hunters  on  the  Falkland  shore.  The  arrest 
seemed  to  be  unjustified  by  the  circumstances,  —  the  fisher- 
men having  merely  followed  a  customary  privilege  granted 
by  England,  —  and  the  American  sloop  of  war,  the  Lexington^ 
not  only  liberated  the  prisoners,  but  in  retaliation  deported 
the  Buenos  Ayrean  governor  (1831).  The  English  there- 
upon resumed  control,  and  complaint  of  the  Argentine 
Republic,  that  this  act  involved  a  gross  violation  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  never  ceased  to  be  pressed  in  Washington, 
The  United  States  never  admitted  a  claim  for  indemnity, 
and  has  always  maintained  that  it  was  no  party  to  the  con- 
troversy between  Buenos  Ayres  and  Great  Britain,  —  the 
rights  of  the  latter  having  long  antedated  those  of  the 
former  in  the  Falklands.  Had  the  same  construction  been 
placed  upon  the  words  of  President  Monroe  that  has 
frequently  been  applied  since.  President  Jackson  might 
well  have  regarded  this  incident  as  one  demanding  the 
interference  of  the  United  States,  —  at  least  to  the  extent 
of  investigating  the  disputed  claims  of  Great  Britain  to  the 
Falkland  Islands.     The  executive,  however,  appears  to  have 


4 

THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  361 

entertained  no  fears  of  European  colonization  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere,  when  located  at  so  distant  a  point  from  the 
United  States  as  the  Falkland  Islands. 

In  1835,  Brazil  and  Buenos  Ayres  recognized  the  indepen- 
dence of  Uruguay  by  a  treaty  made  through  the  mediation  of 
England.  Some  years  later,  Buenos  Ayres  threatened  to 
attack  the  newly  created  nation  it  had  so  recently  recognized, 
and  Brazil  called  upon  Great  Britain  and  France  for  aid  in 
maintaining  the  integrity  of  Uruguay.  In  answer  to  this 
call  those  two  powers  established  a  ntival  blockade  along 
the  coast  of  Buenos  Ayres.  The  United  States  having  no 
live  interest  in  the  dispute,  and  feeling  itself  in  no  way 
threatened  by  such  an  act  of  European  intervention,  refused 
to  interpose.  Again  the  United  States  was  roundly  de-l 
nounced  in  South  America  for  the  abandonment  of  her  I 
principles. 

Through  her  foothold  in  Central  America  along  the  Mos~ 
quito  coast  and  in  Honduras,  England  had,  for  many  years,, 
been  gradually  encroaching  upon  Nicaragua.  Great  Britain's;] 
claims  to  territory  in  Central  America  dated  from  the  seven- 1 
teenth  century,  although  some  of  these  claims  were  judged, 
in  the  United  States,  to  be  of  doubtful  origin.  Up  to 
1835,  extensions  of  her  Belize  boundary  lines  had  been 
made  gradually  and  noiselessly  ;  but  in  that  year  the  English 
made  so  decided  a  territorial  advance  into  Honduras  and 
Nicaragua,  that  the  Central  American  authorities  appealed 
to  the  United  States.  President  Jackson  was  reminded  that 
"  it  had  always  been  the  policy  of  the  United  States  to  pre- 
vent and  resist  European  settlements  in  America."  Geneml, 
Jackson  thought  it  inexpedient  to  interfere.  From  a  more 
modern  point  of  view,  he  would  seem  not  to  have  been  imbued 
with  the  spirit  of  Monroe's  message,  for  a  similar  move  on 
the  part  of  Great  Britain  in  Venezuela,  in  1896,  caused  great 
excitement  in  the  United  States,  notwithstanding  the  fact 
that  Venezuela  is  considerably  further  removed  from  the 
United  States  than  is  Nicaragua.  Subsequently,  however, 
British  territorial  advances  into  Central  America  have  been 
opposed  by  the   United   States,  upon  the   sole   ground   of 


362  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

violation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  but  not  seriously  until 
the  subject  of  an  interoceanic  canal  had  come  forward  more 
prominently. 

In  1842,  and  again  two  years  later,  England  found  it 
necessary  to  besiege  San  Juan,  for  the  sake  of  impressing 

(  upon  the   natives  a  respect  for  the  validity  of   her  terri- 

1  torial  claims.     These  decidedly  aggressive  acts  were  passed 

*  unnoticed  in  Washington. 

Other  instances  might  be  cited  which  prove  to  a  certain 
extent  that  for  a  number  of  years  after  the  famous  message 
had  been  issued,  it  was  not  viewed  by  contemporary  states- 
men in  the  same  light  in  which  it  is  generally  regarded 
to-day.  The  particular  danger  against  which  Mr.  Monroe 
had  directed  his  protest  had  ceased  to  exist.  Its  principles 
were  only  to  be  revived  in  case  such  acts  of  aggression  or 
armed  interference  in  America  seemed  actually  to  threaten 
the  safety  of  the  United  States.  The  idea  that  the  United 
States  should  offer  its  military  forces  to  South  or  Central 
America,  at  its  bidding,  was  never  entertained.  It  was 
never  denied  that  European  nations  had  tlie  right  belonging 
to  any  sovereign  power  to  use  force  in  South  or  Central 
America,  if  necessary,  in  the  collection  of  debt,  or  to  obtain 
redress  for  grievances.  However,  while  the  United  States 
for  a  considerable  period  took  little  cognizance  of  European 
intervention  in  South  and  Central  America,  President* 
Monroe's  declaration  was  by  no  means  forgotten  ;  this  is 
particularly  evidenced  in  relation  to  Cuban  affairs. 

The  proximity  of  Cuba  to  the  American  shores  has  always 
made  it  the  subject  of  jealous  watchfulness  by  the  United 
States,  and  during  each  administration  from  that  of  Presi- 
dent Monroe,  a  share  of  attention  has  been  directed  to  it. 

I  As  early  as  1809,  Jefferson  looked  longingly  toward  Cuba, 
although  he  feared  the  dangers  of  a  general  expansion 
policy.  He  wrote  to  President  Madison :  "  I  would  imme- 
diately erect  a  column  on  the  southernmost  limit  of  Cuba, 
and  inscribe  on  it  a  ne  plus  ultra  as  to  us  in  that  direction. 
.  .  .  Cuba  can  be  defended  by  us  without  a  navy,  and  this 
develops  the  principle  which  ought  to  limit  our  views." 


THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE  36^3 

President  Madison  was  not  so  thoroughly  in  favor  of  the 
annexation  of  Cuba.  His  views,  as  expressed  in  a  letter  to 
William  Pinkney,  in  1810,  reflect  the  sentiment  which  thir- 
teen years  later  crystallized  into  a  national  doctrine.  "  The 
position  of  Cuba  gives  to  the  United  States  so  deep  an 
interest  in  the  destiny,  even,  of  that  island,  that  although 
they  might  be  an  inactive,  they  could  not  be  a  satisfied  spec- 
tator at  its  falling  under  any  European  Government,  which 
might  make  a  fulcrum  of  that  position  against  the  commerce 
and  security  of  the  United  States."  These  views  of  Presi- 
dent Madison  were  at  that  time  more  acceptable  to  the  people 
of  the  United  States  than  was  the  idea  of  actual  annexation. 

During  the  two  administrations  of  President  Monroe,  great 
anxiety  was  felt  in  Washington  lest  Cuba  might  be  seized 
by  some  European  power.  The  English  press,  and  some  of 
the  more  influential  British  statesmen,  constantly  insisted 
upon  the  acquisition  of  the  island,  as  an  offset  to  the  prepon- 
derating influence  in  West  Indian  affairs,  which  the  cession 
of  Florida  had  given  to  the  United  States.  While  the  British 
Government  does  not  seem  to  have  seriously  contemplated 
the  occupation  of  Cuba,  apprehension  lest  it  might  decide 
upon  such  a  course  kept  the  administration  not  a  little  agi- 
tated. This  fear  was  enhanced  by  the  fact  that  numbers  of 
pirates  infested  the  Cuban  coast  and  preyed  upon  England's 
commerce.  The  Spanish  Government  w^as  utterly  unable  to 
suppress  these  marauders,  and  the  threatened  British  demon- 
strations against  them,  if  actually  made,  would  almost  cer- 
tainly lead  to  a  seizure  of  the  island  itself. 

The  French  invasion  of  Spain,  in  1822,  also  gave  rise  to 
many  alarms  in  the  United  States,  in  respect  to  the  fate  of 
Cuba.  It  was  generally  believed  that  Spain  must,  sooner  or 
later,  lose  her  hold  upon  the  island,  and  that  Cuba  would 
naturally  fall  to  the  share  of  France,  —  or  perhaps  of  Great 
Britain,  who  was  known  to  be  furnishing  the  means  to  the 
constitutional  government  of  Spain  to  resist  Ferdinand  and 
his  French  allies.  It  had  always  been  one  of  John  Quincy 
Adams'  fixed  ideas  that  the  acquisition  of  Cuba  would  eventu- 
ally become   a   necessity  to   the   political  interests   of   the 


364  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

Union.  He  was  moved  by  the  threatened  loss  of  Cuba  by 
Spain  to  instruct  Mr.  Nelson,  the  American  Minister  at 
Madrid  (1823)  :  — 

.  .  .  These  islands  from  their  local  position  are  natural  append- 
ages to  the  North  American  continent,  and  one  of  them  [Cuba] 
almost  in  sight  of  our  shores,  from  a  multitude  of  considerations, 
has  become  an  object  of  transcendent  importance  to  the  com- 
mercial and  political  interest  of  our  Union.  ...  In  looking  for- 
i  ward  to  the  probable  course  of  events  for  the  short  period  of  half 
'  a  century,  it  is  scarcely  possible  to  resist  the  conviction  that  the 
annexation  of  Cuba  to  our  Federal  Republic  will  be  indispensable 
to  the  continuance  and  integrity  of  the  Union  itself. 

Mr.  Adams  did  not  then  consider  the  .moment  auspicious 
for  the  annexation  of  Cuba  to  the  Union,  but  he  believed, 
nevertheless,  that 

.  .  .  There  are  laws  of  political  as  well  as  physical  gravita- 
tion ;  and  if  an  apple,  severed  by  the  tempest  from  its  native  tree, 
cannot  clioose  but  fall  to  the  ground,  Cuba,  forcibly  disjoined 
from  its  own  unnatural  connection  with  Spain,  and  incapable  of 
self-support,  can  gravitate  only  towards  the  North  American 
Union,  which,  by  the  same  law  of  nature,  cannot  cast  her  off  from 
its  bosom. 

Jefferson  was  still  of  the  opinion  that  possession  of  Cuba 
by  Great  Britain  "  would  indeed  be  a  great  calamity  to  us," 
but  he  advocated  the  acquisition  of  Cuba  by  peaceful  means 
only. 

The  publication  of  President  Monroe's  message  of  1823 
may  have  had  a  decided  influence  upon  France  in  checking 
her  alleged  Cuban  designs ;  nevertheless,  abundant  rumors 
of  French  plots  to  acquire  the  island  continued  to  vex 
Presidents  Adams  and  Jackson.  The  continued  withholding 
of  Spanish  recognition  of  Colombian  and  Mexican  indepen- 
dence determined  those  states  to  attempt  the  seizure  of  Cuba 
and  Porto  Rico,  should  Spain  persist  in  her  stubborn  policy  of 
maintaining  war  against  them.  The  possibility  of  thus  trans- 
ferring the  theatre  of  Spanish-American  hostilities  to  Cul)a 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  365 

.^roused  Mr.  Clay's  apprehensions.  He  accordingly  sought 
to  induce  Spain  to  yield  at  once  to  the  demands  of  Colombia 
and  Mexico,  and  he  threatened,  moreover,  to  bring  about  the 
occupation  of  Cuba  by  United  States  armies,  rather  than 
suffer  the  dangers  of  a  foreign  war  in  the  islands  "  whose 
fortunes  have  such  a  connection  with  the  prosperity  of  the 
United  States."  At  this  juncture  a  French  fleet  appeared  in 
Cuban  waters  (1825),  and  the  fact  drew  from  the  Secretary 
of  State  an  emphatic  protest.  He  wrote  to  the  American 
Minister  in  Paris  :  "  With  the  hope  of  guarding  before- 
hand against  any  possible  difficulties  on  that  subject  that 
may  arise,  you  will  now  add  that  we  would  not  consent  to 
the  occupation  of  those  islands  [Cuba  and  Porto  Rico]  by 
any  other  European  power  than  Spain  under  any  contingency 
whatever."  At  the  same  time.  President  Adams  took  occa- 
sion to  announce  through  the  various  American  Foreign 
Ministers  to  all  European  powers  that  the  United  States 
"  desired  no  change  in  the  political  condition  of  Cuba  ;  that 
they  were  satisfied  that  it  should  remain  open,  as  it  now  is, 
to  their  commerce,  and  that  they  could  not  with  indifference 
see  it  passing  from  Spain  to  any  European  power." 

Similar  statements  were  freely  expressed  during  the  Jack- 
son, Van  Buren,  and  Tyler  administrations.  Anxiety  upon 
the  subject  of  European  intervention  was  never  permitted 
wholly  to  relax,  chiefly  on  account  of  the  fact  that  the 
Cubans  themselves  were  generally  in  a  ferment  of  rebellion 
against  the  extortionate  and  oppressive  rule  of  the  mother 
country.  Opportunities  for  intervention  were  therefore 
frequent,  and  the  prize  was  unusually  tempting. 

Some  disagreements  between  Great  Britain  and  Spain, 
growing  out  of  a  treaty  for  the  suppression  of  the  slave  trade 
in  Cuba,  again  brought  forth  rumors  of  English  intention 
to  occupy  the  island.  Mr.  Vail,  the  American  Minister  in 
Madrid,  was  instructed  (1840)  "  to  assure  the  Spanish  Gov- 
ernment, that  in  case  of  any  attempt,  from  whatever  quarter, 
to  wrest  from  her  this  portion  of  her  territory,  she  may 
securely  depend  upon  the  military  and  naval  resources  of 
the  United  States  to  aid  her  in  preserving  or  recovering  it." 


< 


366  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

Three  years  later,  Daniel  Webster,  as  Secretary  of  State,, 
addressed  the  United  States  Consul  in  Havana,  to  the  same- 
effect,  his  letter  being  also  used  as  a  basis  of  instructions  to 
Henry  Irving,  the  American  Representative  in  Spain.  He 
said  :  "  The  Spanish  Government  has  long  been  in  possession 
of  the  policy  and  wishes  of  this  government  in  regard  to 
Cuba,  which  have  never  changed,  and  has  repeatedly  been 
told  that  the  United  States  never  would  permit  the  occupa- 
tion of  that  island  by  British  agents  or  forces  upon  any 
pretext  whatever  ;  and  that  in  the  event  of  any  attempt  to 
wrest  it  from  her,  she  might  securely  rely  upon  the  whole 
naval  and  military  resources  of  this  country  to  aid  her  in 
preserving  or  recovering  it." 

Until  about  the  beginning  of  the  Polk  administration,  the 
American  policy  toward  Cuba  appears  therefore  to  have 
been  a  consistent  one,  and  wholly  in  accord  with  the  avowed 
principles  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  The  idea  of  annexation 
found  a  few  hearty  supporters ;  but  even  among  its  cham- 
pions, that  notion  was  prompted  by  expediency  rather  than 
from  a  desire  for  territorial  gain.  Such  ideas  were  especiall}^ 
manifested  at  those  times  when  the  safety  of  the  United 
States  was  supposed  to  be  imperilled  by  European  intrigues 
to  seize  Cuba.  To  prevent  that  contingency  the  United 
States  was  willing  to  go  to  any  length.  It  would  guarantee 
Cuba  to  Spain,  and  pledge  to  her  the  use  of  its  army  and 
navy  ;  if  forced  to  it,  it  would  annex  the  island.  Upon  that 
point,  the  application  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  clear  and 
never  disputed.  After  the  close  of  the  Mexican  War  the 
policy  of  the  United  States  toward  Cuba  underwent  con- 
siderable change.  A  fever  of  expansion  seized  the  people, 
and  the  foreign  policy  of  the  nation  became  bolder.  Covetous 
eyes  were  cast  toward  the  "  Pearl  of  the  Antilles."  The  prin- 
ciples of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  were  neither  forgotten  nor 
overlooked,  but  they  were  considerably  distorted  and  per- 
verted to  meet  political  and  selfish  ends.  The  purchase  of 
the  island  was  impossible,  first,  because  Spain  always  indig- 
nantly refused  to  part  with  "  her  faithful  colony  "  ;  and,, 
secondly,  because  the  slave-holders  of  the  Southern  states,. 


I 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  367  ^ 

and  later  the  anti-slavery  party  in  Congress,  successfully 
thwarted  every  effort  the  national  government  made  looking 
toward  purchase.  Indeed,  the  great  slavery  controversy 
that  soon  came  to  overshadow  all  other  questions  in  national 
politics  affected  any  action  respecting  Cuba.  It  colored 
every  discussion  on  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  as  it  tinged  every 
phase  of  American  politics. 

From  about  1845  to  the  beginning  of  the  Civil  War^j 
our  connection  with  Cuban  affairs  is  marked  by  a  desire! 
for  annexation  not  so  much  as  a  measure  of  self -protection, '| 
as  too  often  asserted,  but  as  a  means  of  extending  the  slave- j 
holding  area  of  the  country.  To  maintain  itself  in  Congress^ 
the  slave  power  had  need  of  more  representatives,  and  to  get 
a  larger  representation  in  Washington,  additional  territory 
was  essential.  The  land  hunger  which  sharpened  the  appe- 
tite for  Texas  was  equally  strong  for  Cuba,  and  this  period 
of  fifteen  years  preceding  the  Rebellion  of  the  Southern 
states,  developed  a  series  of  attempts  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States  to  obtain  the  island  either  by  purchase  or  by 
force. 

In  1845-47,  a  strong  popular  sentiment  in  favor  of  the 
purchase  of  Cuba  prevailed  in  the  Western  states,  which, 
championed  by  the  press,  soon  spread  over  the  entire  country. 
The  movement  was  given  fresh  impetus  by  reports  that 
Great  Britain  was  again  contemplating  the  seizure  of  Cuba 
—  this  time  for  the  purpose  of  holding  Spain's  valuable  pos- 
session as  a  security  for  the  payment  of  Spanish  bonds. 
The  bulk  of  the  Spanish  debt  was  owned  in  London,  and  the 
interest  was  greatly  in  arrears.  The  President  was  therefore 
called  upon  to  act  immediately.  Mr.  Polk's  aggressive  for- 
eign policy  was  relied  upon  by  the  country,  especially  by  the 
South  and  West,  to  accomplish  this  cherished  object. 

On  January  17,  1848,  President  Polk  sent  lengthy  and 
"  profoundly  confidential "  instructions  to  Mr.  Saunders,  the 
American  Minister  in  Madrid,  touching  upon  the  extreme 
danger  of  English  annexation  of  the  island,  which  he 
sought  to  prove  by  a  full  account  of  British  aggression  in 
Central    America.     He   authorized    Mr.    Saunders   to   urge 


/ 


I 


I 


368  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

upon  the  Spanish  Government  the  advisability  of  parting 
with  Cuba  to  the  United  States,  but  he  hastened  to  give 
assurances  that  the  United  States  would  not  seek  to  acquire 
it  "except  by  the  free  will  of  Spain."  It  was  to  be  by 
"fair  purchase"  only,  and  $100,000,000  was  suggested  as  a 
maximum  price.  Popular  feeling  in  Spain  was  outraged 
by  the  very  suggestion  of  releasing  this  gem  of  her  few 
remaining  possessions.  "  It  was  more  than  any  minister 
would  dare,"  replied  Mr.  Saunders  to  Mr.  Buchanan,  "to 
entertain  any  such  proposition  ;  sooner  than  see  the  island 
transferred  to  any  power,  they  would  prefer  seeing  it  sunk 
in  the  ocean."  It  thus  became  clear  that  the  i^urchase  of 
Cuba  was  entirely  out  of  the  question. 

In  1849-50,  during  the  presidency  of  Gen.  Taylor,  an  inci- 
dent occurred  in  connection  with  Cuban  affairs  which  brouofht 
to  light  a  new  phase  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Among  the 
many  political  disturbances  and  revolutionary  movements 
which  illustrate  the  history  of  Cuba,  one  in  particular,  the 
Lopez  rebellion  of  1849-50,  received  its  main,  if  not  entire, 
support,  in  the  United  States. 

Narciso  Lopez,  a  Venezuelan  by  birth,  once  prominent  in 
Spanish  military  service,  became  the  leader  of  a  revolution- 
ary party  in  Cuba.  In  the  summer  of  1849,  he  organized 
an  expedition  in  New  York,  made  up  for  the  most  part  of 
Mexican  war  veterans,  and  was  about  to  embark  in  the 
cause  of  "  Cuba  libre  "  when  he  was  arrested  by  the  United 
States  authorities.  President  Taylor  thereupon  issued  a 
proclamation  (August  11,  1849)  in  which  he  announced  that 
*'  It  is  the  duty  of  this  government  to  observe  the  faith  of 
treaties  and  to  prevent  any  aggression  by  our  citizens  upon 
the  territories  of  friendly  nations.  I  have  therefore  thought 
it  necessary  and  proper  to  issue  this  my  proclamation  to 
warn  all  citizens  of  the  United  States,  who  shall  conduct 
themselves  with  an  enterprise  so  grossly  in  violation  of  our 
laws  and  our  treaty  obligations,  that  they  will  thereby  sub- 
ject themselves  to  the  heavy  penalties  denounced  against 
them  by  our  acts  of  Congress,  and  will  forfeit  their  claim  to 
the  protection   of   their   country.     No   such  persons   must 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  369 

•expect  the  interference  of  this  government  in  any  form  on 
their  behalf,  no  matter  to  what  extremities  they  may  be 
reduced  in  consequence  of  their  conduct." 

There  can  be  no  question  of  the  official  neutrality  of  the 
United  States  Government,  but  the  fitting  out  of  filibuster- 
ing expeditions  could  not  be  prevented.  Undismayed  by 
the  failure  of  his  first  attempt,  Lopez  travelled  through  the 
Southern  states,  where  he  found  both  cordial  sympathy  and 
material  aid  for  his  project.  A  second  expedition  was  or- 
ganized (1850)  under  the  auspices  of  some  wealthy  Southern 
planters,  but  met  with  reverses  in  Cuba.  Lopez  was  then 
prosecuted  by  the  United  States  for  violation  of  the  neutral- 
ity laws,  but  having  escaped  conviction,  he  proceeded  to 
organize  a  third  expedition.  This  time,  along  with  many 
American  citizens  upon  his  staff  and  within  his  ranks,  he 
was  captured,  sentenced,  and  executed  in  Havana  by  the 
Spanish  authorities.  Public  indignation  in  the  United 
States,  especially  in  the  South,  was  keenly  aroused  by  the 
■execution  of  the  Americans  in  Havana.  Anti-Spanish  dem- 
onstrations took  place  in  New  Orleans.  Spain  at  once  ap- 
pealed to  France  and  England  for  protection  against  any 
American  attack  upon  Cuba  which  now  seemed  imminent. 
These  two  powers  despatched  naval  forces  to  the  West  In- 
dies, and  declared  their  intention  of  repelling  any  invasion 
of  Cuba.  While  the  United  States  Government  disclaimed 
^ny  purpose  of  forcibly  seizing  Cuba,  the  naval  demonstra- 
tion of  England  and  France  in  Cuban  waters  was  most  offen- 
sive. The  act  brought  forth  a  protest  from  the  administration^ 
predicated  upon  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  for  the  action  of  these 
two  powers  could  only  be  regarded  by  the  United  States 
*'  with  grave  disapproval,  as  involving  on  the  part  of  Euro- 
pean sovereigns  combined  action  of  protectorship  over  Ameri- 
can waters."  Great  Britain  and  France,  being  strongly  urged 
by  Spain,  went  still  farther.  In  April,  1852,  the  French  and 
English  diplomatic  agents  in  Washington  proposed  to  the 
United  States  the  signing  of  a  tripartite  agreement,  by  virtue 
of  which  the  parties  should  disavow  all  present  or  future 
intention  to  obtain  possession  of  the  island  of  Cuba,  and 


370  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

should  bind  themselves  to  discountenance  all  attempts  to 
that  effect. 

President  Fillmore's  attitude  toward  Cuba  was  made 
known  in  his  annual  message  of  1852,  in  which  he  gave 
assurance  that  the  United  States  not  only  contemplated  no 
designs  against  Cuba,  but  that  he  "  should  regard  its  incor- 
poration into  the  Union  at  the  present  time  as  fraught  with 
serious  peril.'*  Its  acquisition  by  the  United  States  against 
Spanish  opposition  he  regarded  "as  a  hazardous  measure. "^ 
Notwithstanding  these  views,  the  invitation  of  France  and 
Great  Britain  was  declined  by  the  President  for  several 
good  reasons.  While  it  might  liave  been  reassuring  to  know 
that  both  England  and  France  stood  pledged  to  keep  their 
hands  off  Cuba,  —  a  pledge  falling  quite  in  line  with  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  —  yet  it  was  considered  improper  to  admit 
European  nations  into  the  councils  of  the  United  States 
upon  an  equal  footing  relative  to  the  affairs  of  a  territory  so 
essentially  connected  with  American  interests. 

The  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Webster,  had  already  given 
the  Spanish  Minister  little  hope  to  expect  the  President  ta 
consent  to  the  desired  arrangement  with  Great  Britain  and 
France.  His  objections  to  the  measure  lay  principally  in 
the  direction  of  avoiding  entangling  alliances,  and  in  the 
desire  of  the  United  States  "  to  keep  itself  free  from  national 
obligations,  except  such  as  affect  directly  the  interests  of  the 
United  States  themselves."  The  death  of  Mr.  Webster,  in 
the  summer  of  1852,  transferred  the  entire  subject  to  his  suc« 
cessor,  Mr.  Everett.  The  latter,  in  a  communication  to 
Comte  de  Sartiges  (December  1,  1852),  reviewed  the  atti- 
tude of  the  United  States  in  this  matter,  and  although  he 
made  no  mention  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  such,  his  refer- 
ence is  clear  when  he  says  :  "  The  President  does  not  covet 
the  acquisition  of  Cuba  for'  the  United  States.  At  the  same 
time  he  considers  the  condition  of  Cuba  as  mainly  an  Ameri- 
can question.  The  proposed  convention  proceeds  on  a  differ- 
ent principle.  It  assumes  that  the  United  States  liave  no- 
other  or  greater  interest  in  the  question  than  France  or  Eng- 
land, whereas,  it  is  only  necessary  to  cast  one's  eye  on  the 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  371 

map  to  see  liow  r^note  are  the  relations  of  Europe,  and  how 
intimate  those  of  the  United  States  with  this  island." 

The  principles  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  were  not  only 
adhered  to  by  the  President,  but  the  interpretation  of  its 
words  was  enlarged  into  a  protest  against  permitting  either 
European  voice  or  arms  to  control  the  destinies  of  New 
World  territories  that  lay  near  the  borders  of  the  United 
States.  Beyond  doubt  the  position  was  well  taken.  To 
have  entered  into  such  an  agreement  would  not  only  have 
violated  the  older  doctrine  against  entangling  alliances  with 
Europe,  but  would  have  bound  American  hands  in  a  particu- 
larly awkward  manner.  If  the  United  States  desired  to 
prevent  European  annexation  of  Cuba,  it  would  have  been 
consummate  folly  thus  to  curtail  her  freedom  of  action.  Of 
all  the  Spanish-American  states,  Cuba  came  nearest  home. 
A  concentration  of  foreign  interests  there  would  have  proved 
a  danger  not  to  be  tolerated  for  a  moment.  In  case  of  any 
such  threat  from  abroad,  the  true  policy  of  the  United 
States  would  have  been  to  seize  the  island  at  once. 

On  January  4,  1854,  one  month  after  the  refusal  of  the 
United  States  to  take  part  in  the  proposed  tripartite  conven- 
tion, Mr.  Cass  of  Michigan  introduced  into  the  Senate  a 
joint  resolution  declaring  :  — 

"  The  American  continents,  by  the  free  and  independent  con- 
dition which  they  have  assumed  and  maintain,  are  henceforth  not 
to  be  considered  as  subjects  for  future  colonization  by  any  Euro- 
pean power."  And  while  "  existing  rights  should  be  respected," 
and  will  be  by  the  United  States,  they  owe  it  to  their  own  "  safety 
and  interests"  "to  announce,  as  they  now  do,  that  no  future 
European  colony  or  dominion  shall,  with  their  consent,  be  planted 
or  established  on  any  part  of  the  North  American  continent." 
And  should  the  attempt  be  made,  they  thus  deliberately  declare 
that  it  will  be  viewed  as  an  act  originating  in  motives  regardless 
of  their  "  interests  and  their  safety,"  and  which  will  leave  them 
free  to  adopt  such  measures  as  an  independent  nation  may  justly 
adopt  in  defence  of  its  rights  and  its  honor. 

That  while  the  United  States  disclaim  any  designs  upon  the 
Island  of  Cuba,  inconsistent  with  the  laws  of  nations  and  with 
their  duties  to  Spain,  they  consider  it  due  to  the  vast  importance 


372  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

of  the  subject  to  make  known  in  this  solemn  manner  that  they 
should  view  all  efforts  on  the  part  of  any  other  power  to  procure 
possession,  whether  peaceably  or  forcibly,  of  that  island,  which,  as 
a  naval  or  military  position,  must,  under  circumstances  easy  to  be 
foreseen,  become  dangerous  to  their  southern  coast,  to  the  Gulf 
of  Mexico,  and  to  the  south  of  the  Mississippi,  as  unfriendly  acts 
directed  against  them,  to  be  resisted  by  all  the  means  in  their 
power. 

John  P.  Hale,  of  New  Hampshire,  moved  to  amend  this 
resolution  by  the  insertion  of  the  word  "  Canada."  No 
action  was  taken  on  the  resolution,  but  its  introduction  pro- 
voked a  lengthy  discussion  upon  the  subject  of  European 
interference  on  the  Western  continent,  in  which  the  princi- 
ples of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  were  very  generally  endorsed. 
The  Southern  members  advocated  an  extension  of  the  doc- 
trine into  a  justification  for  seizing  Cuba,  while  the  Northern 
members,  though  less  decided  in  their  opinions,  were  still 
willing  to  press  the  words  of  Monroe  into  the  service  of 
acquiring  territory  which  lay  to  the  north  of  the  United 
States.  Only  Mr.  Howard  of  Texas  ventured  the  belief  that 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  did  not  mean  "  that  every  settlement 
upon  any  sand-bank  on  this  continent  is  an  offence  which  is 
to  result  in  war." 

To  succeed  President  Fillmore,  the  Whigs  failed  to 
elect  their  candidate.  General  Scott.  He  had  been  the 
war  hero  of  1845,  but  was  reduced  in  1852  to  the  "peacock 
of  politics,  all  fuss,  feathers,  and  fireworks."  The  Demo- 
cratic party,  demanding  an  aggressive  foreign  policy,  and 
decrying  the  "  old  fogyism "  of  Taylor  and  Fillmore,  tri- 
umphantly placed  Franklin  Pierce  in  the  AVliite  House. 
The  slavery  question  had  made  the  annexation  of  Cuba  a 
party  issue,  and  the  Democrats  looked  to  Pierce  to  carry  out 
their  wishes  in  this  respect.  In  his  inaugural  address,  the 
President  declared  that  the  policy  of  his  administration  would 
not  be  controlled  "  by  any  timid  foreboding  of  evil  from  expan- 
sion." Indeed,  he  further  declared,  "  it  is  not  to  be  disguised 
that  our  attitude  as  a  nation,  and  our  position  on  the  globe, 
render  the  acquisition  of  certain  possessions  not  within  our 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  373 

jurisdiction  eminently  important  for  our  protection,  if  not,  in 
the  future,  essential  for  the  preservation  of  the  rights  of  com- 
merce and  the  peace  of  the  world."  This  pointed  clearly  to- 
Cuba.  The  Southern  Democrats  were  greatly  encouraged, 
and  a  persistent  clamor  arose  for  the  acquisition  of  the  island. 
With  that  purpose  in  view,  the  American  ministers  to 
England,  France,  and  Spain  were  chosen.  Pierre  Soule  of 
Louisiana  was  sent  to  Madrid.  He  was  a  radical  Cuban 
annexationist,  and  had  attacked  President  Fillmore  most 
bitterly  the  previous  year  in  Congress,  for  his  lack  of  sympa- 
thy with  the  Lopez  filibusters.  Mr.  Soule  was  determined 
to  acquire  the  island,  and  entered  upon  his  mission  to  Spain 
with  that  single  purpose  before  him.  President  Pierce's  Sec- 
retary of  State,  William  Marcy,  was  the  conservative  element 
of  the  administration  ;  he  frequently  instructed  Mr.  Soule  to 
bring  about  a  readjustment  of  the  commercial  relations  be- 
tween Spain  and  the  United  States ;  and  although  he  spoke 
of  purchasing  Cuba,  he  did  not  believe  Spain  would  be  "  at  all 
inclined  to  enter  upon  such  a  negotiation."  "Nothing  will 
be  done,  on  our  part,  to  disturb  its  [Cuba's]  present  connec- 
tion with  Spain,  unless  the  character  of  that  connection  should 
be  so  changed  as  to  affect  our  present  or  prospective  security. 
While  the  United  States  would  resist,  at  every  hazard,  the 
transference  of  Cuba  to  any  European  nation,  they  would 
exceedingly  regret  to  see  Spain  resorting  to  any  power  for 
assistance  to  uphold  her  rule  over  it.  Such  a  dependence  on 
foreign  aid  would,  in  effect,  invest  the  auxiliary  with  the 
character  of  a  protector,  and  give  it  a  pretext  to  interfere  in 
our  affairs,  and  also  generally  in  those  of  the  North  Ameri- 
can continent." 

These  mild  instructions  were  not  pleasing  to  Mr.  Soule, 
nor  were  they  in  accord  with  the  sentiments  of  the  political 
party  in  power.  Having  arrived  in  Madrid,  Mr.  Soule  soon 
reported  that  Spain  was  in  a  hopeless  state  of  anarchy,  and 
that  there  was  abundant  evidence  tending  to  show  that  the 
aid  of  Great  Britain  and  France  was  to  be  again  invoked  to 
forestall  any  attempts  to  bring  about  Cuban  independence 
or  annexation  to  the  United  States.     Mr.  Marcy  thereupon. 


374  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

authorized  Mr.  Soule  to  reopen  negotiations  at  once  for  the 
j  purchase  of  the  island,  raising,  upon  this  occasion,  the  price 
I  offered  to  ^130,000,000.  If,  however,  the  Spanish  prejudice 
to  a  sale  was  found  to  be  too  strong  to  overcome,  Soule 
was  authorized  to  suggest  delicately  to  Spain  that  she  might 
permit  Cuba  to  detach  herself  from  her  dominion,  and  to 
become  a  free  nation  ;  in  this  indirect  way  the  same  object 
could  ultimately  be  accomplished. 

Just  at  that  moment,  the  alleged  illegal  seizure  of  the  cargo 
of  an  American  vessel,  the  Black  WarHor^  by  the  customs  au- 
thorities in  Havana,  suddenly  brought  the  two  nations  almost 
to  the  verge  of  war.  This  Spanish  assault  against  American 
shipping  was  eagerly  caught  up  by  the  South  as  an  excuse 
to  substitute  force  for  diplomacy,  and  President  Pierce  was 
very  nearly  induced  to  give  way  to  the  passionate  appeals  of 
his  own  party  leaders.  The  slavery  party  raised  the  stand- 
ard of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  had  their  counsels  pre- 
vailed, a  peculiar  adaptation  of  those  principles  would  have 
resulted.     It  had,  for  many  years,  been  a  favorite  object  of 

I  Great  Britain  to  do  away  with  the  institution  of  negro  slavery 
in  Cuba.  Spain  had,  from  time  to  time,  displayed  a  willing- 
ness to  accede  to  England's  repeated  solicitations  in  this 
respect,  and  especially  at  those  moments  when  English  good- 
will or  cooperation  was  desirable  in  maintaining  inviolate 
her  control  over  the  island.  The  South  pretended  to  regard 
I  the  emancipation  of  Cuban  slaves  as  a  measure  fraught  with 
'  the  gravest  danger  to  the  United  States.  The  absorption  of 
a  free-soil  Cuba  into  the  Union  was,  from  their  point  of  view, 
undesirable.  With  Cuba  as  a  slave  state  added  to  the  Union, 
"  slavery  might  bid  defiance  to  its  enemies." 

In  1855,  the  Richmond  Enquirer^  a  leading  Democratic 
organ,  declared  that  the  "  menace  of  a  design  to  Africanize 
Cuba,  or  to  emancipate  the  slaves,  would  be  a  grievous  act 
of  hostility,  and  would  authorize  the  United  States  to  take 
any  means  of  retaliation,  or  to  wage  war."  The  freedom  of 
the  Cuban  slaves  would  leave  that  island  in  the  control  of  a 
vast  number  of  blacks  who  might  at  any  moment  convert 
Cuba  into  a  second  Haiti  or  Santo  Domingo.     At  the  very 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  375 

least,  emancipation  in  Cuba  would  greatly  imperil  the  policy 
of  the  United  States  touching  the  question  of  human  slavery. 

Mr.  Soule's  diplomacy  did  not  bring  about  a  satisfactory 
settlement  of  the  Black  Warrior  affair.  The  President  was 
far  from  being  satisfied  with  the  results  of  Mr.  Soule's  hot- 
headed methods,  and  the  Democrats  called  all  the  more 
loudly  upon  its  President  for  action  —  for  a  swift  retaliation 
upon  Spain,  and  for  the  immediate  annexation  of  Cuba. 

The  more  conservative  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Marcy,  was 
•driven  to  a  new  plan  for  the  settlement  of  the  vexatious 
Spanish-American  question,  which  plan  he  hoped  would 
bring  about  the  desired  results  without  a  resort  to  arms. 
•Convinced  that  continuance  of  Soule's  efforts  in  Madrid 
would  be  unprofitable,  he  proposed  (June,  1854)  the  ap- 
pointment of  an  extraordinary  commission,  to  be  comj)Osed 
•of  ''  two  distinguished  citizens  "  who  should  act  in  conjunc- 
tion with  Mr.  Soule  in  reenforcing  the  demands  of  the  United 
States  against  Spain.  The  project  creating  such  a  commis- 
sion, however,  was  abandoned,  and  as  a  substitute  therefor, 
Mr.  Soule  was  instructed  (August,  1854)  to  meet  and  con- 
sult with  Messrs.  Buchanan  and  Mason,  the  American  min- 
isters in  London  and  Paris. 

I  am  directed  by  the  President  to  suggest  to  you  a  particular 
•step,  from  which  he  anticipates  much  advantage  to  the  negotia- 
tions with  which  you  are  charged  on  the  subject  of  Cuba.  .  .  . 
It  seems  desirable  that  there  should  be  a  full  and  free  interchange 
of  views  between  yourself,  Mr.  Buchanan  and  Mr.  Mason,  in  order 
to  secure  a  concurrence  in  reference  to  the  general  object. 

The  simplest  and  only  very  apparent  means  of  obtaining  this 
•end  is,  for  the  three  ministers  to  meet,  as  early  as  may  be,  at  some 
•convenient  central  point  (say  Paris),  to  consult  together,  to  com- 
pare opinions  as  to  what  may  be  advisable,  and  to  adopt  measures 
for  perfect  concert  of  action  in  aid  of  your  negotiations  at  Madrid. 

While  the  President  has,  as  I  have  before  had  occasion  to  state, 
full  confidence  in  your  own  intelligence  and  sagacity,  he  conceives 
that  it  cannot  be  otherwise  than  agreeable  to  you,  and  to  your  col- 
leagues in  Great  Britain  and  France,  to  have  the  consultation  sug- 
gested, and  thus  to  bring  your  common  wisdom  and  knowledge  to 
bear  simultaneously  upon  the  negotiations  at  Madrid,  London,  and 
Paris. 


376  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

Accordingly,  the  three  American  ministers  met  in  confer- 
ence at  Ostend,  October  9,  1854,  and  adjourning  to  Aix  la 
Chapelle,  there  signed  a  report  on  the  18th  of  the  same 
month.  This  series  of  resolutions  is  known  as  the  "  Ostend 
Manifesto." 

After  a  lengthy  argument  in  favor  of  the  acquisition  of 
Cuba,  and  an  enumeration  of  the  many  advantages  which 
would  accrue  to  both  Spain  and  the  United  States  by  virtue 
.  of  a  transfer  of  sovereignty  in  Cuba,  the  report  advises  the 
I  offer  to  Spain  of  *1 20,000,000  for  the  island.  Should  Spain 
decline  the  offer,  the  use  of  force  is  proposed  to  accomplish 
/the  same  end.  The  advisability  of  such  radical  measures 
was  based  on  the  broad  principles  of  self-preservation,  —  the 
Monroe  Doctrine.  "Our  past  history  forbids,"  it  reads,^ 
"  that  we  should  acquire  the  island  of  Cuba  without  the  con- 
sent of  Spain,  unless  justified  by  the  great  law  of  self-pres- 
ervation, but,"  the  authors  hasten  to  add  with  a  flourish  of 
virtue,  "  we  must,  in  any  event,  preserve  our  own  conscious 
rectitude,  and  our  own  self-respect."  It  became  a  ques- 
tion, they  asserted,  whether  or  not  the  continued  possession 
of  Cuba  by  Spain  amounted  to  a  menace  "to  our  internal 
peace,  and  the  existence  of  our  cherished  Union."  If  such 
be  the  case,  as  they  believed  it  was,  then  we  would  be  justi- 
fied by  "  every  law,  human  and  divine,"  in  wresting  it  from 
Spain. 

The  position  taken  by  Messrs.  Buchanan,  Soule  and  Mason 
was  certainly  many  degrees  beyond  the  farthest  limits  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine.  The  latter  called  for  opposition  to  for- 
eign aggression  in  the  Western  continent,  and  expressly  stated 
that  no  action  would  be  taken  against  those  European  powers 
already  holding  territory  in  the  New  World  —  unless  they 
sought  to  expand  their  holdings.  The  true  motives  of  the 
Ostend  Manifesto  were,  after  all,  too  thinly  veiled.  The 
words  of  Mr.  Monroe  had  been  obviously  tortured  into  the 
furtherance  of  a  scheme  to  extend  the  slave-holding  area  of 
the  United  States.  The  administration  promptly  condemned 
the  manifesto. 

The  policy  of  forcible  acquisition,  in  case  amicable  nego- 

\ 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  377 

tiations  for  purchase  should  fail,  was  too  radical  even  for 
President  Pierce.  Mr.  Marcy  referred  to  it  as  "a  robber 
doctrine,"  which  would  bring  shame  upon  the  administration, 
and  would  disgrace  the  nation  in  the  eyes  of  the  world. 
"  We  cannot  afford  to  get  it  "  (Cuba),  he  said,  "  by  robbery 
or  by  theft." 

The  Ostend  Manifesto  was  left  entirely  unmentioned  in 
the  President's  annual  report  to  Congress.  The  following 
winter  resolutions  in  Congress  calling  for  the  report,  and  all 
the  correspondence  relating  thereto,  were  suppressed,  and 
every  effort  was  made  by  the  administration  to  prevent  the 
publicity  of  the  document. 

From  1854  to  the  outbreak  of  the  Civil  War,  Cuba  con-, 
tinned  to  occupy  a  prominent  place  in  the  foreign  affairsi 
of  the  United  States.  From  the  close  of  the  Rebellion  down] 
to  the  late  Spanish  War,  this  same  interest  in  Cuba  was  kept 
alive,  but  in  the  absence  of  any  definite  threats  by  other 
nations  to  acquire  the  island,  there  were  no  discussions  in 
Congress  relative  to  the  subject.  After  the  collapse  of  slav-\ 
ery  in  the  United  States,  the  desire  for  Cuban  annexation! 
largely  disappeared,  nor  was  it  revived  until  very  recently.     I 

During  the  past  thirty-five  years,  several  revolutions  in 
Cuba  brought  about  relations  between  the  United  States  and 
Spain  which  were  substantially  similar  to  those  which  existed 
prior  to  the  breaking  out  of  the  late  Spanish-American  War, 
—  conditions  with  which  every  one  is  familiar.  If  not 
actually  desiring  annexation,  the  United  States  has,  upon 
all  occasions,  manifested  a  deep  interest  in  Cuban  indepen- 
dence, and  has  sometimes  with  difficulty  preserved  a  neutral 
attitude. 

In  this  relation,  one  incident  is  noteworthy  in  its  bearings 
upon  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  The  Cespides  rebellion  in  Cuba 
had  dragged  along  for  many  years,  with  the  customary  record 
of  cruelties  and  barbarities  which  seems  generally  to  have 
marked  Spanish-Cuban  warfare.  The  inability  of  Spain  to 
suppress  the  rebellion  induced  President  Grant,  in  his  an- 
nual message  of  December  7,  1875,  to  hint  at  intervention. 
Spain  had  stubbornly  refused  to  listen  to  mediation;    and 


378  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

as  the  conditions  seemed  to  warrant  the  United  States  in 
recognizing  the  independence  of  the  island,  intervention 
was  looked  to  as  the  only  means  left  for  ending  a  hopeless 
conflict.  In  his  note  of  Novemher  5,  1875,  to  Mr.  Gushing, 
the  American  Minister  in  Madrid,' the  Secretary  of  State,  Mr. 
Fish,  had  already  anticipated  these  suggestions  of  the  Presi- 
dent.    He  wrote  :  — 

In  the  absence  of  any  prospect  of  a  termination  of  a  war,  or  of 
any  change  in  the  manner  in  which  it  has  been  conducted  ou  either 
side,  he  [the  President]  feels  that  the  time  is  at  hand  when  it  may 
be  the  duty  of  other  governments  to  intervene,  solely  with  a  view 
of  bringing  to  an  end  a  disastrous  and  destructive  conflict,  and  of 
restoring  peace  in  the  island  of  Cuba.  No  government  is  more 
deeply  interested  in  the  order  and  i)eaceful  administration  of  this 
island  than  is  that  of  the  United  States,  and  none  has  suffered  as 
the  United  States  from  the  condition  which  h<as  obtained  there 
during  the  past  six  or  seven  years.  He  will,  therefore,  feel  it  his 
duty  at  an  early  day  to  submit  the  subject  in  this  light,  and  ac- 
companied by  an  expression  of  the  views  above  presented,  for  the 
consideration  of  Congress. 

Copies  of  this  note  were  sent  to  the  American  ministers  at 
the  various  European  courts  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining 
the  attitude  of  these  governments  toward  intervention  in 
Cuba.  It  seems  also  to  have  been  Mr.  Fish's  desire  to 
secure  Great  Britain's  cooperation.  The  replies  of  all  the 
governments  which  had  thus  been  approached,  were  unfavor- 
able, and  the  matter  was  put  aside.  In  a  short  time,  how- 
ever, the  fact  that  Mr.  Fish  had  seen  fit  to  admit  —  indeed, 
to  invite  —  European  councils  upon  a  matter  so  essentially 
American  in  all  its  bearings,  brought  upon  him  the  odium 
of  having  neglected  the  proper  observance  of  his  country's 
traditions,  and  to  having  violated  the  principles  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.  Mr.  Fish  appears  to  have  been  sensitive  to  this 
accusation,  and  to  have  evaded  an  explanation  of  his  course 
in  seeking  aid  from  abroad  to  oust  Spain  from  Cuba. 

Intervention  in  behalf  of  Cuba  in  1898  was  not  predicated 
directly  upon  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  although  the  Senate 
Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  in  April  of  that  year,  sub- 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  379 

mitted  a  report  upon  United  States  relations  with  Spain  and 
with  Cuba,  in  which  the  following  significant  words  occur  : 
"  We  cannot  consent  upon  any  conditions  that  the  depopu- 
lated portions  of  Cuba  shall  be  recolonized  by  Spain  any  more 
than  she  should  be  allowed  to  found  a  new  colony  in  any 
p'art  of  this  hemisphere  or  islands  thereof.  Either  act  is 
regarded  by  the  United  States  as  dangerous  to  our  peace 
and  safety."  Intervention  was  therefore  favored  upon  the 
grounds  of  necessity  as  contemplated  by  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine,—  it  being  justified  by  the  Cuban  situation,  which  had 
"  become  a  menace  to  the  world,  and  especially  to  the  peace 
of  the  United  States." 

The  resolutian  of  Congress  declaring  war  upon  Spain  for 
the  relief  of  Cuba  (April  19,  1898)  was  not,  however,  based  : 
upon  the  Monroe  Doctrine.     It  merely  recited  the  fact  that  * 
the  people   of  Cuba  were,  and  of  right  ought  to  be,  free.  1 
The  United  States  also  disclaimed  any  intention  or  disposi-  ' 
tion  "to  exercise  sovereignty,  jurisdiction,  or  control  over 
said  island,  except  for  the  pacification  thereof,  and  asserts 
its  determination  when  that  is  accomplished  to  leave  the 
government  and  control  of  the  island  to  its  people." 

VIII.     TEXAS   AND   OREGON   ^ 

James   K.  Polk   entered   upon   the   presidency   in   1845, 
pledged  to  his  party  to  complete  the  annexation  of  Texas, 
and  to  secure  the  whole  of  Oregon,  to  the  Russian  frontier 
of  54°  40'   north   latitude.      The   slavery   question   under- 
lay both   propositions,  and   the   principles  of   the  Monroe 
Doctrine  were  appealed  to  by  the  President  in  both  cases. 
The  South,  in  order  to  maintain  strength  in  Congress,  was»^ 
determined  to  acquire  more  territory  open  to  the  extension  I 
of  slavery,  and  the  North  found  a  parallel  necessity  equally  \ 
pressing  to  increase  anti-slavery  votes  in  Congress  by  the  ' 
acquisition  of    more  free-soil  domain.     For  the  South,  the 
Western  progress  of  slavery  was  checked  at  the  Sabine  River, 
which,  by  agreement  with  Spain  in  1821,  was  recognized  to 
be  the  boundary  line  between  Louisiana  and  Texas.     Texas 


380  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

was  then  a  province  or  state  belonging  to  Mexico,  although 
a  large  immigration  of  Americans  from  the  Southern  states, 
taking  their  slaves  with  them,  gave  to  it  a  decidedly  Ameri- 
can cast,  and  established  in  Texas  a  strong  political  party, 
orthodox  in  the  slavery  creeds,  and  earnest  in  its  agitation 
for  annexation  to  the  United  States.  InJ[829  the  Mexican 
Government  abolished  slavery,  in  consequence  of  which  act 
Texas  revolted,  and  seven  years  later  established  itself  as  an 
independent  republic.  ^ 

The  Texans  at  once  sought  incorporation  into  the  Union, 
and  tlie  Southern  states  chxmored  for  its  annexation  against 
the  opposition  of  the  North.  The  issue  Ix  (  ame  a  vital  one 
in  the  campaign  of  1844,  and  Polk,  the  Democratic  candi- 
date, was  on  tlie  side  of  annexation.  Mexico  had  never 
acknowledged  the  independence  of  her  seceding  state/ arfd 
was  supposedly  Teady  to  ir^rt'Tather  than  yield  it  to  the 
United  States. 

The  underlying  motive  for  the  acquisition  of  Texas  was 
80  apparent  that  a  better  reason  for  annexation  had  to  be 
found,  in  order  to  circumvent  tlie  opposition  of  the  North. 
Mr.  Calhoun,  Secretary  of  State  under  President  Tyler,  had 
become  alarmed  by  his  own  zeal  for  its  acquisition,  and  feared 
the  North  would  become  too  vigorously  aroused  when  his  real 
motives  were  thoroughly  understood ;  but  Polk  was  fully 
equipi)ed  and  ready  to  meet  the  situation.  It  was  known  in 
Congress  that  France  and  England  were  unfavorably  im- 
pressed with  the  idea  of  Texan  incorporation  into  the  Union, 
on  account  of  a  supposed  disturbance  of  the  "balance  of 
power"  on  the  Western  continent,  which  such  a  territorial 
change  would  bring  about.  In  his  message  of  December, 
1845,  Mr.  Polk  said  :  — 

Even  France,  .  .  .  most  unexpectedly,  and  to  our  unfeigned 
regret,  took  part  in  an  effort  to  prevent  annexation  and  to  impose 
on  Texas,  as  a  condition  of  the  recognition  of  her  independence 
by  Mexico,  that  she  would  never  join  herself  to  the  United 
States  .  .  .  and  lately  the  doctrine  has  been  broached  in  some  of 
them  [powers  of  Europe]  of  a  "  balance  of  power  "  on  this  conti- 
nent to  check  our  advancement.     The  United  States  .  .  .  cannot 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE  381 

in  silence  permit  any  European  interference  on  the  North  Ameri- 
can continent,  and  should  any  such  interference  be  attempted, 
will  be  ready  to  resist  it  at  any  and  all  hazards. 

It  is  well  known  to  the  American  people  and  to  all  nations  that 
this  government  has  never  interfered  with  the  relations  subsisting 
between  other  governments.  We  have  never  made  ourselves  par- 
ties to  their  wars  or  their  alliances ;  we  have  not  sought  their  ter- 
ritories by  conquest ;  we  have  not  mingled  with  parties  in  their 
domestic  struggles;  and  believing  our  own  form  of  government 
to  be  the  best,  we  have  never  attempted  to  propagate  it  by  in- 
trigues, by  diplomacy,  or  by  force.  We  may  claim  on  this  conti- 
nent a  like  exemption  from  European  interference.  The  nations 
of  America  are  equally  sovereign  and  independent  with  those  of 
Europe.  They  possess  the  same  rights,  independent  of  all  foreign 
interposition,  to  make  war,  to  conclude  peace,  and  to  regulate  their 
internal  affairs.  The  people  of  the  United  States  cannot,  there- 
fore, view  with  indifference,  attempts  of  European  powers  to 
interfere  with  the  independent  action  of  the  nations  on  this  con- 
tinent. .  .  . 


The  President  had  already  said  in  his  inaugural  address 
of  the  previous  March  :  — 

None  can  fail  to  see  the  danger  to  our  safety  and  future  peace, 
if  Texas  remains  an  independent  state,  or  becomes  an  ally,  or  de- 
pendency of  some  foreign  nation  more  powerful  than  herself. 

Was  it  not  necessary,  therefore,  to  take  Texas,  before 
Europe  might  intervene  between  her  and  Mexico,  and,  in 
the  confusion  of  civil  war,  perhaps  gain  a  foothold  in  the 
Lone  Star  state? 
\  The  scarecrow  of  European  aggression  in  Texas  was  so 
/  obviously  a  pretence  that  it  was  never  seriously  considered 
by  the  government ;  but  it  disguised  the  real  situation  and 
furnished  a  soothing  balm  for  the  conscience.  The  acquisi- 
tion of  Texas,  sooner  or  later,  both  on  account  of  its  geo- 
graphical position  and  the  temper  of  its  people,  was  a  moral 
•certainty ;  but  to  take  it  in  assumed  fear  that  some  other 
nation  might  do  so,  was  a  clear  perversion  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine. 


382  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

An  exemplification  of  the  "  Polk  Doctrine  "  was  further 
given  in  the  matter  of  the  Oregon  territory  dispute,  to  which 
the  President  referred  in  the  same  message  of  December,  1845. 

The  term,  "  Oregon,"  was  applied  to  a  large  district  of 
territory  lying  between  the  Rocky  Mountains  and  the  Pacific 
Ocean,  and  embraced,  in  part,  what  now  constitutes  the  pres- 
ent province  of  British  Columbia  and  the  states  of  Washing- 
ton, Oregon  and  Idaho, — a  total  area  of  about  six  hundred 
thousand  square  miles.  The  United  States'  claim  to  this 
territory  was  based  upon  the  Louisiana  Purchase,  the  explo- 
rations of  Captain  Robert  Gray  in  the  Columbia  River  (1792), 
the  discoveries  of  Lewis  and  Clark  (1804-06),  American 
settlements  at  Fort  Hall  and  Astoria  in  1808  and  1811,  and 
the  treaty  of  1819,  by  which  all  Spanish  title  along  the  Pacific, 
north  of  latitude  42°,  was  surrendered  to  the  United  States. 
In  1824  Russia  agreed  to  limit  the  southern  boundary  of 
her  American  possessions  at  latitude  54°  40',  and  the  United 
States  at  once  set  up  a  territorial  claim  to  that  line.  Thia 
was  contested  by  Great  Britain,  but  an  agreement  to  exer- 
cise joint  sovereignty  over  the  territory  from  the  Columbia 
River  on  the  south  to  54°  40'  on  the  north,  the  disputed  por- 
tion, temporarily  suspended  the  controversy.  Immigration 
of  American  and  British  subjects  into  this  disputed  territory 
began,  and  it  was  tacitly  understood  by  these  early  settlers 
that  eventually  a  majority  among  the  residents  would  control 
in  the  final  determination  of  sovereignty.  With  a  better 
knowledge  of  this  great  territory  came  an  appreciation  of  its 
value,  and  the  Democratic  party  in  1844  took  up  the  battle- 
cry  of  the  '*  whole  of  Oregon  or  none."  With  "  Fifty-four 
forty  or  fight "  upon  its  banners,  James  K.  Polk  was  electe2L 
He  at  once  entered  upon  negotiations  for  the  acquisition  of 
the  entire  extent  of  his  party's  territorial  claim,  as  far  as 
the  Russian  frontier. 

In  his  inaugural  address,  he  asserted  that  the  American 
title  was  "  clear  and  unquestionable  "  and  "  already  are  our 
people  preparing  to  perfect  that  title  by  occupying  it  witli 
their  wives  and  children."  An  earnest  attempt  was  made 
by  the  President  in  the  summer  of  1845  to  reach  an  under- 


THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE  38^ 

standing  through  diplomatic  negotiation  with  Great  Britain, 
for  as  he  afterward  dechired  :  "In  deference  to  what  had 
been  done  by  my  predecessors,  and  especially  in  considera- 
tion that  a  proposition  of  compromise  had  been  thrice  made 
by  two  preceding  administrations  to  adjust  the  question  on 
the  parallel  of  49°  ...  I  deemed  it  to  be  my  duty  not 
abruptly  to  break  it  off." 

Great  Britain  refused  to  consider  any  proposition  of  com- 
promise settlement  that  was  not  based  upon  a  free  naviga- 
tion of  the  Columbia  River,  which  privilege  the  President 
was  naturally  unwilling  to  grant.  The  fourth  attempt  there- 
fore to  adjust  the  Oregon  boundary  having  failed,  a  deter- 
mination to  make  good  the  entire  claim  by  force  swept  over 
the  country,  and  war  seemed  inevitable.  The  President 
then  fell  back  upon  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  In  his  first  annual 
message  to  Congress  (December  2,  1845),  he  said  :  — 

Near  a  quarter  of  a  century  ago  the  principle  was  distinctly 
announced  to  the  world,  in  the  annual  message  of  one  of  my 
predecessors,  that  "  the  American  continents,  by  the  free  and 
independent  condition  which  they  have  assumed  and  maintain, 
are  henceforth  not  to  be  considered  as  subjects  for  future  coloni- 
zation by  any  European  powers." 

This  principle  will  apply  with  greatly  increased  force  should 
any  European  power  attempt  to  establish  any  new  colony  in  North 
America.  In  the  existing  circumstances  of  the  world  the  present 
is  deemed  a  proper  occasion  to  reiterate  and  reaffirm  the  principle 
avowed  by  Mr.  Monroe  and  to  state  my  cordial  concurrence  in  its 
wisdom  and  sound  policy.  The  reassertion  of  this  principle,  espe- 
cially in  reference  to  North  America,  is  at  this  day  but  the  promul- 
gation of  a  policy  which  no  European  power  should  cherish  the 
disposition  to  resist.  Existing  rights  of  every  European  nation 
should  be  respected,  but  it  is  due  alike  to  our  safety  and  our  inter- 
ests that  the  efficient  protection  of  our  laws  should  be  extended 
over  our  whole  territorial  limits,  and  that  it  should  be  distinctly 
announced  to  the  w^orld  as  our  settled  policy  that  no  future  Euro- 
pean colony  or  dominion  shall  with  our  consent  be  planted  or 
established  on  any  part  of  the  North  American  continent. 

Mr.  Polk  had  no  doubt  experienced  a  change  of  heart  since 
his  declaration  in  Congress  during  the  Panama  debate  that 

f^  OF    THK  \ 

f  UNIVERSITY  J 


384  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  "  viewed,  as  it  should  have  been,  as 
the  mere  expression  of  opinion  of  the  executive  .  .  .  designed 
jiiobably  to  produce  an  efifect  upon  the  councils  of  the  Holy 
Alliance  in  relation  to  their  supposed  intention  to  interfere 
in  the  war  between  Spain  and  her  former  colonies.  The 
President  had  no  power  to  bind  the  nation  by  such  a  pledge." 

Had  the  territory  of  Oregon  been  res  nullius^  a  domain 
upon  which  no  claim  rested,  and  therefore  open  to  coloniza- 
tion by  any  nation  according  to  the  terms  of  international 
law,  the  application  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  to  the  case 
would  be  clearer.  In  such  event,  a  foreign  power  would 
actually  have  been  seeking  colonization  upon  the  American 
continent,  and  that  part  of  Monroe's  message  dealing  with 
colonization  would  have  been  violated,  had  any  such  attempt 
to  acquire  Oregon  gone  unchallenged  by  the  United  States. 
As  it  was,  both  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  claimed 
the  territory  in  question.  It  was  not  a  domain  res  nulliuif. 
Great  Britain  did  not  seek  to  extend  her  dominion,  but  only 
to  retain  what  she  considered  properly  belonged  to  her. 
Obviously,  then,  the  only  settlement  of  such  a  question  was 
to  be  found  in  a  minute  comparison  of  claims,  the  better 
one  to  prevail.  In  case  amicable  negotiations  failed,  an 
appeal  to  arms  could  only  be  made  upon  the  broad  principle 
of  the  final  resort  to  settle  quarrels. 

Happily  the  controversy  was  closed  by  a  compromise  set- 
tlement upon  the  49th  parallel  before  the  rough  arbitrament 
of  war  became  necessary. 

The  expressions  of  President  Polk,  touching  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  as  already  quoted,  modified  to  some  extent  the 
true  meaning  of  the  original  declaration.  The  prohibition 
of  European  dominion,  as  well  as  colonization,  would  imply 
that  no  transfer  of  territory  to  European  nations  could  be 
permitted,  even  through  voluntary  conveyance.  The  acqui- 
sition of.  territory  in  North  America  by  any  means  whatso- 
ever was  interdicted  to  foreign  powers.  He  restricted  the 
principle,  however,  to  the  North  American  continent.  By 
his  application  of  this  principle  in  the  case  of  Oregon,  an 
implication  follows  that  no  foreign  power  claiming  territory 


THE    MONROE   DOCTRINE  385 

in  North  America  would  be  permitted  to  complete  its  title, 
should  that  title  admit  of  doubt  in  the  United  States. 

Notwithstanding  the  positive  attitude  he  thus  assumed, 
the  President  was  nevertheless  willing  to  change  his  attitude 
when  the  compromise  offer  from  England  reached  Washing- 
toiii.— to  partition  the  Oregon  territory  north  of  the  Colum- 
bia River,  over  which  he  believed  our  title  was  "clear  and 
unquestionable." 

A  few  weeks  after  the  reading  of  the  President's  message, 
Mr.  Allen,  of  Ohio,  in  the  face  of  considerable  opposition, 
introduced  into  the  Senate  the  following  resolution :  — 

Resolved,  That  Congress,  thus  concurring  with  the  President, 
and  sensible  that  this  subject  has  been  forced  upon  the  attention 
of  the  United  States  by  recent  events  so  significant  as  to  make 
it  impossible  for  this  government  longer  to  remain  silent,  without 
being  ready  to  submit  to  and  even  to  invite  the  enforcement  of  this 
dangerous  doctrine,  do  hereby  solemnly  declare  to  the  civilized 
world  the  unalterable  resolution  of  the  United  States  to  adhere 
to  and  to  enforce  the  principle,  that  any  effort  of  the  powers  of 
Europe  to  intermeddle  in  the  social  organization  or  political 
arrangements  of  the  independent  nations  of  America,  or  further 
to  extend  the  European  system  of  government  upon  this  continent 
by  the  establishment  of  new  colonies,  would  be  incompatible  with 
the  independent  existence  of  the  nations,  and  dangerous  to  the 
liberties  of  the  people  of  America,  and  therefore  would  incur,  as 
by  the  right  of  self-preservation  it  would  justify,  the  prompt 
resistance  of  the  United  States. 

The  bill  expired  in  the  committee  room  of  foreign  affairs 
when  the  treaty  with  England,  of  June  26,  1846,  was  con- 
cluded, by  which  the  Oregon  dispute  was  settled.  Thus  an 
attempt  to  secure  Congressional  expression  upon  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  again  failed. 

IX.    YUCATAN 

One  other  event  occurred  toward  the  close  of  Polk's  ad- 
ministration, which  is  interesting  on  account  of  its  bearing 
upon  the  Monroe  Doctrine.     In  a  Senate  debate  upon  the 
President's  special  message  of  April  29,  1848,  relating  to 
2c 


386  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

Yucatan,  a  considerable  range  of  opinion  concerning  the 
application  of  the  doctrine  was  expressed.  The  speech  of 
John  C.  Calhoun,*  made  at  that  time,  is  an  especially  valuable 
contribution  to  the  literature  of  the  subject. 

In  this  message  the  President  submitted 4,0  the  considera- 
tion of  Congress  certain  communications  from  the  governor 
of  Yucatan,  setting  forth  the  unfortunate  condition  to  which 
the  country  had  been  reduced  by  an  uprising  of  the  native 
Indians.  The  Indians  were  represented  as  carrying  on  a 
war  of  extermination  against  the  whites,  and  the  latter, 
"  panic-stricken  and  destitute  of  arms,''  had  been  brought  to 
a  deplorable  condition  of  suffering  and  misery.  In  despera- 
tion they  had  appealed  to  the  United  States  for  protection, 
and  offered  in  return  the  '*  dominion  and  sovereignty  of  the 
peninsula."  A  similar  appeal  had  been  made,  along  with 
the  same  offer  of  sovereignty,  to  the  Spanish  and  English 
governments. 

The  President  added :  "  Whilst  it  is  not  my  purpose  to 
recommend  the  adoption  of  any  measure  with  the  view  to  the 
acquisition  of  the  *  dominion  and  sovereignty '  over  Yucatan, 
yet,  according  to  our  established  policy,  we  could  not  consent 
to  a  transfer  of  this  'dominion  and  sovereignty,'  either  to 
Spain,  Great  Britain,  or  any  other  European  power."  •  Quot- 
ing from  Monroe's  and  his  own  messages  of  1823  and  1845, 
he  continues  :  "  Our  own  security  requires  that  the  established 
policy  thus  announced  should  guide  our  conduct,  and  this 
applies  with  great  force  to  the  peninsula  of  Yucatan.  ...  I 
submit  to  the  wisdom  of  Congress  to  adopt  such  measures  as 
in  their  judgment  mtiy  be  expedient  to  prevent  Yucatan 
from  becoming  a  colony  of  an}*  European  power,  which  in  no 
event  could  be  permitted  by  the  United  States.   ..." 

Yucatan  was  a  state  belonging  to  Mexico,  but  her  inhabit- 
ants remained  neutral  during  the  war  between  the  United 
States  and  Mexico,  then  in  progress.  A  bill  had  been  intro- 
duced into  the  Senate  to  enable  the  President  to  order  mili- 
tary occupation  of  Yucatan,  which  furnished  the  subject  of 
debate  already  referred  to. 

Aside  from  feelings  of  humanity,  that  naturally  aroused 


THE    MONROE   DOCTRINE  387 

Mr.  Polk's  desire  to  send  prompt  relief  to  a  suffering  people, 
he  believed  that  an  urgent  necessity  called  upon  him  to 
maintain  the  integrity  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  He  believed 
the  doctrine  not  only  forbade  foreign  interference  for  pur- 
poses of  dominion  or  control,  but  he  further  considered  that 
the  duty  of  the  United  States  extended  to  the  prevention  of 
foreign  interposition,  even  when  offered  in  friendly  spirit  and 
upon  the  invitation  of  American  states.  John  C.  Calhoun 
was  then  a  member  of  the  Senate,  and  the  only  survivor  of 
President  Monroe's  cabinet.  In  his  estimation,  the  true  char- 
acter of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  misunderstood  both  by  the 
chief  Executive  and  by  the  masses  of  the  people.  Emi- 
nently qualified  to  speak,  he  delivered  a  speech  in  the  Senate, 
May  15,  1848,  carefully  reviewing  the  circumstances  under 
which  the  declaration  of  President  Monroe  was  promulgated, 
and  gave  as  unavoidable  deductions  a  series  of  conclusions. 
It  is  difficult  to  qualify  them. 

1.  The  declaration  was  made  to  meet  but  one  special  and 
particular  condition,  to  wit;  —  the  threatened  interference  of 
the  Holy  Alliance  in  Spanish- American  affairs,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  preserving  the  revolting  colonies  to  Spain,  and  forcing 
their  continued  allegiance  to  monarchical  institutions.  The 
danger  soon  after  ceased  to  exist,  and  the  warning  of  the 
United  States,  supported  by  the  sympathetic  attitude  of 
Great  Britain,  had  served  its  purpose.  That  part  of  the 
declaration,  therefore,  must  be  considered  in  connection  with 
the  circumstances  under  which  it  was  announced  ;  otherwise 
it  ^''  would  have  involved  the  absurdity  of  asserting  that  the 
attempt  of  any  European  state  to  extend  its  system  of  gov- 
ernment to  this  continent,  the  smallest  as  well  as  the  greatest, 
would  endanger  the  peace  and  safety  of  our  country." 

2.  The  next  declaration,  that  the  interposition  of  any 
European  power  to  oppress  the  governments  of  this  conti- 
nent, or  to  control  their  destiny  in  any  manner  whatever, 
would  be  regarded  as  a  manifestation  of  an  unfriendly  dispo- 
sition toward  the  United  States,  arose  from  the  same  condi- 
tions, and  "belongs  to  the  history  of  that  day."  It  was  an 
appendage  to  the  last  declaration.    The  governments  referred 


388  AMERICAN  DIPLOxMATIC  QUESTIONS 

to  were  those  just  freed  from  Spain,  and  the  Executive  made 
use  of  the  words  "any  European  power,"  for  the  sake  of  en- 
couraging the  young  republics. 

3.  In  regard  to  the  use  of  the  word  "colonization,"  as 
employed  by  Monroe,  it  had  a  specific  meaning  —  "the  estab- 
lishment of  a  settlement  by  emigrants  from  the  parent  coun- 
try, in  a  territory  either  uninhabited,  or  from  which  the 
inhabitants  have  been  partially  or  wholly  expelled."  This 
part  of  the  doctrine  was  also  directed  to  a  certain  source  of 
irritation  —  Russian  colonization  on  the  northwest  coast.  To 
include  the  whole  continent  as  under  the  ban,  was  manifestly 
an  impropriety,  as  a  large  part  of  the  continent  had  not 
asserted  nor  maintained  its  independence  ;  British  and  Rus- 
sian America  then  exceeded  in  area  the  whole  of  the  United 
States.  This  portion  of  the  message  originated  with  Mr. 
Adams,  and  had  not  been  freely  discussed  in  the  cabinet. 
"I  will  venture  to  say,"  asserted  Mr.  Calhoun,  "that  if  that 
declaration  had  come  before  the  cautious  cabinet,  (for  Mr. 
Monroe  was  among  the  wisest  and  most  cautious  men  I  have 
ever  known,)  it  would  have  been  modified  and  expressed  with 
a  far  greater  degree  of  precision,  and  with  much  more  deli- 
cacy in  reference  to  the  feelings  of  tlie  British  Government." 

4.  In  another  respect  as  well,  Mr.  Calhoun  believed^ 
President  Polk  did  not  understand  the  famous  declaration. 
"They  were  but  declarations,  —  nothing  more.  Declara- 
tions announcing  in  a  friendly  manner  to  the  powers  of  the 
world  that  we  should  regard  certain  acts  of  interposition  of 
the  allied  powers  as  dangerous  to  our  peace  and  safety  ;  in- 
terpositions of  European  powers  to  oppress  the  republics, 
w^hich  had  just  arisen  upon  this  continent,  having  become 
free  and  independent,  as  manifesting  an  unfriendly  disposi- 
tion, and  that  this  continent  having  become  free  and  inde- 
pendent, was  no  longer  the  subject  of  colonization  —  not  one 
word  in  any  one  of  them  in  reference  to  resistance." 

5.  Our  country,  then,  is  not  expected  inexorably  to  follow  a 
simple  declaration  as  though  it  were  a  fixed  principle.  Such 
a  course  would  make  the  United  States  a  party,  willing  or 
unwilling,  to  all  the  wars,  just  or  unjust,  of  the  several  Ameri- 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE*  389 

can  states.  "  We  are  not  to  have  quoted  upon  us,  on  every 
occasion,  general  declarations  to  which  any  and  every  mean- 
ing may  be  attached."  Whether  the  country  intends  to 
resist  by  force  any  interposition  from  abroad  rests  with 
Congress;  and  must  be  decided  upon  the  merits  of  the  case 
itself.  It  should  be  asked  —  does  such  interposition  affect  the 
safety  of  the  country?  Is  it  to  the  best  interests  of  the 
nation  to  resist  it,  and  if  so,  are  our  interests  involved  suffi- 
ciently great  to  make  war  expedient?  In  some  particular 
instances  this  would  be  proper  —  proper  because  wise  —  and 
Mr.  Calhoun  cited  the  cases  of  Cuba  and  Texas.  Here  he 
"would  resort  to  the  hazard  of  war  with  all  its  calamities." 
In  the  case  of  Yucatan,  the  only  duty  devolving  upon  the 
United  States  was  to  respond  to  a  cry  for  help. 

From  this  review  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  the  following 
deductions  seem  to  be  clear :  — 

The  safety  of  the  United  States  did  not  demand  the 
annexation  of  Yucatan. 

The, occupation  of  this  country  by  Great  Britain  or  Spain 
would  not  have  been  for  the  purpose  of  dominion.  It  would 
have  been  only  the  friendly  interposition  of  another  power 
at  the  solicitation  of  Yucatan  herself. 

Occupation  of  this  sort  could  not  properly  be  called 
colonization. 

The  doctrine  as  enunciated  by  its  authors  did  not  apply 
in  this  case. 

There  was  but  a  slight  desire  in  the  United  States  to  annex 
Yucatan.  The  country  was  regarded  as  practically  worth- 
less, and  its  admission  into  the  Union  to  be  a  mistake.  It  is^ 
not  easy  to  determine,  however,  what  final  action  the  Senate 
might  have  taken  in  the  matter,  had  not  the  incident  been 
closed  by  a  treaty  between  the  whites  and  the  Indians  which 
put  an  end  to  their  difficulties. 

X.     THE  FRENCH  INTERVENTION   IN   MEXICO 

There  is  no  event  in  the  history  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in 
which  the  principles  it  embodies  have  had  such  direct  and 


390  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

unquestioned  application  as  in  that  of  the  French  invasion 
of  Mexico.  The  circumstances  in  this  case  were  in  many 
respects  strikingly  similar  to  those  that  called  forth  the 
doctrine  in  1828.  In  this  instance,  the  threat  from  abroad 
was  consummated  by  an  actual  landing  of  European  forces 
upon  North  American  soil  for  purposes  of  dominion.  The 
object  of  this  invasion  was  for  the  very  purpose  of  establish- 
ing monarchial  institutions  upon  the  Western  Hemisphere, 
and  the  territory  so  invaded,  bordering  upon  the  United 
States,  brought  the  movement  well  within  the  threatened  line 
of  danger  to  American  interests.  All  the  conditions  neces- 
sary for  an  American  protest  existed.  Indeed,  the  situation 
in  Mexico,  brought  about  by  French  intrigue,  fully  justified 
the  action  of  the  United  States  on  primary  principles  which 
authorize  the  use  of  force  in  self-defence.  The  excuse  of  a 
national  policy  to  be  followed  or  maintained,  could  have  car- 
ried no  argument  for  intervention  half  so  potent.  Wliile 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  properly  considered,  is  fundamentally 
a  plea  for  self-protection,  there  is  a  magic  influence  in  its 
phrases  which  casts  a  spell  upon  the  American  people  when 
they  are  repeated,  —  a  spell  that  has  at  times  blinded  the 
eyes  to  right  or  wrong  in  the  excess  of  patriotism  it  seems 
to  have  inspired.  In  the  French  invasion  of  Mexico,  the 
threatened  danger  to  the  United  States  was  so  real  and 
apparent  that  no  juggling  with  magical  words  was  necessary 
to  satisfy  the  national  conscience  that  interposition  was  neces- 
sary ;  and  it  will  be  noted  that  in  all  the  official  despatches 
relating  to  this  international  episode,  no  mention  whatever 
is  made  of  the  Monroe  Doctdne,  no  statement  refers  to  a 
"  well  established  policy,"  no  precedent  is  exhibited,  and  no 
offerings  are  made  upon  the  altar  of  a  "manifest  destiny." 

With  the  establishment  of  the  republic  in  18^1,  Mexico 
entered  upon  an  era  of  political  convulsion  that  is  probably 
unparalleled  in  the  annals  of  any  other  nation,  if  the  example 
of  turbulent  Haiti  be  excepted.  In  the  course  of  forty  years 
the  fires  of  as  many  revolutions  were  lighted  ;  seventy-two 
rulers,  either  monarchial  or  republican,  were  seated  and  de- 
posed.    The  primary  cause  of  the  chronic  condition  of  civil 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  391 

^ar  which  characterized  this  period  of  Mexican  history  is  to 
be  found  in  the  controversies  between  the  "clerical"  and 
"  liberal "  parties  of  the  State. 

The  Catholic  church  was  supreme  in  Spain,  and  its  sacred 
symbols  were  brought  to  the  New  World  emblazoned  upon  the 
banners  of  her  conquerors ;  with  them  Catholicism  invaded 
Mexico,  and  the  Church  became  the  richest  and  greatest  power 
in  the  land.  The  republic  inherited  a  colossal  and  corrupt 
ecclesiastical  system  that  fattened  upon  the  enormous  wealth 
of  its  own  landed  interests,  all  of  which  were  exempted  from 
taxation.  So  great  had  become  the  power  of  the  church  in 
the  Mexican  Republic  that  it  overshadowed  all  government, 
civil  and  military.  Through  vast  accumulation  of  wealth, 
and  because  of  its  hold  upon  the  minds  of  a  superstitious 
people,  the  Catholic  church  became  a  wholly  tyrannical 
institution.  The  Clerical  party  represented  the  monar- 
chical, aristocratic,  and  despotic  elements  of  the  nation, 
while  the  progressive  Liberals  stood  upon  a  platform  of 
"  equal  rights,"  "  freedom  of  worship,"  and  a  general  reform 
of  abuses.  The  bitter  struggle  between  these  two  parties 
raged  fiercely  in  1858-60,  with  Miramon  (Conservative)  and 
Benito  Juarez  (Liberal)  as  opposing  leaders.  The  nation  had 
been  reduced  by  ceaseless  war  to  a  condition  of  social  and 
political  chaos  ;  guerilla  bands  wandered  about  the  country 
upon  errands  of  plunder,  and  the  smaller  groups  of  banditti, 
like  wolves,  left  the  mountains  and  infested  the  highways  ; 
every  semblance  of  law  and  order  disappeared ;  murder  and 
pillage  were  legitimized,  and  the  term  "  government "  was  a 
mockery.  These  deplorable  conditions  in  Mexico  invited 
foreign  intervention  because,  in  the  turmoil  of  constant  revo- 
lution, Mexico  had  neglected  her  international  obligations. 
During  the  Miramon- Juarez  struggles,  offers  of  mediation 
from  England  and  France  were  declined  by  Juarez  because 
he  suspected  a  design  to  impose  monarchical  institutions 
upon  Mexico. 

In  1861  Juarez  emerged  from  the  confusion,  triumphant 
over  his  enemies,  and  with  the  "  army  of  the  constitution  " 
he  entered  the  capital.     Juarez  was  always  considered  a  good 


392  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

leader  and  a  just  man  ;  in  many  respects  he  was  a  remark- 
able character,  whose  memory  will  continue  to  be  cherished 
in  Mexico ;  although  in  control  of  the  government  he  was 
quite  unable  to  prevent  the  disorder  and  riot  wliich  imme- 
diately followed  his  inauguration  as  president.  Foreign  in- 
tervention again  became  imminent,  and  the  Conservatives, 
—  or,  in  other  words,  those  inclined  to  monarchical  institu- 
tions—  supported  by  the  cliurch,  conspired  in  its  favor.  The 
policy  of  Juarez,  to  suppress  the  monasteries,  to  confiscate  the 
wealth  of  the  clergy,  and  to  guarantee  full  religious  liberty 
to  all,  were  measures  altogether  too  radical  in  a  country  so 
completely  dominated  by  ecclesiastical  orders.  Envoys  of 
the  Conservatives  appeared  in  Europe,  in  1861,  to  induce 
Spain  to  reestablish  an  empire  in  Mexico.  Napoleon  III  of 
France  was  also  approached,  and  that  ambitious  monarch  at 
once  grasped  this  opportunity  to  launch  the  great  project 
that  lay  near  his  heart ;  Earl  Russell,  on  the  part  of  Great 
Britain,  was  finally  induced  to  assume,  though  reluctantly,^ 
a  share  in  a  tripartite  scheme  of  intervention  in  Mexico. 

France,  Spain,  and  England,  no  doubt,  had  each  some 
grounds  for  interposition.  In  the  case  of  France,  the  col- 
lection of  a  debt  long  overdue  gave  her,  as  a  creditor  govern- 
ment, a  right  to  take  action  in  her  own  interests.  It  appears 
that  during  his  presidency  Miramon  had  issued  bonds  to 
the  extent  of  !|15,000,000,  realizing  upon  them,  accord- 
ing to  his  fullest  expectations,  less  than  $1,000,000  in  cash ; 
and  the  largest  holders  of  this  doubtful  Mexican  paper  were 
French  citizens.  Juarez,  on  coming  into  power,  promptly 
repudiated  this  debt.  Other  claims,  amounting  to  many 
millions  of  dollars,  were  suddenly  resurrected  from  the  waste 
basket  by  the  French  Government.  Their  validity  had 
always  been  questionable,  though  some  of  them  were,  no 
doubt,  just.  Spain  relied  upon  a  violated  treaty  to  justify 
her  action,  and  Great  Britain  found  ample  cause  for  armed 
intervention  in  certain  atrocities  committed  by  Miramon's 
officers  in  the  British  Legation  at  Mexico.  A  large  sum  of 
money  had  been  stolen  from  the  legation  safe,  and  various 
English  consulates  had  been  sacked  ;   for  these  enormities  no. 


THE   MONROE  DOCTRINE  393 

redress  had  been  offered  by  the  Mexican  Government,  and 
none  could  be  obtained  by  Great  Britain  through  any  means 
short  of  force.  The  three  powers,  having  decided  to  con- 
duct a  joint  intervention,  signed  an  agreement  in  London 
(October,   1861),  declaring  that :  — 

The  high  contracting  parties  engaged  not  to  seek  for  them- 
selves, in  the  employment  of  the  coercive  measures  contemplated 
by  the  present  convention,  any  acquisition  of  territory,  nor  any 
special  advantage,  and  not  to  exercise  in  the  internal  affairs  of 
Mexico  any  influence  of  a  nature  to  prejudice  the  right  of  the 
Mexican  nation  to  choose  and  to  constitute  freely  the  form  of  its 
government. 

Their  purpose  was  ostensibly  to  secure  payment  of  their 
claims,  and  if  necessary,  to  seize  certain  Mexican  ports,  at- 
tach their  customs  receipts,  and  hold  them  as  a  pledge. 
Accordingly,  on  the  7th  of  January,  1862,  an  allied  fleet  of 
the  three  nations,  supplemented  by  a  French  military  force,, 
appeared  at  Vera  Cruz,  and  demanded  of  Juarez,  the  Liberal 
leader  and  president  of  the  republic,  immediate  payment 
of  the  claims  against  Mexico.  Juarez  could  only  assert  the 
inability  of  his  government  to  meet  such  demands;  he 
frankly  and  truthfully  stated  that  the  treasury  was  empty. 
The  allies  then  proclaimed  to  the  people  of  Mexico  their 
intention.  They  had  not  come,  they  assured  them,  for  con- 
quest, nor  for  the  purpose  of  interfering  with  Mexican  poli- 
tics ;  furthermore,  their  intentions  were  not  primarily  hostile, 
—  on  the  contrary,  they  came  with  a  friendly  hand  out- 
stretched toward  "  a  people  ;whom  Providence  had  favored 
with  many  gifts,  but  who  used  their  forces  and  exhausted 
their  vitality  in  civil  wars  and  perpetual  convulsions." 
They  came  merely  to  obtain  reparation  for  the  many  griev- 
ances which  had  been  inflicted  upon  their  subjects  by  Mexi- 
cans. This  declaration  sounded  well,  but  the  president 
resented  the  display  of  force,  and  called  upon  the  allies  to 
leave  Mexican  territory.  Ignoring  all  promises  of  peace, 
given  in  a  conference  held  with  Juarez  at  Soledas,  a  French 
determination  to  press  hostilities  against  Mexico  at  once  be- 


394  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

came  manifest.  This  sudden  determination  convinced  the 
English  and  Spanish  commanders  in  Mexico  that  their 
French  ally  had  motives  ulterior  to  those  expressed  in  the 
conference  at  London,  and  that  it  was  contemplating  a 
course  of  action  in  which  they  could  take  no  part.  They 
accordingly  withdrew  their  forces,  leaving  the  French  alone. 
Then,  relieved  of  his  allies,  the  French  commander,  un- 
mindful of  the  pledge  given  by  his  emperor,  and  of  his 
own  assurances  to  Mexico,  declared  war  upon  the  Mexican 
Government.  He  issued  at  the  same  time  a  proclamation 
calling  upon  all  good  Mexicans  to  rally  about  his  standard 
as  it  warned  all  foolhardy  ones  who  should  dare  to  oppose 
it ;  with  this  preliminary  flourish  he  commenced  his  march 
tp  the  city  of  Mexico,  expecting  an  easy  and  splendid  entry. 
At  Puebla,  about  halfway  on  his  journey  to  the  capital,  a 
Mexican  army,  under  the  flag  of  Juarez,  met  and  defeated 
the  French  invaders,  obliging  the  latter  to  fall  back  to 
Orizaba  to  await  reenforcements  from  home.  These,  in 
due  time,  arrived,  with  Marshal  Forey  in  command. 

Napoleon's  instructions  to  Forey  left  no  further  doubt 
upon  the  true  object  of  his  intervention  in  Mexico.  The 
emperor  was  kindly  solicitous  for  the  welfare  of  the  Mexi- 
cans, but  "  of  course,"  he  wrote,  "  if  they  prefer  a  monarchy, 
it  is  to  the  interest  of  France  to  support  them  in  that  view. 
...  In  the  present  state  of  civilization  of  the  world,  the 
prosperity  of  America  is  not  indifferent  to  Europe  ;  for  she 
it  is  who  feeds  our  manufacturers  and  keeps  our  commerce 
alive.  It  is  to  our  interests  that  the  Republic  of  the  United 
States  may  be  powerful  and  prosperous,  but  by  no  means 
that  she  should  take  all  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  and  hence  com- 
mand the  West  Indies,  as  well  as  South  America,  and  be  the 
sole  dispenser  of  the  products  of  the  New  World.  ...  If,  on 
the  contrary,  Mexico  conserves  her  independence  and  main- 
tains the  integrity  of  her  territory  ;  if  a  suitable  government 
be  constituted  there,  with  the  assistance  of  France,  we  shall 
have  restored  to  the  Latin  race,  from  the  other  side  of  the 
ocean,  its  strength  and  prestige  ;  we  shall  have  guaranteed 
their  security  to  our  colonies  of  the  West  Indies  and  those 


i 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  395 

of  Spain  ;  we  shall  have  established  our  beneficent  influence 
to  the  centre  of  America  ;  and  that  influence,  by  creating 
immense  openings  to  our  commerce,  will  procure  for  us  the 
indispensable  materials  for  our  industry.  Mexico,  thus  re- 
generated, will  always  be  favorable  to  us ;  not  only  by 
acknowledgment,  but  also  because  its  interests  will  be  in 
harmony  with  ours,  and  it  will  find  a  point  of  support  in  its 
good  relations  with  the  European  powers.  Now,  therefore, 
our  military  honor  pledged,  the  exigence  of  our  politics,  the 
interest  of  our  industry  and  our  commerce  make  it  our  duty 
to  march  on  Mexico,  to  plant  there  boldly  our  standard,  to 
establish  there  a  monarchy,  if  it  is  not  incompatible  with  the 
national  sentiment  of  the  country  —  but  at  all  events,  a  gov- 
ernment which  promises  some  stability." 

Napoleon  III  entertained  the  brilliant  project  of  reestab-  j 
lishing  the  power  of  the  Latin  race  in  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere, and  of  restoring  to  France  her  lost  prestige  in  the 
Americas.     He  felt  that  he  alone  might  be  able  to  accomplish 
this   great   achievement.     Spain    was    virtually    dead ;    her 
former  colonies  in   Central  America  had   not   fulfilled   the 
promises  of  freedom  ;   the  French  were  the  only  branch  of 
the  Latin  race  that  had  given  sufficient  evidence  of  those 
qualities  which  insure  success  and  progress  ;  they  alone  had 
lived  up  to  the  glorious  destinies  of  the  Latins.     Upon  him, 
then,  rested  the  burden  of  quickening  to  new  life  the  race 
that   was  once  supreme,    but   which  now  bent   before   the 
masterful  energies  of  the  Anglo-Saxons.     Eastern  questions 
belonged    to    England ;    Western    questions   must    look    to 
France  for  solution.     Mexico  offered  the  stage  for  the  first 
act  of  his  heroic  drama.     The  Clerical  party,  the  monarchists, 
and  the  many  sympathizers  of  the  old  regime  in  Mexico, 
would  come  to  his  support.      He    would  sweep  aside  the 
quarrelling  political  factions  ;  he  would  exterminate  the  ban- 
ditti, and  found  upon  the  site  of  the  ancient  Aztec  capitol 
the  seat  of  a  new  Latin  Empire,  which,  in  the  fulness  of  time, 
would  outshine  the  old  one.     The  United   States  and  its 
Monroe  Doctrine  perhaps  stood  in  his  way,  but  he  believed 
the  United  States  was  too  busily  engaged  in  its  own  desper- 


396  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

ate  affairs  to  seriously  trouble  him  ;  he  realized,  however, 
that  he  must  act  with  caution,  and  not  unduly  alarm  the 
watchful  authorities  at  Washington,  —  hence,  the  resurrected 
French  claims,  the  convention  of  London,  the  proclamation 
of  his  general  in  Vera  Cruz,  and  the  Soledad  Conference. 
No  doubt  Napoleon  was  encouraged  by  the  mild  tone  of 
American  protest.  He  had  well  chosen  his  time,  for  at  that 
particular  moment  it  was  inexpedient  for  the  United  States 
to  make  enemies  abroad. 

Marshal  Forey,  with  his  letter  of  instructions,  arrived  at 
Vera  Cruz,  in  September,  1862,  and  immediately  assumed 
command  of  a  largely  augmented  French  force.  After  over- 
coming the  resistiince  of  tlie  Mexicans  in  several  hard-fought 
battles,  Forey  entered  the  capital  June  10,  1863,  and  estab- 
lished a  provisional  government,  consisting  of  a  regency,  in 
which  he  himself  was  the  central  figure.  A  branch  of  the 
new  government,  styled  the  *'  Assembly  of  Notables,"  lost 
no  time  in  reporting  to  Napoleon  that  the  Mexican  nation 
"adopts  a  monarchical  and  hereditary  form  of  government 
under  a  Catholic  prince  "  who  shall  take  the  "  title  of  Em- 
])eror  "  —  the  choice  for  ruler  being,  "  His  Imperial  and  Royal 
Highness,  the  Frince  Ferdinand  Maximilian  of  Austria." 

The  Archduke,  Maximilian  of  Austria,  was  a  member 
of  the  House  of  Hapsburg,  —  a  man  of  ambition,  of  honest 
intentions,  of  small  political  sagacity,  and  of  little  experience 
in  worldly  affairs.  He  was  a  tool  in  the  hands  of  Napoleon. 
Before  accepting  the  honor  of  an  emperor's  crown  in  Mexico, 
he  desired  undoubted  assurance  that  the  choice  of  himself  was 
in  reality  the  choice  of  the  Mexican  people,  and  Napoleon's 
officials  in  Mexico  were  clever  enough  to  obtain  for  the  arch- 
duke every  assurance  he  needed  on  that  score.  Finally  con- 
vinced, and  therefore  believing  himself  to  have  the  support 
of  "  an  immense  majority "  of  Mexicans,  he  accepted  the 
honor.  He  was  crowned  atiteramon,  and  in  June,  1864,  was 
welcomed  into  the  city  of  Mexico  with  great  demonstrations 
of  joy. 

The  pleasing  personality  of  the  emperor,  along  with  his 
good   sense    in  recognizing  the   Liberals  in  the   matter   of 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  397 

appointments,  gave  to  the  opening  of  his  reign  promises  of 
a  most  flattering  nature.  Many  influential  men  among  the 
Liberals,  wearied  at  last  with  perpetual  war,  came  to  his  side, 
believing  that  possibly,  after  all,  Napoleon  had  better  solved 
their  political  problems  than  they  themselves  had  been  able 
,  to  do.  Maximilian  in  fact  became  even  popular. 
~~P  However,  all  the  emperor  at  first  gained  in  the  good-will 
of  his  subjects,  was  soon  lost  by  a  woful  lack  of  judgment  in 
the  management  of  his  imperial  office.  He  fell  readily  into 
the  hands  of  the  Clerical  party,  and  under  the  influence  of 
their  fawning  adulation  he  entered  upon  a  stupidly  blind 
policy  of  antagonizing  the  Liberals  at  every  turn,  —  those 
whom  he  had  at  first  conciliated,  and  upon  whose  friendship 
he  most  depended.  He  finally  sealed  his  own  doom  by  the 
astonishingly  foolish  error  of  recalling  from  exile  the  notori- 
ous generals,  Miramon  and  Marquez,  the  former  leaders  of  the 
Conservatives,  and  whose  inhuman  and  barbarous  cruelties 
on  the  field  of  battle  had  disgusted  even  their  own  soldiers. 
No  more  flagrant  offence  could  have  been  offered  than  the 
restoration  to  military  power  of  these  two  detestable  and 
bloodthirsty  men. 

An  emphatic  warning  from  the  United  States  in  April, 
1866,  caused  Napoleon  to  withdraw  the  French  forces  from 
North  America,  thereby  depriving  Maximilian  of  his  only 
real  support.  Abandoned  to  his  fate  by  those  who  had 
placed  him  upon  the  throne,  he  carried  on  a  despairing  fight 
against  the  swelling  forces  of  Juarez,  and  he  finally  paid  the 
.supreme  price  of  his  life  for  the  glories  of  a  four  years'  reign 
in  Mexico, — a  reign  that  was  conceived  and  conducted  in  error. 

He  was  executed  June  19,  1867. 

Bearing  in  mind  the  readiness  with  which  the  various 
administrations  at  Washington  had  invoked  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  whenever  adjacent  territory,  had  been  threatened 
with  invasion  from  abroad,  one  would  naturally  expect  to 
find  a  prompt  and  decided  warning  from  the  United  States, 
when  the  three  allies  signed  the  London  Convention,  and  es- 
pecially when  they  appeared  a  few  months  later  with  a  demon- 
stration of  force  at  Vera  Cruz.  Such,  however,  was  not  the  case. 


398  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

There  were  several  reasons  why  President  Lincoln  and  his^ 
cabinet  chose  to  adopt  a  cautious  policy.  In  the  first  phice, 
the  United  States  had  substantial  claims  of  her  own  against 
Mexico,  and  being  thoroughly  disgusted  with  the  childish 
follies  of  her  Southern  neighbor,  had  only  herself  declined 
to  become  a  party  to  the  London  Convention,  because  of 
her  established  policy  of  non*alliance  with  foreign  powers. 
The  Secretary  of  State,  William  H.  Seward,  had  not  failed, 
from  the  beginning,  to  obtain  the  most  convincing  and  satis- 
factory assurances  from  France  that  the  object  of  the  inter- 
vention was  solely  for  the  purpose  of  collecting  a  debt,  and 
was  in  no  wise  intended  to  be  converted  into  a  political 
movement.  Although  the  Monroe  Doctrine  had,  on  previ- 
ous occasions,  been  loosely  regarded  as  a  general  inhibition 
against  foreign  intervention  of  any  kind  whatever  in  the 
Western  continent,  a  more  reasonable  construction  of  Mr. 
Monroe's  words  could  not  give  them  so  broad  a  meaning. 
The  allies,  it  was  thought,  had  an  undoubted  right  to  use 
force  in  the  collection  of  just  claims  against  Mexico,  and  the 
United  States  had  no  right  to  interpose  so  long  as  her  own 
safety  was  in  no  manner  involved. 

Another  reason  why  Mr.  Seward  chose  to  adopt  a  compla- 
cent attitude  of  neutrality,  a  course  for  which  he  had  later 
to  endure  the  accusation  of  cowardice,  must  be  taken  into 
account.  His  responsible  position  at  the  head  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  was,  at  that  particular  moment,  fraught  with 
the  greatest  difficulties.  A  mistake  in  the  management  of 
foreign  affairs  would  almost  surely  have  invited  disaster,, 
and  this  particular  matter  called  for  the  utmost  delicacy 
of  diplomatic  treatment. 

The  civil  war  that  had  been  threatening  the  United  States 
for  a  quarter  of  a  century  had  at  last  come ;  any  violation 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  however  offensive  to  the  people  of 
the  United  States,  would  probably  have  been  disregarded  be- 
cause of  other  and  greater  dangers.  Mr.  Seward  neverthe- 
less anxiously  watched  the  progress  of  the  allies  ;  he  sought 
constantly  to  conciliate  the  three  powers,  though  expressing 
always  his  country's  displeasure  with  any  foreign  meddling 


THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE  399, 

in  Mexico  which  might  tend  toward  an  overthrow  of  its- 
legitimate  government.  England's  attitude  toward  the 
United  States  Government  he  well  .knew  to  be  unfriendly^ 
and  the  unfortunate  affair  of  the  Trent  was  fresh  in  every 
mind ;  a  further  offence  to  England,  under  the  circumstances^ 
would  have  been  inexpedient  and  possibly  unsafe. 

When  Napoleon's  inner  motives  came  to  light,  and  the 
English  and  Spanish  withdrew  their  forces  from  Vera  Cruz^ 
the  new  danger  thrust  itself  upon  the  State  Department. 
Success  of  the  Rebellion,  and  the  division  of  Anglo-Saxon 
power  in  America,  was  clearly  in  direct  line  with  French 
interest.  That  Mr.  Seward  was  fully  alive  to  the  dangerous 
situation  is  apparent  in  the  cautious  tone  of  his  despatches. 
It  was  only  when  Appomattox  closed  this  critical  period 
of  American  history  that  the  administration  was  enabled 
to  assume  its  proper  attitude  toward  the  French  invasion 
of  Mexico.  With  a  veteran  army  to  back  the  demand^ 
Napoleon  was  requested  to  abandon  at  once  his  project  in 
Mexico.     The  Monroe  Doctrine  was  vindicated. 

A  few  quotations  selected  from  a  voluminous  mass  of  offi- 
cial despatches  will  suffice  to  indicate  the  position  of  the 
government  in  this  matter,  at  its  various  periods,  from 
1861  to  1866,  and  to  present  as  well  a  budget  of  official  lit« 
erature  upon  the  doctrine  under  discussion. 

When  the  intervention  was  first  decided  upon  by  the  three 
powers,  Mr.  Cass,  Secretary  of  State,  wrote  to  Mr.  McLane,. 
September  20,  1860  :  — 


While  we  do  not  deny  the  right  of  any  other  power  to  carry 
on  hostile  operations  against  Mexico,  for  the  redress  of  its  griev- 
ances, we  firmly  object  to  its  holding  possession  of  any  part  of 
that  comitry,  or  endeavoring  by  force  to  control  its  political  des- 
tiny. 

This  opposition  to  foreign  interference  is  known  to  France,  Eng- 
land, and  Spain,  as  well  as  the  determination  of  the  United  States 
to  resist  any  such  attempt  by  all  the  means  in  their  power.  .  .  . 
I  have  already  referred  to  the  extent  of  the  principle  of  foreign 
interference  which  we  maintain  with  regard  to  Mexico.  It  is  proper 
to  add  that  while  that  principle  denies  the  right  of  any  power  to 


400  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

hold  permanent  possession  of  any  part  of  that  country,  or  to 
endeavor  by  force  to  direct  or  control  its  political  destiny,  it  does 
not  call  in  question  its  right  to  carry  on  hostile  operations  against 
that  republic  for  the  redress  of  any  real  grievances  it  may  have 
suffered.  But  we  insist  that  such  hostilities  be  fairly  prosecuted 
for  that  purpose  and  be  not  converted  into  the  means  of  acquisition 
or  of  political  contract. 

Replying  to  the  invitation  extended  by  the  three  allies 
that  the  United  States  should  become  a  party  to  the  London 
Convention,  and  join  them  in  the  recovery  of  their  claims 
against  Mexico,  Mr.  Seward  said  :  — 

.  .  .  the  President  does  not  feel  himself  at  liberty  to  ques- 
tion, and  he  does  not  question,  that  the  sovereigns  represented  have 
undoubted  right  to  decide  for  themselves  the  fact  whether  they 
have  sustained  gi'ievances,  and  to  resort  to  war  against  Mexico 
for  the  redress  thereof,  and  have  a  right  also  to  levy  the  war  sev- 
erally or  jointly.  The  United  States  have  a  deep  interest,  which, 
however,  they  are  happy  to  believe  is  an  interest  held  by  them  in 
common  with  the  high  contracting  lowers  and  with  all  other 
civilized  states,  that  neither  of  the  sovereigns  by  whom  the  con- 
vention has  l)een  concluded  shall  seek  or  obtain  any  acquisition  of 
territory  or  any  advantage  peculiar  to  itself  ...  or  to  exercise 
"  any  influence  of  a  character  to  impair  the  right  of  the  Mexican 
people  to  choose  and  freely  to  constitute  the  form  of  its  own  gov- 
•ernment.  ...  It  is  true,  as  the  high  contracting  parties  assume, 
that  the  United  States  have,  on  their  part,  claims  to  urge  against 
Mexico.  Upon  due  consideration,  however,  the  President  is  of 
opinion  that  it  would  be  inexpedient  to  seek  satisfaction  of  their 
-claims  at  this  time  through  an  act  of  accession  to  the  convention. 

On  March  3,  1862,  when  Napoleon's  duplicity  had  scarcely 
become  suspected,  Mr.  Seward  addressed  Mr.  Adams,  Minis- 
ter to  Great  Britain,  as  follows  :  — 

The  President,  however,  deems  it  his  duty  to  express  to  the 
allies,  in  all  candor  and  frankness,  the  opinion  that  no  monarchi- 
<;al  government  which  could  be  founded  in  Mexico,  in  the  presence 
of  foreign  navies  and  armies  in  the  waters  and  upon  the  soil  of 
Mexico,  would  have  any  prospect  of  security  or  permanence. 

Later  in  March,  1862,  the  administration  became  con- 
vinced of  Napoleon's  real  intentions  in  Mexico,  and  upon  Mr. 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  401 

Seward  fell  the  burden  of  opposing  French  aims  without 
offending  the  French  emperor.  It  at  once  became  Mr.  Sew- 
ard's object  to  prevent  Great  Britain  and  France  from  com- 
bining in  a  common  cause  against  the  United  States.  The 
task  of  the  diplomatist  was  certainly  not  an  easy  one.  Both 
powers  were  thought  to  favor  the  success  of  Southern  arms 
against  the  North,  and  both  were  actually  united  in  an 
aggressive  movement  against  Mexico,  which  was  hostile  to 
American  interests.  At  such  a  moment  the  observance  of 
a  mere  political  tenet  was  of  little  relative  importance.  The 
Secretary  wrote  to  Mr.  Dayton,  Minister  to  France,  March 
31,  1862,  as  follows :  — 

You  will  intimate  to  Mr.  Thouvenel  that  rumors  of  this  kind 
[that  France  is  a  party  to  the  scheme  to  "subvert  the  republican 
American  system  in  Mexico"]  have  reached  the  President  and 
awakened  some  anxiety  on  his  part.  You  will  say  that  you  are 
not  authorized  to  ask  explanations,  but  you  are  sure  that  if  any 
can  be  made,  which  will  be  calculated  to  relieve  that  anxiety,  they 
will  be  very  welcome,  inasmuch  as  the  United  States  desire  noth- 
ing so  much  as  to  maintain  a  good  understanding  and  the  most 
cordial  relations  with  the  government  and  the  people  of  France. 

It  will  hardly  be  necessary  to  do  more  in  assigning  your  rea- 
sons for  this  proceeding  on  your  part  than  to  say  that  we  have 
more  than  once,  and  with  perfect  distinctness  and  candor,  in- 
formed all  the  parties  to  the  alliance  that  we  cannot  look  with 
indifference  upon  any  armed  European  intervention  for  political 
ends  in  a  country  situated  so  near  and  connected  with  us  so 
closely  as  Mexico. 

Mr.  Seward  subsequently  explained  the  mildness  of  his 
protest  by  saying,  that  ''  nations,  no  more  than  individuals, 
can  wisely  divide  their  attention  upon  many  subjects  at  one 
time."^  The  one  subject  of  civil  war  at  home  was  fully 
ample  to  occupy  the  attention  of  every  branch  of  the  gov- 
ernment. 

The  assurances  given  that  France  did  not  intend  to  colo- 
nize Mexico  or  to  take  Sonora  or  any  other  section  of  the 
country  permanently  enabled  the  United  States  Government 
to  defer  the  definite  protest  which  it  held  in  readiness  to  pre- 

1  Bancroft's  Life  of  Seward,  Vol.  2,  p.  425. 
2d 


402  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

sent  at  a  more  auspicious  moment.     To  Mr.  Motley,  Minister 
to  Austria,  Mr.  Seward  wrote,  September  11,  1863  :  — 

When  France  made  war  against  Mexico,  we  asked  of  France 
explanations  of  her  objects  and  purposes.  She  answered,  that  it 
was  a  war  for  the  redress  of  grievances ;  that  she  did  not  intend 
to  permanently  occupy  or  dominate  in  Mexico,  and  that  she 
should  leave  to  the  people  of  Mexico  a  free  choice  of*  institu- 
tions of  government. 

But  the  vigorous  campaign  of  the  French  had  begun  to 
alarm  the  people  of  the  United  States.  Mr.  Seward  ad- 
dressed Mr.  Dayton,  September  21,  1863  :  — 

.  .  .  The  United  States  government  has  hitherto  practised 
strict  neutrality  between  the  French  and  Mexico,  and  all  the 
more  cheerfully  because  it  has  relied  on  the  assurances  given  by 
the  French  government  that  it  did  not  intend  permanent  occupa- 
tion of  that  country  or  any  violence  to  the  sovereignty  of  its  peo- 
ple. The  proceedings  of  the  French  in  Mexico  are  regarded  by 
many  in  that  country  and  in  this  as  at  variance  with  those  assur- 
ances. Owing  to  this  circumstance,  it  becomes  very  difficult  for 
this  government  to  enforce  a  rigid  observance  of  its  neutrality 
laws.  The  President  thinks  it  desirable  that  you  should  seek 
an  opportunity  to  mention  these  facts  to  Mr.  Drouyn  de  I'Huys,. 
and  to  suggest  to  him  that  the  interests  of  the  United  States, 
and,  as  it  seems  to  us,  the  interest  of  France  herself,  require 
that  a  solution  of  the  present  complications  in  Mexico  be  made 
as  early  as  may  be  convenient  upon  the  basis  of  the  unity  and 
independence  of  Mexico.  I  cannot  be  misinterpreting  the  senti- 
ments of  the  United  States  in  saying  that  they  do  not  desire  an 
annexation  of  Mexico  or  any  part  of  it,  nor  do  they  desire  any 
special  interest,  control,  or  influence  there,  but  they  are  deeply 
interested  in  the  reestablishment  of  unity,  i)eace,  and  order  in  the 
neighboring  republic,  and  exceedingly  desirous  that  there  may 
not  arise  out  of  the  war  in  Mexico  any  cause  of  alienation  between 
them  and  France.  .  .  . 

A  threat  is  here  veiled  only  by  expressions  of  good-will ; 
but  numerous  letters  written  by  Mr.  Seward  to  the  French 
Minister  about  this  period,  indicate  the  extreme  dissatisfac- 
tion felt  by  the  United  States  Government  against  France,, 
which  was  held  in  restraint  only  by  domestic  war  at  home. 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  403 

When  Drouyn  de  Lhuys  (the  French  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs)  intimated  the  emperor's  desire  for  the  United 
States  to  recognize  Maximilian,  Mr.  Seward  adroitly  replied 
that  "  a  determination  to  err  on  the  side  of  strict  neutrality, 
if  we  err  at  all,"  was  all  the  emperor  could  expect  of  the 
United  States.     But  he  continued  more  openly  :  — 

Happily  the  French  Government  has  not  been  left  uninformed 
that,  in  the  opinion  of  the  United  States,  the  permanent  establish- 
ment of  a  foreign  and  monarchical  government  in  Mexico  will  be 
found  neither  easy  nor  desirable.  You  will  inform  Mr.  Drouyn 
de  I'Huys  that  this  opinion  remains  unchanged.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  United  States  cannot  anticipate  the  action  of  the  people 
of  Mexico,  nor  have  they  the  least  purpose  or  desire  to  interfere 
with  their  proceedings,  or  control  or  interfere  with  their  free 
choice,  or  disturb  them  in  the  enjoyment  of  whatever  institutions 
of  government  they  may,  in  the  exercise  of  an  absolute  freedom, 
establish.  It  is  proper,  also,  that  Mr.  Drouyn  de  I'Huys  should 
be  informed  that  the  United  States  continue  to  regard  Mexico  as 
the  theatre  of  a  war  which  has  not  yet  ended  in  the  subversion 
of  the  Government  long  existing  there,  with  which  the  United 
States  remain  in  the  relation  of  peace  and  sincere  friendship; 
and  that,  for  this  reason,  the  United  States  are  not  now  at  liberty 
to  consider  the  question  of  recognizing  a  Government  which,  in 
the  further  chances  of  war,  may  come  into  its  place.  The  United 
States,  consistently  with  their  principles,  can  do  no  otherwise  than 
leave  the  destinies  of  Mexico  in  the  keeping  of  her  own  people, 
and  recognize  their  sovereignty  and  independence  in  whatever 
form  they  themselves  shall  choose  that  this  sovereignty  and  inde- 
pendence shall  be  manifested. 

With  the  actual  crowning  of  Maximilian,  Congress  could 
not  restrain  its  indignation,  nor  longer  remain  silent.  Mexi- 
can affairs  then  began  to  compel  consideration  in  the  United 
States,  and  even  to  assume  importance  superior  to  the  en- 
grossing excitements  of  the  civil  war.  The  press  clamored 
for  a  positive  reassertion  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  Con- 
gress responded  to  the  call,  heedless  of  the  consequences. 

On  April  4,  1864,  the  House  passed  the  following  resolu- 
tion without  a  dissenting  voice  :  — 

The  Congress  of  the  United  States  are  unwilling  by  silence  to 
have  the  nations  of  the  world  under  the  impression  that  they  are 


404  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

indifferent  spectators  of  a  deplorable  event  now  transpiring  in 
the  republic  of  Mexico,  and  they  think  tit  to  declare  that  it  does 
not  accord  with  the  policies  of  the  United  States  to  acknowledge 
any  monarchical  government  erected  on  the  ruins  of  any  republi- 
can government  in  America  under  the  auspices  of  any  European 
power. 

The  publication  of  this  act,  which  represented  as  truly  the 
feelings  of  the  administration  as  it  did  the  feelings  of  the 
country,  came  perilously  close  to  causing  war  between  France 
and  the  United  States  —  a  war  which,  coming  at  that  time, 
might  have  very  materially  changed  the  future  destinies  of 
the  United  States.  The  F^rench  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
demanded  of  Mr.  Dayton,  "  Do  you  bring  us  peace  or  do  you 
bring  us  war?  " 

It  required  a  quick  counter-move  on  the  part  of  Mr.  Lin- 
coln and  his  Secretary  of  State  to  repair  tlie  dam  which 
Congress  had  nearly  opened  to  the  devouring  flood.  Mr. 
Seward  hastened  to  instruct  Mr.  Dayton  to  report,  "  that  the 
proceedings  of  the  House  of  Representatives  were  adopted 
upon  suggestions  arising  within  itself,  and  not  upon  any 
communication  of  the  Executive  Department,  and  that  the 
French  Government  would  be  seasonably  apprised  of  any 
change  of  policy  upon  the  subject  which  tlie  President  might, 
at  any  future  time,  think  it  proper  to  adopt ;  "  and  to  report 
also  that  the  question  of  a  policy  toward  Mexico  was  an 
executive  one  unless  Congress  should  agree  by  a  two-thirds 
vote  of  both  Houses,  and  that  the  opinions  in  the  House,  us 
demonstrated  by  the  resolution,  were  **not  in  harmony  with 
the  policy  of  neutrality,  forbearance,  and  consideration  which 
the  President  has  so  faithfully  pursued  " 

When  the  Civil  War  closed  the  hands  of  the  administra- 
tion were  unloosed,  and  Mr.  Seward  was  then  enabled  ta 
assume  a  more  defiant  attitude  toward  French  aggression  in 
Mexico,  but  he  hoped  nevertheless  to  accomplish  by  peaceful 
means  what  Generals  Grant  and  Slieridan  insisted  should  be 
done  by  the  direct  threat  of  military  force.  In  September, 
1865,  he  announced  in  a  firm  but  conciliatory  manner,  that  as 
France  and  the  United  States  had  armies  confronting  eacli 


THE    MONROE   DOCTRINE  405 

other  on  the  Mexican  frontier,  "  a  time  seems  to  have  come 
when  both  nations  may  well  consider  whether  the  permanent 
interests  of  international  peace  and  friendship  do  not  require 
the  exercise  of  a  thoughtful  and  serious  attention  to  the  politi- 
cal questions  to  which  I  have  thus  reverted." 

The  "  political  questions "  referred  to,  were  that  the 
United  States  favored  republican  institutions  on  the  Ameri- 
can continent,  and  the  French  did  not. 

The  United  States  refused  to  recognize  Maximilian's  Gov- 
ernment ;  and  on  December  16,  1865,  Mr.  Seward  gave  the 
direct  warning  to  Napoleon  that  ended  the  affair,  so  far  as 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  concerned.  He  instructed  Mr. 
Dayton  to  announce  that  :  — 

It  has  been  the  President's  purpose  that  France  should  be 
respectfully  informed  upon  two  points,  namely  :  first,  that  the 
United  States  earnestly  desire  to  continue  and  to  cultivate  sin- 
cere friendship  with  France ;  secondly,  that  this  policy  would  be 
brought  into  imminent  jeopardy  unless  France  could  deem  it 
consistent  with  her  interests  and  honor  to  desist  from  the  prose- 
cution of  armed  intervention  in  Mexico*to  overthrow  the  domestic 
republican  government  existing  there,  and  to  establish  upon  its 
ruins  the  foreign  monarchy  which  has  been  attempted  to  be  inau- 
gurated in  the  capital  of  that^country. 

With  the  change  of  condition  in  the  United  States  which 
reunited  its  strength  and  gave  to  it  a  large  veteran  army, 
ready  to  proceed  at  once  to  Mexico,  Napoleon  saw  the  down- 
fall of  his  scheme.  He  awoke  at  last  from  his  dream  of 
Western  Empire. 

With  the  withdrawal  of  the  French  troops  from  Mexico, 
a  movement  was  begun  in  Austria  to  raise  an  army  to  pro- 
ceed to  Mexico  in  support  of  the  deserted  Maximilian.  Mr. 
Seward  protested,  but  upon  Austria^s  proposition  to  despatch 
a  smaller  force,  Seward  replied  that  the  question  of  military 
aid  for  Maximilian  was  not  to  be  discussed,  and  should  the 
Austrian  Government  persist  in  its  determination,  the  Ameri- 
can Minister  to  Vienna  would  be  expected  to  retire.  The 
Austrian  project  was  accordingly  abandoned  "  in  considera- 
tion of  all  the  .   .   .  circumstances." 


406  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

Thus  closed  the  episode  with  a  complete  vindication  of 
those  principles  upon  which  the  original  Monroe  Doctrine 
was  founded,  but  without  mention  of  the  Doctrine  itself,  and 
without  the  slightest  allusion  to  its  author.  This  was  the 
first  overt  act  in  American  history  looking  to  the  establish- 
ment of  European  monarchy  on  the  Western  continent ;  the 
only  case  where  the  threat  was  made  good  by  actual  inva- 
sion—  the  only  case,  indeed,  which  really  threatened  the 
interests  or  safety  of  the  United  States.  Yet  the  adminis- 
tration, being  fully  alive  to  the  situation,  preferred  to  justify 
American  intervention  upon  those  broad  grounds  of  self- 
defence  that  are  recognized  by  all  civilized  nations,  and 
accepted  by  all  authorities  as  sanctioned  by  the  public  law. 
It  did  not  choose  to  summon  specifically  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
in* its  defence.  No  precedent  was  needed,  no  appeal  to  sen- 
timent was  necessary,  there  were  no  doubters  to  be  soothed 
or  cajoled  by  magical  words.  American  intervention  in 
Mexico  involved  no  ulterior  political  schemes  which  had  to 
be  hidden  under  the  cloak  of  a  "  national  policy,"  or  clothed 
with  the  appearance  of  right  by  the  sanctity  of  a  popular 
slogan.  The  danger  to  the  United  States  of  a  new  European 
empire,  planted  upon  her  very  borders,  was  too  real  to  call 
for  sleight-of-hand  methods  to  arouse  opposition  to  it.  There 
was  no  party  to  be  led  on  by  high-soundfng  phrases. 

The  principles  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  were  fully  vindi- 
cated, as  they  always  must,  and  always  will,  be  when  the 
proper  occasion  calls.  Those  principles  belong,  not  to  the 
United  States  alone,  but  to  all  nations  alike.  The  Monroe 
Doctrine  was  not  alluded  to,  because  the  object  of  that 
declaration  had  long  since  been  fulfilled ;  because  from 
Mr.  Seward's  point  of  view,  if  it  could  be  regarded  as  a 
"  national  policy "  at  all,  it  had  fallen  into  disgrace  ;  and 
finally,  because  a  purely  national  policy  can  have  no  authori- 
tative place  in  international  law. 

To  William  H.  Seward  is  due  a  credit,  not  generally  ac- 
corded  him,  for   the   able   manner   in  which   he   defended  7 
American  interests  against  the  schemes   of   Napoleon  III, 
also   for  his  skill  as  a  diplomatist   in   conciliating   foreign 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  407 

enemies  to  the  Northern  cause,  while  he  opposed  at  the  same 
time  their  advance  in  Mexico.  His  adroitness  in  preventing 
Great  Britain  and  France  finding  a  common  grievance  against 
the  United  States  during  the  trying  period  of  the  Civil  War 
is  worthy  of  great  praise.  An  equal  distinction  is  no  less 
due  him  for  his  independence  and  good  judgment  in  declin- 
ing to  justify  his  intervention  in  Mexico  on  the  ground  of  a 
domestic  political  policy  when  the  universal  principle  of  self- 
defence  offered  him  sufficient  argument. 

XL     1866-1896 

From  the  close  of  the  Mexican  episode  in  1866  to  the 
present  day,  there  has  been  but  one  important  international 
question  involving  the  Monroe  Doctrine  that  has  given  rise 
to  serious  discussion,  —  the  case  of  Venezuela  and  Great 
Britain  in  1896"^  From  time  to  time,  debates  in  the  Senate 
concerning  the  revocation  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  with 
England  (1850)  have  taken  place,  in  most  of  which  discus- 
sions the  relation  of  the  doctrine  to  the  policy  of  American 
control  of  an  isthmian  canal  formed  a  part  ;  but  during  this 
period  of  three  decades  the  country  has  been  singularly  free 
from  vexatious  diplomatic  questions,  arising  from  acts  of 
European  aggression  upon  the  Western  continents. 

President  Grant  in  his  second  annual  message  (Decem- 
l3er  5,  1870)  proposed  the  annexation  of  Santo  Domingo. 
Among  other  reasons  for  taking  it,  he  submitted  that  if 
the  United  States  did  not  acquire  the  island  —  the  natives 
being  prepared  to  welcome  American  sovereignty  —  "a  free 
port  will  be  negotiated  for  by  European  nations  in  the  Bay 
of  Samana."  He  declared  that  "The  acquisition  of  Santo 
Domingo  is  an  adherence  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  ;  it  is 
a  measure  of  self -protection  ;  it  is  asserting  our  just  claim 
to  a  controlling  influence  over  the  great  commercial  traffic 
soon  to  flow  from  west  to  east  by  way  of  the  Isthmus  of 
Darien.   ..." 

Like  Mexico,  the  Dominican  Republic  had  led  a  checkered 
political  career  after  its  declaration  of  independence  in  1844. 


408  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

In  1861,  Pedro  Santana,  a  party  leader  and  prominent  revo- 
lutionary general,  proposed  the  retrocession  of  the  island  to 
Spain,  hoping  thereby  to  secure  for  its  inhabitants  freedom 
from  the  vexations  of  continual  war. 

The  United  States  was  just  then  too  busily  occupied  with 
home  affairs  to  take  very  serious  notice  of  Santo  Domingo. 
Nevertheless,  hearing  of  Santana's  action,  Secretary  Seward 
announced  to  Spain  that  "the  Government  of  the  United 
States  would  regard  with  grave  concern  and  dissatis- 
faction, movements  in  Cuba  to  introduce  Spanish  authority 
within  the  territory  of  Dominica."  Spain  was  {ilso  much 
occupied  with  internal  difficulties,  yet  not  wishing  to  lose 
so  excellent  an  opportunity  to  recoup  her  lost  fortunes  in 
the  West  Indies,  she  disregarded  Mr.  Seward's  warning 
and  sent  a  body  of  troops  to  Santana's  aid.  Spain's  wel- 
come in  Santo  Domingo  was  less  cordial  than  she  had  been 
led  to  expect.  The  Dominicans  waged  a  relentless  guerilla 
warfare  upon  the  Spanish  troops.  In  1865,  the  governor 
general  and  his  military  captain,  Maximo  Gomez  (later  of 
Cuban  fame),  were  obliged  to  withdraw,  with  a  parting 
farewell  thrust  from  the  Dominicans,  to  the  effect  that, 
"The  united  Dominican  people,  without  regard  to  rank  or 
color,  have  planted  the  white  cross  of  the  Republic  upon  the 
principles  enunciated  by  the  great  mother  of  free  nations,. 
that  America  belongs  to  Americans,  and  we  will  endure  all 
our  trials  over  again,  sooner  than  desert  it." 

At  the  time  of  President  Grant's  message,  therefore,  the 
Spaniards  had  abandoned  all  intention  of  subjugating  the 
island,  and  no  actual  negotiations  upon  the  part  of  any  foreign 
power  had  been  made,  nor  were  likely  to  be  made,  to  secure 
a  port  within  the  Bay  of  Samana.  It  is  difficult,  then,  to 
see  just  how  the  doctrine  applied  to  the  case. 

This,  as  has  been  already  intimated,  was  not  the  first  per- 
version of  the  Monroe  Doctrine ;  President  Polk  had  em- 
ployed much  the  same  tactics  in  furthering  the  annexation  of 
Texas.  A  stuffed  bird  in  both  cases  had  to  be  substituted 
for  a  living  one  at  which  to  shoot. 

The  real  merits  of  the  question  respecting  the  annexation 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  409 

of  Santo  Domingo  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  Monroe  doc- 
trine, and  the  admission  of  the  island  into  the  Union  was 
considered  by  Congress  in  reference  only  to  the  actual  value 
or  worthlessness  of  the  territory.  Unfortunately  the  debate 
in  Congress  was  so  characterized  by  bitterness  of  personal 
feeling  and  antagonism  to  the  President,  that  the  friends 
of  General  Grant  felt  obliged  to  withdraw  the  bill  before 
a  vote  could  be  taken  upon  it. 

Shortly  after  the  close  of  the  Civil  War  a  movement  was 
inaugurated  in  Congress  looking  to  acquisition  of  territory 
north  of  the  United  States.  A  series  of  conflicts  between 
upper  and  lower  Canada  had  awakened  the  British  Govern- 
ment to  the  advisability  of  uniting  her  Canadian  posses- 
sions into  a  single  dominion.  This  was  accomplished  by 
what  is  called  the  British  North  American  Act.  This  act 
united  in  close  ties  of  confederation  the  provinces  of 
Ontario,  Quebec,  Nova  Scotia,  New  Brunswick,  Prince 
Edward  Island,  Manitoba,  and  British  Columbia,  with  a 
Parliament  at  Ottawa.  More  cordial  feelings  between  the 
provinces  were  thus  brought  about  by  the  acknowledgment 
of  mutual  interests  and  dependence. 

In  some  quarters  objections  were  made  in  the  United 
States  that  this  act  of  Great  Britain  was  in  violation  of  the 
spirit  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  because  it  seemed  to  be 
antagonistic  to  the  proper  fulfilment  of  the  destiny  of  those 
provinces,  which  eventually  would  become  a  part  of  the 
United  States.  Mr.  Seward  declared  that  "  British  Colum- 
bia, by  whomsoever  possessed,  must  be  governed  in  con- 
formity with  the  interests  of  her  people  and  of  society  upon 
the  American  continent." 

Congress  also  considered  a  resolution  which  voiced  the 
uneasiness  of  the  country  at  witnessing  ''  such  a  vast  con- 
glomeration of  American  states,  established  on  the  monar- 
chial  principle,  such  a  proceeding  [the  confederation]  being 
in  contravention  of  the  traditionary  and  constantly  declared 
principles  of  the  United  States,  and  endangered  their  most 
important  interests." 

In  this  case,  as  in  the  preceding  one,  the  application  of 


410  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  not  clear.  Mr.  Monroe  expressly 
stated  that,  "  With  the  existing  colonies  or  dependencies  of 
any  European  power  we  have  not  interfered  and  shall  not 
interfere." 

Certain  political  disturbances  in  South  America,  from  1864 
to  1871,  drew  from  Washington  further  statements  relating 
to  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  An  alliance  of  South  American 
states,  including  Chili  and  Peru,  were  involved  in  difficul- 
ties with  Spain,  growing  out  of  the  unsatisfied'  claims  of 
Spanish  citizens.  In  the  war  that  followed  a  Spanish 
fleet  bombarded  Valparaiso  (March,  186(3),  and  the  United 
States  was  looked  to  by  the  allies  for  an  assertion  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Mr.  Seward  wrote  to  Mr.  Kirk- 
.patrick,  the  American  Envoy  to  Chili  (June  2,  1866)  that 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  will  "maintain  and 
insist  with  all  the  decision  and  energy  which  are  compatible 
with  our  existing  neuti*ality  that  the  republican  system 
which  is  accepted  by  any  one  of  those  [South  American] 
states  shall  not  be  wantonly  assailed,  and  that  it  shall  not  be 
subverted  as  an  end  of  a  lawful  war  by  European  powers." 
However,  Mr.  Seward  declared  it  was  not  the  intention  of 
the  United  States  to  go  beyond  this  position.  In  South 
American  wars,  where  European  powers  did  not  seek  the 
establishment  of  monarchical  government,  the  United  States 
could  not  be  expected  to  take  part. 

In  the  early  part  of  1895  Great  Britain  was  moved  to 
indignation  by  the  arrest  and  forcible  detention  by  Nicara- 
guan  authorities  of  Mr.  Hatch,  the  acting  British  Consul, 
and  certain  other  British  subjects  in  the  Mosquito  Reser- 
vation. These  men  were  denied  a  trial,  and  summarily 
expelled  from  Nicaraguan  territory.  Nicaragua  alleged  that 
they  had  instigated  riots  against  her  sovereignty  in  Mosqui- 
tia,  but  she  failed  to  give  the  prisoners  a  hearing  before 
a  court  of  justice.  Great  Britain  at  once  presented  a 
claim  of  15,000  pounds  sterling,  and  receiving  no  satisfac- 
tory promise  of  payment  from  Managua,  promptly  sent  a 
war  vessel  to  Corinto  to  enforce  her  demands. 

Nicaragua  appealed  to  the  United  States.     Mr.  Gresham 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  411 

replied  that  Nicaragua  must  deal  directly  with  Great 
Britain.  In  a  telegram  of  April  24,  to  Mr.  Bayard  in  Lon- 
don, he  said  :  ''  The  President  advises  that  you  say  un- 
officially and  confidentially  to  Lord  Kimberley,  that  while 
disclaiming  any  right  to  interfere  in  pending  settlement  of 
claim  for  pecuniary  reparation,  compliance  with  Nicara- 
gua's request  [extension  of  time  for  payment]  would  avoid 
embarrassment  to  commerce  of  this  and  other  countries, 
and  be  very  satisfactory  to  the  United  States." 

This,  Lord  Kimberley  willingly  granted,  and  the  claim 
was  soon  after  settled. 

Commenting  upon  this  episode,  the  President  in  his  an- 
nual message  the  following  December,  said  :  "  While  the 
sovereignty  and  jurisdiction  of  Nicaragua  was  in  no  way 
questioned  by  Great  Britain,  the  former's  arbitrary  conduct 
in  regard  to  British  subjects  furnished  the  ground  for  this 
proceeding  [seizure  of  Corinto]." 

The  landing  of  an  armed  British  force  in  Central  America 
provoked  considerable  comment  in  the  press  throughout  the 
country  concerning  the  duty  and  probable  action  of  the 
United  States.  The  matter  was  closed,  however,  without 
an  official  appeal  to  the  doctrine. 

XU.    GREAT   BRITAIN  AND  VENEZUELA 

The  latest  application  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  by  our 
government  was  made  in  1895-96.  In  his  third  annual  mes- 
sage (December  2,  1895),  President  Cleveland  used  the  fol- 
lowing words  :  — 

It  being  apparent  that  the  boundary  dispute  between  Great 
Britain  and  the  Republic  of  Venezuela  concerning  the  limits  of 
British  Guiana  was  approaching  an  acute  stage,  a  definite  state- 
ment of  the  interest  and  policy  of  the  United  States  as  regards 
the  controversy  seemed  to  be  required  both  on  its  own  account 
and  in  view  of  its  relations  with  the  friendly  powers  directly  con- 
cerned. In  July  last,  therefore,  a  despatch  was  addressed  to  our 
Ambassador  at  London  for  comnumication  to  the  British  Govern- 
ment in  which  the  attitude  of  the  United  States  was  fully  and 


412  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

distinctly  set  forth.  The  general  conclusions  therein  reached 
and  formulated  are  in  substance  that  the  traditional  and  estab- 
lished policy  of  this  government  is  firmly  opposed  to  a  forcible 
increase  by  any  European  power  of  its  territorial  possessions  on 
this  continent ;  that  this  policy  is  as  well  founded  in  principle 
as  it  is  strongly  supported  by  numerous  precedents ;  that  as  a 
consequence  the  United  States  is  bound  to  protest  against  the 
enlargement  of  the  area  of  British  Guiana  in  derogation  of  the 
rights  and  against  the  will  of  Venezuela ;  that  considering  the  dis- 
parity in  strength  of  Great  Britain  and  Venezuela  the  territorial 
dispute  between  them  can  be  reasonably  settled  only  by  friendly 
and  impartial  arbitration,  and  that  the  resort  to  such  arbitration 
should  include  the  whole  controversy.  .  .  . 

It  had  long  been  known  in  the  United  States  that  there 
existed  a  boundary  dispute  between  Great  Britain  and 
Venezuela,  but  in  view  of  the  fact  that  many  of  the 
boundary  lines  in  South  America  were  vaguely  defined  and 
had  for  many  years  caused  more  or  less  irritation  between 
the  South  American  republics,  the  settlement  of  this  par- 
ticular one  was  not  considered  important  to  American  inter- 
est.y  This  was  the  case  even  regardless  of  the  fact  that  one 
of  the  contestants  represented  a  European  power.  The  dis- 
pute between  Great  Britain  and  Venezuela  originated  in 
conflicting  Dutch  and  Spanish  territorial  claims  in  the 
northeastern  part  of  the  South  American  continent, —  Eng- 
land being  the  successor  of  the  Dutch  in  Guiana,  while 
Venezuela  based  her  claims  upon  Spanish  title.  It  be- 
came apparent  in  1840  that  these  early  territorial  claims 
were  in  conflict.  Unsuccessful  attempts  to  define  the  lines 
characterized  half  a  century  of  correspondence  between  the 
rival  claimants.  From  time  to  time,  as  the  territory  in  dis- 
pute became  better  known  to  settlers,  the  quarrel  broke 
out  anew,  but  as  often  to  be  abandoned  on  failure  of  an 
understanding. 

In  1876,  Venezuela  called  the  attention  of  the  United 
States  to  the  alleged  encroachments  of  British.  Guiana  upon 
her  soil,  laying  especial  emphasis  upon  English  advances  in 
the  region  lying  about  the  mouth  of  the  Orinoco  River. 
From  that  time  to  1895,  Venezuela  upon  several  occasions 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  413 

had  urged  the  United  States  as  the  "  oldest  of  the  republics 
of  the  new  continent,"  and  therefore  the  one  called  upon  "  to 
lend  the  otiiers  its  powerful  moral  support  in  disputes  with 
European  nations,"  to  intercede  in  its  behalf.  Without 
-exception,  the  replies  from  Washington  expressed  sympathy 
with  Venezuela  in  her  controversy.  In  some  instances  assur- 
ances were  given  that  if  Great  Britain  were  wrongfully  seek- 
ing to  extend  the  lines  of  her  Guiana  colony,  such  action 
would  be  regarded  by  the  United  States  as  an  unjustifi- 
able encroachment  upon  the  Western  Hemisphere,  and 
therefore  a  subject  coming  clearly  within  the  scope  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine.  Moved  by  these  representations,  Mr. 
Frelinghuysen,  in  1882,  had  offered  to  propose  to  Great 
Britain  a  submission  of  the  question  to  the  arbitrament 
of  a  third  power,  should  Venezuela  so  request.  In  a 
letter  to  Mr.  Baker,  American  Minister  resident  at 
Caracas  (January  31,  1883),  he  outlined  the  attitude  of  the 
United  States  —  one  of  strict  impartiality,  but  favorable  to 
the  employment  of  good  offices  toward  inclining  Great 
Britain  to  arbitrate.  There  was  a  word  of  caution  to  Mr. 
Lowell,  the  American  Minister  in  London  (July  7, 1884),  not 
to  commit  the  United  States  "to  any  determinate  political 
solution"  of  the  question,  which  at  that  time  indicated 
clearly  the  conservative  attitude  of  the  government.  In 
this  letter  Mr.  Frelinghuysen  stated  that  "  The  moral  posi- 
tion of  the  United  States  in  these  matters  [alleged  foreign 
encroachments  in  the  Americas]  was  well  known  through 
the  enunciation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  but  formal  action 
in  the  direction  of  applying  that  doctrine  to  a  speculative 
case  affecting  Venezuela  seemed  to  be  inopportune,  and  I 
could  not  advise  Venezuela  to  arouse  a  discussion  of  the 
point." 

Venezuela  readily  accepted  the  arbitration  proposals  of 
the  United  States,  but  not  without  some  show  of  embar- 
rassment. Should  the  United  States  use  its  good  offices  in 
an  endeavor  to  incline  Great  Britain  to  submit  the 
matter  to  tlie  arbitrament  of  a  third  power,  the  United 
JStates,  therefore,  as  mediator  in  the  case,  would  likely  be 


414  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

debarred  from  acting  in  the  capacity  of  umpire  ;  and  the 
United  States  alone  was  acceptable  as  an  umpire  to  Vene- 
zuela. On  the  other  hand,  while  the  United  States  was 
perfectly  willing  to  name  an  umpire,  it  could  not  do  so 
with  propriety,  unless  a  concurrent  request  came  from  both 
parties  to  the  dispute. 

Further  English  advances  near  the  mouth  of  the  Orinoco 
River  in  1886  were  viewed  with  alarm  and  dismay,  and  war 
was  almost  precii)itated  by  the  despatch  of  a  Venezuelan 
gunboat  to  Barima  Point  with  engineers  and  equipment  to 
construct  a  lighthouse  in  that  locality  of  disputed  owner- 
ship. At  this  same  time  a  Venezuelan  note  was  addressed 
to  the  British  authorities  that  should  Great  Britain  object 
to  this  assertion  of  sovereignty  over  Barima,  diplomatic 
rerlations  between  the  two  nations  would  instantly  cease. 
Even  at  this  critical  juncture,  public  interest  in  the  United 
States  was  not  greatly  moved.  Mr.  Bayard,  voicing  his^ 
friendly  concern  in  the  adjustment  of  the  dispute,  felt 
warranted  in  tendering  to  the  British  Government  the 
good  offices  of  the  United  States,  in  an  endeavor  ta 
promote  an  amicable  settlement  of  the  respective  claims, 
with  which  the  secretary  coupled  an  offer  to  act  as  arbi- 
trator, should  such  proposal  prove  acceptable  to  both  coun- 
tries. In  a  communication  to  Mr.  Phelps,  December  30^ 
1886,  Mr.  Bayard  touched  upon  the  responsibility  of  the 
United  States  in  relation  to  the  South  American  republics, 
in  which  he  mentioned  "the  doctrine  we  announced  two 
generations  ago "  ;  such  responsibility  he  declared  to  be 
entirely  consistent  and  compatible  with  an  "attitude  of 
friendly  neutrality  and  entire  impartiality."  He  said  fur-  > 
ther  :  "It  is  not  supposed  for  a  moment  that  any  idea  of  r 
political  or  territorial  expansion  of  authority  on  the  Ameri- 
can continent  can  control  Her  Majesty's  counsellors  in  any 
action  they  may  take  in  relation  to  Venezuela.  .  .  .  The 
dispute  with  Venezuela  is  merely  one  of  geographical  limits- 
and  title,  not  of  attempted  political  jurisdiction." 

With  the  clash  of  authority  at  Barima  Point,  Venezuela 
assumed  a  more  aggressive  attitude  toward  Great  Britain. 


^*«!!^4y££Sr '         THP:    MONROE    DOCTRINE  415 

Her  Minister  in  Washington  constantly  reminded  Mr.  Bayard 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  ''  The  violation  of  the  territory 
of  Venezuela,"  he  urged,  "  has  been  gradually  accomplished 
by  means  and  under  pretences  which,  in  view  of  the  ante- 
cedents of  the  case,  appear  scarcely  credible.  The  repre- 
sentative of  Great  Britain  at  Caracas  formally  declared,  in 
1850,  that  the  acquisition  which  has  now  been  so  tenaciously 
insisted  upon,  was  not  even  thought  of.  By  this  acquisition,. 
Great  Britain  gains  possession  of  territories  which  she  did 
not  formerly  pretend  to  claim,  and  violates  the  stipulations 
made  with  Venezuela  in  the  convention  signed  at  that  time 
through  reliance  on  the  sincerity  of  those  declarations." 

Great  Britain  declined  to  accept  the  friendly  offices  of  the 
United  States,  and  the  British  Minister  at  Caracas  secured 
his  passport  preparatory  to  abandoning  his  diplomatic  post. 
English  men-of-war  appeared  in  the  Orinoco  and  at  La  Guira, 
and  for  the  moment  war  seemed  inevitable.  Just  at 
this  anxious  moment  of  suspense  the  unfortunate  bound- 
ary dispute  was  more  than  ever  complicated  by  the  dis- 
covery of  gold  in  the  interior  district  of  Caratal,  —  a  region 
claimed  by  Venezuela,  and  now  suddenly  occupied  by  British 
miners,  who,  with  the  usual  independence  of  gold  miners,, 
refused  to  recognize  any  sovereignty  but  their  own.  The 
matter  was  still  further  aggravated  by  the  firmer  attitude 
assumed  toward  Great  Britain  in  Washington.  Mr.  Bayard 
wrote  to  Mr.  Phelps,  February  17, 1888  :  "The  Government 
of  the  United  States  has  hitherto  taken  an  earnest  and 
friendly  interest  in  the  question  of  boundaries  so  long  in 
dispute  between  Great  Britain  and  Venezuela,  and,  so  far 
as  its  disinterested  counsels  were  admissible,  has  advocated 
an  amicable,  final,  and  honorable  settlement  of  the  dispute. 
We  have  followed  this  course  on  the  assumption  that  the 
issue  was  one  of  historical  fact,  eminently  adaptable  foi**admit- 
ting  arbitration,  and  that  the  territorial  claims  of  each  party 
had  a  fixed  limit,  the  right  to  which  would  without  difficulty 
be  determined  according  to  the  evidence.  The  claim  now 
stated  to  have  been  put  forth  by  the  authorities  of  British 
Guiana  necessarily  gives  rise  to  grave  disquietude,  and  creates. 


416  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

an  apprehension  that,  the  territorial  claim  does  not  follow 
historical  traditions  or  evidence,  but  is  apparently  indefi- 
nite. ...  It  may  be  well  for  you  to  express  anew  to  Lord 
Salisbury  the  great  gratification  it  would  afford  this  govern-  \^ 
ment  to  see  the  Venezuelan  dispute  amicably  and  honorably 
settled,  by  arbitration  or  otherwise,  and  our  readiness  to  do 
anything  we  properly  can  to  assist  in  that  end." 

In  the  spring  of  1888  Congress  called  for  the  corre- 
spondence relating  to  the  Venezuelan  controversy,  and  thus 
the  matter  came  more  prominently  before  the  country. 
Although  the  subject  was  duly  discussed  by  the  press,  even 
then  it  did  not  occur  to  the  people  of  the  United  States  that 
the  question  of  a  South  American  boundary  could,  to  any 
very  great  or  serious  extent,  affect  American  interests. 

From  1888  to  December,  1895,  amicable  relations  between 
Venezuehi  and  Great  Britain  were  greatly  disturbed, 
although  diplomatic  intercourse  was  resumed  in  the  form 
of  several  special  Venezuelan  envoys  to  London,  who  labored 
earnestly,  tliough  in  vain,  for  a  friendly  adjustment  of  the 
boundary  difficulties.  During  this  period  of  seven  years 
British  subjects  continued  to  emigrate  to  the  Caratal  gold 
district,  where  they  founded  numerous  settlements,  and  so 
far  won  the  confidence  of  the  native  Indian  tribes  that  the 
latter  were  often  willing  to  unite  with  them  in  forcibly  resist- 
ing Venezuelan  authority.  In  the  year  1895  the  boundary 
dispute  had  again  reached  a  dangerous  crisis,  owing  to 
some  hostile  encounters,  within  the  disputed  area,  between 
British  settlers  Jind  the  Venezuelan  police.  Venezuela's 
appeals  to  the  United  States  for  protection  were  so  persistent 
that  President  Cleveland  was  finally  induced  to  step  into 
the  arena.  A  somewhat  vigorous  correspondence  took  place 
between  Washington  and  London,  the  burden  of  the  discus- 
sion between  Mr.  Olney  and  Lord  Salisbury  being  the  appli-  f 
cability  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  to  the  case. 

The  annual  message  of  the  President  (1895)  was  followed, 
two  weeks  later  (December  17),  by  a  special  message  to  Con- 
gress, submitting  the  Olney-Salisbury  letters,  and  further 
sustaining,  in  argumentative  form,  the   attitude  which  the 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  417 

administration  had  seen  lit  to  take.  Then,  for  the  first  time, 
the  whole  tangled  question  came  before  the  American  people 
as  a  matter  of  vital  importance.  For  several  months  it  was 
the  absorbing  topic  of  the  press.  The  journals  bristled  with 
inflammatory  editorials.  England  was  roundly  denounced 
as  a  nation  of  robbers  and  the  natural  enemy  of  the  United 
States.  The  usually  quiet  antipathy  to  Great  Britain, 
which  would  seem  to  be  an  inherited  American  instinct, 
suddenly  came  to  the  surface,  and  the  people  of  the  country 
called  for  a  prompt  vindication  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
An  intensity  of  bitter  feeling  against  England  was  excited, 
pointing  ominously  to  armed  conflict ;  while  the  more  con- 
servative elements  of  the  country  stood  amazed  and  alarmed 
at  the  seriousness  of  the  situation. 

The  position  taken  by  Mr.  Olney  was  substantially  as 
follows:  If  Great  Britain  were  encroaching  upon  Venezuela, 
as  Venezuela  alleged,  by  an  unwarranted  extension  of  her 
Guiana  boundary,  such  British  aggression  constituted  an 
attempt  to  extend  the  sovereignty  of  a  European  power, 
along  with  its  system  of  government,  to  a  portion  of  the 
American  continent ;  an  act  which  clearly  fell  within  the 
interdiction  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  The  only  way  to 
determine  whether  Great  Britain  was  merely  occupying 
territory  that  rightfully  belonged  to  her,  or  whether  she 
was  seeking  to  extend  her  sovereignty,  was  by  means  of 
a  careful  examination  and  comparison  of  the  historical  evi- 
dences that  supported  the  conflicting  claims  ;  therefore  the 
United  States  must  insist  that  the  matter  be  submitted  to  a 
tribunal  of  arbitration.  Should  such  a  tribunal  find  that  the 
British  claims  to  the  disputed  territory  were  just,  the  whole 
matter  would  fall  outside  the  operation  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, and  the  United  States  would  hold  her  peace ;  but,  on 
the  contrary,  should  such  a  tribunal  find  that  Great  Britain 
was  seeking  to  appropriate  territory  belonging  of  right  to 
Venezuela,  then  it  would  become  the  duty  of  the  United 
States,  in  the  interest  of  her  own  safety,  and  in  conformity 
with  a  great  principle,  to  oppose  such  an  advance  by  every 
means  in  her  power. 
2e 


418  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

The  British  position  was,  in  substance,  that  the  Monroe    ^ 
Doctrine  had  no  bearing  upon  the  boundary  dispute  in  South 
America ;  that  that  doctrine  had  been  created  to  meet  cer-  \/ 
tain  ends,  and  had  long  since  fulfilled  its  purpose ;  that  the 
interest  and  safety  of  the  United  States  was  in  no  manner*^ 
threatened  ;    and,  therefore,  the  British-Venezuela  quarrel 
being  no  affair  of  the  United  States,  the  intervention  of  the  L 
latter  was  wholly  unwarranted. 

The  two  letters  of  Secretary  Olney  and  Lord  Salisbury  on 
this  subject  are  most  important  documents  in  the  historical 
development  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  free  quotation 
from  them  cannot  well  be  avoided.  Only  those  parts  of  the 
letters  relating  to  the  merits  of  the  territorial  claims  are 
omitted. 

Mr,  Olney  to  Mr,  Bayard, 

No.  804.]  Department  of  State, 

Wiishinglon,  July  20^  1895, 

His  Excellency  Thomas  F.  Bayarp^ 

Etc.,  etc.,  etc.,  London, 

Sir:  I  am  directed  by  the  President  to  communicate  to  you  his 
views  upon  a  subject  to  which  he  has  given  much  anxious  thought 
and  respecting  which  he  has  not  reached  a  conclusion  without 
a  lively  sense  of  its  great  importance  as  well  as  of  the  serious 
responsibility  involved  in  any  action  now  to  be  taken. 

It  is  not  proposed,  and  for  present  purposes  is  not  necessary,  to 
enter  into  any  detailed  account  of  the  controversy  between  Great 
Britain  and  Venezuela  respecting  the  western  frontier  of  the 
colony  of  British  Guiana.  The  dispute  is  of  ancient  date  and 
began  at  least  as  early  as  the  time  when  Great  Britain  acquired 
by  the  treaty  with  the  Netherlands  of  1814  "  the  establishments 
of  Demerara,  Essequibo,  and  Berbice."  From  that  time  to  the 
present  the  dividing  line  between  these  "  establishments  "  (now 
called  British  Guiana)  and  Venezuela  has  never  ceased  to  be  a 
subject  of  contention.  The  claims  of  both  parties,  it  must  be 
conceded,  are  of  a  somewhat  indefinite  nature.  On  the  one  hand 
Venezuela,  in  every  constitution  of  government  since  she  became 
an  independent  State,  has  declared  her  territorial  limits  to  be 
those  of  the  Captaincy  General  of  Venezuela  in  1810.  Yet,  out 
of  '*  moderation  and  prudence,"  it  is  said,  she  has  contented  her- 


f 


THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE  419 

self  with  claiming  the  Essequibo  line  —  the  line  of  the  Essequibo 
River,  that  is  —  to  be  the  true  boundary  between  Venezuela  and 
British  Guiana,  On  the  other  hand,  at  least  an  equal  degree  of 
indeliniteness  distinguishes  the  claim  of  Great  Britain.  .  .  . 

To  the  territorial  controversy  between  Great  Britain  and  the 
Republic  of  Venezuela,  thus  briefly  outlined,  the  United  States 
has  not  been  and,  indeed,  in  view  of  its  traditional  policy,  could 
not  be  indifferent.  The  note  to  the  British  Foreign  Office  by 
which  Venezuela  opened  negotiations  in  1876  was  at  once  com- 
municated to  this  Government.  In  January,  1881,  a  letter  of  the 
Venezuelan  Minister  at  Washington,  respecting  certain  alleged 
demonstrations  at  the  mouth  of  the  Orinoco,  was  thus  ansVered 
hy  Mr.  Evarts,  then  Secretary  of  State :  .  .  . 

Subsequent  communications  to  Mr.  Bayard  direct  him  to  ascer- 
tain whether  a  Minister  from  Venezuela  would  be  received  by 
Great  Britain.  In  the  annual  Message  to  Congress  of  December 
3d  last,  the  President  used  the  following  language: 

"  The  boundary  of  British  Guiana  still  remains  in  dispute  between 
Great  Britain  and  Venezuela.  Believing  that  its  early  settlement, 
on  some  just  basis  alike  honorable  to  both  parties,  is  in  the  line 
of  our  established  policy  to  remove  from  this  hemisphere  all 
causes  of  difference  with  powers  beyond  the  sea,  I  shall  renew 
the  efforts  heretofore  made  to  bring  about  a  restoration  of  diplo- 
matic relations  between  the  disputants  and  to  induce  a  reference 
to  arbitration,  a  resort  which  Great  Britain  so  conspicuously 
favors  in  principle  and  respects  in  practice  and  which  is  earnestly 
sought  by  her  weaker  adversary." 

And  February  22,  1895,  a  joint  resolution  of  Congress  declared 
"  That  the  President's  suggestion  .  .  .  that  Great  Britain  and 
Venezuela  refer  their  dispute  as  to  boundaries  to  friendly  arbitra- 
tion be  earnestly  recommended  to  the  favorable  consideration  of 
both  parties  in  interest." 

The  important  features  of  the  existing  situation,  as  shown  by 
the  foregoing  recital,  may  be  briefly  stated. 

1.  The  title  to  territory  of  indefinite  but  confessedly  very  large 
extent  is  in  dispute  between  Great  Britain  on  the  one  hand  and 
the  South  American  Republic  of  Venezuela  on  the  other. 

2.  The  disparity  in  the  strength  of  the  claimants  is  such  that 
Venezuela  can  hope  to  establish  her  claim  only  through  peaceful 
methods  —  through  an  agreement  with  her  adversary  either  upon 
the  subject  itself  or  upon  an  arbitration. 

3.  The  controversy,  with  varying  claims  on  the  part  of  Great 
Britain,  has  existed  for  more  than  half  a  century,  during  which 


420  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

period  many  earnest  and  persistent  efforts  of  Venezuela  to  estab- 
lish a  boundary  by  agreement  have  proved  unsuccessful. 

4.  The  futility  of  the  endeavor  to  obtain  a  conventional  line 
being  recognized,  Venezuela  for  a  quarter  of  a  century  has  asked 
and  striven  for  arbitration. 

5.  Great  Britain,  however,  has  always  and  continuously  refused 
to  arbitrate,  except  upon  the  condition  of  a  renunciation  of  a  large 
jjart  of  the  Venezuelan  claim  and  of  a  concession  to  herself  of  a 
large  share  of  the  territory  in  controversy. 

6.  By  the  frequent  interposition  of  its  good  offices  at  the 
instance  of  Venezuela,  by  constantly  urging  and  promoting  the 
restoi-ation  of  diplomatic  relations  between  the  two  countries,  by 
pressing  for  arbitration  of  the  disputed  boundary,  by  offering  ta 
act  as  arbitrator,  by  expressing  its  grave  concern  whenever  new 
alleged  instances  of  British  aggression  upon  Venezuelan  territory 
have  been  brought  to  its  notice,  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  has  made  it  clear  to  Great  Britain  and  to  the  world  that 
the  controversy  is  one  in  which  both  its  honor  and  its  interests 
are  involved  and  the  continuance  of  which  it  cannot  regard  with 
indifference. 

The  accuracy  of  the  foregoing  analysis  of  the  existing  status 
cannot,  it  is  believed,  \ye  challenged.  It  shows  that  status  to  be 
such  that  those  charged  with  the  interests  of  the  United  States 
are  now  forced  to  determine  exactly  what  those  interests  are  and 
what  course  of  action  they  require.  It  compels  them  to  decide 
to  what  extent,  if  any,  the  United  States  may  and  should  inter- 
vene in  a  controversy  between  and  primarily  concerning  only 
Great  Britain  and  Venezuela  and  to  decide  how  far  it  is  bound 
to  see  that  the  integrity  of  Venezuelan  territory  is  not  impaired 
by  the  pretensions  of  its  powerful  antagonist.  Are  any  such  right 
and  duty  devolved  upon  the  United  States  ?  If  not,  the  United 
States  has  already  done  all,  if  not  more  than  all,  that  a  purely 
sentimental  interest  in  the  affairs  of  the  two  countries  justifies,, 
and  to  push  its  interposition  further  would  be  unbecoming  and 
undignified  and  might  well  subject  it  to  the  charge  of  impertinent 
intermeddling  with  affairs  with  which  it  has  no  rightful  concern. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  any  such  right  and  duty  exist,  their  due 
exercise  and  discharge  will  not  permit  of  any  action  that  shall 
not  be  efficient  and  that,  if  the  power  of  the  United  States  is  ade- 
quate, shall  not  result  in  the  accomplishment  of  the  end  in  view. 
The  question  thus  presented,  as  matter  of  principle  and  regard 
being  had  to  the  settled  national  policy,  does  not  seem  difficult 
of  solution.  Yet  the  momentous  practical  consequences  depend- 
ent upon  its  determination  require  that  it  should  be  carefully  con- 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  421 

sidered  and  that  the  grounds  of  the  conclusion  arrived  at  should 
be  fully  and  frankly  stated. 

That  there  are  circumstances  under  which  a  nation  may  justly 
interpose  in  a  controversy  to  which  two  or  more  other  nations  are 
the  direct  and  immediate  parties  is  an  admitted  canon  of  inter- 
national law.  The  doctrine  is  ordinarily  expressed  in  terms  of 
the  most  general  character  and  is  perhaps  incapable  of  more  spe- 
cific statement.  It  is  declared  in  substance  that  a  nation  may 
avail  itself  of  this  right  whenever  what  is  done  or  proposed  by 
any  of  the  parties  primarily  concerned  is  a  serious  and  direct 
menace  to  its  own  integrity,  tranquillity,  or  welfare.  The  propri- 
ety of  the  rule  when  applied  in  good  faith  will  not  be  questioned 
in  any  quarter.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  an  inevitable  though 
unfortunate  consequence  of  the  wide  scope  of  the  rule  that  it  has 
only  too  often  been  made  a  cloak  for  schemes  of  wanton  spoliation 
and  aggrandizement.  We  are  concerned  at  this  time,  however, 
not  so  much  with  the  general  rule  as  with  a  form  of  it  which  is 
peculiarly  and  distinctively  American.  Washington,  in  the  sol- 
emn admonitions  of  the  Farewell  Address,  explicitly  warned  his 
countrymen  against  entanglements  with  the  politics  or  the  con- 
troversies of  European  powers. 

"  Europe  has  a  set  of  primary  interests  which  to  us  have  none 
or  a  very  remote  relation.  Hence  she  must  be  engaged  in  fre- 
quent controversies  the  causes  of  which  are  essentially  foreign 
to  our  concerns.  Hence,  therefore,  it  must  be  unwise  in  us 
to  implicate  ourselves  by  artificial  ties  in  the  ordinary  vicissi- 
tudes of  her  politics  or  the  ordinary  combinations  and  collisions 
of  her  friendships  or  enmities.  Our  detached  and  distant  situa- 
tion invites  and  enables  us  to  pursue  a  different  course." 

During  the  administration  of  President  Monroe  this  doctrine 
of  the  Farewell  Address  was  first  considered  in  all  its  aspects- 
and  with  a  view  to  all  its  practical  consequences.  The  Farewell 
Address,  while  it  took  America  out  of  the  field  of  European  poli- 
tics, was  silent  as  to  the  part  Europe  might  be  permitted  to  play 
in  America.  Doubtless  it  was  thought  the  latest  addition  to  the 
family  of  nations  should  not  make  haste  to  prescribe  rules  for  the 
guidance  of  its  older  members,  and  the  expediency  and  propriety 
of  serving  the  powers  of  Europe  with  notice  of  a  complete  and 
distinctive  American  policy  excluding  them  from  interference 
with  American  political  affairs  might  well  seem  dubious  to  a. 
generation  to  whom  the  French  alliance,  with  its  manifold  advan- 
tages to  the  cause  of  American  independence,  was  fresh  in  mind. 


422  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

Twenty  years  later,  however,  the  situation  had  changed.  The 
lately  born  nation  had  greatly  increased  in  power  and  resources, 
had  demonstrated  its  strength  on  land  and  sea  and  as  well  in  the 
conflicts  of  arms  as  in  the  pursuits  of  peace,  and  had  begun  to 
realize  the  commanding  position  on  this  continent  which  the  char- 
acter of  its  people,  their  free  institutions,  and  their  remoteness 
from  the  chief  scene  of  European  contentions  combined  to  give 
to  it.  The  Monroe  administration  therefore  did  not  hesitate  to 
accept  and  apply  the  logic  of  the  Farewell  Address  by  declaring 
in  effect  that  American  non-intervention  in  European  affairs  neces- 
sarily implied  and  meant  European  non-intervention  in  American 
affairs.  Conceiving  uncjuestionably  that  complete  European  non- 
interference in  American  concerns  would  be  cheaply  purchased 
by  complete  American  non-interference  in  European  concerns. 
President  Monroe,  in  the  celebrated  Message  of  December  2, 1823, 
used  the  following  language :  .  .  . 

'  The  Monroe  administration,  however,  did  not  content  itself 
with  formulating  a  correct  rule  for  the  regulation  of  the  rela- 
tions between  Europe  and  America.  It  aimed  at  also  securing 
the  practical  benefits  to  result  from  the  application  of  the  rule. 
Henc^  the  message  just  quoted  declared  that  the  American  conti- 
nents were  fully  occupied  and  were  not  the  subjects  for  future 
colonization  by  European  })ower8.  To  this  spirit  and  this  pur- 
pose, also,  are  to  be  attributed  the  passages  of  the  same  message 
which  treat  any  infringement  of  the  rule  against  interference  in 
American  affairs  on  the  part  of  the  powers  of  Europe  as  an  act 
of  unfriendliness  to  the  United  States.  It  was  realized  that  it 
was  futile  to  lay  down  such  a  rule  unless  its  observance  could  be 
enforced.  It  was  manifest  that  the  United  States  was  the  only 
power  in  this  hemisphere  capable  of  enforcing  it.  It  was  there- 
fore courageously  declared  not  merely  that  Europe  ought  not  to 
interfere  in  American  affairs,  but  that  any  European  power  doing 
so  would  be  regarded  as  antagonizing  the  interests  and  inviting 
the  opposition  of  the  United  States. 

That  America  is  in  no  part  open  to  colonization,  though  the 
proposition  was  not  universally  admitted  at  the  time  of  its  first 
enunciation,  has  long  been  universally  conceded.  We  are  now 
concerned,  therefore,  only  with  that  other  practical  application 
of  the  Monroe  doctrine  the  disregard  of  which  by  an  European 
power  is  to  be  deemed  an  act  of  unfriendliness  towards  the  United 
States.  The  precise  scope  and  limitations  of  this  rule  cannot  be 
too  clearly  apprehended.  It  does  not  establish  any  general  pro- 
tectorate by  the  United  States  over  other  American  states.  It 
■does  not  relieve  any  American  state  from  its  obligations  as  fixed 


THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE  423 

by  international  law  nor  prevent  any  European  power  directly 
interested  from  enforcing  such  obligations  or  from  inflicting  mer- 
ited punishment  for  the  breach  of  them.  It  does  not  contemplate 
any  interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of  any  American  state  or 
in  the  relations  between  it  and  other  American  states.  It  does 
not  justify  any  attempt  on  our  part  to  change  the  established 
form  of  government  of  any  American  state  or  to  prevent  the 
people  of  such  state  from  altering  that  form  according  to  their 
own  will  and  pleasure.  The  rule  in  question  has  but  a  single  y 
purpose  and  object.  It  is  that  no  European  power  or  combina- 
tion of  European  powers  shall  forcibly  deprive  an  American  state 
of  the  right  and  power  of  self-government  and  of  shaping  for 
itself  its  own  political  fortunes  and  destinies. 

That  the  rule  thus  defined  has  been  the  accepted  public  law 
of  this  country  ever  since  its  promulgation  cannot  fairly  be 
denied.  Its  pronouncement  by  the  Monroe  administration  at 
that  particular  time  was  unquestionably  due  to  the  inspiration 
of  Great  Britain,  who  at  once  gave  to  it  an  open  and  unqualified 
adhesion  which  has  never  been  withdrawn.  But  the  rule  was 
decided  upon  and  formulated  by  the  Monroe  administration  as 
a  distinctively  American  doctrine  of  great  import  to  the  safety 
and  welfare  of  the  United  States  after  the  most  careful  considera- 
tion by  a  Cabinet  which  numbered  among  its  members  John  Quincy 
Adams,  Calhoun,  Crawford,  and  Wirt,  and  which  before  acting  took 
both  Jefferson  and  Madison  into  its  counsels.  Its  promulgation 
was  received  with  acclaim  by  the  entire  people  of  the  country 
irrespective  of  party.  Three  years  after,  Webster  declared  that 
the  doctrine  involved  the  honor  of  the  country.  "I  look  upon 
it,"  he  said,  "as  part  of  its  treasures  of  reputation,  and  for  one 
I  intend  to  guard  it,"  and  he  added, 

"  I  look  on  the  message  of  December,  1823,  as  forming  a  bright 
page  in  our  history.  I  will  help  neither  to  erase  it  nor  to  tear  it 
out ;  nor  shall  it  be  by  any  act  of  mine  blurred  or  blotted.  It  did 
honor  to  the  sagacity  of  the  Government,  and  I  will  not  diminish 
that  honor." 

Though  the  rule  thus  highly  eulogized  by  Webster  has  never 
been  formally  affirmed  by  Congress,  the  House  in  1864  declared 
against  the  Mexican  monarchy  sought  to  be  set  up  by  the  French 
as  not  in  accord  with  the  policy  of  the  United  States,  and  in  1889 
the  Senate  expressed  its  disapproval  of  the  connection  of  any 
European  power  with  a  canal  across  the  Isthmus  of  Darien  or 
Central  America.     It  is  manifest  that,  if  a  rule  has  been  openly 


424  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

and  uniformly  declared  and  acted  upon  by  the  executive  branch 
of  the  Government  for  more  than  seventy  years  without  express 
repudiation  by  Congress,  it  must  be  conclusively  presumed  ta 
have  its  sanction.  Yet  it  is  certainly  no  more  than  the  exact 
truth  to  say  that  every  administration  since  President  Monroe's 
has  had  occasion,  and  sometimes  more  occasions  than  one,  to 
examine  and  consider  the  Monroe  doctrine  and  has  in  each 
instance  given  it  emphatic  endorsement.  Presidents  have  dwelt 
upon  it  in  messages  to  Congress  and  Secretaries  of  State  have 
time  after  time  made  it  the  theme  of  diplomatic  representation. 
Nor,  if  the  practical  results  of  the  rule  be  sought  for,  is  the 
record  either  meagre  or  obscure.  Its  first  and  immediate  effect 
was  indeed  most  momentous  and  far  reaching.  It  was  the  con- 
trolling factor  in  the  emancipation  of  South  America  and  to  it  the 
independent  states  which  now  divide  that  region  between  them 
are  largely  indebted  for  their  very  existence.  Since  then  the  most 
striking  single  achievement  to  be  credited  to  the  rule  is  the  evacu- 
ation of  Mexico  by  the  French  upon  the  termination  of  the  civil 
war.  But  we  are  also  indebted  to  it  for  the  provisions  of  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  which  Ijoth  neutralized  any  interoceania 
canal  across  Central  America  and  expressly  excluded  Great  Brit- 
ain from  occupying  or  exercising  any  dominion  over  any  part  of 
Central  America.  It  has  been  used  in  the  case  of  Cuba  as  if  jus- 
tifying the  i)osition  that,  while  the  sovereignty  of  Spain  will  be 
respected,  the  island  will  not  be  permitted  to  become  the  posses- 
sion of  any  other  European  power.  It  has  been  influential  in 
bringing  about  the  definite  relinquishment  of  any  supposed  pro- 
tectorate by  Great  Britain  over  the  Mosquito  Coast. 

President  Polk,  in  the  case  of  Yucatan  and  the  proposed  volun 
tary  transfer  of  that  country  to  Great  Britain  or  Spain,  relied 
upon  the  ^lonroe  doctrine,  though  perhaps  erroneously,  when  lie 
declared  in  a  special  message  to  Congress  on  the  subject  that  the 
United  States  could  not  consent  to  any  such  transfer.  Yet,  in 
somewhat  the  same  spirit.  Secretary  Fish  affirmed  in  1870  that 
President  Grant  had  but  followed  "the  teachings  of  all  our  his- 
tory "  in  declaring  in  his  annual  message  of  that  year  that  exist- 
ing dependencies  were  no  longer  regarded  as  subject  to  transfer 
from  one  Euroi)ean  power  to  another,  and  that  when  the  present 
relation  of  colonies  ceases  they  are  to  become  independent  powers. 
Another  development  of  the  rule,  though  apparently  not  neces- 
sarily required  by  either  its  letter  or  its  spirit,  is  found  in  the 
objection  to  arbitration  of  South  American  controversies  by  an 
European  power.  American  questions,  it  is  said,  are  for  Ameri- 
can decision,  and  on  that  ground  the  United  States  went  so  far  as. 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  425 

to  refuse  to  mediate  in  the  war  between  Chili  and  Peru  jointly 
with  Great  Britain  and  France.  Finally,  on  the  ground,  among 
others,  that  the  authority  of  the  Monroe  doctrine  and  the  prestige 
of  the  United  States  as  its  exponent  and  sponsor  would  be  seri- 
ously impaired,  Secretary  Bayard  strenuously  resisted  the  enforce- 
ment of  the  Pelletier  claim  against  Hayti. 

"  The  United  States,  [he  said,]  has  proclaimed  herself  the  pro- 
tector of  this  western  world,  in  which  she  is  by  far  the  stronger 
power,  from  the  intrusion  of  European  sovereignties.  She  can 
point  with  proud  satisfaction  to  the  fact  that  over  and  over  again 
has  she  declared  effectively,  that  serious  indeed  would  be  the 
consequences  if  European  hostile  foot  should,  without  just  cause, 
tread  those  states  in  the  Kew  World  which  have  emancipated 
themselves  from  European  control.  She  has  announced  that  she 
would  cherish  as  it  becomes  her  the  territorial  rights  of  the  feeblest 
of  those  states,  regarding  them  not  merely  as  in  the  eye  of  the 
law  equal  to  even  the  greatest  of  nationalities,  but  in  view  of  her 
distinctive  policy  as  entitled  to  be  regarded  by  her  as  the  objects 
of  a  peculiarly  gracious  care.  I  feel  bound  to  say  that  if  we 
should  sanction  by  reprisals  in  Hayti  the  ruthless  invasion  of  her 
territory  and  insult  to  her  sovereignty  which  the  facts  now  before 
us  disclose,  if  we  approve  by  solemn  Executive  action  and  Con- 
gressional assent  that  invasion,  it  will  be  difficult  for  us  hereafter 
to  assert  that  in  the  New  World,  of  whose  rights  we  are  the 
peculiar  guardians,  these  rights  have  never  been  invaded  by 
ourselves." 

The  foregoing  enumeration  not  only  shows  the  many  instances 
wherein  the  rule  in  question  has  been  affirmed  and  applied,  but 
also  demonstrates  that  the  Venezuelan  boundary  controversy  is  in 
any  view  far  within  the  scope  and  spirit  of  the  rule  as  uniformly 
accepted  and  acted  upon.  A  doctrine  of  American  public  law  thus 
long  and  firmly  established  and  supported  could  not  easily  be 
ignored  in  a  proper  case  for  its  application,  even  were  the  con- 
siderations upon  which  it  is  founded  obscure  or  questionable.  No 
such  objection  can  be  made,  however,  to  the  Monroe  doctrine 
understood  and  defined  m  the  manner  already  stated.  It  rests, 
on  the  contrary,  upon  facts  and  principles  that  are  both  intelligible 
and  incontrovertible.  That  distance  and  three  thousand  miles  of 
intervening  ocean  make  any  permanent  political  union  between 
an  European  and  an  American  state  unnatural  and  inexpedient 
will  hardly  be  denied.  But  physical  and  geographical  considera- 
tions are  the  least  of  the  objections  to  such  a  union.  Europe,  as 
Washington  observed,  has  a  set  of  primary  interests  which  are 


/^ 


/ 


426  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

peculiar  to  herself.  America  is  not  interested  in  tliem  and  ought 
not  to  be  vexed  or  complicated  with  them.  Each  great  European 
power,  lor  instance,  to-day  maintains  enormous  armies  and  fleets 
in  self-defence  and  for  protection  against  any  other  European 
power  or  powers.  What  have  the  states  of  America  to  do  with 
that  condition  of  things,  or  why  should  they  be  impoverished  by 
wars  or  preparations  for  wars  with  whose  causes  or  results  they 
can  have  no  direct  concern  ?  If  all  Europe  were  to  suddenly  fly 
to  arms  over  the  fate  of  Turkey,  would  it  not  be  preposterous  that 
any  American  state  should  find  itself  inextricably  involved  in  the 
miseries  and  burdens  of  the  contest?  If  it  were,  it  would  prove 
to  be  a  partnership  in  the  cost  and  losses  of  the  struggle  but  not 
in  any  ensuing  benefits. 

What  is  true  of  the  material,  is  no  less  true  of  what  may  be 
termed  the  moral  interests  involved.  Those  pertaining  to  Europe 
are  peculiar  to  her  and  are  entirely  diverse  from  those  pertaining 
and  peculiar  to  America.  Europe  as  a  whole  is  monarchical,  and, 
with  the  single  im|)ortant  exception  of  the  Republic  of  France,  is 
committed  to  the  monarchical  principle.  America,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  devoted  to  the  exactly  opposite  principle  —  to  the  idea 
that  every  i)eople  has  an  inalienable  right  of  self-government  — 
and,  in  the  United  States  of  America,  has  furnished  to  the  world 
the  most  conspicuous  and  conclusive  example  and  proof  of  the 
excellence  of  free  institutions,  whether  from  the  standpoint  of 
national  greatness  or  of  individual  happiness.  It  cannot  be 
necessary,  however,  to  enlarge  u])on  this  phase  of  the  subject — 
whether  moral  or  material  interests  be  considered,  it  cannot  but 
be  universally  conceded  that  those  of  Europe  are  irreconcilably 
diverse  from  those  of  America,  and  that  any  European  control  of 
the  latter  is  necessarily  both  incongruous  and  injurious.  If,  how- 
ever, for  the  reasons  stated  the  forcible  intrusion  of  European 
powers  into  American  politics  is  to  be  deprecated  —  if,  as  it  is 
to  be  deprecated,  it  should  be  resisted  and  prevented — such 
resistance  and  prevention  must  come  from  the  United  States. 
They  would  come  from  it,  of  course,  were  it  made  the  point  of 
attack.  But,  if  they  come  at  all,  they  must  also  come  from  it 
when  any  other  American  state  is  attacked,  since  only  the  United 
States  has  the  strength  adequate  to  the  exigency. 

Is  it  true,  then,  that  the  safety  and  welfare  of  the  United  States 
are  so  concerned  with  the  maintenance  of  the  independence  of 
ever}^  American  state  as  against  any  European  power  as  to  justify 
and  require  the  interposition  of  the  United  States  whenever  that 
independence  is  endangered?  The  question  can  be  candidly 
answered  in  but  one  way.     The  states  of  America,  South  as  well 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE  427 

as  North,  by  geographical  proximity,  by  natural  sympathy,  by 
similarity  of  governmental  constitutions,  are  friends  and  allies, 
commercially  and  politically,  of  the  United  States.  To  allow  the 
subjugation  of  any  of  them  by  an  European  power  is,  of  course,  to 
completely  reverse  that  situation  and  signifies  the  loss  of  all  the 
advantages  nicident  to  their  natural  relations  to  us.  But  that  is 
not  all.  The  people  of  the  United  States  have  a  vital  interest  in 
the  cause  of  popular  self-government.  They  have  secured  the 
right  for  themselves  and  their  posterity  at  the  cost  of  infinite 
blood  and  treasure.  They  have  realized  and  exemplified  its 
beneficent  operation  by  a  career  unexampled  in  point  of  national 
greatness  or  individual  felicity.  They  believe  it  to  be  for  the 
healing  of  all  nations,  and  that  civilization  must  either  advance 
or  retrograde  accordingly  as  its  supremacy  is  extended  or  cur- 
tailed. Imbued  with  these  sentiments,  the  people  of  the  United 
States  might  not  impossibly  be  wrought  up  to  an  active  propa- 
ganda in  favor  of  a  cause  so  highly  valued  both  for  themselves 
and  for  mankind.  But  the  age  of  the  Crusades  has  passed,  and 
they  are  content  with  such  assertion  and  defence  of  the  right  of 
popular  self-government  as  their  own  security  and  welfare  de- 
mand. It  is  in  that  view  more  than  in  any  other  that  they  believe 
it  not  to  be  tolerated  that  the  political  control  of  an  American 
state  shall  be  forcibly  assumed  by  an  European  power. 

The  mischiefs  apprehended  from  such  a  source  are  none  the 
less  real  because  not  immediately  imminent  in  any  specific  case, 
and  are  none  the  less  to  be  guarded  against  because  the  combina- 
tion of  circumstances  that  will  bring  them  upon  us  cannot  be  pre- 
dicted. The  civilized  states  of  Christendom  deal  with  each  other 
on  substantially  the  same  principles  that  regulate  the  conduct  of 
individuals.  The  greater  its  enlightenment,  the  more  surely 
every  state  perceives  that  its  permanent  interests  require  it  to  be- 
governed  by  the  immutable  principles  of  right  and  justice.  Each, 
nevertheless,  is  only  too  liable  to  succumb  to  the  temptations 
offered  by  seeming  special  opportunities  for  its  own  aggrandize- 
ment, and  each  would  rashly  imperil  its  own  safely  were  it  not  to 
remember  that  for  the  regard  and  respect  of  other  states  it  must 
be  largely  dependent  upon  its  own  strength  and  power.  To-day 
the  United  States  is  practically  sovereign  on  this  continent,  and 
its  fiat  is  law  upon  the  subjects  to  which  it  confines  its  interpo- 
sition. Why  ?  It  is  not  because  of  the  pure  friendship  or  good 
will  felt  for  it.  It  is  not  simply  by  reason  of  its  high  character 
as  a  civilized  state*  nor  because  wisdom  and  justice  and  equity  are 
the  invariable  characteristics  of  the  dealings  of  the  United  States. 
It  is  because,  in  addition  to  all  other  grounds,  its  infinite  resources 


428  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

combined  with  its  isolated  position  render  it  master  of  the  situa- 
tion and  practically  invulnerable  as  against  any  or  all  other 
powers. 

All  the  advantages  of  this  superiority  are  at  once  imperilled  if 
the  principle  be  admitted  that  European  powers  may  convert 
American  states  into  colonies  or  provinces  of  their  own^  The 
principle  would  be  eagerly  availed  of,  and  every  power  doing  so 
would  immediately  acquire  a  base  of  military  ojierations  against 
us^  What  one  power  was  ])ermitted  to  do  coukl  not  be  denied 
to  another,  and  it  is  not  inconceivable  that  the  struggle  now  going 
on  for  the  acquisition  of  Africa  might  be  transferred  to  South 
America.  If  it  were,  the  weaker  countries  would  unquestionably 
be  soon  absorbed,  while  the  ultimate  result  might  be  the  partition 
of  all  South  America  l)etween  the  various  European  powers.  The 
disastrous  consequences  to  the  United  States  of  such  a  condition 
of  things  are  obvious.  The  loss  of  prestige,  of  authority,  and  of 
weight  in  the  councils  of  the  family  of  nations,  would  l)e  among 
the  least  of  them.  Our  only  real  rivals  in  peace  as  well  as  ene- 
mies in  war  would  l)e  found  located  at  our  very  doors.  Thus  far 
m  our  history  we  have  been  spared  the  burdens  and  evils  of 
immense  standing  armies  and  all  the  other  accessories  of  huge 
warlike  establishments,  and  the  exemption  has  largely  contributed 
to  our  national  greatness  and  wealth  as  well  as  to  the  happiness 
of  every  citizen.  Ihit,  with  the  powers  of  Europe  ])ermanently 
encamped  on  American  soil,  the  ideal  conditions  we  have  thus  far 
enjoyed  cannot  be  expected  to  continue.  We  too  must  be  armed 
to  the  teeth,  we  too  must  convert  the  flower  of  our  male  population 
into  soldiers  and  sailors,  and  by  withdrawing  them  from  the  vari- 
ous pursuits  of  peaceful  industry  we  too  must  practically  annihilate 
a  large  share  of  the  productive  energy  of  the  nation. 

How  a  greater  calamity  than  this  could  overtake  us  it  is  difficult 
to  see.  Nor  are  our  just  apprehensions  to  be  allayed  by  sugges- 
tions of  the  friendliness  of  European  powers  —  of  their  good  will 
towards  us  —  of  their  disposition,  should  they  be  our  neighbors, 
to  dwell  with  us  in  peace  and  harmony.  The  people  of  the  United 
States  have  learned  in  the  school  of  experience  to  what  extent  the 
relations  of  states  to  each  other  depend  not  upon  sentiment  nor 
principle,  but  upon  selfish  interest.  They  will  not  soon  forget 
that,  in  their  hour  of  distress,  all  their  anxieties  and  burdens 
were  aggravated  by  the  possibility  of  demonstrations  against 
their  national  life  on  the  part  of  powers  with  whom  they  had 
long  maintained  the  most  harmonious  relations.  They  have  yet 
in  mind  that  France  seized  upon  the  apparent  opportunity  of  our 
civil  war  to  set  up  a  monarchy  in  the  adjoining  state  of  Mexico. 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  429 

They  realize  that  had  France  and  Great  Britain  held  important 
South  American  possessions  to  work  from  and  to  benefit,  the 
temptation  to  destroy  the  predominance  of  the  Great  Republic  in 
this  hemisphere  by  furthering  its  dismemberment  might  have 
been  irresistible.  From  that  grave  peril  they  have  been  saved  in  ^ 
the  past  and  may  be  saved  again  in  the  future  through  the  opera- 
tion of  the  sure  but  silent  force  of  the  doctrine  proclaimed  by 
President  Monroe.  To  abandon  it,  on  the  other  hand,  disregard- 
ing both  the  logic  of  the  situation  and  the  facts  of  our  past  expe- 
rience, would  be  to  renounce  a  policy  which  has  proved  both  an 
•easy  defence  against  foreign  aggression  and  a  prolific  source  of 
internal  progress  and  prosperity. 

There  is,  then,  a  doctrine  of  American  public  law,  well  founded 
in  principle  and  abundantly  sanctioned  by  precedent,  which 
-entitles  and  requires  the  United  States  to  treat  as  an  injury  to 
itself  the  forcible  assumption  by  an  European  power  of  political 
control  over  an  American  state.  The  application  of  the  doctrine 
to  the  boundary  dispute  between  Great  Britain  and  Venezuela  ^ 
remains  to  be  made  and  presents  no  real  difficulty.  Though  the 
dispute  relates  to  a  boundary  line,  yet,  as  it  is  between  states,  it 
necessarily  imports  political  control  to  be  lost  by  one  party  and 
-gained  by  the  other.  The  political  control  at  stake,  too,  is  of  no 
mean  importance,  but  concerns  a  domain  of  great  extent  —  the 
British  claim,  it  will  be  remembered,  apparently  expanded  in  two 
years  some  33,000  square  miles — and,  if  it  also  directly  involves 
the  command  of  the  mouth  of  the  Orinoco,  is  of  immense  conse- 
quence in  connection  with  the  whole  river  navigation  of  the 
interior  of  South  America.  It  has  been  intimated,  indeed,  that 
in  respect  of  these  South  American  possessions  Great  Britain  is 
herself  an  American  state  like  any  other,  so  that  a  controversy 
between  her  and  Venezuela  is  to  be  settled  between  themselves 
as  if  it  were  between  Venezuela  and  Brazil  or  between  Venezuela 
and  Colombia,  and  does  not  call  for  or  justify  United  States 
intervention.  If  this  view  be  tenable  at  all,  the  logical  sequence  , 
is  plain. 

Great  Britain  as  a  South  American  state  is  to  be  entirely  differ- 
entiated from  Great  Britain  generally,  and  if  the  boundary  ques- 
tion cannot  be  settled  otherwise  than  by  force,  British  Guiana, 
with  her  own  independent  resources  and  not  those  of  the  British 
Empire,  should  be  left  to  settle  the  matter  with  Venezuela  —  an 
nrrangement  which  very  possibly  Venezuela  might  not  object  to. 
But  the  proposition  that  an  European  power  with  an  American 
■dependency  is  for  the  purposes  of  the  Monroe  doctrine  to  be 
■classed  not  as  an  European  but  as  an  American  state  will  not 


430  AMERICAN    DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

admit  of  serious  discussion.  If  it  were  to  be  adopted,  the  Monroe 
doctrine  would  be  too  valueless  to  be  worth  asserting.  Not  only 
would  every  European  power  now  having  a  South  American 
colony  be  enabled  to  extend  its  possessions  on  this  continent 
indefinitely,  but  any  other  European  power  might  also  do  the 
same  by  first  taking  pains  to  procure  a  fraction  of  South  American 
soil  by  voluntary  cession. 

The  declaration  of  the  Monroe  message  —  that  existing  colonies 
or  dependencies  of  an  li^uropean  power  would  not  be  interfered 
with  by  the  United  States  —  means  colonies  or  dependencies  then 
existing,  with  their  limits  as  then  existing.  So  it  has  been  inva- 
riably construed,  and  so  it  must  continue  to  be  construed  unless  it 
is  to  be  deprived  of  all  vital  force.  Great  Britain  cannot  be 
deemed  a  South  American  state  within  the  purview  of  the  Monroe 
doctrine,  nor,  if  she  is  appropriating  Venezuelan  territory,  is  it 
material  that  she  does  so  by  advancing  the  frontier  of  an  old 
colony  instead  of  by  the  planting  of  a  new  colony.  The  differ- 
ence is  matter  of  form  and  not  of  substance  and  the  doctrine  if 
pertinent  in  the  one  case  must  be  in  the  other  also.  It  is  not 
admitte<l,  however,  and  therefore  cannot  be  assumed,  that  Great 
Britain  is  in  fact  usurping  dominion  over  Venezuelan  territory. 
AVhile  Venezuela  charges  such  usurpation,  Great  Britain  denies 
it,  and  the  United  States,  until  the  merits  are  authoritatively 
ascertained,  can  take  sides  with  neither.  But  while  this  is  so  — 
while  the  United  States  may  not,  under  existing  circumstances 
at  least,  take  upon  itself  to  say  which  of  the  two  parties  is  right 
and  which  wrong —  it  is  certainly  within  its  right  to  demand  that 
the  truth  shall  be  ascertained.  Being  entitled  to  resent  and  resist 
any  sequestration  of  Venezuelan  soil  by  Great  Britain,  it  is  neces- 
sarily entitled  to  know  whether  such  sec  i  nest  rat  ion  has  occurred 
or  is  now  going  on.  Otherwise,  if  the  United  States  is  without 
the  right  to  know  and  have  it  determined  whether  there  is  or  is 
not  British  aggression  upon  Venezuelan  territory,  its  right  to  pro- 
test against  or  repel  such  aggression  may  be  dismissed  from 
consideration. 

The  right  to  act  upon  a  fact  the  existence  of  which  there  is  no 
right  to  have  ascertained  is  simply  illusory.  It  being  clear, 
therefore,  that  the  United  States  may  legitimately  insist  upon 
the  merits  of  the  boundary  question  being  determined,  it  is 
equally  clear  that  there  is  but  one  feasible  mode  of  determining 
them,  viz.,  peaceful  arbitration.  The  impracticability  of  any 
conventional  adjustment  has  been  often  and  thoroughly  demon- 
strated. Even  more  impossible  of  consideration  is  an  iippeal  to 
arms  —  a  mode  of  settling  national  pretensions  unhappily  not  yet 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  431      « 

wholly  obsolete.  If,  however,  it  were  not  condemnable  as  a  relic 
of  barbarism  and  a  crime  in  itself,  so  one-sided  a  contest  could 
not  be  invited  nor  even  accepted  by  Great  Britain  without  dis- 
tinct disparagement  to  her  character  as  a  civilized  state.  Great 
Britain,  however,  assumes  no  such  attitude.  On  the  contrary, 
she  both  admits  that  there  is  a  controversy  and  that  arbitration 
should  be  resorted  to  for  its  adjustment.  But,  while  up  to  that 
point  her  attitude  leaves  nothing  to  be  desired,  its  practical  effect 
is  completely  nullified  by  her  insistence  that  the  submission  shall 
cover  but  a  part  of  the  controversy  —  that,  as  a  condition  of  arbi-  ^  ' 
trating  her  right  to  a  part  of  the  disputed  territory,  the  remainder 
shall  be  turned  over  to  her.  If  it  were  possible  to  point  to  a 
boundary  which  both  parties  had  ever  agreed  or  assumed  to  be 
such  either  expressly  or  tacitly,  the  demand  that  territory  con- 
ceded by  such  line  to  British  Guiana  should  be  held  not  to  be  in 
dispute  might  rest  upon  a  reasonable  basis.  But  there  is  no  such 
line.  The  territory  which  Great  Britain  insists  shall  be  ceded  to  / 
her  as  a  condition  of  arbitrating  her  claim  to  other  territory  has  ^ 
never  been  admitted  to  belong  to  her.  It  has  always  and  con- 
sistently been  claimed  by  Venezuela. 

Upon  what  principle  —  except  her  feebleness  as  a  nation  —  is 
she  to  be  denied  the  right  of  having  the  claim  heard  and  passed 
upon  by  an  impartial  tribunal?  No  reason  nor  shadow  of  reason 
appears  in  all  the  voluminous  literature  of  the  subject.  "  It  is  to  ^ 
be  so  because  I  will  it  to  be  so"  seems  to  be  the  only  justification 
Great  Britain  offers.  It  is,  indeed,  intimated  that  the  British  y^ 
claim  to  this  particular  territory  rests  upon  an  occupation,  which,*^ 
whether  acquiesced  in  or  not,  has  ripened  into  a  perfect  title  by 
long  continuance.  But  what  prescription  affecting  territorial 
rights  can  be  said  to  exist  as  between  sovereign  states  ?  Or,  if 
there  is  any,  what  is  the  legitimate  consequence?  It  is  not  that 
all  arbitration  should  be  denied,  but  only  that  the  submission 
should  embrace  an  additional  topic,  namely,  the  validity  of  the 
asserted  prescriptive  title  either  in  point  of  law  or  in  point  of 
fact.  No  different  result  follows  from  the  contention  that  as 
matter  of  principle  Great  Britain  cannot  be  asked  to  submit  and 
ought  not  to  submit  to  arbitration  her  political  and  sovereign 
rights  over  territory.  This  contention,  if  applied  to  the  whole 
or  to  a  vital  part  of  the  possessions  of  a  sovereign  state,  need  not 
be  controverted.  To  hold  otherwise  might  be  equivalent  to  hold- 
ing that  a  sovereign  state  was  bound  to  arbitrate  its  very  existence. 

But  Great  Britain  has  herself  shown  in  various  instances  that 
the  principle  has  no  pertinency  when  either  the  interests  or  the 
territorial  area  involved  are  not  of  controlling  magnitude  and  her 


y 


432  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

loss  of  them  as  the  result  of  an  arbitration  cannot  appreciably 
affect  her  honor  or  her  power.  Thus,  she  has  arbitrated  the 
extent  of  her  colonial  possessions  twice  with  the  United  States, 
twice  with  Portugal,  and  once  with  Germany,  and  perhaps  in 
other  instances.  The  Northwest  Water  Boundary  arbitration  of 
1872  between  her  and  this  country  is  an  example  in  point  and 
well  illustrates  both  the  effect  to  be  given  to  long-continued  use 
and  enjoyment  and  the  fact  that  a  truly  great  power  sacrifices 
neither  prestige  nor  dignity  by  reconsidering  the  most  emphatic 
rejection  of  a  proposition  when  satisfied  of  the  obvious  and  intrin- 
sic justice  of  the  case.  By  the  award  of  the  Emperor  of  Ger- 
many, the  arbitrator  in  that  case,  the  United  States  acquired  San 
Juan  and  a  number  of  smaller  islands  near  the  coast  of  Van- 
couver as  a  consequence  of  the  decision  that  the  term  "  the  chan- 
nel which  separates  the  continent  from  Vancouver's  Island,"  as 
used  in  the  treaty  of  Washington  of  1846,  meant  the  Haro  chan- 
nel and  not  the  Rosario  channel.  Yet  a  leading  contention  of 
Great  Britain  before  the  arbitrator  was  that  equity  required  a 
judgment  in  her  favor  because  a  decision  in  favor  of  the  United 
States  would  deprive  British  subjects  of  rights  of  navigation  of 
which  they  had  had  the  habitual  enjoyment  from  the  time  when 
the  Rosario  Strait  was  first  explored  and  surveyed  in  1798.  So, 
though  by  virtue  of  the  award  the  United  States  acquired  San 
Juan  and  the  other  islands  of  the  group  to  which  it  belongs,  the 
British  Foreign  Secretary  had  in  1859  instructed  the  British 
Minister  at  Washington  as  follows: 

"  Her  Majesty's  Government  must,  therefore,  under  any  circum- 
stances, maintain  the  right  of  the  British  Crown  to  the  Island  of 
San  Juan.  The  interests  at  stake  in  connection  with  the  reten- 
tion of  that  Island  are  too  important  to  admit  of  compromise  and 
Your  Lordship  will  consequently  bear  in  mind  that,  whatever 
arrangement  as  to  the  boundary  line  is  finally  arrived  at,  no  set- 
tlement of  the  question  will  be  accepted  by  Her  Majesty's  Gov- 
ernment which  does  not  provide  for  the  Island  of  San  Juan  being 
reserved  to  the  British  Crown." 

Thus,  as  already  intimated,  the  British  demand  that  her  right 
to  a  portion  of  the  disputed  territory  shall  be  acknowledged  be- 
fore she  will  consent  to  an  arbitration  as  to  the  rest  seems  to 
stand  upon  nothing  but  her  own  ipse  dixit.  She  says  to  Vene- 
zuela, in  substance:  "You  can  get  none  of  the  debatable  land 
by  force,  because  you  are  not  strong  enough ;  you  can  get  none 
by  treaty,  because  I  will  not  agree ;  and  you  can  take  your  chance 
of  getting  a  portion  by  arbitration,  only  if  you  first  agree  to  aban- 


i 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  433 

don  to  me  such  other  portion  as  I  may  designate."  It  is  not 
perceived  how  such  an  attitude  can  be  defended  nor  how  it  is 
reconcilable  with  that  love  of  justice  and  fair  play  so  eminently 
characteristic  of  the  English  race.  It  in  effect  deprives  Venezuela 
of  her  free  agency  and  puts  her  under  virtual  duress.  Territory 
acquired  by  reason  of  it  will  be  as  much  wrested  from  her  by  the 
strong  hand  as  if  occupied  by  British  troops  or  covered  by  British 
fleets.  It  seems  therefore  quite  impossible  that  this  position  of 
Great  Britain  should  be  assented  to  by  the  United  States,  or  that, 
if  such  position  be  adhered  to  with  the  result  of  enlarging  the 
bounds  of  British  Guiana,  it  should  not  be  regarded  as  amounting, 
in  substance,  to  an  invasion  and  conquest  of  Venezuelan  territory. 

In  these  circumstances,  the  duty  of  the  President  appears  to 
him  unmistakable  and  imperative.  Great  Britain's  assertion  of 
title  to  the  disputed  territory  combined  with  her  refusal  to  have 
that  title  investigated  being  a  substantial  appropriation  of  the 
territory  to  her  own  use,  not  to  protest  and  give  warning  that  the 
transaction  will  be  regarded  as  injurious  to  the  interests 
the  people  of  the  United  States  as  well  as  oppressive  in  itself 
would  be  to  ignore  an  established  policy  with  which  the  honor 
and  welfare  of  this  country  are  closely  identified.  While  the 
measures  necessary  or  proper  for  the  vindication  of  that  policy 
are  to  be  determined  by  another  branch  of  the  Government,  it  is 
clearly  for  the  Executive  to  leave  nothing  undone  which  may 
tend  to  render  such  determination  unnecessary. 

You  are  instructed,  therefore,  to  present  the  foregoing  views 
to  Lord  Salisbury  by  reading  to  him  this  communication  (leaving 
with  him  a  copy  should  he  so  desire),  and  to  reinforce  them  by 
such  pertinent  considerations  as  will  doubtless  occur  to  you. 
They  call  for  a  definite  decision  upon  the  point  whether  Great 
Britain  will  consent  or  will  decline  to  submit  the  Venezuelan 
boundary  question  in  its  entirety  to  impartial  arbitration.  It  is 
the  earnest  hope  of  the  President  that  the  conclusion  will  be  on 
the  side  of  arbitration,  and  that  Great  Britain  will  add  one  more 
to  the  conspicuous  precedents  she  has  already  furnished  in  favor 
of  that  wise  and  just  mode  of  adjusting  international  disputes. 
If  he  is  to  be  disappointed  in  that  hope,  however — a  result  not  to 
be  anticipated  and  in  his  judgment  calculated  to  greatly  embarrass 
the  future  relations  between  this  country  and  Great  Britain  —  it 
is  his  wish  to  be  made  acquainted  with  the  fact  at  such  early  date 
as  will  enable  him  to  lay  the  whole  subject  before  Congress  in 
his  next  annual  message. 

I  am,  sir,  your  obedient  servant, 

ElCHARD    OlNEY. 
2f 


he 

tie      / 
of    / 
^If  Y 


434  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 


Lord  Salisbury  to  Sir  Julian  Pauncefote. 

No.  189.]  Foreign  Office, 

November  26,  1895. 

Sir,  On  the  7th  August  I  transmitted  to  Lord  Gough  a  copy 
of  the  despatch  from  Mr.  Olney  which  Mr.  Bayard  had  left  with 
me  that  day,  and  of  which  he  had  read  portions  to  me.  I  in- 
formed him  at  the  time  that  it  could  not  be  answered  until  it  had 
been  carefully  considered  by  the  Law  Oflfieers  of  the  Crown.  I 
have  therefore  deferred  replying  to  it  till  after  the  recess. 

I  will  not  now  deal  with  those  portions  of  it  which  are  con- 
cerned exclusively  with  the  controversy  that  has  for  some  time 
past  existed  between  the  Republic  of  Venezuela  and  Her  Majesty's 
Government  in  regard  to  the  boundary  which  separates  their  do- 
minions. I  take  a  very  different  view  from  Mr.  Olney  of  various 
matters  upon  which  he  touches  in  that  part  of  the  despatch ;  but 
I  will  defer  for  the  present  all  observation  upon  it,  as  it  concerns 
matters  which  are  not  in  themselves  of  first-rate  importance,  and 
do  not  directly  concern  the  relations  between  Great  Britain  and 
the  United  States. 

The  latter  part  however  of  the  despatch,  turning  from  the 
question  of  the  frontiers  of  Venezuela,  proceeds  to  deal  with  j)rin- 
ciples  of  a  far  wider  character,  and  to  advance  doctrines  of  inter- 
national law  which  are  of  considerable  interest  to  all  the  nations 
whose  dominions  include  any  portion  of  the  western  hemisphere. 

The  contentions  set  forth  by  Mr.  Olney  in  this  part  of  hi& 
despatch  are  represented  by  him  as  being  an  application  of  the 
political  maxims  which  are  well  known  in  American  discussion 
under  the  name  of  the  Monroe  doctrine.  As  far  as  I  am  aware^ 
this  doctrine  has  never  l)een  before  advanced  on  behalf  of  the 
United  States  in  any  written  communication  addressed  to  the 
Government  of  another  nation ;  but  it  has  been  generally  adopted 
and  assumed  as  true  by  many  eminent  writers  and  politicians  in 
the  United  States.  It  is  said  to  have  largely  influenced  the  Gov- 
ernment of  that  country  in  the  conduct  of  its  foreign  affairs: 
though  Mr.  Clayton,  who  was  Secretary  of  State  under  President 
Taylor,  expressly  stated  that  that  Administration  had  in  no  way 
adopted  it.  But  during  the  period  that  has  elapsed  since  the 
Message  of  President  Monroe  was  delivered  in  1823,  the  doctrine 
has  undergone  a  veiy  notable  development,  and  the  aspect  which 
it  now  presents  in  the  hands  of  Mr.  Olney  differs  widely  from  its- 
character  when  it  first  issued  from  the  pen  of  its  author.  The 
two  propositions  which  in  effect  President   Monroe  laid  down 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  435 

were,  first,  that  America  was  no  longer  to  be  looked  upon  as  a 
field  for  European  colonization ;  and,  secondly,  that  Europe  must 
not  attempt  to  extend  its  political  system  to  America,  or  to  con- 
trol the  political  condition  of  any  of  the  American  communities 
who  had  recently  declared  their  independence. 

The  dangers  against  which  President  Monroe  thought  it  right 
to  guard  were  not  as  imaginary  as  they  would  seem  at  the  present 
day.  The  formation  of  the  Holy  Alliance;  the  Congresses  of 
Laybach  and  Verona ;  the  invasion  of  Spain  by  France  for  the 
purpose  of  forcing  upon  the  Spanish  people  a  form  of  government 
which  seemed  likely  to  disappear,  unless  it  was  sustained  by 
external  aid,  were  incidents  fresh  in  the  mind  of  President  Mon- 
roe when  he  penned  his  celebrated  Message.  The  system  of 
which  he  speaks,  and  of  which  he  so  resolutely  deprecates  the 
application  to  the  American  Continent,  was  the  system  then 
adopted  by  certain  powerful  States  upon  the  Continent  of  Europe 
of  combining  to  prevent  by  force  of  arms  the  adoption  in  other 
countries  of  political  institutions  which  they  disliked,  and  to 
uphold  by  external  pressure  those  which  they  approved.  Various 
portions  of  South  America  had  recently  declared  their  indepen- 
dence, and  that  independence  had  not  been  recognized  by  the 
Governments  of  Spain  and  Portugal,  to  which,  with  small  excep- 
tion, the  whole  of  Central  and  South  America  were  nominally 
subject.  It  was  not  an  imaginary  danger  that  he  foresaw,  if  he 
feared  that  the  same  spirit  which  had  dictated  the  French  expe- 
dition into  Spain  might  inspire  the  more  powerful  Governments  of 
Europe  with  the  idea  of  imposing,  by  the  force  of  European  arms, 
upon  the  South  American  communities  the  form  of  government 
and  the  political  connection  which  they  had  thrown  off.  In 
declaring  that  the  United  States  would  resist  any  such  enterprise 
if  it  was  contemplated,  President  Monroe  adopted  a  policy  which 
received  the  entire  sympathy  of  the  English  Government  of  that 
date. 

The  dangers  which  were  apprehended  by  President  Monroe 
have  no  relation  to  the  state  of  things  in  which  we  live  at  the 
present  day.  There  is  no  danger  of  any  Holy  Alliance  imposing 
its  system  upon  any  portion  of  the  American  Continent,  and  there 
is  no  danger  of  any  European  State  treating  any  part  of  the 
American  Continent  as  a  fit  object  for  European  colonization.  It 
is  intelligible  that  Mr.  Olney  should  invoke,  in  defence  of  the 
views  on  which  he  is  now  insisting,  an  authority  which  enjoys  so 
high  a  popularity  with  his  own  fellow-countrymen.  But  the  cir- 
cumstances with  which  President  Monroe  was  dealing,  and  those 
to  which  the  present  American  Government  is  addressing  itself, 


436  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

have  very  few  features  in  common.  Great  Britain  is  imposing 
no  "system''  upon  Venezuela,  and  is  not  concerning  herself  in 
any  way  with  the  nature  of  the  political  institutions  under 
which  the  Venezuelans  may  prefer  to  live.  But  the  British 
Empire  and  the  Republic  of  Venezuela  are  neighbours,  and  they 
have  differed  for  some  time  past,  and  continue  to  differ,  as  to  the 
line  by  which  their  dominions  are  separated.  It  is  a  controversy 
with  which  the  United  States  have  no  apparent  practical  concern. 
It  is  difficult,  indeed,  to  see  how  it  can  materially  affect  any  State 
or  community  outside  those  primarily  interested,  except  perhaps 
other  parts  of  Her  Majesty's  dominions,  such  as  Trinidad.  The 
disputed  frontier  of  Venezuela  has  nothing  to  do  with  any  of 
the  questions  dealt  with  by  President  Monroe.  It  is  not  a  (jues- 
tion  of  the  colonization  by  a  European  Power  of  any  portion  of 
America.  It  is  not  a  question  of  the  imposition  upon  the  com- 
munities of  South  America  of  any  system  of  government 
•devised  in  Europe.  It  is  simply  the  determination  of  the  frontier 
of  a  British  possession  which  l)elonged  to  the  Throne  of  England 
long  before  the  Republic  of  Venezuela  came  into  existence.  But 
even  if  the  interests  of  Venezuela  were  so  far  linked  to  those  of 
the  United  States  as  to  give  to  the  latter  a  locua  standi  in  this 
controversy,  their  Government  apparently  have  not  formed,  and 
certainly  do  not  express,  any  opinion  upon  the  actual  merits  of 
the  dispute.  The  Government  of  the  United  States  do  not  say 
that  Great  Britain,  or  that  Venezuela,  is  in  the  right  in  the  mat- 
ters that  are  in  issue.  But  they  lay  down  that  the  doctrine  of 
President  Monroe,  when  he  opposed  the  imposition  of  European 
systems,  or  the  renewal  of  European  colonization,  confers  upon 
tliem  the  right  of  demanding  that  when  a  European  Power 
has  a  frontier  difference  with  a  South  American  community, 
the  European  Power  shall  consent  to  refer  that  controversy  to 
arbitration;  and  Mr.  Olney  states  that  unless  Her  Majesty's 
Government  accede  to  this  demand,  it  will  "greatly  embarrass 
the  future  relations  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States." 

Whatever  may  be  the  authority  of  the  doctrine  laid  down  by 
President  Monroe,  there  is  nothing  in  his  language  to  show  that 
he  ever  thought  of  claiming  this  novel  prerogative  for  the  United 
States.  It  is  admitted  that  he  did  not  seek  to  assert  a  Protector- 
ate over  Mexico,  or  the  States  of  Central  and  South  America.  Such 
a  claim  would  have  imposed  upon  the  United  States  the  duty  of 
answering  for  the  conduct  of  these  States,  and  consequently  the 
responsibility  of  controlling  it.  His  sagacious  foresight  would 
have  led  him  energetically  to  deprecate  the  addition  of  so  serious 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  43T 

a  burden  to  those  which  the  Rulers  of  the  United  States  have  to- 
bear.  It  follows  of  necessity  that  if  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  will  not  control  the  conduct  of  these  communities, 
neither  can  it  undertake  to  protect  them  from  the  consequences 
attaching  to  any  misconduct  of  which  they  may  be  guilty  towards 
other  nations.  If  they  violate  in  any  way  the  rights  of  another 
State,  or  of  its  subjects,  it  is  not  alleged  that  the  Monroe  doctrine 
will  assure  them  the  assistance  of  the  United  States  in  escaping^ 
from  any  reparation  which  they  may  be  bound  by  international 
law  to  give.  Mr.  Olney  expressly  disclaims  such  an  inference 
from  the  principles  he  lays  down. 

But  the  claim  which  he  founds  upon  them  is  that,  if  any  inde- 
pendent American  State  advances  a  demand  for  territory  of 
which  its  neighbour  claims  to  be  the  owner,  and  that  neighbour  is 
the  colony  of  a  European  State,  the  United  States  have  a  right  to 
insist  that  the  European  State  shall  submit  the  demand,  and  its 
own  impugned  rights  to  arbitration. 

I  will  not  now  enter  into  a  discussion  of  the  merits  of  this  method 
of  terminating  international  differences.  It  has  proved  itself  val- 
uable in  many  cases ;  but  it  is  not  free  from  defects,  which  often 
operate  as  a  serious  drawback  on  its  value.  It  is  not  always  easy 
to  find  an  Arbitrator  who  is  competent,  and  who,  at  the  .same 
time,  is  wholly  free  from  bias ;  and  the  task  of  insuring  compli- 
ance with  the  Award  when  it  is  made  is  not  exempt  from  diffi- 
culty. It  is  a  mode  of  settlement  of  which  the  value  varies 
much  according  to  the  nature  of  the  controversy  to  which  it  is 
applied,  and  the  character  of  the  litigants  who  appeal  to  it. 
Whether,  in  any  particular  case,  it  is  a  suitable  method  of  proced- 
ure is  generally  a  delicate  and  difficult  question.  The  only  parties 
who  are  competent  to  decide  that  question  are  the  two  parties 
whose  rival  contentions  are  in  issue.  The  claim  of  a  third  nation, 
which  is  unaffected  by  the  controversy,  to  impose  this  particular 
procedure  on  either  of  the  two  others,  cannot  be  reasonably  justi- 
fied, and  has  no  foundation  in  the  law  of  nations. 

In  the  remarks  which  I  have  made,  I  have  argued  on  the 
theory  that  the  Monroe  doctrine  in  itself  is  sound.  I  must  not,, 
however,  be  understood  as  expressing  any  acceptance  of  it  on  the 
part  of  Her  Majesty's  Government.  It  must  always  be  mentioned 
with  respect,  on  account  of  the  distinguished  statesman  to  whom 
it  is  due,  and  the  great  nation  who  have  generally  adopted  it. 
But  international  law  is  founded  on  the  general  consent  of 
nations;  and  no  statesman,  however  eminent,  and  no  nation,  how- 
ever powerful,  are  competent  to  insert  into  the  code  of  interna- 
tional law  a  novel  principle  which  was  never  recognized  before,. 


438  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

and  which  has  not  since  been  accepted  by  the  Government  of  any- 
other  country.  The  United  States  have  a  right,  like  any  other 
nation,  to  interpose  in  any  controversy  by  which  their  own  inter- 
ests are  affected ;  and  they  are  the  judge  whether  those  interests 
are  touched,  and  in  what  measure  they  should  be  sustained.  But 
their  rights  are  in  no  way  strengthened  or  extended  by  the  fact 
that  the  controversy  affects  some  territory  which  is  called  Ameri- 
can. Mr.  Olney  quotes  the  case  of  the  recent  Chilean  war,  in 
which  the  United  States  declined  to  join  with  France  and  England 
in  an  effort  to  bring  hostilities  to  a  close,  on  account  of  the  Mon- 
roe doctrine.  The  United  States  were  entirely  in  their  right  in 
declining  to  join  in  an  attempt  at  pacification  if  they  thought  fit ; 
but  Mr.  Olney's  principle  that  "  American  questions  are  for 
American  decision,"  even  if  it  receive  any  countenance  from  the 
language  of  President  Monroe  (which  it  does  not),  cannot  be  sus- 
tained by  any  reasoning  drawn  from  the  law  of  nations. 
•  The  Government  of  the  United  States  is  not  entitled  to  affirm 
as  a  universal  proposition,  with  reference  to  a  number  of  inde- 
j)endent  States  for  whose  conduct  it  assumes  no  responsibility, 
that  its  interests  are  necessarily  concerned  in  whatever  may  befall 
those  States  simply  because  they  are  situated  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere.  It  may  well  be  that  the  interests  of  the  United 
States  are  affected  by  something  that  happens  to  Chile  or  to  Peru, 
and  that  that  circumstance  may  give  them  the  right  of  interfer- 
ence ;  but  such  a  contingency  may  equally  happen  in  the  case  of 
China  or  Japan,  and  the  right  of  interference  is  not  more  exten- 
sive or  more  assured  in  the  one  case  than  in  the  other. 

Though  the  language  of  President  Monroe  is  directed  to  the 
attainment  of  objects  which  most  Englishmen  would  agree  to  be 
salutary,  it  is  impossible  to  admit  that  they  have  been  inscribed 
by  any  adequate  authority  in  the  code  of  international  law ;  and 
the  danger  which  such  admission  would  involve  is  sufficiently  ex- 
hibited both  by  the  strange  development  which  the  doctrine  has 
received  at  Mr.  Olney's  hands,  and  the  arguments  by  which  it  is 
supported,  in  the  despatch  under  reply.  In  defence  of  it  he 
says : 

That  distance  and  3,000  miles  of  intervening  ocean  Timke  any 
permanent  political  union  between  a  European  and  an  American 
State  unnatural  and  inexpedient  will  hardly  be  denied.  But  phys- 
ical and  geographical  considerations  are  the  least  of  the  objections 
to  such  a  union.  Europe  has  a  set  of  primary  interests  which  are 
peculiar  to  herself ;  America  is  not  interested  in  them,  and  ought 
not  to  be  vexed  or  complicated  with  them. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  439 

And  again : 

Thus  far  in  our  history  we  have  been  spared  the  burdens  and 
€vils  of  immense  standing  armies  and  all  the  other  accessories  of 
huge  warlike  establishments ;  and  the  exemption  has  highly  con- 
tributed to  our  national  greatness  and  wealth,  as  well  as  to  the 
happiness  of  every  citizen.  But  with  the  Powers  of  Europe  per- 
manently encamped  on  American  soil,  the  ideal  conditions  we  have 
thus  far  enjoyed  cannot  be  expected  to  continue. 

The  necessary  meaning  of  these  words  is  that  the  union  be- 
tween Great  Britain  and  Canada;  between  Great  Britain  and 
Jamaica  and  Trinidad ;  between  Great  Britain  and  British  Hon- 
duras or  British  Guiana  are  "  inexpedient  and  unnatural.'^ 
President  Monroe  disclaims  any  such  inference  from  his  doctrine; 
but  in  this,  as  in  other  respects,  Mr.  Olney  develops  it.  He  lays 
down  that  the  inexpedient  and  unnatural  character  of  the  union 
l)etween  a  European  and  American  State  is  so  obvious  that  it 
^'will  hardly  be  denied."  Her  Majesty's  Government  are  pre- 
pared emphatically  to  deny  it  on  behalf  of  both  the  British  and 
American  people  who  are  subject  to  her  Crown.  They  maintain 
that  the  union  between  Great  Britain  and  her  territories  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere  is  both  natural  and  expedient.  They  fully 
concur  with  the  view  which  President  Monroe  apparently  enter- 
tained, that  any  disturbance  of  the  existing  territorial  distribution 
in  that  hemisphere  by  any  fresh  acquisitions  on  the  part  of  any 
European  State  would  be  a  highly  inexpedient  change.  But  they 
are  not  prepared  to  admit  that  the  recognition  of  that  expediency 
is  clothed  with  the  sanction  which  belongs  to  a  doctrine  of  inter- 
national law.  They  are  not  prepared  to  admit  that  the  interests 
•of  the  United  States  are  necessarily  concerned  in  every  frontier 
•dispute  which  may  arise  between  any  two  of  the  States  who  pos- 
sess dominion  in  the  Western  Hemisphere ;  and  still  less  can  they 
accept  the  doctrine  that  the  United  States  are  entitled  to  claim 
that  the  process  of  arbitration  shall  be  applied  to  any  demand  for 
the  surrender  of  territory  which  one  of  those  States  may  make 
against  another. 

I  have  commented  in  the  above  remarks  only  upon  the  general 
aspect  of  Mr.  Olney's  doctrines,  apart  from  the  special  considera- 
tions which  attach  to  the  controversy  between  the  United  King- 
dom and  Venezuela  in  its  present  phase.  This  controversy  has 
undoubtedly  been  made  more  difficult  by  the  inconsiderate  action 
of  the  Venezuelan  Government  in  breaking  off  relations  with  Her 
Majesty's  Government,  and  its  settlement  has  been  correspond- 
ingly delayed;  but  Her  Majesty's  Government  have  not  surren- 


440  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

dered  the  hope  that  it  will  be  adjusted  by  a  reasonable  arrangement 
at  an  early  date. 

I  request  that  you  will  read  the  substance  of  the  above  despatch 
to  Mr.  Olney,  and  leave  him  a  copy  if  he  desires  it. 

S. 

President  Cleveland  in  submitting  the  above  correspond- 
ence to  Congress  concluded  his  message  as  follows  :  — 

Without  attempting  extended  argument  in  reply  to  these 
positions,  it  may  not  be  amiss  to  suggest  that  the  doctrine  upon 
which  we  stand  is  strong  and  sound  because  its  enforcement  is 
important  to  our  peace  and  safety  as  a  nation,  and  is  essential  ta 
the  integrity  of  our  free  institutions  and  the  trancjuil  maintenance 
of  our  distinctive  form  of  government.  It  was  intended  to  apply 
to  every  stage  of  our  national  life,  and  cannot  become  obsolete 
-while  our  Republic  endures.  .  .  . 

In  the  belief  that  the  doctrine  for  which  we  contend  was  clear 
and  definite,  that  it  was  founded  upon  substantial  considerations 
and  involved  our  safety  and  welfare,  that  it  was  fully  applicable 
to  our  present  conditions  and  to  the  state  of  the  world's  progress^ 
and  that  it  was  directly  related  to  the  i)ending  controversy  and 
without  any  conviction  as  to  the  final  merits  of  the  dispute,  but 
anxious  to  learn  in  a  satisfactory  and  conclusive  manner  whether 
Great  Britain  sought,  under  a  claim  of  boundary,  to  extend  her 
possessions  on  this  continent  without  right,  or  whether  she  merely 
sought  possession  of  territory  fairly  included  within  her  lines  of 
ownership,  this  Government  projwsed  to  the  Government  of  Great 
Britain  a  resort  to  arbitration  as  the  proper  means  of  settling  the 
question  to  the  end  that  a  vexatious  boundary  dispute  between 
the  two  contestants  might  be  determined  and  our  exact  standing 
and  relation  in  respect  to  the  controversy  might  be  made  clear. 

It  will  be  seen  from  the  correspondence  herewith  submitted 
that  this  proposition  has  been  declined  by  the  British  Govern- 
ment, upon  grounds  which  in  the  circumstances  seem  to  me  to  be 
far  from  satisfactory.  It  is  deeply  disappointing  that  such  an 
appeal  actuated  by  the  most  friendly  feelings  towards  both  nations- 
directly  concerned,  addressed  to  the  sense  of  justice  and  to  the 
magnanimity  of  one  of  the  great  powers  of  the  world  and  touch- 
ing its  relations  to  one  comparatively  weak  and  small,  should 
have  produced  no  better  results. 

The  course  to  be  pursued  by  this  Government  in  view  of  the 
present  condition  does  not  appear  to  admit  of  serious  doubt. 
Having  labored  faithfully  for  many  years  to  induce  Great  Britain 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  441 

to  submit  this  dispute  to  impartial  arbitration,  and  having  been 
now  finally  apprized  of  her  refusal  to  do  so,  nothing  remains  but 
to  accept  the  situation,  to  recognize  its  plain  requirements  and 
deal  with  it  accordingly.  Great  Britain's  present  proposition 
has  never  thus  far  been  regarded  as  admissible  by  Venezuela, 
though  any  adjustment  of  the  boundary  which  that  country  may 
deem  for  her  advantage  and  may  enter  into  of  her  own  free  will 
cannot  of  course  be  objected  to  by  the  United  States. 

Assuming,  however,  that  the  attitude  of  Venezuela  will  remain 
unchanged,  the  dispute  has  reached  such  a  stage  as  to  make  it 
now  incumbent  upon  the  United  States  to  take  measures  to  de- 
termine with  sufficient  certainty  for  its  justification  what  is  the 
true  divisional  line  between  the  Republic  of  Venezuela  and 
British  Guiana.  The  inquiry  to  that  end  should  of  course  be  con- 
ducted carefully  and  judicially,  and  due  weight  should  be  given 
to  all  available  evidence,  records,  and  facts  in  support  of  the 
claims  of  both  parties. 

In  order  that  such  an  examination  should  be  prosecuted  in  a 
thorough  and  satisfactory  manner  I  suggest  that  the  Congress 
make  an  adequate  appropriation  for  the  expenses  of  a  Commis- 
sion, to  be  appointed  by  the  Executive,  who  shall  make  the  neces- 
sary investigation  and  report  upon  the  matter  with  the  least 
possible  delay.  When  such  report  is  made  and  accepted  it  will 
in  my  opinion  be  the  duty  of  the  United  States  to  resist  by  every 
means  in  its  power,  as  a  wilful  aggression  upon  its  rights  and  in- 
terests, the  appropriation  by  Great  Britain  of  any  lands  or  the 
exercise  of  governmental  jurisdiction  over  any  territory  which 
after  investigation  we  have  determined  of  right  belongs  to  Vene- 
zuela. 

In  making  these  recommendations  I  am  fully  alive  to  the 
responsibility  incurred  and  keenly  realize  all  the  consequences 
that  may  follow. 

I  am  nevertheless  firm  in  my  conviction  that  while  it  is  a 
grievous  thing  to  contemplate  the  two  great  English-speaking 
peoples  of  the  world  as  being  otherwise  than  friendly  competitors 
in  the  onward^maji^h-of  civilization,  and  strenuous  and  worthy 
rivals  in  all  the  arts  of  peace,  there  is  no  calamity  which  a  great 
nation  can  invite  whi&h-eqxrals  that  which  follows  a  supine  sub- 
mission to  wrong  and  injustice  and  the  consequent  loss  of  national 
self-respect  and  honor,  beneath  which  are  shielded  and  defended 
a  people's  safety  and  greatness. 

After  a  short  controversy  Congress  provided  for  the 
appointment  of  an  American  Commission  of  Jurists  to  inves- 


442  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

tigate  the  territorial  claims  of  Venezuela  and  Great  Britain 
in  order  to  enlighten  the  government  upon  the  question  as 
to  whether  Great  Britain's  action  in  South  America  should 
be  accepted  by  the  executive  as  an  extension  of  European 
dominion  on  the  American  continent.  The  President  there- 
fore appointed  a  commission  "to  investigate  and  report 
upon  the  true  divisional  line  between  the  republic  of  Vene- 
zuela and  British  Guiana.'*  In  asking  Congress  for  an  ap- 
propriation to  defray  tlie  expenses  of  such  an  investigating 
board,  the  President  said:  "  Wlien  such  report  is  made  and 
accepted,  it  will,  in  my  opinion,  be  the  duty  of  the  United 
States  to  resist  by  every  means  in  its  power,  as  a  wilful 
aggression  upon  its  right  and  interest,  the  appropriation  by 
(treat  Britain  of  any  lands  or  the  exercise  of  governmental 
jurisdiction  over  any  territory  which  after  investigation  we 
have  determined  of  right  belongs  to  Venezuela. 

"  In  making  these  recommendations,  I  am  fully  alive  to  the 
responsibility  incurred,  and  keenly  realize  all  the  consequences 
that  may  follow." 

The  commission  at  once  entered  upon  the  arduous  labor 
of  examining  a  voluminous  mass  of  documentary  evidence 
furnished  by  Venezuela  and  somewhat  good-naturedly  by 
England,  but  l)efore  the  final  conclusion  of  their  task  had 
been  reached,  the  British  Government  yielded  to  the  repeated 
solicitations  of  the  United  States,  and  agreed  to  arbitrate 
with  Venezuela.  For  that  purpose  a  treaty  was  drawn  up 
in  Washington  and  afterward  signed  (February  12, 1897)  by 
the  British  and  Venezuelan  representatives.  By  this  conven- 
tion a  tribunal  of  arbitration  was  appointed,  consisting  of 
two  English  judges,  two  American  judges,  and  a  president 
of  the  tribunal  who  should  be  selected  by  the  four  members 
of  the  court  already  designated. 

In  June,  1899,  the  commission  assembled  in  Paris.  It  con- 
sisted of  Professor  Martens,  the  distinguished  Russian 
authority  upon  international  law,  the  Chief  Justice  of  th( 
United  States,  Justice  Brewer  of  the  United  States  Supreme 
Court,  Baron  Russell,  Lord  Chief  Justice  of  England,  an< 
Sir  Richard  Collins,  Lord  Justice  of  Appeals  of  Great  Brit 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  443 

ain.  The  Venezuelan  case  was  presented  by  ex-President 
Harrison,  Gen.  B.  F.  Tracy,  M.  Mallet-Prevost,  and  the 
Marquis  de  Rajas.  The  British  case  was  conducted  by  Sir 
Richard  Webster,  Sir  Robert  Reid,  and  others.  A  verdict 
was  rendered  on  October  3,  which  was  of  a  compromise 
nature. 

The  rendering  of  this  award  closed  an  incident  of  Ameri- 
can intervention  in  support  of  the  principles  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  which  has  been  considered  fortunate  by  many,  only 
in  so  far  as  its  ending  was  a  happy  one.  British  feeling  had 
been  greatly  aroused  against  the  United  States  by  what 
appeared  to  be  an  unwarranted  meddling  in  an  affair  belong- 
ing only  to  Great  Britain  and  Venezuela.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  belief  had  been  general  in  the  United  States  that  Eng- 
land's unwillingness  at  first  to  arbitrate  the  dispute  gave  evi- 
dence of  her  aggressive  designs  in  South  America.  The 
positive  tone  of  Mr.  Olney's  letters  and  of  President  Cleve- 
land's messages  indicated  that  Anglo-American  affairs  were 
nearing  a  crisis,  and  that  the  two  great  powers  were  peril- 
ously close  to  an  open  rupture.  When  the  moment  for 
sober  thought  arrived,  it  was  generally  conceded  that  a  war 
so  appalling  in  its  probable  consequences  between  these  two 
nations  of  one  language  and  of  a  common  purpose  in  the 
advancement  of  civilization  and  constitutional  liberty  would 
have  been  totally  unjustified  by  the  circumstances  in  the 
case.  It  has  since  been  freely  said  that  the  wise  resolution 
of  Great  Britain  to  yield  was  prompted  by  the  wishes  of  the 
Queen,  who  cherished  a  desire  to  preserve  peace  during  her 
reign  between  the  two  great  nations  of  kindred  race. 

XIII 

The  course  of  the  Cleveland  administration  in  using  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  as  a  means  for  compelling  Great  Britain  to 
arbitrate  her  differences  with  Venezuela  called  forth  much 
criticism.  The  opponents  of  Mr.  Olney's  radical  position 
argued  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  having  been  established  to 
meet  a  certain  end,  it  had  accomplished  its  purposes  and  was 


V 


444  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

now  functuB  officio.  It  being  at  best  but  a  domestic  policy, 
its  observance  could  not  properly  be  enforced  against  foreign 
nations.  It  had  no  place  in  international  law,  and  conse- 
quently it  was  unreasonable  to  expect  other  powers  to  recog- 
nize it.  Indeed,  it  was  not  even  an  established  principle  of 
American  diplomacy,  for  it  had  upon  many  occasions  been 
disregarded  when  it  might  with  propriety  have  been  appealed 
to ;  whenever  proclaimed,  it  had  been  accepted  by  the  coun- 
try as  merely  the  expression  of  a  policy  which  imposed  no 
obligation  upon  the  government  to  enforce  it.  Finally,  it 
was  insisted  that  the  occupation  by  Great  Britain  of  some 
hundreds  of  miles  of  comparatively  worthless  territory  in 
South  America,  tlieretofore  considered  as  belonging  to 
Venezuela,  in  no  manner  affected  the  rights  or  interests 
of  the  United  States.  On  the  contrary,  some  critics  rather 
openly  hinted  that  the  settlement  of  the  disputed  area  by 
British  subjects  would  give  to  the  territory  better  chances 
for  development  under  an  assured  good  government,  and 
that  England's  occupation  of  the  tract  would  therefore 
inure  to  the  advantage  of  American  trade.  So  far  as  the 
wilds  of  the  upper  Orinoco  were  capable  of  civilized  occu- 
pation, it  would  be  better  for  the  commercial  interests  of  the 
world  if  they  were  under  British  jurisdiction  than  under  the 
uncertain  rule  of  a  nation  whose  weak  and  faltering  govern- 
ment has  been  throughout  its  history  subject  to  constant 
revolution.  American  trade  with  Great  Britain  and  with 
British  possessions  far  exceeded  the  slender  volume  of  Ameri- 
can commerce  with  Venezuela.  Indeed,  to  have  imperilled 
even  for  a  year  the  five  hundred  millions  of  trade  with 
Great  Britain  for  the  sake  of  the  annual  two  or  three  millions 
with  Venezuela  would  have  been  a  quixotic  proceeding.  This 
suspected  expansion  of  British  territory  in  South  America 
involved  no  danger  to  the  safety  of  the  United  States. 
England  already  possessed  Canada  with  a  contiguous  boun- 
dary line  of  nearly  3000  miles.  The  islands  of  Newfoundland, 
Bermuda,  the  Bahamas,  Jamaica,  together  with  numerous 
smaller  islands  of  the  Lesser  Antilles  and  Trinidad,  already 
formed  a  chain  of  English  naval  posts  along  the  coast  of 


THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE  445 

the  United  States.  Belize  and  British  Guiana  supplemented 
these  outposts,  and  all  of  these  English  possessions,  barring 
the  last,  are  nearer  to  the  United  States  than  is  the  territory 
in  dispute,  —  indeed,  a  direct  line  from  the  southernmost 
point  of  Florida  to  the  mouth  of  the  Orinoco  River  is  about 
1600  miles.  The  addition  of  this  tract  of  land  to  existing 
English  possessions  in  the  Western  Hemisphere  would  have 
been,  after  all,  a  matter  of  little  consequence.  The  country 
was  a  tropical  jungle,  where  the  maintenance  of  military 
forces  would  be  impossible,  on  account  of  its  extremely 
unhealthy  climate ;  and  such  military  posts  as  England 
would  be  likely  to  establish  thereabouts  would  be  located 
in  her  existing  Guiana  colony.  Under  these  circumstances, 
the  danger  to  the  United  States  arising  out  of  British  occupa- 
tion appeared  to  be  wholly  imaginary.  If  British  acquisi- 
tion of  this  disputed  territory  lying  so  far  distant  could  be 
justly  regarded  as  threatening  the  safety  of  the  United 
States,  by  similar  process  of  reasoning,  to  what  deplorable 
condition  of  helplessness  is  the  American  Government  re- 
duced by  the  cordon  of  English  possessions,  naval  stations, 
and  fortified  positions  which  have  threatened  it  for  one 
hundred  years  ! 

Whatever  may  have  been  the  dangers  of  European  coloni- 
zation in  1823,  that  danger  had  ceased  to  exist.  English 
liberty  is  as  well  guaranteed  as  American  liberty.  The 
English  colonist  is  as  jealous  of  his  rights  and  as  determined 
in  the  support  of  human  freedom  as  is  the  American. 
Wherever  he  or  his  descendants  go,  industry,  trade,  com- 
merce, civilization,  and  religion  go  with  them.  In  reality, 
the  English  Government  in  its  actual  administration  more 
nearly  approximates  that  of  the  United  States  than  does  the 
Government  of  Venezuela. 

Finally  it  was  asked.  If  British  occupation  of  the  disputed 
territory  entailed  such  disastrous  consequences  upon  the 
United  States  that  the  risk  of  war  were  better,  would  not 
the  nation's  safety  have  demanded  at  the  start  a  positive 
denial  of  British  rights  in  the  premises,  and  a  refusal  to  con- 
.sent  to  the  arbitration  of  the  boundary  lines?     To  insist 


446  AMERICAN  DlPLOxMATlC  QUESTIONS 

upon  Great  Britain's  acceptance  of  arbitration,  to  institute 
an  ex  parte  commission  to  determine  British  rights  and 
to  dictate  the  course  she  was  to  follow  in  the  settlement 
of  this  dispute,  was  as  much  an  effront  as  peremptorily 
to  order  the  British  Government  to  withdraw  its  pretensions 
from  Venezuelan  territory.  In  either  case  the  United  States 
assumed  a  high  degree  of  authority  which  Great  Britain 
refused  to  acknowledge ;  in  either  case,  war  was  a  possible 
outcome.  In  short,  therefore,  the  opponents  of  the  admin- 
istration policy  held  simply  that  the  United  States  was  not 
threatened  in  any  way  by  British  advances  in  Venezuela,  and 
therefore  the  circumstances  in  the  case  did  not  justify  the 
country  in  going  to  the  extremity  of  a  war  with  England. 

Those  who  defended  the  stand  taken  by  the  administra- 
tion asserted  that  while  the  occupation  of  a  portion  of  Ven- 
ezuela by  Great  Britain  did  not  in  itself  endanger  American 
interests,  it  violated  a  well-established  policy  of  the  American 
people.  This  cardinal  principle  of  American  diplomacy  had 
been  so  long  revered  it  should  be  maintained  at  all  hazards. 
To  abandon  the  Monroe  Doctrine  at  that  particular  time 
would  be  to  open  the  entire  South  American  continent  to  the 
rapacious  and  land-hungered  nations  of  Europe. 

After  all  is  said  on  both  sides  of  the  controversy  there  ia 
but  one  point  which  merits  serious  consideration.  That  one 
point  determines  the  applicability  of  the  doctrine  in  every 
case,  —  that  is,  the  safety  of  the  United  States. 

Self-defence  is  an  essential  principle  of  existence.  It  is 
a  law  of  nature  that  no  rules  of  society  can  accurately  define. 
Because  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  an  invocation  of  this^ 
great  principle  of  which  Mr.  Monroe  was  in  no  wise  the 
author,  because  it  came  opportunely,  because  it  was  so  ably 
expressed,  because  it  met  with  enthusiastic  approval  at  the 
time,  it  has  lived  and  obtained  a  permanence  in  American 
politics  as  though  it  were  a  principle  purely  American  and 
of  American  discovery.  In  reality  it  is  only  a  special  or  a 
/  new  name  for  a  principle  of  life  that  is  as  old  as  the  existence 
'  of  man.    The  new  name  has  supplanted  the  old  in  the  Ameri- 


THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE  447 

can  mind,  and  whenever  a  threat,  real  or  fancied,  has  come 
in  the  shape  of  aggression  in  the  Western  Hemisphere,  the 
United  States  Government  has  asserted  its  right  to  inter- 
pose —  the  right  of  self-protection,  but  called  instead  the 
Monroe  Doctrine.  The  phrase  "  Monroe  Doctrine "  has 
ISeen  preferredr  and  in  the  course  of  three-quarters  of  a 
century  it  has  wrought  a  weird  and  enchanting  influence  on 
the  American  intellect.  The  mind  becomes  imbued  with  a 
vague  sense  of  past  traditions  resulting  in  a  confusion  of 
sentimental  ideas  which  impair  the  powers  of  discrimina- 
tion, and  thus  the  original  purpose  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
and  the  defen^giyje,  principles  which  it  represents  are  often 
lost  sight  of.  IndeeH^  the  circumstances  under  which  the 
Doctrine  was  originally  enunciated,  as  well  as  the  condition 
of  American  political  life  pi'evious  to  1823,  were  of  a  nature 
to  give  Mr.  Monroe's  declaration  a  peculiar  significance. 
Fear  of  European  aggression  in  the  Americas  was  the  par- 
ticular danger  that  gave  the  "  doctrine  "  birth.  The  United 
States  was  comparatively  a  weak  nation,  its  system  of  gov- 
ernment was  experimental,  and  it  was  in  conflict  with  the 
monarchical  principles  of  Europe ;  and  jealous  Europe  was 
feared.  The  Spanish  possessions  were  in  revolt,  and  offered 
a  tempting  field  for  the  exploitation  of  European  arms.  The 
American  people  were  impressed  with  the  danger  that  lurked 
in  every  European  advance  ;  the  Monroe  Doctrne  voiced  the 
apprehension  in  a  manner  that  satisfied  every  American 
citizen.  ^ 

The  American  nation  is  no  longer  weak  ;  its  system  of 
government  is  no  experiment.  Absolutism  in  Europe  has 
almost  disappeared,  and  liberal  constitutional  monarchies 
and  republics  have  taken  its  place.  There  is  no  holy  alli- 
ance, there  is  no  scheme  to  subvert  republican  forms  of  gov- 
ernment, but  the  people  of  the  United  States  have  not  yet 
outlived  the  inherited  fears  of  their  grandfathers,  and  they 
still  cherish  the  apprehensions  they  bequeathed.  They  cling 
to  the  words  that  proclaimed  their  fears,  the  words  which 
Mr.  Monroe  announced.  Thus  to-day  the  same  cry  of  alarm 
of  three  generations  ago  is  still  uttered ;  the  Monroe  Doctrine 


\V 


448  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

has  become  a  magic  symbol,  and  an  idol  for  national  worship. 
Thus  it  comes  about  in  course  of  time,  after  that  doctrine 
lias  undergone  numerous  modifications,  after  it  has  been  dis- 
torted in  various  waj's  to  meet  the  requirements  of  party 
politics,  that  it  has  lost,  to  some  extent,  its  original  meaning. 
The  "doctrine", is  supported  on  other  grounds  than  those 
of  self-protection  ;  admittedly  British  occupation  of  certain 
tracts  of  land  in  Venezuela  could  not  conceivably  endanger 
the  peace,  safety,  and  integrity  of  the  United  States,  yet  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  seemed  to  call  for  action  to  prevent  such 
occupancy. 

The  position  may  be  maintained  with  considerable  force 
that  when  a  political  principle  obtains  a  superstitious  hold 
upon  a  nation  that  compels  its  blind  observance  regardless 
of'  consequences  it  is  time  to  cast  it  aside.  To  consign  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  to  its  appropriate  place  of  political  signifi- 
cance in  American  history  is  by  no  means  to  deprive  the 
American  people  of  self -protection.  It  is  only  to  rid  the 
mind  of  a  disturbing  factor  in  the  determination  of  foreign 
questions  —  to  leave  the  judgment  free  to  measure  danger  by 
the  exigencies  of  tlie  present,  and  not  the  remembrance  of  the 
fears  which  are  of  the  past. 

The  acquisition  of  the  Philippine  Islands  necessarily  opens 
new  fields  of  diplomacy  to  the  United  States  Government. 
To  some  extent  at  least  the  older  policy  of  political  isolation 
must  give  way  to  that  of  a-more  intimate  connection  with 
foreign  powers ;  it  is.  therefore  all  the  more  important  that 
every  habit  of  thouglit  should  be  suppressed  which  prevents 
clear  and  reasonable  consideration  of  all  diplomatic  questions. 

There  need  be  no  apprehension  lest  the  people  of  the 
United  States  will  always  be  alert  and  watchful  of  their  own 
interests.  A  higher  principle  than  devotion  to  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  will  guide — principles  of  an  organic  law  upon 
which  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  founded,  and  of  which  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  was  but  a  single  expression. 


THE   NORTHEAST   COAST    FISHERIES 


THE   NORTHEAST   COAST   FISHERIES 

One  of  the  most  perplexing  problems  which  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  has  been  called  upon  to  meet,  in  con- 
nection with  its  foreign  relations,  is  the  northeastern  fishery 
question.  It  formerly  concerned  the  rights  of  American  citi- 
zens to  catch  fish  within  the  territorial  waters  of  Canada  and 
Newfoundland,  and  to  use  the  shores  of  these  provinces  either 
for  the  purpose  of  drying  and  curing  their  fares  or  to  pro- 
cure bait.  The  consideration  of  these  rights  necessarily 
involved  a  host  of  incidental  legal  questions  —  such  as  the 
nature  of  territorial  jurisdiction  over  the  ocean  within  the 
three-mile  limit  of  shore,  the  doctrine  of  headlands  and 
the  rights  of  vessels  under  local  laws  of  commerce  and  navi- 
gation. It  involved  also  the  interpretation  of  numerous 
treaty  stipulations,  some  of  them  more  or  less  ambiguous  ; 
and  these  injterpretations,  furthermore,  were  too  often  dis- 
torted by  the.  exigencies  of  party  politics.  Since  the  begin- 
ning of  our  national  existence  this  question  has  brought 
almost  constant  care  and  vexation  to  both  American  and 
English  statesmen,  and  thus  far  it  seems  to  have  defied  all 
efforts  at  permanent  and  satisfactory  adjustment.  Brief 
respites  have  been  found  in  the  awards  of  arbitration  tribu- 
nals, while  new  conventions  and  treaties  have  sufficed  tem- 
porarily to  allay  irritation  ;  but  after  all,  the  old  quarrel  of 
the  fishermen  constantly  recurs  in  some  form  no  less  aggra- 
vating and  threatening  than  before. 

The  circumstances  which  have  given  this  question  eminent 
importance  have  been  of  a  nature  to  render  its  solution  pecul- 
iarly difficult.  The  great  economic  value  of  the  fisheries, 
both  in  the  matter  of  providing  employment  for  thousands 
of   men   and  in  the  matter  of   furnishing  to  the  world  a 

451 


452  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

staple  article  of  food,  has  excited  the  earnest  solicitude  of 
the  governments  of  both  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States.  Each  has  necessarily  sought  to  secure  for  its  re- 
spective subjects  the  greatest  possible  advantage  in  the 
prosecution  of  so  important  an  industry. 

These  fishing  operations  on  the  part  of  Americans  have 
required  in  the  past  not  only  the  occupancy  of  Canadian 
waters,  but  equally  the  occupancy  and  use  of  Canadian 
shores ;  and  as  a  quid  pro  quo  for  granting  these  privileges 
British  subjects  have  naturally  demanded  as  large  remunera- 
tions as  they  could  reasonably  obtain.  On  the  other  hand, 
American  fishermen  have  always  desired,  and  sometimes 
demanded  as  a  national  right,  the  privilege  to  follow  their 
game  into  British  territorial  waters,  and  the  United  States 
Government  has  always  souglit  to  obtain  for  them  these 
important  privileges  on  terms  least  objectionable  and  oner- 
ous to  the  nation  at  large.  In  pursuit  of  their  voca- 
tions, American  and  Canadian  fishermen  have  necessarily 
been  brought  side  by  side  into  direct  personal  contact,^ 
thus  affording  occasion  for  the  breeding  of  jealousies  and 
bitter  feelings  of  resentment  for  real  and  fancied  wrongs. 
It  is  not  remarkable  that  collisions  from  time  to  time  have 
resulted,  which  have  always  served  to  complicate  the  settle- 
ment of  the  public  issues  involved. 

It  has  been  said  that  fishermen  are  the  "wards  of  nations.'* 
They  enjoy  certain  special  immunities  in  times  of  war,  and 
in  many  respects  they  receive  from  their  governments  all  the 
fostering  care  and  protection  required  at  the  hands  of  a  guar- 
dian. Formerly  they  were  specially  encouraged  and  protected 
both  by  England  and  the  United  States,  on  the  ground  that 
the  character  of  their  calling  peculiarly  fitted  them  for  the 
naval  service.  From  this  nautical  school  the  hardiest  and 
best  sjiilors  have  been  drafted.  In  this  connection  it  is 
interesting  to  note  the  fears  of  an  English  writer,  expressed 
as  early  as  1670,  who  viewed  with  alarm  the  growth  of  the 
cod-fisheries  in  the  New  World.  He  wrote  :  "  New  England 
is  the  most  prejudicial  plantation  in  this  kingdom,  ...  of 
all  the  American  plantations,  His  Majesty  has  none  so  apt 


THE  NORTHEAST   COAST   FISHERIES  453 

for  building  or  shipping  as  New  England,  nor  any  compara- 
tively so  qualified  for  the  breeding  of  seamen,  —  principally 
by  reason  of  their  cod  and  mackerel  fisheries,  and,  in  my 
opinion,  there  is  nothing  more  prejudicial,  and  in  prospect 
more  dangerous,  to  any  mother  kingdom,  than  the  increase 
of  shipping  in  her  colonies,  plantations,  or  provinces."  Sir 
Joshua  Child's  utterance  proved  prophetic.  Thus  were  the 
governments  of  England  and  of  the  United  States  stimulated 
to  nurture  with  greatest  care  the  industry  that  furnished 
their  best  naval  reserves. 

The  chief  difficulty  in  the  way  of  a  permanent  and  satis- 
factory settlement  of  this  question  has  been  to  discover  some 
suitable  return  to  the  Canadians  for  the  privileges  asked  by 
American  fishermen,  to  wit:  the  right  (should  the  necessity 
demand),  to  fish  in  Canadian  territorial  waters,  and  unmo- 
lested to  secure  bait  and  supplies  ashore.  No  compensation 
yet  devised  for  such  privileges  has  remained  mutually  satis- 
factory for  more  than  a  few  years.  The  partial  reduction  of 
tariff  duties  or  the  total  omission  to  tax  specified  articles  in 
favor  of  Canadian  trade  has  been  tried  with  but  indifferent 
success.  The  American  producers  of  articles  whenever 
brought  thus  into  active  competition  with  Canadian  prod- 
ucts, have  invariably  raised  their  voices  in  angry  disap- 
proval, —  chiefly  upon  the  ground  that  they  were  being 
sacrificed  for  the  benefit  of  fishermen  in  whose  success  or 
failure  they  had  no  interest  whatever.  Congress  has  always 
been  compelled  sooner  or  later  to  abandon  this  scheme  of 
settlement  as  impracticable.  The  admission  of  Canadian 
fish  free  of  duty  into  United  States  ports  has  always  been 
regarded  by  Canada  as  the  proper  price  for  her  fishery  con- 
cessions to  the  United  States,  but  this  seemingly  rational 
method  of  adjustment  has  been  at  all  times  most  vigorously 
opposed  by  our  own  fishermen.  They  insist  that  the  bene- 
lits  to  the  nation  of  a  free  fishery  are  general,  and  that  the 
burdens  of  its  maintenance  should  be  equally  so  ;  moreover, 
they  stoutly  maintain  that  they  cannot  successfully  compete 
with  their  Canadian  brethren  in  the  United  States  markets 
without  the  same  tariff  protection  accorded  to  other  indus- 


454  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

tries.  Therefore  a  solution  which  seems  on  its  face  to  be 
perfectly  just  and  rational  has  always  come  eventually  to 
be  abandoned  as  impracticable. 

The  payment  of  a  lump  sum  or  an  annual  license  tax  to 
Canada  has  at  times  been  considered  as  a  hopeful  adjust- 
ment of  the  question,  but  this  means  of  settlement  has 
always  met  with  a  determined  opposition  from  the  agricul- 
tural classes  throughout  the  country. 

Thus  it  is  that,  abounding  in  difficulties,  aggravated  by 
frequent  encounters  of  the  fishermen,  —  especially  during 
periods  of  ill  feeling  between  England  and  the  United  States, 
—  complicated  by  private  claims  and  confused  by  numerous 
minor  issues,  the  fishery  question  has  remained  an  unsolved 
problem  for  nearly  a  century  and  a  quarter. 


The  most  valuable  food  fishes  inhabit  the  cold  waters  of 
northern  seas.  A  great  ocean  river,  having  its  origin  in  the 
polar  seas,  and  known  as  the  "  Labrador  Current,"  sweeps 
to  the  south  along  the  entire  shore  of  British  America,  past 
Newfoundland,  and  down  the  New  England  coast.  Round- 
ing Cape  Cod,  and  following  thence  a  southern  course,  it 
plunges  downward,  to  pass  beneath  the  warmer  and  lighter 
waters  of  the  Gulf  Stream,  and  is  finally  lost  in  the  abyssal 
depths  of  the  middle  Atlantic.  The  presence  of  this  body 
of  cold  water  near  the  coast  greatly  influences  the  climate  of 
Labrador  and  Newfoundland,  rendering  their  shores  bleak 
and  desolate,  while  it  prolongs  the  rigorous  winters  of  New 
England.  As  a  seeming  recompense  for  so  much  of  cheerless 
cold  and  gloom,  it  brings  to  these  maritime  provinces  the 
conditions  necessary  for  a  marvellous  wealth  of  marine  life, 
which  has  proved  of  almost  incalculable  value  to  their  in- 
habitants. The  coastal  waters  of  these  provinces  teem  with 
cod,  herring,  mackerel,  and  a  variety  of  other  fish  of  great 
commercial  value. 

Of  the  various  kinds  of  food  fish  taken  in  these  waters, 
the  first  in  importance  is  the  cod,  which  remarkable  fish  ex- 


THE   NORTHEAST  COAST  FISHERIES  455 

ceeds  in  commercial  value  any  other  product  of  the  ocean,  — 
possibly  excepting  the  herring,  which,  in  northern  Europe, 
forms  the  basis  of  a  colossal  industry.  The  natural  home  of 
the  cod  is  in  the  shore  waters  extending  from  Greenland  to 
Massachusetts,  but  they  are  taken  in  small  numbers  as  far 
south  as  Hatteras.  They  frequent  the  coast  waters  of  moder- 
ate depths,  having  no  definite  migratory  habits  other  than 
during  certain  seasons  to  pass  to  and  from  somewhat  deeper 
water  offshore,  in  order  to  find  a  temperature  more  appro- 
priate, or  perhaps  necessary  to  their  existence.  The  largest 
and  best  cod  are  those  which  betake  themselves  from  the 
shore  stations  to  the  more  suitable  conditions  that  seem  to 
be  offered  by  those  "  elevated  tablelands  "  of  the  Atlantic,  — 
those  great  submarine  plateaux  that  lie  to  the  south  and  east 
of  Newfoundland,  and  to  the  east  of  Nova  Scotia  and  New 
England,  and  which  are  known  as  the  "Banks."  Here,  at  a 
depth  of  fifty  to  four  hundred  feet,  they  are  found  in  countless 
numbers.  Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  for  several  hundred 
years  the  Banks  have  furnished  to  the  fishermen  millions  of 
cod,  the  supply  seems  to  be  but  little  less  abundant  than 
when  first  discovered.  On  shore  stations  their  decreas- 
ing numbers  may  be  attributed  to  the  exhaustive  raids 
made  upon  the  smaller  species  of  fish  which  serve  the  larger 
ones  as  food,  rather  than  to  the  direct  catch  of  shore  cod. 
On  the  Maine  and  Massachusetts  coasts  cod  have  long 
since  ceased  to  exist  in  quantities  sufficient  to  warrant  ex- 
tensive operations  as  are  now  carried,  on  by  the  fleets  of 
American  vessels  employed  on  the  Banks.  BartholomcAV 
Gosnold,  in  1602,  arriving  at  Cape  Cod,  reported  that  the 
fish  were  so  abundant  that  they  "did  vex  the  ship."  With 
due  allowance  for  Gosnold's  enthusiasm,  the  prevalence  of 
cod  in  New  England  in  colonial  days  is  evidenced  by  the 
flourishing  business  carried  on  along  its  shores  by  the 
early  settlers,  even  so  late  as  the  revolutionary  era.  The 
decline  was  felt,  however,  even  before  that  period,  and  it 
continued  in  increasing  ratio  on  account  of  the  steady 
development  of  manufacturing  interests  in  New  England. 
The  damming  of  rivers  to  secure  water  power  for  machinery 


456  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

to  a  great  extent  destroyed  the  spawning  grounds  of  the  fish. 
Cod,  however,  still  exist  all  along  the  New  England  shores 
in  varying  quantities,  though  the  supply  is  scarcely  sufficient 
some  seasons  to  meet  the  demands  of  local  markets. 

Every  portion  of  the  fish  is  of  use.  The  flesh,  as  a  staple 
article  of  food,  forms  the  basis  of  an  enormous  export  trade 
to  all  parts  of  the  world ;  the  entrails,  head,  and  bones,  are 
extensively  used  for  fertilizing  lands ;  the  swimming  bladder 
is  employed  in  the  manufacture  of  gelatine,  and  the  oil  ex- 
tracted from  the  liver  is  well  known  as  a  valuable  agent  in 
the  materia  medica ;  the  skin  is  utilized  in  the  manufacture 
of  glue. 

A  number  of  cities  on  the  Maine  and  Massachusetts  coasts 
are  famous  as  rendezvous  for  large  fleets  of  fishing  vessels 
which  make  their  annual  cruises  to  the  Banks  for  the  pur- 
pose of  gathering  the  harvests  of  the  sea.  Many  of  these 
cities  owe  both  their  origin  and  their  prosperity  to  the 
energy,  industry  and  success  of  their  fishermen.  The  busi- 
ness is  probably  of  less  relative  importance  to-day,  although 
the  number  of  men  employed  in  1900  was  about  35,000,  the 
catch  162,218,921  pounds,  and  its  value  $4,385,102. 

The  method  of  fishing  on  the  Banks  is  from  small  boats 
with  hand  lines  and  trawls,  the  latter  being  long  lines  upon 
which  are  attached  several  hundred  hooks.  They  are  an- 
chored and  buoyed  at  both  ends,  and  left  out  during  the 
night.  In  the  morning  the  trawl  is  brought  up,  the  fish  that 
have  feasted  unwisely  are  removed,  and  the  hooks  are  rebaited 
to  repeat  the  operation.  The  bait  used  is  the  soft-shell  clam, 
the  capelin  (a  small  fish  from  the  bays  of  Newfoundland), 
and  the  squid  (a  mollusk  of  the  cuttle-fish  order,  which  is 
principally  taken  in  Newfoundland  waters).  When  the 
American  fishermen  use  clams  as  bait  they  take  a  supply, 
iced  or  salted,  from  the  United  States,  being  enabled  thereby 
to  avoid  the  necessity  of  touching  the  Dominion  coast ;  in 
former  times,  however,  a  call  at  some  Canadian  or  Newfound- 
land port  was  made  imperative  for  obtaining  supplies  of 
capelin  or  squid,  neither  of  which  occurs  abundantly  in  the 
United  States.     A  class  of  Canadian  longshoremen  followed 


THE   NORTHEAST   COAST  FISHERIES  457 

the  business  of  catching  and  providing  these  articles  of  bait 
to  American  fishermen,  the  rates  being  about  $1  a  barrel, 
though  it  sometimes  happened,  in  the  confusion  of  their  mis- 
understandings, that  the  Canadians  declined  to  supply  their 
rivals  with  the  necessary  bait. 

Formerly,  when  fishing  on  the  coast  stations,  the  cod  were 
taken  ashore,  cleaned,  split  open,  and  spread  out  to  dry  in 
the  sun  upon  "  stages,"  or  rudely  constructed  wooden  plat- 
forms. Thus  prepared,  the  fish  will  keep  indefinitely.  Bank 
fishermen  never  resort  to  this  means  of  curing  their  fish,  the 
run  into  port  consuming  too  much  valuable  time.  The  fish 
are  carefully  salted  or  iced,  and  packed  away  in  the  holds  of 
the  vessels,  and  thus  brought  home.  The  decline  of  shore 
fisheries  for  cod,  and  the  substitution  in  late  years  of  a  better 
class  of  Bank  fishing  vessels  carrying  ice,  has  materially 
changed  the  relations  of  American  and  Canadian  cod-fisher- 
men. The  former  maintain  they  are  independent  of  all 
privileges  the  Canadians  might  seek  to  offer  them,  yet  the 
fact  remains  that  shore  privileges  in  Newfoundland  are  still 
considered  valuable  for  purposes  of  transshipment  of  cargo, 
refitting,  purchase  of  bait,  ice,  and  provisions. 

The  mackerel  is  a  pelagic  free-roving  fish,  appearing  at 
times  in  vast  numbers  within  the  shore  waters  from  the  Gulf 
of  St.  Lawrence  to  Cape  Hatteras.  They  appear  and  disap- 
pear suddenly,  and  without  known  reason,  to  the  joy  or  de- 
spair of  the  masters  and  crews  of  a  large  fleet  of  American 
mackerel  schooners.  The  capriciousness  of  this  excellent 
food  fish  is  liable  to  bring  to  its  pursuers  either  very  great 
profit,  or  complete  disappointment.  Governor  Winthrop,  in 
1639,  relates :  "  There  was  such  a  store  of  exceeding  large 
and  fat  mackerel  upon  our  coasts  this  season  as  was  a  great 
benefit  to  all  our  plantation,  since  one  boat  with  three  men 
would  take  in  a  week  ten  hogsheads,  which  were  sold  at 
Connecticut  for  three  pounds  ten  shillings  a  hogshead." 
American  fishing  schooners  have  long  frequented  Canadian 
territorial  waters  in  the  prosecution  of  the  mackerel  fishery, 
and  many  disputes  have  arisen  between  the  two  governments 
concerning  the  value  to  American  citizens  of  this  privilege. 


458  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

The  uncertain  nature  of  the  fish  renders  all  calculations  re- 
specting future  catches  virtually  impossible ;  hence,  it  is  the 
more  difficult  to  agree  upon  regulations  for  future  seasons  to 
govern  the  mackerel  fisheries. 

When  the  mackerel  first  appear  in  the  early  summer  months 
along  the  New  England  coasts,  the  fleet  of  American  fisher- 
men set  out  in  pursuit,  following  the  school  of  fish  into  the 
Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence,  where  they  remain  throughout  the  sum- 
mer. As  the  mackerel  frequent  shallow  water,  the  American 
fishermen,  having  no  right  to  do  so,  are  often  tempted  to 
approach  the  shore  and  carry  on  their  operations  within  the 
forbidden  territorial  waters  of  Canada.  This  has  been  even 
recently  one  of  the  principal  grievances  of  the  Canadian 
fishermen.  The  method  employed  by  Americans  in  the 
mackerel  fishery  is  the  "purse  seine."  This  mode  of  fish- 
ing is  attended  with  many  difficulties  and  dangers  in  the 
shallow  waters  of  the  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence,  where  violent 
squalls  are  frequent,  yet  as  a  method  of  capturing  fish  it  is 
most  effective.  The  Canadians  object  to  the  use  of  the  purse 
seine,  even  when  employed  outside  the  three-mile  limit  of 
their  jurisdictional  waters,  for,  they  maintain,  it  "  vexes"  the 
fish,  interferes  with  their  breeding,  and  tends  to  drive  them 
away  altogether  from  the  Gulf.  For  this  reason  they  hold 
—  on  the  score  of  contra  bonos  mares  —  that  the  Americans 
have  no  right  to  use  this  kind  of  seine  in  the  Gulf  of  St.  Law- 
rence. In  asserting  their  right  to  fish  as  they  choose  upon 
the  high  seas,  the  attitude  of  American  and  Canadian  fisher- 
men is  the  exact  reverse  of  the  positions  assumed  by  their 
respective  governments  in  relation  to  pelagic  sealing  in  Ber- 
ing Sea.  The  most  serious  difficulties  of  the  fishery  ques- 
tion to-day  are  connected  with  the  rights  and  privileges  of 
the  American  mackerel  fleet. 
^  The  herring  fisheries  of  the  United  States,  until  within 
recent  years,  have  occupied  a  relatively  subordinate  place. 
In  northern  Europe  this  industry  is  carried  on  with  great 
vigor,  the  annual  yield  sometimes  reaching  the  extraordinary 
number  of  2,500,000,000  fish.  The  herring  on  the  west  side 
of  the  Atlantic  have  their  range  within  the  limits  of  th( 


THE  NORTHEAST  COAST  FISHERIES  459 

Labrador  current.  They  swarm  in  countless  numbers  on 
the  Banks,  and  indeed  throughout  the  Canadian  and  New- 
foundland shore  waters,  but  they  were  not  formerly  pursued 
by  Americans  with  the  energy  and  zeal  justified  by  their 
value  as  an  article  of  food.  By  treaty  with  England,  Ameri- 
can fishermen  obtained  the  right  to  catch  herring  about  the 
Magdalen  Islands,  and  in  1839,  just  after  the  commencement 
of  the  fishery,  a  record  is  given  of  146  American  schooners 
"taking  nearly  700  barrels  each."  A  generous  estimate  of 
1,000,000  barrels  of  herring  taken  annually  from  Dominion 
and  Newfoundland  waters  has  been  given  by  Professor  Hinds. 
A  large  part  of  these  were  taken,  however,  for  fertilizing 
purposes. 

As  carried  on  to-day  the  herring  is  largely  a  shore  fishery. 
The  young  herring  swim  in  vast  schools  close  along  the  mar- 
gin of  the  water,  having  certain  definite  courses  which  they 
follow.  The  fishermen  construct  "weirs"  or  pocket-like 
traps,  extending  out  from  the  land  and  crossing  the  track 
of  the  fish.  In  these  labyrinths,  the  herring  become  im- 
prisoned in  great  numbers.  They  form  the  basis  of  a 
rapidly  growing  "  sardine  "  canning  industry  in  New  Eng- 
land. The  herring,  being  practically  a  shore  fishery,  does 
not  figure  prominently  in  the  disputes  between  the  two 
governments. 

In  a  lesser  degree,  pollock,  haddock,  hake,  halibut  and 
other  species  of  fish,  of  more  or  less  commercial  value,  figure 
in  the  comprehensive  phrase  "  Northeast  Coast  Fisheries  "  ; 
but  the  greater  importance  of  the  cod  and  mackerel  over 
other  varieties  of  fish  included  within  the  term,  warrants 
the  omission  of  all  others  from  a  historical  review  of  the 
subject. 

n 

As  early  as  1415  English  fishermen  resorted  to  Iceland  to 
catch  cod.  There  is  evidence  tending  to  prove  that  before 
the  voyages  of  Columbus,  the  codfishery  of  the  Newfound- 
land Banks  was  known  to  the  Basque  and  Normandy  fisher- 


460  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

men.  This  supposition  is  supported  by  the  fact  that,  as  early 
as  1504,  only  seven  years  after  the  discovery  of  Newfound- 
land by  the  Cabots,  Basque  fishermen  are  known  to  have 
visited  the  Banks,  and  in  1557  their  fishing  operations  in 
the  New  World  had  increased  in  extent  to  the  employment 
of  some  fifty  or  more  vessels. 

The  English  do  not  seem  promptly  to  have  followed  up 
the  advantages  gained  for  them  by  the  discoveries  of  Cabot 
in  1497.  Possibly  the  superior  naval  forces  of  her  enemies 
deterred  her  at  that  time  from  asserting  jurisdiction  over 
the  waters  of  North  America.  These  waters  had  been  re- 
ported, first  by  Cabot,  and  soon  after  by  other  English 
voyagers,  as  marvellously  rich  in  fish.  For  nearly  a  century 
England  made  no  attempt  to  colonize  the  newly  discovered 
territories.  The  French  were  more  alert  in  grasping  the 
im[)ortance  of  the  new  industry  thus  disclosed  to  the  world, 
and  during  the  early  and  middle  portions  of  the  sixteenth 
century,  enterprising  merchants  of  Dieppe,  St.  Malo  and 
Rouen,  sent  their  vessels  to  the  Banks  in  annually  increasing 
numbers.  By  the  year  1540,  they  had  established  fishing 
stations  on  the  shores  of  Newfoundland,  and  in  1577  their 
fleet  mustered  150  ships.  At  that  time  Spain  and  Portugal 
were  also  well  represented  on  the  Banks,  but  tlie  thirst  for 
gold,  which  consumed  the  Spanish  adventurers  of  that  period, 
soon  lured  away  her  fishermen  to  the  West  Indies  ;  and  the 
Portuguese  soon  found  more  congenial  fields  for  exploration 
in  Brazil.  By  the  end  of  the  century  Spanish  and  Portu- 
guese ships  disappeared  almost  entirely  from  the  fishing 
grounds. 

English  vessels,  fitted  out  in  London  and  Bristol,  came  to 
Newfoundland  as  early  as  1540,  and  continued  yearly  to  visit 
the  region,  though  their  operations  were  not  carried  on  with 
the  vigor  that  characterized  the  efforts  of  the  French  fisher- 
men of  that  period.  Verranzo,  Chabot,  Cartier,  Robeval  de 
la  Roche  and  other  voyagers  of  the  sixteenth  century  were 
conspicuous  in  establishing  the  supremacy  of  France  in  this 
part  of  the  New  World  ;  and  Champlain,  who  founded  Quebec 
in  1608,  gave  his  country  a  still  firmer  hold  on  these  shores, 


THE   NORTHEAST  COAST  FISHERIES  461 

—  a  hold  that  took  the  English  a  century  and  a  half  to 
loosen.  '  The  principal,  if  not  the  sole  object  of  acquiring 
territory  in  northeastern  America  at  this  early  period,  was 
to  obtain  a  control  of  the  fisheries  which  were  regarded  by 
both  English  and  French  as  far  the  most  valuable  possession 
of  the  New  World.  It  was  not  until  1583,  however,  that 
England  fully  awakened  to  the  necessity  of  protecting  her 
interests  in  America.  In  that  year  Sir  Humphrey  Gilbert, 
with  a  royal  patent  from  Queen  Elizabeth,  landed  at  St. 
Johns,  Newfoundland,  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  a 
colony.  To  a  motley  group  of  fishermen  of  various  na- 
tionalities, who  happened  to  be  gathered  in  the  harbor, 
he  read  a  proclamation,  setting  forth  the  intention  of  his 
sovereign  to  assume  control  of  the  waters  about  Newfound- 
land to  the  distance  of  200  leagues.  This  order  was  enforced, 
notably  in  one  instance,  when  that  redoubtable  old  sea  rover. 
Sir  Francis  Drake,  cruising  thereabouts  some  years  later, 
seized  several  Portuguese  fishing  vessels  as  prizes ;  and 
although  his  captures  v/ere  made  many  miles  from  land,  he 
appropriated  to  his  own  use  their  cargoes  of  fish  and  oil. 
This  tardy  effort  at  colonization,  followed  by  an  attack  on 
the  right  of  free  fishery,  was  not  an  unqualified  success, 
though  there  is  little  doubt  that  it  gave  a  great  impetus  to 
English  fishing  interests  in  North  America.  Sir  Humphrey's 
settlement  languished,  and  in  1610  another  attempt  to  colo- 
nize the  forbidding  shores  of  Newfoundland  was  made  by 
John  Guy  of  Bristol.  Sir  Francis  Bacon  was  a  patron  of 
this  scheme,  and  his  prophetic  utterance  that  the  fisheries 
of  Newfoundland  would  prove  more  valuable  than  all  the 
mines  of  Peru,  has  been  amply  verified  by  time. 

John  Guy's  colony  reaped  a  harvest  of  sorrows,  but  it  gave 
another  lease  of  life  to  English  fishery  interests.  Five  years 
later  (1615)  250  English  vessels,  employing  over  10,000  men, 
were  engaged  in  fishing  along  the  coast,  and  profits  arising 
therefrom  grew  apace.  In  1623  another  colonizing  scheme  in 
Newfoundland  was  carried  out  by  Sir  George  Calvert,  after- 
ward Lord  Baltimore,  the  founder  of  the  colony  of  Mary- 
land.    He  was  granted  by  King  James  a  large  tract  of  land 


462  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

extending  from  Trinity  Bay  to  Placentia,  which  he  named 
"Avelon."  Baltimore's  hardy  followers  were  beset  and 
harassed  by  the  French  who,  from  their  strongholds  on  the 
mainland,  were  determined  to  possess  Newfoundland,  hoping 
thereby  to  secure  to  themselves  the  control  of  the  fisheries. 

By  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth  century,  the  resident 
population  of  Newfoundland  had  increased  to  2000,  the 
greater  part  of  which  followed  fishing  for  a  livelihood.  Be- 
sides them,  several  thousand  fishermen  from  France  and 
England  came  annually  in  the  spring  season  to  her  shores, 
returning  in  the  autumn  to  their  homes  across  the  Atlantic 
with  full  fares  of  fish  and  oil. 

This  already  extensive  and  rapidly  growing  industry  of 
the  English  soon  fell  into  the  hands  of  a  number  of  mer- 
chants and  shippers  who  resided  in  London  and  in  the  west 
coast  cities  of  England.  These  men  having  ample  means, 
fitted  out  numbers  of  superior  vessels,  and  manning  them 
with  skilful  crews,  began  a  systematic  exploitation  of  the 
Newfoundland  fisheries.  It  n<iturally  came  to  pass  that  the 
interests  of  these  English  fishermen  and  of  those  who  had 
settled  permanently  as  colonists  in  Newfoundland  came  into 
conflict.  The  former  sought  the  most  desirable  harbors  and 
shore  stations  for  erecting  their  stages  to  cure  and  prepare 
their  fish,  and  the  resident  colonists  naturally  selected  these 
advantageous  coast  situations  as  places  for  permanent  settle- 
ment ;  and  thus  a  petty  warfare  between  settlers  and  sailors 
took  place  every  summer  on  the  southern  Newfoundland 
coast.  The  interests  of  the  English  merchants  were  para- 
mount in  the  estimation  of  the  sovereign,  it  being  conceived 
that  the  only  real  value  of  the  desolate  island  of  Newfound- 
land to  the  mother  country  consisted  in  its  control  of  the 
fisheries,  for  which  control  a  mere  nominal  possession  of  the 
island  was  quite  sufficient. 

Legislation  at  London  accorded  precedence  and  preemi- 
nence to  the  rights  of  fishermen  over  those  of  the  Newfound- 
land settlers.  Laws  enacted  by  the  English  Parliament 
between  1630  and  1640  proved  to  be  oppressive  and  highly 
injurious  to  the  colonists,  and  the  enforcing  of  many  cruel 


THE  NORTHEAST  COAST  FISHERIES  463 

and  unjust  regulations,  under  the  plea  that  the  fisheries  must 
be  preserved  to  England,  both  as  a  means  of  profit  and  as  a 
nursery  for  her  seamen,  covered  a  period  of  more  than  a  hun- 
dred years.  The  building  of  houses  and  cultivation  of  the 
soil  were  prohibited  within  six  miles  of  the  shore,  and  numer- 
ous other  barriers  to  prospective  colonization  gave  great 
annoyance  to  existing  settlers.  In  fact,  the  London  Board 
of  Trade,  in  whose  hands  the  regulation  of  the  English 
fisheries  had  been  placed,  pursued  its  radical  policy  so  far  as 
to  send  Sir  John  Berry  to  Newfoundland  in  1670  with  orders 
to  burn  and  destroy  all  dwellings,  and  drive  the  wretched 
owners  from  the  island.  Under  such  adverse  conditions, 
British  colonization  in  Newfoundland  dwindled  into  insig- 
nificance in  the  presence  of  a  protected  interest  of  pre- 
dominant importance.  At  that  dark  period  of  her  history, 
Newfoundland  was  generally  regarded  beyond  the  Atlantic 
as  "  a  great  English  ship  moored  near  the  Banks  during  the 
fishing  season  for  the  convenience  of  English  fishermen." 

The  era  of  oppression  upon  the  Newfoundland  settlers 
reached  its  culmination  in  the  passing  of  the  statute,  10  and 
11  William  and  Mary  (1698),  entitled :  "An  act  to  encourage 
the  trade  of  Newfoundland,"  which  was,  in  reality,  an  act  to 
discourage  immigration  and  to  foster  the  interests  of  fisher- 
men alone.  By  one  of  the  provisions  of  this  statute,  referred 
to  as  "  infamous  "  in  the  annals  of  Newfoundland,  a  judicial 
system  was  established  for  the  colony,  to  be  administered  by 
the  "fishing  admiral."  This  system  abolished  the  plan  of 
dispensing  justice,  already  in  vogue  in  the  colony,  and  created 
in  its  stead  a  form  of  impromptu  courts,  held  by  the  captains 
of  the  English  fishing  vessels  whenever  they  happened  in 
port.  The  captain  arriving  first  in  a  harbor  was  constituted 
"Admiral  of  the  Port,"  the  second,  " Vice-Admiral,"  etc., 
in  whom  was  vested  the  exercise  of  all  judicial  functions. 
The  rule  of  these  generally  ignorant,  and  too  often  vicious, 
men  soon  brought  all  semblance  of  law  and  order  into  con- 
tempt, and  resulted  in  conditions  bordering  on  anarchy. 
This  statute  remained  in  force  many  years,  and  did  much  to 
retard  the  growth  of  the  colony.      Indeed,  it  may  reasonably 


464  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

be  questioned  whether  Newfoundland  has  ever  fully  recov- 
ered from  the  many  sacrifices  she  has  been  forced  to  make  in 
preserving  the  monopoly  of  the  fisheries  to  her  mother 
country.  The  wealth  of  her  large  bays  and  coastal  waters 
may  be  said  to  have  brought  to  the  island  benefits  and 
damages  in  about  equal  proportions. 

The  history  of  the  fisheries,  from  the  early  part  of  the 
seventeenth  century  to  the  treaty  of  1763,  is  merely  the  story 
of  English  and  French  conflicts  for  mavstery  in  the  regions 
lying  about  the  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence,  and  south  on  the  main- 
land of  Massachusetts,  —  the  primary  object  of  these  many 
encounters  being  to  secure  control  of  the  inexhaustible 
riches  of  the  neighboring  seas. 

Throughout  the  sixteenth  century,  the  flags  of  France 
were  the  more  numerous  on  the  fishing  grounds ;  and  after  the 
disappearance  of  the  Spanish,  the  French  remained  for  many 
years  a  formidable  rival  of  the  English.  They  clung  tena- 
ciously to  the  shore  stations  they  had  established  in  New- 
foundland during  the  sixteenth  century,  and  were  always 
ready  to  fight  for  the  maintenance  of  their  full  rights  on  the 
Banks.  In  1577  they  employed  no  less  than  150  vessels,  and 
about  this  time  the  fisheries  were  deemed  of  sufficient  im- 
portance to  be  placed  under  the  protection  of  the  French 
Government. 

Seeking  a  permanent  base  of  operations  on  the  continent, 
the  French  set  up  a  claim  to  Nova  Scotia,  which,  together 
with  Cajje  Breton,  New  Brunswick  and  a  part  of  Maine, 
constituted  a  great  tract  of  country  known  later  as  Acadia. 
Basing  their  rights  upon  early  discovery  and  upon  a  grant 
of  Henry  IV  of  France  to  Pierre  de  Gast,  Sieur  de  Morts, 
in  1603,  the  French  occupied  this  territory,  built  Port  Royal, 
and  established  a  thriving  fishery  at  Canso.  It  was  the 
intention  of  the  French  monarch  to  found  a  colony  at  some 
point  accessible  to  the  Banks,  from  which,  as  a  base,  the 
business  might  be  easily  and  successfully  conducted.  Cod 
was  becoming  a  necessity  as  a  food  in  France,  and  was  espe- 
cially suitable  for  use  on  the  many  religious  fast  days  of  that 
period.     The  settlement  of  Acadia  fulfilled  all  the  needs  of 


THE   NORTHEAST   COAST  FISHERIES  465 

this  desire  to  secure  the  bank  fisheries  for  his  own  sub- 
jects. The  first  French  emigrants  to  this  country,  however, 
came  into  immediate  collision  with  English  subjects,  who, 
taking  shelter  behind  a  royal  patent  from  the  English  sov- 
ereign to  Sir  William  Alexander,  in  1621,  set  up  a  claim  of 
their  own  to  the  greater  part  of  the  territory  constituting 
Acadia.  Here,  then,  began  in  earnest  the  quarrel  that,  last- 
ing more  than  a  century,  terminated  only  in  the  total  extinc- 
tion of  French  sovereignty  in  Canada.  Charles  I  of  England, 
having  married  a  French  princess,  was  prevailed  upon  to 
abandon  all  settlements  in  Canada,  Nova  Scotia  and  Cape 
Breton  occupied  by  his  subjects  ;  and  by  the  treaty  of  St. 
Oermains  (1632)  the  French  were  made  secure  in  their 
possession  of  Acadia. 

With  so  favorable  a  base  for  aggressive  operations,  the 
French  began  at  once  to  extend  their  fisheries  and  to  enlarge 
their  dominion.  They  boasted  that  they  would  eventually 
drive  English  colonists  into  the  sea.  Within  three  years 
they  obtained  privileges  from  the  English  Government  for 
drying  their  fish  on  the  southern  shore  of  Newfoundland  by 
payment  of  a  duty  of  5  per  cent  on  the  product.  In  twenty-five 
years  more,  by  seizing  the  chance  of  an  opportune  moment, 
they  established  a  colony  at  Placentia,  on  the  large  bay  of 
that  name  (south  shore  of  Newfoundland).  In  a  short  time, 
and  apparently  through  the  favor  and  sympathy  of  the  English 
sovereign,  they  were  relieved  from  the  5  per  cent  duty  which 
had  been  previously  exacted  of  them  in  return  for  shore  privi- 
leges. Growing  bolder  by  success,  they  carried  their  sphere 
of  influence  along  the  entire  southern  coast  of  Newfoundland, 
establishing  here  and  there  fishing  stations  and  small  settle- 
ments —  meeting  only  occasional  checks  in  their  progress 
irom  the  English  settlers  on  the  island. 

Cromwell  seized  Acadia  in  1654,  during  a  period  of  per- 
fect peace  between  the  two  nations,  on  the  alleged  ground 
that  its  transfer  to  the  French  by  Charles  I  in  1632  was 
fraudulent  and  traitorous;  but  upon  the  restoration  of  the 
Stuarts  this  valuable  territory  was  again  restored  to  France 
'(treaty  of  Breda,  1667),  to  the  intense  disgust  of  all  Eng- 

2h 


466  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS       - 

lish  fishermen,  and  other  English  subjects  who  had  borne  the 
brunt  of  conflict  with  the  ambitious  and  aggressive  French- 
men of  North  America. 

The  New  England  colonists  south  of  Acadia,  who,  by  this, 
time,  were  becoming  sensible  of  their  increasing  vigor  and 
strength,  and  who,  moreover,  were  acquiring  a  degree  of  self- 
confidence  inspired  by  their  triumphs  over  the  many  difficulties. 
attending  their  early  settlements,  looked  upon  the  growth  of 
French  power  in  the  New  World  with  bitter  jealousy,  inten- 
sified as  well  by  local  conflict  of  interest.  Not  only  as  British 
subjects  with  the  usual  ahtipathy  against  Frenchmen,  but  in 
defence  of  their  own  colonial  interests  and  welfare,  they 
opposed,  whenever  opportunity  offered,  the  development  of 
French  power  and  influence  in  Acadia  or  elsewhere  in  North 
America. 

After  the  breaking  out  of  hostilities  between  France  and 
England,  on  the  accession  of  William  and  Mary  to  the  throne. 
Sir  William  Phips  of  Massachusetts,  with  a  band  of  hardy 
fishermen,  made  a  successful  attack  on  Port  Royal  (1690), 
and  took  formal  possession  of  all  Acadia  in  the  name  of 
King  William.  Phips'  victory  resulted  in  the  alleged  an- 
nexation of  that  great  province  to  Massachusetts.  Similar 
attempts  were  made  upon  Newfoundland,  and  among  them 
a  desperate  effort  to  dislodge  the  French  from  Placentia; 
but  in  retaliation  St.  Johns  was  successfully  besieged  by  a 
French  fleet.  The  peace  of  Ryswick  (1697)  closed  hostilities, 
leaving  the  French  in  the  New  World  in  full  possession  of 
their  previous  claims,  and  Acadia  was  specifically  restored  to 
them.  Their  right  to  Placentia  and  to  a  considerable  extent 
of  the  Newfoundland  shores  was  confirmed.  The  indigna- 
tion of  the  English  colonists  in  America,  aroused  by  this 
surrender  of  Acadia,  was  very  great.  It  readily  occurred  to 
these  people  that  the  mother  country  attached  but  little 
value  to  her  American  possessions,  or  else  had  consented  to 
sacrifice  her  interests  here  as  mere  pawns  on  the  chessboard 
of  European  politics. 

The  new  governor  of  Acadia,  Villabon,  announced,  soon 
after  the  treaty  of  1697,  that  he  had  received  orders  from  his 


THE  NORTHEAST  COAST  FISHERIES  467 

Lome  government  to  arrest  any  foreign  vessels  found  tres- 
passing on  the  French  shores,  the  southern  limit  of  which  he 
placed  at  the  Kennebec  River.  The  way  was  now  opened 
to  the  goal  of  French  ambition  in  America,  and  Villabon  set 
about  to  secure  full  and  immediate  control  of  the  fisheries. 
French  fishing  vessels,  some  five  hundred  in  number,  and 
many  of  them  well  armed,  soon  practically  enjoyed  a  monopoly 
of  the  fisheries  along  the  coasts  and  in  the  Gulf  of  St.  Law- 
rence, the  returns  proving  exceedingly  remunerative.  In 
order  better  to  maintain  this  monopoly,  he  inaugurated  a 
military  campaign  in  Newfoundland,  the  full  possession  of 
which  was  ever  dear  to  the  French.  Success  attended  their 
arms,  and  in  a  very  short  time  nearly  every  desirable  settle- 
ment, port  and  harbor  in  the  island  fell  into  their  hands,  and 
Newfoundland  became  virtually  lost  to  England.  French 
enterprise  had  secured  to  them  an  almost  absolute  monopoly 
of  the  fisheries,  and  they  held  besides  the  territory  from 
Maine  to  Labrador,  including  Newfoundland. 

The  hostilities  incident  to  this  great  advance  of  French 
interests  were  terminated  by  the  treaty  of  Utrecht  in  1713, 
which  very  considerably  altered  the  political  situation  in  the 
North,  and  may  be  said  to  have  inserted  a  wedge  that  ulti- 
mately rended  and  destroyed  French  prestige  and  monopoly 
of  the  fisheries  in  North  American  waters.  By  this  famous 
compact  the  stronghold  of  Placentia  was  yielded  by  France, 
and  all  Newfoundland  restored  to  England.  A  reservation 
was  made,  however,  securing  to  the  French  a  concurrent  and 
equal  right  of  fishery  with  English  subjects  along  the  coast 
of  Newfoundland,  from  Bona  Vista  to  Cape  Riche  by  the 
north,  and  of  using  the  shores  for  curing,  etc.  Acadia  again 
became  English  territory,  France  retaining  only  the  island  of 
Cape  Breton.  An  instance  is  given  in  this  treaty  of  a  nation 
establishing  by  agreement  its  exclusive  sovereignty  over  a 
wide  expanse  of  high  seas,  for  by  one  of  its  articles  the 
French  were  prohibited  from  approaching  within  thirty 
leagues  of  the  coast  of  Nova  Scotia. 

The  French  were  by  no  means  discouraged  by  such  re- 
verses, and  continued  to  press  their  fishing  operations  with 


468  amerA:an  diplomatic  questions 

their  accustomed  vigor.  On  the  Newfoundland  coast,  within 
the  area  allotted  to  them,  where  they  enjoyed  concurrent 
fishing  rights,  they  at  once  began  to  assert  an  absolute  and 
exclusive  right,  and  forbade  the  settlement  of  the  region  by 
English  subjects.  In  Cape  Breton,  where  their  fishing  fleet 
of  some  400  sail  rendezvoused,  they  constructed  the  famous 
fortress  of  Louisburg.  This  position  was  maintained  with 
a  sort  of  desperate  determination  as  the  last  barrier  against 
English  advance.  It  was  designed  and  considered  by  the 
French  Government  to  be  absolutely  impregnable.  It  re- 
quired twenty-five  years  to  build,  at  a  cost  of  1^5,000,000. 
Upon  its  great  walls  were  placed  200  pieces  of  heavy  artil- 
lery, which  gave  defiance  to  all  assault.  Within  these 
massive  fortifications  reposed  a  city  with  full  complement  of 
public  edifices,  churches,  parks  and  the  homes  of  several  thou- 
sand fishermen,  by  whose  persevering  industry  the  city  was 
made  prosperous.  In  the  building  of  this  fortress,  —  "  the 
Dunkirk  of  America,'' — upon  a  low  sandy  spot  in  a  desolate 
island,  a  mere  outpost  in  the  vast  wilderness  of  a  new  coun- 
try, one  finds  a  glaring  example  of  the  ill-judged  policy  that 
has  so  generally  characterized  French  colonial  operations. 
The  splendid  scale  upon  which  this  great  fortress  was  built 
measures  the  earnest  and  extraordinary  interest  felt  by  the 
French  at  that  period  in  the  northeastern  fisheries. 

Louisburg  was  regarded  by  British  subjects  in  America, 
and  especially  in  Massachusetts,  as  both  an  insult  and  a 
menace.  The  aggressiveness  of  the  French  in  prosecuting 
the  fisheries  ;  their  unreasonable  and  exaggerated  claims  on 
the  Newfoundland  coast,  combined  with  the  uneasiness  and 
jealousy  produced  by  the  contemplation  of  their  position  of 
vantage  and  strength  in  Cape  Breton,  greatly  irritated  and 
inflamed  the  colonists.  They  believed  that  French  chicanery 
and  effrontery  had  accomplished  what  her  arms  had  failed 
to  achieve,  and  it  was  thoroughly  believed  and  constantly 
asserted  that  there  could  be  no  lasting  peace  in  America 
until  Gallic  influence  had  been  extirpated  from  the  continent. 

In  1744  war  again  broke  out  between  England  and 
France,  and  the   long-cherished  plan  of  striking  a  blow  at 


THE   NORTHEAST  COAST  FISHERIES  469 

Louisburg  was  immediately  set  on  foot  in  New  England. 
Massachusetts  colony  organized  an  expedition  with  Pepper- 
rell,  a  merchant  of  Kittery,  Maine,  at  its  head.  With  some 
English  ships  as  allies  he  maintained  a  siege  under  many 
difficulties  for  nearly  two  months,  and  was  finally  rewarded 
by  the  capitulation  of  the  fortified  city  on  June  16,  1745. 
The  capture  of  Louisburg  was  an  event  of  great  importance. 
Smollett  refers  to  it  as  "the  most  important  achievement. of 
the  war  of  1744,"  as  it  accomplished  much  toward  balancing 
English  reverses  across  the  Atlantic.  Pepperrell  was  made 
a  baronet,  and  all  the  expenses  of  the  campaign  which  had 
been  borne  by  Massachusetts  were  subsequently  repaid  to 
the  colony.  The  English  colonists  were  jubilant  over  the 
success  of  their  expedition,  but  they  were  as  suddenly  disap- 
pointed and  chagrined  when  the  English  surrendered  Cape 
Breton  with  a  restoration  of  Louisburg  only  three  years 
later  in  the  peace  of  Aix  la  Chapelle.  Again  had  the  mother 
country  profited  by  the  valor  of  her  American  subjects  in 
furthering  her  ends  in  Europe,  and  again  had  the  French 
reaped  triumph  from  defeat  in  North  America. 

Louisburg  was  promptly  rebuilt  and  strengthened,  and  a 
vigorous  effort  was  made  by  France  to  revive  her  fishing 
industries,  which  had  suffered  severely  by  the  war.  It  is 
estimated  that  of  the  560  French  fishing  vessels  employed  at 
the  beginning  of  the  war  of  1744,  only  about  100  remained 
after  the  fall  of  Louisburg  ;  these  carried  on  their  opera- 
tions almost  entirely  on  the  Newfoundland  coast.  Although 
the  French  were  reaching  the  period  of  decline  in  the  pros- 
perity of  their  North  American  fishing  interests,  yet  despite 
all  discouragements  they  had  no  intention  of  abandoning  the 
valuable  industry.  Reinstated  in  Cape  Breton,  the  French 
at  once  resumed  their  old  system  of  aggression.  The  ancient 
quarrels,  involving  questions  of  boundary  and  of  fishing 
rights,  were  revived.  Seemingly  incapable  of  peaceful  rela- 
tions with  others,  when  their  interests  were  touched,  they 
began  to  renew  their  attacks  on  Newfoundland,  arid  to  make 
hostile  raids  into  Nova  Scotia.  War  again  broke  out  between 
England  and  France  in  1756,  one  of  the  causes  of  which  was 


470  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

these  French  aggressions  upon  Nova  Scotia  and  Newfound- 
land ;  and  it  gave  the  British  subjects  in  America  the  oppor- 
tunity they  especially  desired  —  to  remove,  if  possible,  the 
humiliation  brought  on  them  by  the  disgraceful  peace  treaty 
of  Aix  la  Chapelle.  A  strong  British  fleet  commanded  by 
Lord  Amherst,  with  the  gallant  Wolfe  second  in  command, 
and  supported  by  nearly  one-third  of  the  fighting  strength 
of  Massachusetts,  again  captured  Louisburg  in  1758,  and 
razed  its  battlements  to  the  ground  ;  the  following  year 
Wolfe  marched  into  Canada  and  captured  Quebec.  With 
the  fall  of  these  two  strongholds,  French  power  in  the  New 
World  was  broken,  and  Great  Britain  became  mistress  of 
her  possessions  in  North  America. 

It  was  during  this  same  war  that  the  attempt  was  made  by 
the  British  authorities  in  Nova  Scotia  to  remove  from  that 
colony  all  vestiges  of  Latin  influence,  by  forcibly  expelling 
the  French  settlers  from  the  land.  The  execution  of  this 
harsh  and  cruel  policy  furnishes  the  saddest  chapter  in  the 
somewhat  romantic  history  of  Acadia.  Thousands  were  de- 
ported to  the  Virginia  and  New  England  colonies,  where 
they  found  a  scant  welcome,  and  many  hundreds  perished 
miserably  through  exposure  and  want.  The  pathetic  incidents 
connected  with  the  depopulation  of  the  French  village  of 
Grand  Pre,  conducted  by  the  unwilling  Lieutenant  Winslow, 
who  declared  the  duty  "  very  disagreeble  to  my  natural.make 
and  temi)er,"  gave  to  Longfellow  the  theme  for  "  Evange- 
line." If  the  chroniclers  of  the  time  are  reliable,  the  natives 
of  Grand  Pre  were  not  altogether  the  simple-hearted,  peace- 
loving  people  depicted  by  the  poet,  but  were  rather  a 
troublesome  and  somewhat  vicious  colony  of  fishermen 
who  lost  no  opportunity  to  inflict  injury  upon  the  New 
England  skippers  who  came  in  contact  with  them.  Candor, 
however,  compels  one  in  forming  estimates  of  the  moral 
qualities  of  the  French  and  English  fishermen  of  the  seven- 
teenth  and  eighteenth  centuries,  to  divide  honors  about 
equally  between  them.  If  the  French  in  Nova  Scotia  were 
sullen  and  unruly  under  English  dominion,  and  if  they  enjoyed 
harrying  New  Englanders  when  they  came  to  the  Bay  of 


THE   NORTHEAST   COAST   FISHERIES  Vj^lVi''^^'^^^ 

Fundy,  they  probably  found  ample  justification  for  their  mis-" 
deeds  in  the  bad  treatment  they  had  themselves  received. 

In  drawing  up  the  treaty  of  peace  which  was  concluded 
in  Paris  in  1763,  much  difficulty  was  encountered  by  the 
plenipotentiaries  in  adjusting  the  fishery  question  which 
appears  to  have  claimed  consideration  beyond  all  other 
topics.  '  France,  driven  to  extremities,  seemed  willing 
enough  to  lose  all  of  Canada,  but  she  insisted  upon  the 
retention  of  some  parcel  of  territory  as  a  basis  from  which 
to  carry  on  her  fisheries.  Strong  opposition  to  any  fish- 
ing concessions  manifested  itself  in  England,  it  being  ear- 
nestly contended  that  the  fisheries  alone  were  worth  more 
than  possession  of  all  Canada.  It  was  finally  agreed  that 
France  should  continue  her  use  of  the  shores  of  Newfound- 
land from  Bona  Vista  to  Cape  Riche,  as  had  been  previously 
stipulated  in  the  treaty  of  Utrecht.  French  fishermen  were 
not  allowed  to  fish  elsewhere  within  three  leagues  of  the 
shore  ;  and  along  the  coast  of  Cape  Breton  an  interdiction  of 
fifteen  leagues  was  placed  against  them.  The  islands  of  St. 
Pierre  and  Miquelon  were  ceded  to  France  in  full  right,  to 
serve  as  shelter  to  its  fishermen,  and  the  French  engaged 
not  to  fortify  or  to  effect  permanent  settlements  upon  the 
same. 

The  French  fishery  interests  had  again  suffered  severely 
by  these  wars,  although  after  the  treaty  of  Paris,  through 
generous  bounties  and  every  kind  of  governmental  encour- 
agement, they  slowly  revived,  and  in  course  of  time  recov- 
ered a  share  of  their  former  prestige.  France  having  sided 
with  the  American  colonists  in  their  war  of  independence, 
suffered  the  loss  of  St.  Pierre  and  Miquelon,  but  by  the 
treaty  of  Versailles  in  1783,  these  islands  were  restored,  to- 
gether with  an  extension  of  privileges  theretofore  granted 
on  the  shores  of  Newfoundland,  giving  them  an  area  of  shore 
line  for  curing,  from  Cape  St.  John  to  Cape  Ray.  The 
phraseology  of  this  treaty,  defining  the  nature  of  the  rights 
of  France  on  the  Newfoundland  shore,  furnished  another  sub- 
ject of  contention  to  English  and  French  statesmen,  until  a 
true  meaning  was  agreed  upon  in  1881,  nearly  a  century 


472  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

later.  The  French  insisted  upon  their  exclusive  right  to 
occupy  the  shore  areas  allotted  to  them,  even  as  against  Brit- 
ish settlers. 

Despite  continued  ill-feeling  between  French  and  English 
fishing  interests,  both  have  nevertheless  prospered,  and  the 
friction  between  them  has  gradually  diminished  ever  since. 

m 

In  seeking  a  home  for  themselves  and  their  posterity,  the 
Pilgrim  Fathers  were  largely  influenced  in  their  choice  of  a 
place  of  settlement  by  the  value  they  attached  to  the  fisher- 
ies of  New  England.  Enthusiastic  descriptions  of  the  abun- 
dance of  cod  in  that  region  had  reached  them  in  England. 
The  reports  of  Gosnold  in  1602;  of  Pring,  who  explored 
the  harbors  of  Maine  in  1603 ;  of  Way  mouth  in  1605 ;  of 
Popham  and  Gilbert  who  settled  in  Maine  in  1608 ;  and  of 
the  romantic  John  Smith  who  caught  47,000  cod  at  Monhe- 
gan  in  1614,  and  who  devoted  pages  "writ  with  his  oune 
hande  "  to  the  wealth  of  the  fisheries  in  the  New  World,  and 
especially  in  New  England,  —  all  of  these  had  been  read  and 
considered  by  the  Puritans  before  making  their  exodus  to 
the  West.  Before  abandoning  forever  the  shores  of  the 
Old  World,  they  executed  contracts  with  certain  merchant^ 
in  England,  to  whom  they  agreed  to  furnish  fish,  hoping 
thereby  to  defray  the  expenses  of  their  voyage.  In  his  his* 
tory  of  Virginia,  John  Smith  takes  credit  to  himself  fo 
having  been  largely  instrumental  in  inducing  the  Pilgri 
to  come  to  the  New  World  on  account  of  his  favorable  repre 
sentations  regarding  the  New  England  fisheries.  In  a  dis- 
course on  the  trials  of  the  New  England  colonists  and  thei 
wonderful  industry  in  fishing,  he  enumerates  the  Englisl 
ships  that  had  made  "exceeding  good  voyages"  to  th( 
coasts,  and  continuing,  says,  "at  last,  upon  these  induce- 
ments, some  well-disposed  Brunists  [Puritans],  as  they  are 
termed,  with  some  gentlemen  and  merchants  of  Leyden  an  ^" 
Amsterdam,  to  save  charges,  would  try  their  oune  conclu 
sions,   though   with   great   losse   and   much   miserie."     H 


THE   NORTHEAST   COAST  FISHERIES  473 

refers  later  to  the  prosperity  of  the  little  band  in  1634 

"  since  they  had  made  a  salt  worke  wherewith  they  preserv 
all  the  fish  they  take,  and  have  fraughted  this  yeare  a  ship 
of  an  hundred  and  four  score  tun." 

The  Pilgrims  lost  no  time  in  entering  upon  the  business 
of  fishing.  Within  ten  years  after  their  landing  at  Plym- 
outh Rock,  they  carried  on  an  export  fish  trade  with  Eng- 
lish and  Dutch  settlers  in  New  York  ;  indeed,  fishing  became 
the  principal  occupation  and  chief  source  of  revenue  of  the 
people  of  New  Plymouth,  and  the  rapid  settlement  of  Mas- 
sachusetts after  the  founding  of  that  colony  was  greatly 
promoted  by  the  great  profits  arising  from  the  fishing 
interests  on  its  coast.  The  colonists  at  Plymouth  found 
remunerative  occupation,  while  English  vessels  at  Monhe- 
gan  and  other  points  along  the  coast  of  Maine  reported  fish 
in  great  abundance. 

It  was  during  the  infancy  of  the  Massachusetts  colony 
that  Salem,  Gloucester  and  Marblehead  were  founded,  and 
they  soon  became  centres  of  great  importance  for  fishing 
and  other  associated  interests.  The  first  Massachusetts 
ship  visited  the  Banks  of  Newfoundland  in  1645  —  a  pioneer 
destined  to  have  an  abundant  following.  Some  friction 
between  the  fishermen  of  Plymouth  and  Boston  manifested 
itself,  but  all  such  differences  were  finally  adjusted  by  unit- 
ing the  two  colonies  in  1692,  and  the  fisheries  of  the  greater 
Massachusetts  flourished  more  extensively  than  ever.  At 
the  close  of  the  seventeenth  century,  the  merchants  of  Boston 
exported  to  Portugal,  Spain  and  Italy  about  100,000  quin- 
tals of  cod,  worth  1400,000  annually. 

In  1731  the  fisheries  of  this  colony  employed  about 
6000  men.  Ten  years  later  the  cod  fishery  had  become 
exceedingly  prosperous;  the  annual  product  being  about 
230,000  quintals,  valued  at  ^700,000.  One  hundred  and 
sixty  fifty-ton  vessels  were  owned  at  Marblehead  alone ; 
and  it  is  estimated  that  in  all  Massachusetts  counted  about 
400  fishing  vessels,  together  with  multitudes  of  smaller 
fishing  craft  operating  along  New  England  shore  stations. 

A  variety  of  causes  contributed  to  the  decline  of  the  New 


474  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

England  fisheries  from  1740  to  1763.  As  already  noted,  the 
struggles  between  the  French  and  English  in  Nova  Scotia, 
Cape  Breton  and  Newfoundland  were  especially  acute  at 
that  period,  and  the  New  Englanders,  as  British  subjects, 
were  expected  to  answer  repeated  calls  to  arms.  Fishermen 
were  impressed  into  the  royal  navy,  or  were  drafted  into 
military  expeditions  by  land  against  the  traditional  foe  ; 
and,  as  is  usual  in  war,  industrial  pursuits  languished. 

After  the  final  capitulation  of  Louisburg  and  the  fall  of 
Quebec,  the  fishing  interests  of  the  British  colonies  revived, 
and  the  coast  towns  of  New  England  would  have  greatly 
increased  in  population  and  wealth,  but  for  the  threatening 
controversies  which  soon  led  to  the  American  Revolution, 
and  the  final  separation  of  the  thirteen  colonies  from  the 
mother  country.  The  commencement  of  actual  hostilities 
of  course  suspended  all  fishing  operations  until  the  restora- 
tion of  peace  in  1783. 

The  important  role  played  by  the  fisheries  in  the  causes 
that  led  to  the  Revolutionary  War  does  not  appear  to  be  fully 
appreciated.  Other  causes  assumed  greater  and  more  gen- 
eral prominence  in  popular  discussion  because  they  affected 
interests  more  extended  in  their  nature,  and  exerted  an  influ- 
ence on  a  greater  number  of  the  colonists.  England  had 
watched  with  jealous  eyes  the  steadily  growing  trade  —  the 
expanding  commerce  and  the  rapidly  increasing  marine 
power  of  the  New  England  colonies.  This  colonial  trade 
had  already  extended  to  the  ports  of  Europe  and  South 
America,  and  to  the  Spanish,  French  and  English  West 
Indies  as  well,  where  American  fish  found  ready  market  to 
be  paid  for  in  sugar,  molasses,  rum,  bullion  and  bills  of 
exchange  payable  in  European  cities.  The  commercial 
prestige  of  New  England  began  to  interfere  in  no  slight 
degree  with  the  foreign  trade  of  English  merchants,  and 
the  excellent  nautical  training  acquired  by  New  England 
fishermen  and  sailors  began  to  arouse  the  apprehension  of 
Englishmen  who  demanded  exclusive  dominion  in  all  that 
pertains  to  British  industries. 

The  policy  of  curtailing  American  commerce  by  legislative 


THE  NORTHEAST  COAST  FISHERIES  475 

enactment  began  with  the  restoration  of  the  Stuarts,  and  was 
maintained  by  a  series  of  more  or  less  stringent  navigation 
laws  which  imposed  the  most  injurious  and  oppressive  bur- 
dens upon  the  colonists.  In  1733  Parliament  placed  a  duty 
in  New  England  on  rum,  sugar  and  molasses  imported  from 
the  islands  of  the  West  Indies  other  than  British,  the  aim 
being  to  check  the  prosperous  trade  that  had  sprung  up  be- 
tween Boston  and  the  French,  Dutch  and  Spanish  islands. 
This  measure,  along  with  other  measures  restricting  export 
trade  from  New  England,  tended  to  work  great  injury  to  the 
fishing  interests.  The  merchants  of  Boston  complained  bit- 
terly, saying  that  the  fisheries  were  their  mainstay  of  life, 
and  that  to  prevent  trade  with  the  West  Indies  was  to  do  no 
less  than  render  their  fisheries  of  little  value  —  in  short,  to 
convert  their  gold  into  dross.  An  English  fleet  was  sent 
over  to  enforce  the  tariff  law,  but  its  commander  reported, 
"  ye  fishermen  to  be  stubberne  fellowes,"  and  in  spite  of  his 
vigilance,  the  West  Indian  trade  continued  as  before,  in  defi- 
ance of  Parliamentary  action.  The  act  of  1733  was  renewed 
in  1764,  and  the  vigilance  of  the  authorities  doubled.  The 
jurisdiction  of  the  admiralty  courts  was  enlarged,  and 
determined  efforts  were  made  by  the  officers  of  the  crown 
to  collect  the  duties.  For  this  purpose  commanders  of  the 
English  men-of-war  were  commissioned  to  act  as  revenue 
collectors. 

The  field  having  just  been  cleared  of  the  annoying  compe- 
tition of  French  fishermen,  the  Americans  were  about  to  enter 
upon  an  era  of  great  prosperity.  Their  fishing  stations  were 
located  at  Canso,  in  the  Bay  of  Chaleur,  and  extended  along 
the  Labrador  coast,  and  a  certain  renewal  of  former  successes 
was  just  in  sight.  The  navigation  laws  of  England,  how- 
ever, operated  so  adversely  to  American  interests  that  the 
English  fishermen,  untrammelled  by  these  exactions,  soon 
regained  a  monopoly  in  the  fishing  business.  Many  New 
England  skippers  became  discouraged  and  took  their  vessels 
and  outfits  abroad,  where  they  sold  them  to  their  more  fortu- 
nate rivals.  By  evasions  of  the  law,  however,  many  of  the 
merchants  and  fishermen  of  Boston,  Salem  and  Gloucester 


476  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

still  managed  to  maintain  themselves,  but  only  at  the  cost  of 
frequent  collisions  with  the  king's  officers. 

The  effect  upon  the  fisheries,  caused  by  the  renewal  of  the 
navigation  laws  of  1764,  is  well  set  forth  in  the  petition  of  the 
common  council  of  Massachusetts  to  the  House  of  Commons 
for  their  abrogation.  It  recites  that  the  importation  of  mo- 
lasses from  the  West  India  Islands  is  of  the  greatest  import- 
ance, not  merely  because  it  is  a  valuable  and  useful  commodity, 
but,  —  "  If  the  trade,  for  many  years  carried  on  for  foreign 
molasses  can  no  longer  be  continued,  a  vent  cannot  be  found 
for  more  than  one-half  the  fish  of  inferior  quality  which  are 
caught  and  cured  by  the  inhabitants  of  the  province,  the 
French  not  permitting  fish  to  be  carried  by  foreigners  to 
any  of  their  islands  unless  to  be  bartered  or  exchanged  for 
molasses ;  that  if  there  be  no  sale  of  fish  of  inferior  quality, 
it  will  be  impossible  to  continue  the  fishery ;  the  fish  usually 
sent  to  England  will  then  cost  so  dear  that  the  French  will 
be  able  to  undersell  the  English  in  all  the  European  markets." 
Thus  it  will  be  seen  that  the  fisheries,  which  formed  the 
basis  of  New  England  commerce,  and  wliich  may  be  said  to 
have  been  the  very  life-blood  of  all  its  commercial  enterprise, 
had  a  most  intimate  relation  to  the  causes  that  soon  brought 
about  the  dismemberment  of  the  empire. 

The  final  act  of  Great  Britain  in  its  policy  toward  New 
England,  and  which  at  last  brought  on  the  war,  was  aimed 
directly  against  the  fisheries,  its  purpose  being  to  starve  the 
rebellious  colonists  into  submission  by  destroying  their  most 
important  industry.  Pending  the  discussion  of  the  bill  in 
the  English  Parliament  "  to  restrain  the  trade  and  commerce 
of  the  provinces  of  Massachusetts  Bay  and  New  Hampshire, 
the  colonists  of  Connecticut  and  Rhode  Island  and  Providence 
plantation,  in  North  America,  to  Great  Britain,  Ireland,  and 
the  British  Islands  in  the  West  Indies ;  and  to  prohibit  such 
provinces  and  colonies  from  carrying  on  any  fisheries  on  the 
banks  of  Newfoundland  or  other  places  therein  to  be  men- 
tioned, under  certain  conditions,  and  for  a  time  to  be  limited," 
an  examination  of  witnesses  from  Massachusetts  by  a  com- 
mittee of  Parliament  elicited  the  statements  that  the  enforce- 


THE  NORTHEAST  COAST  FISHERIES  477 

ment  of  such  an  act  would  deprive  over  sixty-two  hundred 
inhabitants  of  Massachusetts  of  the  means  of  livelihood,  and 
throw  out  of  employment  ten  thousand  persons.  An  expert 
witness  from  Nantucket  declared  that  the  great  number  of 
people  then  engaged  in  the  fisheries  in  New  England,  if  de- 
prived of  the  right  of  following  their  calling,  could  only 
subsist  "perhaps  three  months." 

After  a  stormy  debate  in  both  Houses  of  Parliament,  the 
bill  was  passed  March  21,  1775.  The  passage  of  this  act,  so 
well  calculated  to  destroy  the  fisheries  of  the  New  England 
colonies,  was  soon  followed  by  a  motion  of  Lord  North,  then 
the  British  Premier,  that  the  "  House  do  resolve  itself  into  a 
committee  of  the  whole  to  consider  the  encouragement  proper 
to  be  given  to  the  fisheries  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland." 

During  the  entire  period  of  the  war,  the  fisheries  of  New 
England  as  a  business  ceased,  and  the  fishermen  took  an 
active  part  in  the  conflict.  In  the  negotiations  of  the  colo- 
nies with  France,  seeking  her  aid  against  England,  a  proposi- 
tion was  advanced  to  attempt  jointly  the  capture  of  Canada 
and  Newfoundland,  and  if  successful,  to  divide  between  E>ance 
and  the  United  States  all  fishing  privileges  accruing  there- 
from. The  plan  was  never  seriously  entertained  by  France, 
and  was  lost  sight  of  in  the  United  States,  amid  the  stirring 
events  of  the  Revolution. 

Although  systematic  prosecution  of  work  was  necessarily 
abandoned  during  the  war,  the  importance  and  value  of  the 
fisheries  were  steadily  kept  in  view,  and  after  the  termination 
of  the  conflict  the  necessity  of  preserving  these  interests  is 
evidenced  by  numerous  resolutions  of  Congress,  and  is  further 
indicated  in  the  debates  of  various  state  legislatures  (espe- 
cially in  New  England),  and  in  frequent  utterances  of  the 
public  men  of  the  times.  It  seems  to  have  been  believed  by 
many  American  statesmen  of  that  day  that  because  New 
England  fishermen  had  contributed  their  share  of  blood  and 
treasure  in  the  joint  struggles  against  France  for  the  purpose 
of  securing  fishery  rights  in  the  Canadian  waters,  it  followed 
as  a  natural  and  legal  consequence  that  Americans  must  have 
a  perfect  right  to  their  continued  enjoyment  quite  irrespective 


478  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

of*  any  territorial  changes,  —  in  whioh  respect  it  made  no 
difference  whether  Canada  and  Newfoundland  should  remain 
under  the  sovereignty  of  England  or  pass  to  the  United 
States  at  the  conclusion  of  hostilities.  In  the  light  of  a 
better  understanding  of  the  public  law  on  this  subject,  it 
now  seems  clear  that  the  fishery  rights  must  attach  to  and 
adhere  to  the  ownership  of  and  sovereignty  over  the  terri- 
tories in  whose  waters  the  fish  are  found.  Americans  should 
have  been  left  free  to  fish  on  the  Banks,  for  they  lie  wholly 
without  the  limits  of  territorial  marine  jurisdiction,  and  are 
therefore  free  to  the  world,  —  but  the  right  to  catch  fish  in 
Canadian  waters,  that  is,  within  the  three-mile  limit  of  ordi- 
dary  marine  jurisdiction,  was  wholly  a  different  matter.  In  the 
one  case  (the  Bank  fishery)  no  fears  should  have  been  enter- 
tained at  any  time  touching  the  question  of  American  rights. 
The  public  law  settles  this  matter,  and  gives  all  nations  the 
right  to  fish  outside  territorial  waters.  In  the  other  case, 
a  continuance  of  inshore  fishing  by  Americans  in  Canadian 
territorial  waters,  as  enjoyed  by  them  while  British  colonists, 
could  not  have  been  allowable  as  an  international  right,  nor 
could  such  right  have  been  legally  based  on  the  relations  of 
the  parties  existing  prior  to  the  peace  of  1783.  The  appre- 
hensions of  the  statesmen  of  the  period  lest  Great  Britain 
should  attempt  in  a  spirit  of  retaliation  to  perpetuate  the 
interdictions  of  Lord  North's  Bill  and  thus  seek,  perhaps  by 
force  of  arms,  to  cut  off  Americans  from  all  participation  in 
the  northern  fisheries,  were  possibly  well  founded.  It  was 
determined,  at  all  events,  to  make  the  question  of  the  fisheries 
a  prominent  subject  of  the  treaty  of  peace  with  England. 
The  fishery  interests  of  the  country  were  supposed  to  be  so 
intimately  associated  with  its  commercial  prosperity  that  no 
conditions  interfering  with  their  full  development  could  be 
tolerated ;  indeed,  it  was  urged  in  many  quarters  that  their 
importance  warranted  a  continuance  of  the  war,  if  need  be, 
to  preserve  them  inviolate. 

The  firm  purpose  of  Congress  to  insist  upon  a  full  recogni- 
tion of  these  fishing  rights  as  a  sine  qua  non  of  commercial 
relations  with  England  was  supported  by  all  its  members. 


THE   NORTHEAST   COAST   FISHERIES  479 

barring  certain  delegtites  from  the  extreme  South.  Thfese 
legislators  represented  constituents  who  had  never  partici- 
pated in  the  fisheries,  and  who  therefore  felt  their  import- 
ance less  keenly.  Mr.  Gerry,  of  Massachusetts,  replied  to 
their  protests  against  making  free  fishery  an  important 
feature  of  the  coming  peace  negotiations :  "  It  is  not  so 
much  fishing  as  enterprise,  industry,  employment.  It  is  not 
fish  merely,  which  gentlemen  sneer  at,  —  it  is  gold,  the  prod- 
uct of  that  avocation.  It  is  the  employment  of  those  who 
would  otherwise  be  idle,  the  food  of  those  who  would  other- 
wise be  hungry,  the  wealth  of  those  who  would  otherwise  be 
poor,  that  depend  on  your  putting  these  resolutions  into  the 
instructions  of  your  minister." 

After  a  lengthy  debate  (1779)  Congress  instructed  John 
Adams,  who  was  then  in  Europe  acting  in  a  diplomatic 
capacity,  and  to  whom  had  been  entrusted  the  responsibility 
of  negotiating  a  treaty  of  peace  with  England, "  that  the 
common  right  of  fishing  would  in  no  case  be  given  up "  ; 
"  that  it  is  essential  to  the  welfare  of  all  the  United  States 
that  the  inhabitants  thereof,  at  the  expiration  of  the  war, 
should  continue  to  enjoy  the  free  and  undisturbed  exercise 
of  their  common  right  to  fish  on  the  Banks  of  Newfound- 
land, and  all  other  fishing  banks  and  seas  of  North  America, 
preserving  inviolate  the  treaties  between  France  and  the  said 
States "  ;  "  that  our  faith  be  pledged  to  the  several  states 
that  without  their  unanimous  consent  no  treaty  of  commerce 
shall  be  entered  into,  nor  any  trade  or  commerce  whatever 
carried  on  with  Great  Britain,  without  the  explicit  stipula- 
tion hereinafter  mentioned.  You  are,  therefore,  not  to  con- 
sent to  any  treaty  of  commerce  with  Great  Britain  without 
an  explicit  stipulation  on  her  part  not  to  molest  or  disturb 
the  inhabitants  of  the  United  States  of  America  in  taking 
fish  on  the  Banks  of  Newfoundland,  and  other  fisheries  in 
the  American  seas,  anywhere  except  within  the  distance  of 
three  leagues  of  the  shores  of  the  territories  remaining  to 
Great  Britain  at  the  close  of  the  war.  If  a  nearer  distance 
cannot  be  obtained  by  negotiations,  you  are  to  exert  your 
most  strenuous  endeavors  to  obtain  a  nearer  distance  in  the 


480  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence,  and  particularly  along  the  shores  of 
Nova  Scotia  ;  as  to  which  latter,  we  are  desirous  that  even 
the  shores  may  be  occasionally  used  for  the  purpose  of  carry- 
ing on  the  fisheries  by  the  inhabitants  of  those  states." 

Before  actual  negotiations  for  a  treaty  of  peace  With  Eng- 
land were  entered  upon,  innumerable  difficulties  had  arisen 
to  dishearten  American  legislators,  and  these  difficulties 
tended  to  weaken  the  obligatory  force  of  previous  congres- 
sional resolutions  on  the  subject.  The  war  dragged  on 
remorselessly,  exhausting  the  slender  resources  of  the  country 
and  discouraging  the  brave  men  who  were  sacrificing  their 
all  in  the  cause  of  freedom.  To-day  peace  was  in  sight,  to- 
morrow it  seemed  farther  away  than  ever ;  and  the  disheart- 
ened patriots  realized  too  well  that  the  English  ministry  was 
firm  in  its  determination  to  withhold  any  fishery  concessions. 
Other  important  concessions  besides  the  fisheries  had  to  be 
secured  from  England,  and  form  a  part  of  any  treaty  of 
peace  —  such  as  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  River, 
the  delimitations  of  boundaries,  indemnities,  etc.  ;  but  first, 
and  above  all,  independence,  the  primary  object  of  the  war, 
was  to  be  obtained  at  any  and  all  cost.  The  yielding  of  this 
concession  alone,  in  the  judgment  of  Congress,  would  be  so 
distasteful  to  the  mother  country  that  it  might  not  be  well 
to  jeopardize  the  treaty  by  making  other  demands  scarcely 
less  distasteful  to  England.  Might  it  not  prove  unreasonable, 
or  at  least  impolitic,  to  prolong  a  war  begun  for  freedom, 
simply  to  keep  inviolate  a  single  commercial  privilege  which 
might  be  as  well  secured  by  subsequent  treaty  ?  In  a  gloomy 
mood  Congress  therefore  declared  that,  "although  it  is  of 
the  utmost  importance  to  the  peace  and  commerce  of  the 
United  States  that  Canada  and  Nova  Scotia  should  be  ceded, 
and  more  particularly  that  their  equal  common  right  to  the 
fisheries  should  be  guaranteed  to  them,  yet  a  desire  of  termi- 
nating the  war  has  induced  us  not  to  make  the  acquisition 
of  these  objects  an  ultimatum  on  the  present  occasion."  It 
was  thus  that  in  July,  1781,  the  instructions  to  Mr.  Adams  of 
1779  were  overruled,  much  to  the  chagrin  of  that  zealous 
patriot. 


THE   NORTHEAST   COAST  FISHERIES  481 

In  addition  to  the  obstacles  in  the  way  of  a  probable  reten- 
tion of  full  fishing  rights  already  mentioned,  others  of  a 
most  serious  character  suddenly  presented  themselves  from 
an  unexpected  source.  France  had  given  to  the  struggling 
colonists  not  only  moral  support,  but  that  substantial  and 
material  aid  without  which  a  successful  issue  of  the  war  for 
independence  would  have  been  next  to  impossible.  American 
friendship  for  France  was  sincere  and  profound.  Confidence 
in  her  motives  was  without  suspicion  and  undisturbed  by 
doubt.  American  gratitude  recognized  the  full  measure  of 
obligation  due  to  an  act  of  disinterested  beneficence  and 
kindness.  In  the  progress  of  efforts  toward  peace,  the 
disagreeable  and  startling  fact  became  apparent  that  our 
ally  entertained  some  schemes  of  self-interest  hardly  com- 
patible with  the  generous  motives  which  had  been  originally 
ascribed  to  her.  Traces  of  French  reserve  in  the  proposed 
adjustment  of  questions  growing  out  of  the  war  were 
first  detected  in  the  matter  of  the  fisheries  ;  but  the  benefit 
of  presumed  innocence  was  for  some  time  accorded  to  the 
action  of  the  French  Government,  and  its  motives  were 
ascribed  to  the  accomplishment  of  ends  not  prejudicial 
to  American  interests.  It  subsequently  came  to  light, 
however,  that  Count  de  Vergennes,  the  astute  Minister  of 
State  at  Paris,  had  carefully  mapped  out  a  course  of  action 
relating  to  the  fisheries,  in  the  event  of  American  indepen- 
dence, which  looked  to  the  enjoyment  of  a  monopoly  of  this 
valuable  industry  by  France  and  Spain  to  the  entire  exclu- 
sion of  the  Americans.  This  seemingly  inconsistent  attitude 
of  the  French  premier  toward  his  ally  across  the  ocean  may 
be  fully  understood  when  considered  in  connection  with  the 
grand  scheme  he  had  planned  for  so  shaping  the  destinies 
of  the  new  republic  as  to  hold  them  permanently  under 
French  influence.  The  people  of  America  were  to  have 
"liberty,"  of  course,  but  liberty  under  French  domination. 
In  no  event  did  he  propose  to  permit  the  growth  of  the  new 
nation  to  interfere  with  the  interests  of  his  own  country,  it 
being  his  intention,  on  the  contrary,  to  train  his  protege  into 
a  subservient  and  useful  ally  of  France.     According  to  De 


482  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

Vergennes,  the  territorial  limits  of  the  United  States  were 
to  be  confined  to  a  narrow  strip  along  the  Atlantic  seaboard  ; 
they  were  to  be  "  circumscribed,"  he  wrote,  "  with  the  great- 
est exactness,  and  all  the  belligerent  powers  [England, 
France,  and  Spain]  must  bind  themselves  to  prevent  any 
transgression  of  them."  In  the  furtherance  of  his  project  to 
perpetuate  the  glory  of  France  on  the  Western  continent, 
and  to  humiliate  his  Anglo-Saxon  enemy,  he  flattered  himself 
upon  having  made  an  excellent  beginning.  By  timely  aid  to 
the  United  States  in  its  period  of  distress  he  had  won  the 
gratitude  and  confidence  of  the  young  nation,  and  it  needed 
but  the  exercise  of  vigilance  and  political  sagacity  to  guide 
its  future  steps  in  paths  of  his  own  making.  As  a  guardian 
it  was  necessary  to  gain  control  of  the  nation's  diplomatic 
bureau,  and  for  himself  to  negotiate  for  his  ward  its  treaty 
of  peace  with  Great  Britain.  The  young  eagle's  wings  were 
to  be  clipped  at  once. 

French  diplomatic  agents  in  Philadelphia  exerted  all  their 
influence  over  Congress  to  bring  about  this  end,  and  with 
such  skill,  be  it  said,  that  in  July,  1781,  Congress  instructed 
the  peace  commission  (now  to  be  enlarged  by  the  appoint- 
ment of  Jay,  Franklin,  Jefferson,  and  Laurens),  to  take  no 
initiative  in  the  coming  negotiations  for  peace  without  the 
knowledge  and  consent  of  the  king  of  France,  and,  "  ulti- 
mately to  govern  ourselves  by  their  advice  and  opinion, 
endeavoring  in  our  whole  conduct  to  make  him  sensible  how 
much  we  rely  on  His  Majesty's  influence  for  effectual  sup- 
port." Madison  bitterly  denounced  this  resolution  of  Con- 
gress as  a  "sacrifice  of  the  national  dignity."  About  one 
year  later  an  intercepted  letter  of  Marbois,  a  French  diplo- 
mat in  the  United  States,  to  De  Vergennes,  when  made  pub- 
lic, aroused  great  and  well-merited  indignation,  as  it  furnished 
the  first  real  proof  of  French  duplicity  toward  the  United 
States.  It  had  a  wholesome  effect  in  determining  the  course 
of  action  to  be  followed  by  the  peace  commissioners  in  Paris. 

The  letter  is  in  part  as  follows  :  — 

But  Mr.  Samuel  Adams  is  using  all  his  endeavors  to  raise  in 
the  State  of  Massachusetts  a  strong  opposition  to  peace  if  the 


THE   NORTHEAST   COAST   FISHERIES  483 

Eastern  States  are  not  thereby  admitted  to  the  fisheries,  and  in 
particular  to  that  of  Newfoundland  .  .  .  and  if  the  States  should 
agree  relative  to  the  fisheries,  and  be  certain  of  partaking  of  them, 
all  his  measures  and  intrigues  would  be  directed  toward  the  con- 
quest of  Canada  and  Nova  Scotia ;  but  he  could  not  have  used  a 
fitter  engine  than  the  fisheries  for  stirring  up  the  passions  of  the 
eastern  people,  by  renewing  the  question  which  has  lain  dormant 
during  his  two  years  absence  from  Boston.  He  has  raised  the 
expectations  of  the  people  to  an  extravagant  pitch.  The  public 
prints  hold  forth  the  importance  of  the  fisheries.  The  reigning 
toast  in  the  East  is  "  May  the  United  States  ever  maintain  their 
rights  to  the  fisheries."  It  has  often  been  repeated  in  the  delib- 
erations of  the  General  Courts,  "  no  peace  without  the  fisheries." 
However  clear  the  principle  may  be  in  this  matter,  it  would  be 
useless,  and  even  dangerous,  to  attempt  informing  the  people 
through  the  public  papers.  But  it  appears  to  me  possible  to 
use  all  means  for  preventing  the  consequences  of  success  to 
Mr.  Samuel  Adams  and  his  party ;  and  I  take  the  liberty  of  sub- 
mitting them  to  your  discernment  and  indulgence. 

Jefferson  did  not  act  upon  the  peace  commission,  and 
Laurens  did  so  only  at  its  close.  Jay,  who  was  then  Minis- 
ter at  Madrid,  had  resided  long  enough  abroad  to  become 
thoroughly  imbued  with  a  distrust  in  the  genuineness  of 
French  and  Spanish  friendship  toward  his  country,  and 
he  deprecated  his  instructions  to  abide  by  the  wishes  of 
any  European  sovereign.  John  Adams  fairly  blazed  with 
indignation  at  the  humiliating  conditions  placed  by  Con- 
gress upon  himself  and  his  associate  commissioners,  and  he 
determined  to  rebel  against  the  meddling  interference  of  the 
French  court,  whose  treachery  to  the  United  States  touch- 
ing the  fisheries  he  thoroughly  understood.  Franklin,  then 
United  States  Minister  at  Paris,  had  grown  more  com- 
plaisant to  French  intrigues,  or  possibly  he  feared  them  less 
than  did  his  colleagues,  but  he  nevertheless  yielded  to  the 
proposals  of  Adams  and  Jay,  and  the  negotiations  were  con- 
sequently carried  on  by  the  three  American  peace  commis- 
sioners entirely  upon  their  own  responsibility,  and  without 
the  aid  or  advice  of  De  Vergennes  or  of  the  French  court. 

The  firmness  of  these  men  in  adhering  to  their  ultimatum 
that  a  fishery  clause   granting  ample  rights  to    Americans 


484  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

was  one  of  the  conditions  of  peace  with  England,  and  their 
courage  in  ignoring  French  interference,  though  done  in 
open  defiance  of  instructions  from  Congress,  secured  the 
excellent  foundation  upon  which  have  rested  all  the  fishery 
rights  and  privileges  the  United  States  has  since  enjoyed  in 
Canadian  waters.  To  John  Adams  especial  credit  is  due. 
His  steadfastness  of  purpose  inspired  his  colleagues  to  share^ 
with  him  the  risk  of  disobeying  legislative  commands  in  so 
important  a  matter,  and  of  assuming  the  responsibility 
incurred  in  slighting  the  French  court  at  a  critical  moment 
when  foreign  symj^athy  could  ill  be  spared. 

The  discussions  of  the  commissioners  concerning  the  fish- 
eries were  long  and  tedious,  and  the  opposition  of  the  Eng- 
lish to  any  satisfactory  form  of  concession  in  relation  to 
them  was  only  gradually  and  with  great  difficulty  overcome. 
Had  the  fishery  interest  been  the  only  one  involved,  the^ 
matter  might  have  been  settled  after  a  comparatively  easy 
diplomatic  struggle,  but  to  retain  tlie  fisheries  deprived 
the  American  negotiators  of  capital  to  draw  upon  in  pay- 
ment for  the  other  equally  valuable  concessions  which  they 
demanded. 

On  one  occasion,  when  the  phraseology  of  the  fishery 
clause  was  under  discussion,  an  English  commissioner  objected 
to  the  word  "  right "  of  fishing  instead  of  liberty^  as  a  term 
obnoxious  to  his  countrymen,  to  which  Mr.  Adams  replied : 
"  Gentlemen,  is  there  or  can  there  be  a  clearer  right  ?  In 
former  treaties  —  that  of  Utrecht  and  that  of  Paris —  France; 
and  England  have  claimed  the  right  to  use  the  word.  When 
God  Almighty  made  the  banks  of  Newfoundland,  at  three- 
hundred  leagues  distant  from  the  people  of  America,  and  at 
six  hundred  leagues  distant  from  those  of  France  and  Eng- 
land, did  He  not  give  as  good  a  right  to  the  former  as  to- 
the  latter  ?  If  Heaven,  at  the  creation,  gave  a  right,  it  is. 
ours  at  least  as  much  as  it  is  yours.  If  occupation,  use,, 
and  possession  give  a  right,  we  have  it  as  clearly  as  you.  If 
war  and  blood  and  treasure  give  a  right,  ours  is  as  good  as- 
yours.  We  have  been  continually  fighting  in  Canada,  Cape 
Breton,  and  Nova  Scotia  for  the  defence  of  this  fishery,  and 


THE   NORTHEAST  COAST   FISHERIES  485 

have  expended  beyond  all  proportion  more  than  you.  If, 
then,  the  right  cannot  be  denied,  why  should  it  not  be 
acknowledged  and  be  put  out  of  dispute  ?  Why  should  we 
leave  room  for  illiterate  fishermen  to  wrangle  and  chicane  ?  " 
As  finally  signed  on  September  8,  1783,  Article  III  of  the 
treaty  of  Paris  stands  as  follows :  — 

It  is  agreed  that  the  people  of  the  United  States  shall  continue 
to  enjoy  unmolested  the  right  to  take  fish  of  every  kind  on  the 
Grand  Bank,  and  on  all  the  other  banks  of  Newfoundland;  also 
in  the  Gulph  of  St.  Lawrence,  and  at  all  other  places  in  the  sea, 
where  the  inhabitants  of  both  countries  used  at  any  time  hereto- 
fore to  fish;  and  also  that  the  inhabitants  of  the  United  States 
shall  have  the  liberty  to  take  fish  of  every  kind  on  such  part  of 
the  coast  of  Newfoundland  as  British  fishermen  shall  use  (but 
not  to  dry  or  cure  the  same  on  that  island) ;  and  also  on  the 
coasts,  bays  and  creeks,  of  all  other  of  His  British  Majesty's 
dominions  in  America;  and  that  the  American  fishermen  shall 
have  the  liberty  to  dry  and  cure  fish  in  any  of  the  unsettled  bays, 
harbours  and  creeks  of  Nova  Scotia,  Magdalen  Islands,  and  Lab- 
rador, so  long  as  the  same  shall  remain  unsettled ;  but  so  soon  as 
the  same,  or  either  of  them  shall  be  settled,  it  shall  not  be  law- 
ful for  the  said  fishermen  to  dry  or  cure  fish  at  such  settlement, 
without  a  previous  agreement  for  that  purpose  with  the  inhabit- 
ants, proprietors  or  possessors  of  the  ground. 

It  will  be  observed,  then,  that  in  regard  to  the  fisheries, 
very  few  privileges  enjoyed  by  the  American  colonists  (as 
British  subjects)  were  denied  to  them  as  American  citizens  by 
the  treaty  of  Paris.  The  Bank  fishery  was  recognized  by 
England  to  be  beyond  her  legislative  control,  and  therefore 
open  and  free  to  the  world  ;  likewise  the  fishery  of  the  Gulf 
of  St.  Lawrence.  The  treaty  rights  to  take  fish  in  the  in- 
shore waters  of  Canada  were  ample ;  all  that  marine  area, 
including  the  bays  and  creeks  of  the  Dominion  coast, 
was  left  free  to  American  fishermen.  Two  restrictions  only 
were  placed  upon  them,  first,  that  they  should  not  use  the 
Newfoundland  shores  for  purposes  of  drying  or  curing  their 
fish,  —  and  second,  they  should  not,  upon  all  the  balance  of 
the  British-American  coast  (where  such  privileges  were 
granted),  so  locate  their  stages  as  to  molest  or  annoy  the 


486  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

inhabitants.  This  latter  restriction  was  a  proper  and  wise 
one,  and  could  have  called  for  no  reasonable  complaint.  The 
withholding  from  American  fishermen  of  the  Newfoundland 
shores  for  the  purpose  of  curing  fish  was  regarded  as  unfortu- 
nate, for  these  being  nearer  the  Banks  were  more  convenient 
for  the  establishment  of  shore  stations.  Had  American  citi- 
zens been  accorded  this  one  additional  right  to  the  others- 
acquired  by  the  treaty,  there  would  virtually  have  been  no 
distinction  drawn  between  American  and  English  fishermen 
in  their  freedom  of  movements  in  Canadian  territorial 
waters  or  on  Canadian  soil. 

IV 

At  the  close  of  the  Revolutionary  War,  the  fisheries  were 
substantially  annihilated,  and  their  restoration  to  a  condition 
of  vigor  was  neither  immediate  nor  rapid.  An  order  issued 
b}''  proclamation  (July,  1783)  in  London,  prohibited  the 
importation  of  American  fish  into  British  West  Indian 
ports.  This  action  was  a  telling  blow  to  the  greatly  weak- 
ened American  industry,  and  adverse  tariff  regulations  in 
various  foreign  markets  added  to  the  causes  that  retarded 
its  growth.  To  offset  these  depressing  foreign  influences, 
efforts  were  made  by  Congress  to  stimulate  the  languishing 
fisheries  by  means  of  bounties.  In  1789  an  act  was  passed 
allowing  a  bounty  of  five  cents  per  quintal  on  all  dried,  and 
five  cents  a  barrel  on  all  pickled  (salted)  fish  exported,  and, 
at  the  time,  imposing  a  duty  on  fish  imported  into  the  United 
States.  Even  this  encouragement  seems  to  have  been  insuf- 
ficient, for  the  fishermen  of  Gloucester  soon  after  presented 
a  petition  to  Congress  setting  forth  a  grievous  story  of  their 
losses,  with  a  prayer  for  further  measures  of  relief. 

The  necessity  of  reviving  the  fisheries  seems  to  have  been 
generally  accepted  by  the  legislators  of  the  period.  The 
reasons  given  were  not  simply  that  the  industry  was  in  itself 
a  valuable  one  and  promised  wealth  to  its  followers,  but 
higher  considerations  of  national  utility  were  advanced  for 
its  encouragement.      President  Washington,   in    1790,  an- 


THE   NORTHEAST  COAST  FISHERIES  487 

nounced  that  "  our  fisheries  and  the  transportation  of  our 
own  produce  offer  us  abundant  means  for  guarding  ourselves 
against  depending  upon  foreign  vessels."  The  views  of  Con- 
gress are  reflected  in  its  reply  to  the  President's  message  : 
"  The  navigation  and  the  fisheries  of  the  United  States  are 
objects  too  interesting  not  to  inspire  a  disposition  to  promote 
them  by  all  the  means  which  shall  appear  to  us  consistent 
with  their  natural  progress  and  permanent  prosperity." 

The  fishermen's  appeal  was  answered,  and  in  1792  a  new 
law  was  created  abolishing  the  bounties  on  exported  fish, 
and  in  lieu  thereof  a  specific  tonnage  allowance  was  made  to 
all  American  vessels  engaged  in  the  fisheries.  This  law  was 
more  or  less  altered  by  subsequent  legislative  acts,  until 
finally  all  bounties  and  allowances  to  fishermen  were  abolished 
in  1854.  These  various  bounty  acts  had  always  met  more 
or  less  opposition  on  constitutional  grounds.  A  generation 
later,  Senator  Benton  opposed  them  with  all  the  vigor  and 
strength  which  that  parliamentary  leader  possessed.  Fur- 
ther legislative  measures  were  taken  to  improve  the  condi- 
tion of  the  fishermen  by  the  act  of  1793  authorizing  the 
customs  officials  to  grant  to  fishing  vessels  licenses  "  to 
touch  and  trade  "  at  any  foreign  port  or  place.  The  object 
of  this  act  was  to  enable  the  fishermen  to  purchase  in  foreign 
ports,  —  and  free  of  all  duties,  —  needful  supplies  of  salt, 
provisions,  fishing  gear,  etc.  This  privilege  was  certainly  of 
great  benefit  to  the  fishermen,  who  availed  themselves  of  it 
to  carry  on  regular  trading  operations  in  Newfoundland  and 
in  Canadian  ports.  Thus  it  soon  led  to  abuses  that  later 
ushered  in  a  series  of  diplomatic  complications,  and  added 
to  the  "  fishery  question  "  new  elements  of  controversy. 

Despite  these  earnest  efforts  to  infuse  new  life  into  the 
crippled  fisheries,  they  rallied  but  sloAvly  from  the  shock  of 
war.  Statistics  of  the  yearly  catches  from  1789  to  1812  in- 
dicate a  wavering  increase  in  vessels  and  tonnage  employed, 
but  the  fishermen  had  nevertheless  reason  to  rejoice  in  fairly 
bright  prospects  for  renewal  of  the  prosperity  they  had. 
enjoyed  before  the  Revolution.  When  their  hopes  were 
about  to  be  realized,  the  shadow  of  the  approaching  political 


488  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

crises  of  1812  depressed  the  fisheries.  Jefferson's  Embargo 
measures  brought  great  distress  to  the  fishermen,  and  the 
advent  of  war  soon  after  drove  them  from  the  Banks,  and 
completely  paralyzed  their  industry. 


Immediately  following  the  withdrawal  of  the  British 
forces  from  the  United  States  at  the  close  of  the  Revolu- 
tionary War,  a  strong  dislike  was  manifested  for  the  "  Tories,'* 
or  those  who  had  remained  loyal  to  England  throughout  the 
struggle  for  independence.  Numbers  of  these  disaffected 
people  emigrated  to  Nova  Scotia  and  to  Canada  ;  not  a  few 
of  them  established  homes  in  Newfoundland.  These  disap- 
pointed men,  no  doubt  nurturing  feelings  of  resentment^ 
regarded  with  jealous  interest  the  operations  of  American 
fishermen  in  Canadian  waters.  As  loyal  emigrants  making 
new  settlements  on  the  coasts  of  New  Brunswick  and  Nova 
Scotia,  they  were  naturally  loath  to  recognize  the  rights  of 
American  fishermen  under  the  treaty  of  1783,  namely,  to 
use  British  shores  for  drying  and  curing  their  fish  ;  and  they 
were  in  a  mood  to  record  eagerly  any  transgression  of  privi- 
leges by  their  old  enemies  as  they  were  always  vigilant  to 
detect  them  in  misdeeds  of  any  kind.  These  unfriendly 
settlers  along  the  Canadian  shores  were  largely  instrumental, 
it  is  known,  in  causing  the  British  colonies  in  1807  to  make 
protests  to  their  home  government  against  the  conduct  of  the 
Americans  ;  later,  upon  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  between 
England  and  the  United  States,  and  the  consequent  abroga- 
tion of  all  former  treaties  between  those  powers,  they  took 
the  opportunity  to  urge  upon  the  British  Government  a 
refusal  to  renew  any  fishing  privileges  whatever  in  their 
waters.  These  appeals,  backed  by  many  representations  of 
the  pernicious  moral  influences  exerted  by  New  England 
fishermen  over  the  inhabitants  of  Nova  Scotia  and  Labrador, 
through  their  evasions  of  custom  duties,  illicit  trading,  etc.» 
soon  convinced  the  British  ministry  that  England  had  been 
far  too  generous  for  her  own  good  in  granting  such  extended 


THE   NORTHEAST  COAST  FISHERIES  489 

and  valuable  fishery  rights  to  her  seceded  colonists.  Accord- 
ingly, at  the  close  of  the  War  of  1812  (though  before  the 
battle  of  New  Orleans),  when  the  American  peace  commis- 
sioners arrived  in  Ghent  for  the  purpose  of  making  a  new 
treaty  with  England,  they  were  met  at  the  outset  by  the  asser- 
tion of  the  British  commissioners  that  "  it  was  thought  proper 
in  candor  to  state,  that  in  relation  to  the  fisheries,  although 
it  was  not  intended  to  contest  the  right  of  the  United  States 
to  them,  yet  so  far  as  respected  the  concessions  to  land  and 
dry  fish  within  the  exclusive  jurisdiction  of  the  British,  it  was 
proposed  not  to  renew  that  without  an  equivalent,"  and  fur- 
ther, that  "  the  British  Government  did  not  intend  to  grant  to 
the  United  States  gratuitously  the  privileges  formerly  granted 
by  treaty  to  them,  of  fishing  within  the  limits  of  the  British 
sovereignty,  and  of  using  the  shores  of  the  British  territo- 
ries for  purposes  connected  with  the  British  fisheries."  John 
Quincy  Adams,  speaking  for  the  American  commissioners, 
replied  that  they  had  not  intended  to  mention  the  subject 
of  fisheries,  that  question  not  being  one  of  the  subjects  of 
difference  in  the  war  just  concluded. 

Although  it  had  become  apparent  before  1812  that  different 
conceptions  of  the  force  and  character  of  the  third  article  of 
the  treaty  of  Paris  were  held  in  England  and  the  United 
States,  then  for  the  first  time,  the  opposing  views,  as  to  the 
exact  nature  of  American  claims  to  the  inshore  fisheries  as 
expressed  by  that  article,  came  face  to  face. 

The  English  held  that  the  liberties  accorded  the  Americans 
by  the  third  article  of  the  treaty  of  1783  to  fish  within  the 
territorial  waters  of  Great  Britain  and  to  land  on  the  shores 
of  Nova  Scotia,  to  dry  and  cure  fish,  were  in  the  nature 
of  a  grant  or  a  concession,  and  were  liable,  as  are  all  such 
treaty  rights  and  privileges,  to  abrogation  by  subsequent 
war  between  the  parties.  The  British  commissioners  as- 
sumed, therefore,  that  these  inshore  privileges  had  been  ter- 
minated by  the  War  of  1812,  and  that  should  the  United  States 
desire  a  renewal  or  modification  of  them,  such  could  only  be 
obtained  through  new  treaty  stipulations.  They  drew  a  dis- 
tinction, however,  between  the  fisheries  on  the  Banks  (or  in 


490  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

all  waters  lying  without  the  marine  jurisdiction  of  Great 
Britain)  and  those  fisheries  that  were  prosecuted  within  such 
marine  jurisdiction  (vaguely  regarded  then  as  all  waters  lying 
within  three  leagues  of  the  shore).  The  former,  they  were 
willing  to  concede,  belonged  equally  to  all  nations,  —  as  fixed 
and  permanent  a  right  as  the  navigation  of  the  high  seas  ; 
the  latter,  the  inshore  fisheries,  belonged  to  England  alone, 
and  any  transfer  of  privileges  to  other  nations  by  treaty  to 
participate  therein  was  necessarily  in  the  form  of  a  contract, 
—  and  contracts  between  nations  are  cancelled  by  war. 

The  American  commissioners  took  a  radically  different  view 
of  the  situation.  It  will  be  remembered  that  in  1782,  when 
the  treaty  of  Paris  was  being  negotiated,  John  Adams,  sup- 
ported by  the  opinions  of  many  prominent  men  of  New 
England,  had  stoutly  contended  that  these  inshore  fisher- 
ies of  Canada,  together  with  all  landing  privileges  to  cure 
fish,  belonged  to  Americans,  in  equal  right,  as  well  as  they 
belonged  to  England.  They  had  fought  and  bled  for  them, 
and  as  American  citizens  they  were  entitled  to  them  quite  as 
much  as  were  the  Canadians  who  had  chosen  to  remain 
British  subjects.  Mr.  Livingstone,  Secretary  of  State,  in 
writing  of  the  bank  fisheries  to  Benjamin  Franklin,  January 
7,  1782,  said:  — 

The  arguments  on  which  the  people  of  America  found  their 
claim  to  fish  on  the  banks  of  Newfoundland  arise,  first,  from  their 
having  once  formed  a  part  of  the  British  Empire,  in  which  state 
they  always  enjoyed,  as  fully  as  the  people  of  Britain  themselves, 
the  right  of  fishing  on  these  banks.  They  have  shared  in  all  the 
wars  for  the  extension  of  that  right,  and  Britain  could  with  no 
more  justice  have  excluded  them  from  the  enjoyment  of  it  (even 
supposing  that  one  nation  could  possess  it  to  the  exclusion  of 
another),  while  they  formed  a  part  of  the  empire,  than  they  could 
exclude  the  people  of  London  or  Bristol.  .  .  . 

Upon  the  same  principle  that  Mr.  Livingstone  supported 
the  American  right  to  the  Bank  fishery,  namely,  previous 
enjoyment  of  them  as  British  subjects,  Mr.  Adams  and  his 
colleagues  claimed   the  inshore   fisheries   of   Canada.      He 


THE   NORTHEAST   COAST   FISHERIES  491 

maintained  that  these  natural  rights,  enjoyed  as  British 
subjects  before  the  Revolution,  had  never  been  yielded  or 
lost  by  the  war  of  independence,  nor  forfeited  by  the  result- 
ing changes  in  sovereignty  over  Canadian  waters.  As  ''  ten- 
ants in  common  "  with  Great  Britain,  the  Americans  held  all 
fishery  rights  in  northeastern  waters,  both  open  and  terri- 
torial, and  by  the  "  partition  "  of  the  territory  of  North 
America,  effected  in  the  treaty  of  1783,  these  fishery  rights 
were  in  no  manner  destroyed  or  abridged.  He  wrote  some 
years  later  (1822):  — 

The  inhabitants  of  the  United  States  had  as  clear  a  right  to 
every  branch  of  the  fisheries,  and  to  cure  fish  on  land,  as  the 
inhabitants  of  Canada  or  Nova  Scotia.  .  .  .  the  citizens  of  Boston, 
New  York,  or  Philadelphia  had  as  clear  a  right  to  these  fisheries, 
and  to  cure  fish  on  land,  as  the  inhabitants  of  London,  Liverpool, 
Bristol,  Glasgow  or  Dublin ;  fourthly,  that  the  third  article  was 
demanded  as  an  ultimatum,  and  it  was  declared  that  no  treaty  of 
peace  should  be  made  without  that  article.  And  when  the  British 
ministers  found  that  peace  could  not  be  made  without  that  article, 
they  consented,  for  Britain  wanted  peace,  if  possible  more  than 
we  did ;  fifthly,  we  asked  no  favor,  we  requested  no  grant,  and 
would  accept  none. 

Following  the  same  line  of  argument,  Rufus  King,  in 
addressing  the  Senate  in  1818,  said  that  the  fisheries  "on 
the  coasts  and  bays  of  the  provinces  conquered  in  America 
from  the  French  were  acquired  by  the  common  sword,  and 
mingled  blood  of  Americans  and  Englishmen  —  members  of 
the  same  empire,  we,  with  them,  had  a  common  right  to  these 
fisheries  ;  and,  in  the  division  of  the  empire  England  con- 
firmed our  title  without  condition  or  limitation;  a  title 
equally  irrevocable  with  those  of  our  boundaries  or  of  our 
independence  itself." 

In  a  celebrated  pamphlet  on  the  "  Fisheries  and  the  Mis- 
sissippi," in  which  this  controversy  over  American  fishery 
rights  is  discussed  at  great  length,  John  Quincy  Adams 
said :  — 

As  a  possession  it  was  to  be  held  by  the  people  of  the  United 
States  as  it  had  been  held  before.     It  was  not,  like  the  land  parti- 


492  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

tioned  out  by  the  same  treaty,  a  corporeal  possession,  but,  in  the 
technical  language  of  the  English  law,  an  incorporeal  hereditament, 
and  in  that  of  the  civil  law  a  right  of  mere  faculty,  consisting  in 
the  power  and  liberty  of  exercising  a  trade,  the  places  in  which  it 
is  exercised  being  occupied  only  for  the  purposes  of  the  trade. 
Now,  the  right  or  liberty  to  enjoy  this  possession,  or  to  exercise 
this  trade,  could  no  more  be  affected  or  impaired  by  a  declaration 
of  war  than  the  right  to  the  territory  of  the  nation.  The  inter- 
ruption to  the  exercise  of  it,  during  the  war,  could  no  more  affect 
the  right  or  liberty  than  the  occupation  by  the  enemy  could  affect 
the  right  to  that.  The  right  to  territory  could  be  lost  only  by 
abandonment  or  renunciation  in  the  treaty  of  peace,  by  agree- 
ment to  a  new  boundary  line,  or  by  acquiescence  in  the  occupa- 
tion of  the  territory  by  the  enemy.  The  fishery  liberties  could 
be  lost  only  by  express  renunciation  of  them  in  a  treaty,  or  by 
acquiescence,  on  the  principle  that  they  were  forfeited,  which 
would  have  been  a  tacit  renunciation. 

Again  :  — 

...  in  consenting  by  that  treaty  [1783]  that  a  part  of  the  North 
American  continent  should  remain  subject  to  the  British  jurisdic- 
tion, the  people  of  the  United  States  had  reserved  to  themselves 
the  liberty,  which  they  had  ever  before  enjoyed,  of  fishing  upon 
that  part  of  the  coasts,  and  of  drying  and  curing  fish  upon  the 
shores,  and  this  reservation  had  been  agreed  to  by  the  other  con- 
tracting party. 

In  substance,  then,  the  American  position  at  Ghent,  as 
regards  the  inshore  as  well  as  the  open  sea  fisheries,  was  : 
that  the  people  of  the  United  States  had  done  as  much  as 
the  English  to  win  and  protect  the  fisheries;  that  as  Brit- 
ish subjects  they  had  always  enjoyed  them  ;  that  at  the 
close  of  the  Revolutionary  War  a  treaty  (1783)  had  been 
made  recognizing  the  independence  of  the  United  States  and 
making  a  partition  of  the  territory  of  North  America ;  that 
so  far  as  the  fishery  rights  were  concerned,  they  were  simply 
incorporeal  hereditaments  owned  alike  by  England  and  the 
United  States,  as  tenants  in  common  in  North  America  ; 
that  the  third  article  of  the  treaty  of  Paris  recognized  this 
to  be  the  case,  and  by  its  terms  simply  defined  those  rights 
and  recorded  them,  but  did  not  create  nor  grant  them  to  the 
United  States  ;   that  all  these  fishery  rights  belonging  to  the 


THE   NORTHEAST   COAST   FISHERIES  493 

United  States'  citizens  as  a  natural  heritage  of  their  former 
allegiance  to  Great  Britain  (and  being  in  no  wise  a  conces- 
sion from  England)  were  by  nature  perpetual,  and  not  liable 
to  revocation  by  war  between  England  and  the  United 
States,  —  and  therefore  they  had  not  been  lost  by  the  War 
of  1812.  Consequently,  American  fishery  rights  were  not  a 
proper  subject  for  discussion  or  negotiation  at  that  time. 

The  American  commissioners  went  still  farther  to  substan- 
tiate their  contention  that  the  inshore  fisheries  of  Canada 
and  the  right  to  use  Canadian  shores  for  curing  and  drying 
fish  belonged  to  the  United  States  as  an  inviolable  right. 
They  maintained  that  as  these  liberties  of  fishing  were  not 
created  but  merely  defined  and  recorded  by  the  third  article 
of  the  Paris  treaty,  that  article,  like  all  treaty  clauses  per- 
taining to  matters  of  partition  or  boundaries  or  territory, 
was  of  that  particular  class  of  treaty  articles  which  is  perma- 
nent and  not  affected  by  subsequent  suspension  of  friendly 
relations  between  the  parties.  Thus  they  considered  their 
position  doubly  strengthened,  and  be3^ond  question  correct. 

The  arguments  of  Mr.  Adams  and  the  members  of  the 
commission  who  supported  him  were  clearly  unsound.  While 
British  colonists,  the  Americans  certainly  possessed  all  the 
rights  of  other  English  subjects  in  British  territorial  waters, 
and  shared  with  them  the  obligations  and  duties  which  such 
possession  imposed.  These  obligations  had  called  for  the 
protection  of  the  fisheries  against  French  aggressions,  and 
the  American  colonists  answered  the  call  as  a  duty,  and  per- 
formed it  well.  After  the  war  of  independence,  England 
retained  Nova  Scotia,  Newfoundland,  and  Labrador,  and  as 
an  inseparable  condition,  the  jurisdiction  over  their  marginal 
belts  of  ocean;  the  Americans  ceased  to  be  British  subjects, 
and  were  at  once  relieved  of  all  duties  and  obligations  to 
defend  English  territory  or  protect  English  waters,  and  in  a 
like  manner  they  were  certainly  deprived  of  the  privileges 
of  ownership  over  such  alien  territory  and  waters.  Had  the 
contention  of  Mr.  Adams  been  sound,  the  United  States 
with  equal  justice  could  have  pressed  a  claim  for  possession 
of  Quebec  or  Halifax,  for  by  the  "common  sword  and  min- 


494  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

gled  blood  of  Americans  and  Englishmen  "  those  strongholds 
were  won  and  defended.  By  the  same  argument  the  Eng- 
lish could  have  claimed  the  right  to  navigate  the  Mississippi 
River,  which  had  been  conceded  to  them  by  the  treaty  of 
1783,  and  which  Mr.  Clay  (one  of  the  commissioners  at 
Ghent)  declared  to  be  forfeited  by  the  War  of  1812. 

Again,  had  the  United  States  an  inherent  and  natural 
right  to  the  inshore  fisheries  of  Canada,  and  to  the  perpetual 
use  of  its  shores,  why  had  these  shore  privileges  been  limited 
by  the  treaty  of  Paris  ?  Why  had  the  United  States  accepted 
the  privilege  of  curing  and  drying  fish  in  Nova  Scotia  and 
Labrador,  and  relinquished  it  in  Newfoundland  ?  If  Ameri- 
can citizens  had  been  entitled  as  of  right  to  use  a  part  of 
the  Canadian  coast,  they  were  equally  entitled  to  use  all  of 
it'.  On  the  Newfoundland  coast,  where  shore  privileges 
were  most  desired,  and  where  long  usage  would  have  set  up 
an  easement  or  prescriptive  title  fully  as  well  as  to  the  Nova 
Scotia  or  Labrador  coast,  Americans  had  been  denied  all 
landing  privileges. 

Furthermore,  a  review  of  the  instructions  of  Congress  to 
the  commissioners,  who  negotiated  the  treaty  of  Paris,  devel- 
ops the  fact  that  it  had  not  been  the  intention  or  object  of 
the  United  States  Government  to  insist  upon  a  continuance 
of  the  inshore  fisheries  which  had  formerly  been  enjoyed  as 
a  right.  Congress  did  insist  on  the  right  to  fish  on  the 
"  Banks  of  Newfoundland  and  other  fisheries  in  the  Ameri- 
can seas,  anywhere  excepting  within  the  distance  of  three 
leagues  of  the  shores  of  the  territory  remaining  to  Great 
Britain  at  the  close  of  the  war,  if  a  nearer  distance  cannot 
be  obtained  by'  negotiation."  A  full  expression  of  the 
policy  of  the  government  in  1782  is  given  in  a  report  of  a 
committee  of  Congress  on  certain  resolutions  adopted  by  the 
legislature  of  Massachusetts  touching  the  fisheries  (1781). 
An  elaborate  argument  is  there  set  forth  to  demonstrate  the 
freedom  of  the  high  seas,  and  to  prove  that  the  Bank  fishery 
may  not  be  properly  appropriated  by  any  power.  These 
Banks,  "  the  nearest  point  of  which  is  thirty-five  leagues  dis- 
tant from  Cape  Race,  are  too  far  advanced  in  the  Atlantic 


THE   NORTHEAST   COAST   FISHERIES  495 

to  be  a  dependence  of  the  shores."  Thus  a  distmction  was 
at  that  time  made  between  the  Bank  and  the  shore  fishery. 
All  expressions  of  Congress  signifying  a  determination  to 
retain  the  fisheries,  at  all  hazards,  refer  only  to  the  open  sea 
fisheries ;  for  at  that  period  of  uncertainty  it  was  feared  that 
England  might  even  refuse  to  yield  her  pretended  sovereignty 
over  the  Banks.  The  spirit  of  John  Adams'  instructions  in 
1782,  as  gathered  from  congressional  actions  previously  taken 
upon  the  subject,  was  to  insist  as  a  right  upon  the  freedom 
of  the  high  seas  for  American  fishermen,  and  to  secure  for 
them  by  negotiation  the  largest  possible  inshore  privileges. 
Finally,  it  will  be  noted  that  in  the  third  article  of  the  treaty 
itself  the  word  "right"  is  used  in  connection  with  the  Bank 
and  deep  sea  fishery,  and  the  word  "  liberty  "  with  reference 
to  the  shore  fishery. 

Failing  to  make  good  the  doctrine  that  Canadian  inshore 
fisheries  belonged  to  the  United  States,  not  by  treaty  stipu- 
lation, concession  or  grant,  but  by  natural  and  inherent 
right,  the  second  contention  of  our  commissioners  at  Ghent 
was  equally  bound  to  fail,  namely,  that  the  third  article  of 
the  treaty  of  Paris  belonged  to  that  class  of  treaty  obliga- 
tions which  are  exempt  frorii  abrogation  by  war.  The  second 
proposition  is  in  a  measure  a  corollary  to  the  first.  It  will 
readily  be  seen  that  all  treaty  stipulations  must  belong  to 
one  or  the  other  of  two  classes.  Those  covering  acknowl- 
edgments of  independence,  cessions  or  partitions  of  territory, 
delimitations  of  boundaries,  acknowledgments  of  preexisting 
rights  and  stipulations  made  in  contemplation  of  war,  —  all 
of  which  may  be  regarded  as  executed  stipulations,  —  are  not 
subject  to  abrogation  by  war.  All  such  as  include  mere 
grants  of  privileges,  or  rights,  may  be  regarded  as  executory 
stipulations,  and  are  necessarily  terminated  by  war  between 
the  parties.  Mr.  Adams  and  his  colleagues  at  Ghent  clung 
persistently  to  the  idea  that  the  fishery  clause  of  the  Paris 
treaty  belonged  to  the  first  class  of  treaty  stipulations  men- 
tioned, and  therefore  that  this  in  the  same  manner  as  the 
first  article  of  that  treaty  (acknowledging  the  independence 
of  the  United  States),  and  in  the  same  manner  as  the  second 


496  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

article  (defining  the  boundaries  of  the  United  States),  stood 
inviolate  and  unaffected  by  the  war  that  had  just  been  con- 
cluded between  the  parties.  In  defending  his  position  he 
afterward  wrote :  — 

In  case  of  a  cession  of  territory,  when  the  possession  of  it  has 
been  delivered,  the  article  of  the  treaty  is  no  longer  a  compact 
between  the  parties,  nor  can  a  subsequent  war  between  them 
operate  in  any  manner  upon  it.  So  of  all  articles,  the  purport  of 
which  is  the  acknowledgment  by  one  party  of  a  preexisting  right 
belonging  to  another.  The  engagement  of  the  acknowledging 
party  is  consummated  by  the  ratification  of  the  treaty.  It  is  no 
longer  an  executory  contract,  but  a  perfect  right  united  with  a 
vested  possession,  is  thenceforth  in  one  party,  and  the  acknowl- 
edgment of  the  other  is  in  its  own  nature  irrevocable.  As  a  bar- 
gain the  article  is  extinct ;  but  the  right  of  the  party  in  whose 
favor  it  was  made  is  complete,  and  «annot  be  affected  by  a  sub- 
sequent war.  A  grant  of  a  facultative  right  or  incorporeal 
hereditament,  and  specifically  of  a  right  of  fishery,  from  one 
sovereign  to  another,  is  an  article  of  the  same  description.  It 
is  analogous  to  a  cession  of  territory,  and  is  in  fact  a  partial  and 
qualified  cession.  The  right  is  consummated  by  the  ratification 
of  the  treaty.  The  possession  is  vested  by  the  exercise  of  the 
faculty. 

So  that  whether  the  third  article  of  the  treaty  of  1783  be  con- 
sidered as  an  acknowledgment  of  preexisting  liberties  or  as  a 
grant  of  them,  to  be  exercised  within  British  jurisdiction,  it  was 
in  its  nature  permanent  and  irrevocable. 

Only  on  the  assumption  that  the  treaty  article  in  question 
created  no  new  privileges  but  merely  recognized  an  existing 
one,  can  Mr.  Adams'  somewhat  ingenious  argument  be 
accepted  as  sound.  However,  as  it  is  universally  agreed 
that  a  nation  has  full  jurisdiction  over  its  marginal  waters, 
Mr.  Adams'  contention  must  be  regarded  as  wholly  unten- 
able. With  a  mind  uninfluenced  or  clouded  by  considera- 
tions of  the  national  needs  and  popular  clamors  of  a  period, 
one  may  often  look  back  over  the  distance  of  years  and 
obtain  a  clearer  view  of  political  conditions  and  of  interna- 
tional questions  than  was  possible  to  the  men  who  were 
called  upon  to  grapple  with  them.  The  very  nearness  to 
difficulties  occasionally  distorts  the  vision  of  great  men  and 


THE   NOKTHEAST   COAST   FISHERIES  497 

leads  them  into  absurdities  of  reasoning  that  afterwards 
seem  almost  inexcusable.  John  Quincy  Adams  was  prob- 
ably less  influenced  by  the  popular  clamor  of  the  day 
than  by  a  certain  family  tradition  in  regard  to  the  North 
American  fisheries.  His  father,  at  Paris  in  1782-83,  had 
defied  the  consequences  of  disobedience  to  his  country's  com- 
mands, and  had  staked  his  reputation  as  a  patriot  in  order 
to  wrest  from  Great  Britain  those  very  fishery  rights  that 
he,  the  son,  thirty-one  years  later  at  Ghent,  found  himself 
called  upon  to  protect.  As  a  New  Englander  he  was  satu- 
rated with  the  belief  that  the  fisheries  constituted  the  most 
valuable  American  industry.  It  was  the  calling  which  for 
generations  his  countrymen  and  their  ancestors  had  fol- 
lowed almost  without  interruption.  The  fisheries  formed 
the  very  basis  of  the  great  commercial  interests  of  his  own 
New  England.  Under  no  circumstances  must  they  be  for- 
feited through  neglect  or  fault  of  his.  Their  loss  meant 
to  his  people  the  greatest  of  calamities.  Thus  may  one 
appreciate  the  mental  attitude  that  permitted  in  John 
Quincy  Adams  so  decided  a  warp  in  his  reasoning  upon 
this  subject. 

A  satisfactory  adjustment  either  of  the  fisheries,  or  the 
navigation  of  the  Mississippi  River,  proved  to  be  impossible, 
and  it  was  finally  agreed  to  sign  a  treaty  that  should  remain 
silent  on  these  two  important  subjects.  Hence  it  is  that  no 
mention  whatever  is  made  of  the  fisheries  in  the  treaty  of 
Ghent  (1814). 


VI 


The  inability  to  reach  an  understanding  at  Ghent,  in  regard 
to  the  fisheries  left  that  question  in  a  most  unsatisfactory 
<3ondition.  The  war  clouds  of  1812  had  no  sooner  blown 
away  than  the  New  England  fishermen  appeared  in  force  in 
Canadian  waters.  A  series  of  collisions  with  the  Canadians 
immediately  took  place.  English  authorities,  assuming  that 
■all  American  fishery  privileges  in  British  waters  had  lapsed 
hy  the   war,   arrested  numbers  of   Boston  and   Gloucester 

2k 


498  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

schooners  on  various  charges  of  trespass,  and  condemned 
them  as  prizes  in  the  Halifax  courts.  The  disputed  ques- 
tion of  American  fishery  rights  was  frequently  left  to  the 
rude  arbitrament  of  American  fishermen  and  the  Dominion 
police,  resulting  in  a  severe  strain  upon  the  recently  restored 
amicable  relations  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States.  In  the  United  States,  where  Mr.  Adams'  doctrine 
that  American  fishery  rights  had  survived  the  war  still 
obtained,  feelings  of  anger  and  hostility  to  Great  Britain 
grew  more  and  more  intense.  Fortunately  the  tension  was 
soon  relieved  by  the  Convention  of  1818,  wherein  a  com- 
promise of  the  troublesome  fishery  question  was  effected. 
The  first  ai'ticle  of  this  treaty,  the  one  relating  to  the: 
fisheries,  is  as  follows  :  — 

Whereas  differences  have  arisen  respecting  the  liberty  claimed 
by  the  United  States  for  the  inhabitants  thereof,  to  take,  dry,  and 
cure  fish  on  certain  coasts,  bays,  harbors  and  creeks,  of  His  Bri- 
tannic Majesty's  dominions  in  America,  it  is  agreed  between  the 
high  contracting  parties,  that  the  inhabitants  of  the  United  States 
shall  have  forever,  in  common  with  the  subjects  of  His  Britannic 
Majesty,  the  liberty  to  take  fish  of  every  kind  on  that  part  of  the 
southern  coast  of  Newfoundland  which  extends  from  Cape  Ray 
to  the  Rameau  Islands,  on  the  western  and  northern  coast  of 
Newfoundland  from  the  said  Cape  Ray  to  the  Quirpon  Islands ; 
on  the  southern  shores  of  the  Magdalen  Islands,  and  also  on  the- 
coasts,  bays,  harbors,  and  creeks,  from  Mount  Joly,  on  the  south- 
ern coast  of  Labrador,  to  and  through  the  Streights  of  Belleisle, 
and  thence  northwardly  indefinitely  along  the  coast,  without, 
prejudice  however,  to  any  of  the  exclusive  rights  of  the  Hudson 
Bay  Company ;  and  that  the  American  fishermen  shall  also  have- 
liberty  forever,  to  dry  and  cure  fish  in  any  of  the  unsettled  bays, 
harbors,  and  creeks  of  the  southern  part  of  the  coast  of  New- 
foundland hereabove  described,  and  of  the  coast  of  Labrador; 
but  so  soon  as  the  same,  or  any  portion  thereof,  shall  be  settled,  it 
shall  not  be  lawful  for  the  said  fishermen  to  dry  or  cure  fish  at  such 
portion  so  settled,  without  previous  agreement  for  such  purpose- 
with  the  inhabitants,  proprietors,  or  possessors  of  the  ground. 
And  the  United  States  hereby  renounce  forever,  any  liberty 
heretofore  enjoyed  or  claimed  by  the  inhabitants  thereof,  to  take, 
dry,  or  cure  fish  on,  or  within  three  marine  miles  of  any  of  the 
coasts,  bays,  creeks,  or  harbors  of  His  Britannic  Majesty's  do- 


THE   NORTHEAST   COAST   FISHERIES  499 

minions  in  America,  not  included  within  the  above-mentioned  lim- 
its. Provided,  however,  that  the  American  fishermen  shall  be  per- 
mitted to  enter  such  bays  or  harbors  for  the  purpose  of  shelter 
and  of  repairing  damages  therein,  of  purchasing  wood,  and  of 
obtaining  water,  and  for  no  other  purpose  whatever.  But  they 
shall  be  under  such  restrictions  as  may  be  necessary  to  prevent 
their  taking,  drying  or  curing  fish  therein,  or  in  any  manner 
abusing  the  privileges  hereby  reserved  to  them. 

It  will  be  observed  that  under  this  nev7  arrangement 
Americans  were  permitted  to  fish  in  all  waters  falling  within 
British  marine  jurisdiction,  on  the  south  coast  of  Newfound- 
land between  Cape  Ray  and  the  Rameau  Islands,  and  on 
the  west  and  north  coasts  thereof  between  Cape  Ray  and 
the  Quirpon  Islands  ;  on  the  southern  shores  of  the  Magda- 
len Islands  and  upon  the  Labrador  coast  from  Mount  Jolly 
northward  indefinitely.  The  coasts  of  Nova  Scotia,  New 
Brunswick,  Lower  Canada,  Cape  Breton,  more  than  half  of  the 
south  coast,  and  all  of  the  east  coast  of  Newfoundland,  were 
excepted  from  this  grant  of  fishery  privileges.  It  must  be 
borne  in  mind  that  the  Bank  and  all  open  sea  fisheries  were 
•entirely  free  to  the  world,  for  at  this  time  no  nation  pre- 
tended to  control  the  high  seas. 

The  privileges  of  landing  for  the  purpose  of  curing  and 
•drying  fish  were  withheld  from  the  United  States,  except 
upon  the  south  shores  of  Newfoundland  from  Cape  Ray  to 
the  Rameau  Islands,  and  except  upon  the  coast  of  Labrador, 
—  and  here  the  right  was  only  granted  within  unsettled  bays 
and  harbors.  In  all  other  bays  or  harbors  of  the  Dominion, 
American  fishermen  were  fully  privileged  to  enter  for  cer- 
tain designated  purposes,  —  "  shelter,"  "  repairing  damages," 
"  purchasing  wood,"  and  "  obtaining  water,"  but  for  no  other 
purpose  whatever. 

The  adoption  of  these  regulations  was  called  in  .  the 
United  States  a  "  compromise,"  because  American  statesmen 
still  contended  that  the  United  States  owned  the  Canadian 
fisheries  by  a  title  as  good  as  that  of  Great  Britain,  and  that 
by  the  relinquishing  of  jurisdictional  privileges  over  certain 
parts  of  the  Canadian  coast,  and  accepting  England's  recogni- 


500  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

tion  of  them  on  other  parts  of  the  coast,  a  genuine  compro- 
mise had  been  effected.  It  is  curious  to  note  the  light  in 
which  this  fishery  clause  was  regarded  by  eminent  statesmen 
of  the  period,  and  indeed  by  many  since.  Never  abandoning 
the  idea  of  John  Quincy  Adams  that  the  United  States  pos- 
sessed and  always  had  possessed  an  inherent  and  natural 
right  to  the  inshore  fisheries,  a  right  that  had  survived  the 
operation  of  war,  they  firmly  believed,  and  as  solemnly  ar- 
gued that,  by  the  convention  of  1818,  England  granted  no 
fishery  privileges  to  the  United  States,  no  rights  of  landing 
to  cure  fish  or  to  obtain  supplies,  but,  on  the  contrary,  the 
United  States  had  simply  consented  to  certain  restrictions  on 
those  rights  and  privileges  always  possessed.  This  erroneous 
conception  of  the  spirit  of  the  convention  might  be  dismissed 
as  an  innocent  historical  or  legal  curio,  had  it  not  vitally 
affected  the  interpretation  of  the  words,  and  later  given  rise 
to  much  misunderstanding  between  England  and  the  United 
States. 

The  adherents  to  this  view  found  proof  of  their  contentions 
in  that  part  of  the  fishery  clause  wherein  the  United  States 
expressly  "  renounces  forever  any  liberty,"  etc.  They  urged 
that  in  the  use  of  these  words  Great  Britain  acknowledged 
those  preexisting  and  natural  rights.  The  insertion  of  that 
phrase  had  been  insisted  upon  by  our  commissioners,  Messrs. 
Rush  and  Gallatin,  and  was  reluctantly  allowed  by  the  Brit- 
ish representatives,  who  were  actuated  by  a  strong  desire  to 
settle  the  troublesome  quarrels  of  the  fishermen  as  quickly 
as  possible,  and  to  remove  the  whole  question  from  discussion. 
This  fallacious  theory  of  a  "  natural  and  inherent  right "  has 
never  entirely  lost  its  influence,  even  to  the  present  day. 
It  has  been  defended  by  the  ponderous  arguments  of  many 
legal  writers,  as  it  colored  the  deliberations  of  government 
officials. 

With  the  promulgation  of  the  new  rules  and  regulations 
of  1818,  the  future  of  American  fishermen  seemed  particu- 
larly bright.  Congress  encouraged  them  the  following  year 
with  increased  bounties.  The  fisheries  had  suffered  greatly 
through   the   vicissitudes   of   war.     Blissfully  ignorant   of, 


THE  NORTHEAST  COAST   FISHERIES  501 

and  probably  caring  little  for,  the  diplomatic  wrangles 
over  the  legal  nature  of  their  rights,  the  fishermen  took 
immediate  advantage  of  the  privileges  just  opened  to  them, 
and  sought  to  restore  their  industry  to  a  paying  basis. 
In  the  course  of  a  few  years,  however,  a  harvest  of  new  and 
unforeseen  troubles  ripened  to  confound  the  men  who  had 
fishing  interests  in  charge.  Fresh  quarrels  grew  alarm- 
ingly, and  in  the  course  of  some  years  reached  a  degree  of 
intensity  that  forboded  another  war  with  Great  Britain. 
Happily  such  a  calamity  was  averted  in  time,  though  not 
before  the  "  Fishery  Question "  had  given  evidence  of  its 
liability  sooner  or  later  to  embroil  the  nation  in  armed 
conflict. 

In  1819,  Parliament  enacted  a  statute  to  carry  out  the 
provisions  of  1818.  This  statute  authorized  local  regu- 
lations to  declare  it  unlawful  for  foreign  vessels  to  take,  dry, 
or  cure  fish  within  three  marine  miles  of  any  coast,  bays, 
creeks,  or  harbors  in  any  part  of  His  Majesty's  dominion 
in  America,  not  included  in  the  limits  of  the  treaty.  It  de- 
fined with  particularity  the  privileges  of  American  vessels 
in  all  such  bays,  creeks,  harbors,  etc., — i.e.,  to  enter  only 
for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  shelter,  repairs,  wood  and  water, 
—  and  it  provided  that  if  any  vessels  were  caught  violating, 
or  preparing  to  violate,  those  laws,  or  that  refused  to  depart 
from  such  bays,  etc.,  when  ordered  to  do  so,  they  should  be 
liable  to  certain  enumerated  punishments  and  fines.  No 
objection  could  be  found  to  this  act  itself,  but  in  alleged 
conformity  to  it,  and  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  out  its  pro- 
visions, the  provincial  legislatures  of  British  America,  from 
time  to  time,  enacted  series  of  laws  relating  to  the  fisheries 
that  were  far  more  stringent  and  rigid  in  their  nature  than 
justified  by  the  original  parliamentary  act.  These  provincial 
regulations  manifested  a  spirit  of  unfriendliness,  and  it  was 
often  asserted  that  they  were  executed  with  a  severity  and  in 
a  manner  wholly  unwarranted  and  improper.  By  the  narrow- 
est construction  of  the  terms  of  the  treaty  they  restricted  the 
rights  of  Americans  in  every  possible  way.  In  accordance 
with  these  laws,  the  Canadian  police  authorities   detained 


502  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

American  fishermen  upon  the  most  shadowy  pretexts,  and 
otherwise  vexatiously  harassed  them,  sometimes  confiscat- 
ing their  vessels  upon  the  merest  suspicion  of  offence. 
While  these  burdensome  regulations  were  unnecessarily 
severe,  and  perhaps  maliciously  enforced,  it  is  more  than 
probable  that  American  fishermen  were  not  always  guiltless 
of  the  offences  charged  to  their  account. 

A  new  form  of  fishery  was  at  that  period  rapidly  develop- 
ing which  brought  into  Canadian  waters  conditions  entirely 
novel,  and  which,  not  having  been  anticipated  by  those  who 
framed  the  convention  of  1818,  were  not  provided  for  in  that 
instrument.  Mackerel  had  appeared  in  vast  quantities,  and 
with  them,  in  close  pursuit,  a  large  fleet  of  American  schoon- 
ers. The  modus  operandi  of  the  mackerel  fishery  is  entirely 
different  from  that  of  the  cod  fishery.  The  latter,  even 
at  that  day,  was  carried  on  for  the  most  part  on  the 
Banks,  or  in  localities  generally  well  removed  from  the 
debatable  waters  of  British  sovereignty.  The  men  who 
confined  themselves  to  cod  fishing  had  less  occasion  to  seek 
shore  stations,  either  for  bait  or  shelter.  The  mackerel  fish- 
ery, on  the  other  hand,  constantly  lured  its  followers  within 
the  three-mile  limit  of  the  Nova  Scotia  and  New  Brunswick 
shores,  for  it  is  the  habit  of  these  fish  to  hover  about  the 
shallower  reaches  of  the  sea  near  land.  Large  quantities  of 
bait  were  cast  upon  the  waters  to  tempt  the  fish  within  range; 
this  process,  of  course,  necessitated  frequent  landing  at 
Canadian  ports  to  procure  fresh  bait  supplies ;  besides  this, 
the  nets  employed  in  taking  mackerel  demanded  for  their 
proper  preservation  occasional  drying  upon  shore.  Now 
neither  of  these  acts  fell  within  the  list  of  privileges  guar- 
anteed to  American  fishermen  in  Nova  Scotia  or  New  Bruns- 
wick by  the  treaty  of  1818.  As  American  fishermen  were 
perhaps  not  overconscientious  in  these  matters,  disputes 
between  them  and  the  Canadians  grew  more  and  more  fre- 
quent, and  the  situation  soon  became  painfully  acute.  Num- 
bers of  New  England  vessels  were  held  on  charges  of  "  fishing 
within  the  prescribed  limits  "  ;  "  hovering  within  shore  dur- 
ing calm  weather  without  ostensible  cause,  having  on  board 


THE   NORTHEAST  COAST  FISHERIES  503 

ample  supplies  of  wood  and  water  " ;  "  lying  at  anchor  and 
remaining  inside  of  bays  to  clean  and  pick  fish";  "selling 
goods  and  buying  supplies " ;  "  landing  and  transhipping 
cargoes  of  fish." 

The  fishermen  of  the  United  States  were  privileged  by  the 
treaty  to  take  fish  of  every  kind  on  the  southern  shores  of 
the  Magdalen  Islands.  This  involved  the  herring  fishery,  and 
herring  are  certainly  included  in  the  comprehensive  term  — 
"fish  of  every  kind."  From  the  peculiar  mode  of  taking 
this  kind  of  fish,  resort  to  the  shore  was  necessary  for  haul- 
ing seines  and  constructing  weirs,  but  the  Canadian  authori- 
ties remained  inflexible  in  their  determination  to  prevent 
such  landing.  It  is  true  that  on  these  islands  no  landing 
privileges  were  expressly  guaranteed  in  the  treaty,  but  it 
was  contended  in  Washington  that  as  the  fishery  of  the 
Magdalen  Islands  was  principally  for  herring,  —  a  mode  of 
fishery  carried  on  from  the  shore,  —  the  right  to  prosecute 
it  at  all  must  of  necessity  presuppose  the  right  to  use  the 
shore.  At  all  events,  whether  or  not  landing  privileges  are 
inseparable  from  the  right  to  take  herring,  American  fisher- 
men continued  to  land  on  the  Magdalen  Islands,  despite  the 
opposition  of  the  natives.  A  petty  warfare  resulted  that 
kept  full  the  measure  of  ill-feeling  between  New  England 
and  Canada. 

A  subject  that  provoked  much  discord,  and  that  soon  in- 
volved the  two  powers  in  another  diplomatic  controversy, 
arose  from  opposing  theories  entertained  in  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States  concerning  the  line  of  "  three-mile 
limit "  as  applied  to  the  bays  and  harbors  of  British  America. 
Several  American  vessels,  including  the  Washington  in  1843, 
had  been  seized  within  the  Bay  of  Fundy  and  other  "  bays  " 
of  the  coast,  at  a  greater  distance  than  three  marine  miles 
from  the  shore.  The  Canadian  authorities,  to  make  sure  of 
their  position  in  thus  seizing  foreign  vessels  outside  a  three- 
mile  line  from  the  shore,  had  appealed  to  the  crown  lawyers 
at  London  to  ascertain  definitely  whether  Americans  had  a 
right,  under  the  treaty  of  1818,  to  fish  in  the  bays  of  Fundy 
and  of  Chaleurs,  or  to  navigate  the  Strait  of  Canso  ;  or,  in 


504  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

other  words,  to  learn  whether  the  doctrine  of  "  Headlands  '* 
applied  to  these  great  bodies  of  water.  The  reply  of  the 
queen's  counsel  assured  them  of  their  undoubted  right  to 
exclude  all  foreign  vessels  from  fishing  in  any  of  the  larger 
bays  of  British  America.  "  Except,"  they  wrote,  "  within 
certain  defined  limits,  to  which  the  query  put  to  us  does  not 
apply,  we  are  of  opinion  that,  by  the  terms  of  the  treaty, 
American  citizens  are  excluded  from  the  right  of  fishing 
within  three  miles  of  the  coast  of  British  America;  and 
that  the  prescribed  distance  of  three  miles  is  to  be  measured 
from  the  headlands  or  extreme  points  of  land  next  the  sea 
of  the  coasts,  or  of  the  entrance  of  the  bays,  and  not  from 
the  interior  of  such  bays  or  inlets  of  the  coast ;  and  conse- 
quently that  no  right  exists  on  the  part  of  American  citizens 
to  enter  the  bays  of  Nova  Scotia,  there  to  take  fish,  although 
the  fishing,  being  within  the  bay,  may  be  at  a  greater  dis- 
tance than  three  miles  from  the  shore  of  the  bay,  as  we  are 
of  opinion  that  the  term  *  headland '  is  used  in  the  treaty  to 
express  the  part  of  the  land  we  have  before  mentioned,  ex- 
cluding the  interior  of  the  bays  and  inlets  of  the  coasts." 

Although  the  term  "headland"  does  not  appear  in  the 
instrument  referred  to,  the  British  interpretation  of  the 
"  three-mile  limit,"  as  applied  to  all  harbors,  bays,  or  inden- 
tations of  the  coast,  was  made  clear  by  this  decision  of  the 
royal  counsel. 

It  was  held  in  the  United  States  that  the  phrase  "  within 
three  marine  miles  of  any  of  the  coasts,  bays,  creeks,  or  har- 
bors," indicated  an  imaginary  line  three  miles  distant  from 
and  following  the  sinuosities  of  the  shore.  Thus  all  bays 
over  six  miles  wide  at  their  entrances  would  be  free  to  their 
fishermen,  except,  of  course,  within  three  miles  of  shore. 
This  question  became  a  pressing  one  about  1840,  and  pre- 
cipitated a  lengthy  discussion  between  Washington  and  Lon- 
don. Theoretically,  the  question  of  "headlands"  has  never 
been  definitely  settled,  and  the  many  authorities  in  interna- 
tional law  furnish  as  yet  no  fixed  rule  for  guidance.  In  gen- 
eral it  may  be  said  that  the  tendency  of  the  law  of  nations  is 
to  restrict  the  extent  of  marine  jurisdiction.     In  the  matter 


THE  NORTHEAST  COAST  FISHERIES  505 

of  harbors  and  bays,  international  usage  has  long  established 
the  propriety  of  reserving  within  the  limits  of  national 
jurisdiction  bodies  of  water,  or  arms  of  the  sea,  the  en- 
trances to  which  from  the  ocean  may  exceed  six  miles  in 
width.  Many  examples  of  this  can  be  found  in  England 
and  France  ;  in  the  United  States  no  one  doubts  the  legality 
of  our  claim  to  the  full  jurisdiction  over  Chesapeake  and 
Delaware  bays,  and  over  Long  Island  Sound,  all  of  whose 
entrances  from  the  open  sea  measure  more  than  six  miles  from 
headland  to  headland.  An  approximate  rule  only  may  be 
formulated  respecting  the  length  of  the  line  from  headland  to 
headland  that  may  reasonably  be  claimed  to  form  a  divisional 
line  between  the  open  ocean  and  jurisdictional  waters.  This 
may  be  somewhat  vaguely  stated  as  double  the  length  of  a 
cannon  shot ;  or,  in  other  words,  all  bays,  recesses  of  the  sea, 
or  inland  waters  connected  with  the  ocean,  whose  entrances 
may  be  defended  by  cannon  placed  upon  the  opposing  head- 
lands, are  properly  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  nation 
possessing  their  shores. 

The  English  construction  of  the  terms  "three  marine  miles 
of  any  of  the  coasts,  bays,"  etc.,  was  undoubtedly  correct,  so 
far  as  that  principle  governs  the  smaller  indentations  of  the 
seacoast,  but  the  gross  error  in  their  contention  lay  in  the 
effort  to  include  within  the  definition  of  "  bays  "  such  great 
bodies  of  water  as  the  Bay  of  Fundy  or  the  Bay  of  Chaleurs. 
The  distances  from  headland  to  headland  at  the  entrances  of 
these  great  estuaries  measure  no  less  than  sixty  miles,  clearly 
excepting  them  from  the  most  liberal  designation  of  closed 
seas. 

The  British  Government,  however,  showed  some  signs  of 
relenting,  though  not  of  receding  from  the  position  it  had 
taken  regarding  the  closed  nature  of  the  Bay  of  Fundy.  In 
1845  Lord  Aberdeen  announced  that  out  of  considerations  of 
courtesy  Great  Britain  would  yield  to  the  United  States  the 
right  of  her  fishermen  in  that  bay,  "  provided  they  do  not 
approach,  except  in  the  cases  specified  in  this  treaty  of  1818, 
within  three  miles  of  the  entrance  of  any  bay  on  the  coast  of 
Nova  Scotia  or  New  Brunswick."     Mr.  Everett,  the  Ameri- 


506  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

can  Minister  to  the  court  of  St.  James,  very  properly  declined 
to  receive  this  privilege  as  a  favor,  but  reiterating  the  Ameri- 
can claim,  he  explained  that  it  was  "  not  for  the  sake  of  detract- 
ing from  the  liberality  evinced  by  Her  Majesty's  Government 
in  relaxing  from  what  they  regarded  as  their  right,  but  it 
would  be  placing  his  own  government  in  a  false  position  to 
accept  as  a  mere  favor  that  for  which  they  had  so  long  and 
so  strenuously  contended  as  due  them  from  the  convention." 

The  colonists  of  Nova  Scotia  and  New  Brunswick  were 
greatly  disturbed  by  Lord  Aberdeen's  proposed  "concession." 
Fearing  it  indicated  a  weakening  in  the  face  of  American 
contentions,  and  that  it  might  perhaps  presage  a  more  gen- 
eral yielding  of  all  the  large  bays  of  the  Dominion  to  the 
operations  of  foreign  fishermen,  they  hurriedly  despatched 
an  envoy  to  London,  who  appeared  before  the  colonial  office 
with  representations  "of  the  injurious  consequences  cer- 
tainly to  result  to  Her  Majesty's  American  subjects,  were  the 
negotiations  with  Mr.  Everett  to  be  concluded  on  the  basis 
proposed."  The  policy  of  the  colonial  secretary  was  accord- 
ingly abandoned,  and  the  Bay  of  Fundy  was  again  dechired 
to  be  a  closed  sea.  The  vexatious  shipping  regulations  of  the 
Dominion  were  even  mpre  strictly  enforced  than  before  ; 
seizure  of  American  vessels  was  continued  ;  and  the  ani- 
mosity which  had  been  smouldering  in  New  England  against 
its  northern  neighbors  nearly  blazed  into  war. 

The  Canadians,  on  their  side,  were  thoroughly  indignant  at 
what  they  considered  the  persistent  lawlessness  on  the  part 
of  American  fishermen,  and  they  displayed  their  resentment 
in  still  another  form.  The  Strait  of  Canso,  between  Nova 
Scotia  and  Cape  Breton,  affords  a  shorter  and  safer  route  to 
vessels  making  the  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence  from  the  south. 
This  narrow  passage  is  in  certain  places  not  more  than  a 
mile  in  width.  When  the  navigation  of  two  seas  is  free,  the 
navigation  of  a  channel  connecting  them  should  also  be  free, 
although  it  may  for  certain  reasons  be  made  subject  to  a 
toll  regulation.  The  Canadians  insisted  that  the  Strait  of 
Canso  fell  within  the  description  of  territorial  waters,  and 
they  consequently  denied  the  right  of  passage  through  it  to 


THE  NORTHEAST  COAST  FISHERIES  507 

American  fishing  vessels.  American  fishermen  were  not  jus- 
tified in  tarrying  in  the  strait  or  fishing  therein,  but  its  pro- 
hibition merely  as  a  channel  of  communication  was  distinctly 
an  unfriendly  act. 

The  affair  of  the  Washington  had  not  been  forgotten  ; 
claims  for  indemnity  were  presented  by  her  owners  and  the 
matter  was  laid  before  the  British  authorities.  In  1852  this 
claim  along  with  others  was  referred  to  a  commission  in 
London.  By  decision  of  an  umpire,  the  Bay  of  Fundy  was 
declared  not  to  be  a  mare  clausum  within  the  meaning  of  the 
treaty  of  1818.  In  this  matter,  then,  the  American  contention 
was  sustained,  and  one  of  the  unhappy  subjects  of  contro- 
versy growing  out  of  the  fisheries  was  laid  at  rest. 

About  this  time  (1847-54)  commercial  relations  with  the 
Canadian  provinces  were  beginning  to  develop  along  new 
lines.  The  free-trade  policy  of  England  had  opened  her 
ports  to  the  world's  trade,  and  this  to  a  large  extent  had 
deprived  the  Dominion  of  her  most  valuable  markets ;  and 
her  merchants  hopefully  turned  to  the  United  States.  To 
enter  American  markets  with  their  products  became  to  them 
an  object  of  prime  importance.  In  1847  overtures  were 
made  to  Congress  for  reciprocity,  Canada  promising  full 
freedom  to  American  fishermen  in  return  for  a  remission  of 
tariff  duties  upon  her  fish.  For  several  years  Congress 
refused  to  consider  the  question,  and  the  colonies  vented 
their  displeasure  by  an  increased  naval  force  to  patrol  their 
waters  and  terrorize  American  fishermen.  It  was  soon  sus- 
pected that  there  was  a  method  in  this  madness  of  a  Do- 
minion navy,  and  the  attempt,  supposed  or  real,  to  coerce 
the  United  States  into  a  reciprocity  treaty,  by  annoying  her 
fishermen,  provoked  an  animated  discussion  in  Congress. 
Mr.  Hamlin,  of  Maine,  declared  that  the  sending  of  a  naval 
force  to  the  fishing  grounds,  pending  negotiations,  was  "  noth- 
ing more  nor  less  than  to  compel  the  United  States  to  legis- 
late under  duress,"  and  to  this  he,  for  one,  was  unwilling  to 
submit.  A  growing  sentiment  manifested  itself  to  despatch 
to  Canadian  waters  a  naval  force  of  equal  proportions.  Mr. 
Webster   promised   the   people   of   Massachusetts   that   the 


508  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

administration  would  protect  the  fishermen,  "  hook  and  line, 
bob  and  sinker."  An  American  war  vessel  was  sent  to  the 
scene  ;  the  relations  of  the  two  countries  became  most  criti- 
cal and  war  was  again  predicted.  When  popular  excitement 
was  running  high,  the  Governor  General  of  Canada,  Lord 
Elgin,  came  to  Washington  (1854)  for  the  purpose  of  mak- 
ing a  commercial  treaty  with  the  United  States.  It  was  a 
most  inopportune  time  for  the  success  of  his  mission,  not 
only  on  account  of  the  ill-feeling  throughout  the  East  toward 
Canada  and  the  decided  opposition  in  Congress  to  any  form 
of  reciprocal  trade  relations  with  her,  but  it  was  also  the 
moment  when  political  parties  in  the  United  States  were 
absorbed  in  a  desperate  struggle  over  the  Kansas-Nebraska 
Bill,  and  were  too  deeply  agitated  by  the  threatening  aspect 
of  the  slavery  question  to  give  willing  heed  to  less  important 
affairs.  Notwithstanding  these  obstacles.  Lord  Elgin  suc- 
ceeded. In  the  short  space  of  a  fortnight,  a  treaty  "  Extend- 
ing the  Right  of  Fishing  and  Regulating  Commerce  and 
Navigation  between  the  United  States  and  the  British  pos- 
sessions in  North  America,"  was  signed  (June  5,  1854). 


VII 

Up  to  this  point  in  the  history  of  the  fisheries,  the  discus- 
sions relative  to  the  rights  and  liberties  of  citizens  of  the 
United  States  in  Canadian  waters,  and  all  negotiations  look- 
ing toward  larger  British  concessions,  had  been  almost  wholly 
free  from  entanglement  with  the  many  concurrent  diplomatic 
questions  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States. 
With  the  exception  of  that  famous  dispute  concerning  the 
navigation  of  the  Mississippi  River,  which  had  been  for  a 
time  associated  with  it,  the  fishery  question  was  fought  out 
alone,  and  upon  its  own  merits.  By  the  year  1854,  the  most 
important  of  the  legal  points  involved  in  the  old  controversy 
had  been  disposed  of.  Although  the  doctrine  of  "  inherent 
and  natural  right "  to  the  fisheries  still  found  its  supporters, 
those  notions  had  been  practically  abandoned,  and  the  rights 
of    American  citizens  in  Canadian  waters  were   admittedly 


THE   NORTHEAST  COAST   FISHERIES  509 

based  upon  the  convention  of  1818.  England  had  receded 
from  her  contention  of  mare  clausum  in  regard  to  the  Bay 
of  Fundy.  Barring  some  minor  disputed  points,  there  existed 
between  the  two  governments  a  fairly  good  understanding 
as  to  the  broad  principles  of  law  underlying  the  question. 
In  future,  American  rights  in  the  inshore  waters,  and  upon 
the  shores  of  Canada,  were  to  become  matters  of  purchase, 
and  the  whole  fishery  question,  with  its  record  of  strife  and 
contention,  was  transferred  from  the  domain  of  law  to  that 
of  political  economy.  What  are  the  fisheries  worth  to  New 
England,  and  what  will  be  a  suitable  quid  pro  quo  were  the 
queries  to  be  answered.  The  compensation  Canada  most 
desired  for  the  freedom  of  her  shore  waters  was  commercial 
favors.  The  fisheries,  therefore,  became  associated  with 
commercial  reciprocity,  and  the  two  questions  have  become 
so  thoroughly  associated,  that  to-day  they  cannot  well  be  con- 
sidered separately.  Although  those  larger  and  more  serious 
disagreements  which  had  formerly  characterized  all  negoti- 
ations concerning  the  fisheries,  and  which  had  rendered  their 
successful  termination  so  difficult,  were  removed,  minor  issues 
of  a  legal  nature  were  yet  to  appear,  and  to  produce  at  times 
a  high  degree  of  irritation. 

The  treaty  of  1854  permitted  a  free  exchange  of  nearly 
all  the  land  and  sea  products  of  Canada  and  the  United 
States.  The  first  article  relating  to  the  fisheries  is  as 
follows  :  — 

It  is  agreed  by  the  high  contracting  parties  that  in  addition  to 
the  liberty  secured  to  the  United  States  fishermen  by  the  above- 
mentioned  convention  of  October  20th,  1818,  of  taking,  curing,  and 
drying  fish  on  certain  coasts  of  the  British  North  American  Col- 
onies therein  defined,  the  inhabitants  of  the  United  States  shall 
have,  in  common  with  the  subjects  of  Her  Britannic  Majesty,  the 
liberty  to  take  fish  of  every  kind,  except  shell  fish,  on  the  sea- 
coasts  and  shores,  and  in  the  bays,  harbors,  and  creeks  of  Canada, 
New  Brunswick,  Nova  Scotia,  Prince  Edward's  Island,  and  of  the 
several  islands  thereunto  adjacent,  without  being  restricted  to  any 
distance  from  the  shore,  with  permission  to  land  upon  the  coasts 
and  shores  of  those  Colonies  and  the  islands  thereof,  and  also  upon 
the  Magdalen  Islands,  for  the  purpose  of  drying  their  nets  and 


510  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

curing  their  fish ;  provided  that,  in  so  doing,  they  do  not  interfere 
with  the  rights  of  private  property,  or  with  British  fishermen,  in 
the  peaceable  use  of  any  part  of  the  said  coast  in  their  occu- 
pancy for  the  same  purpose. 

By  the  second  article,  Canadian  fishermen  were  accorded 
similar  privileges  in  American  waters  north  of  latitude  36°. 

With  the  sole  exception  of  taking  "  shell  fish,"  the  Ameri- 
cans were  practically  placed  upon  the  same  footing  with 
British  subjects  in  the  prosecution  of  the  fisheries  in  Cana- 
dian waters.  By  the  fifth  article  it  was  stipulated  that  the 
treaty  "  is  to  remain  in  force  for  ten  years  and  further,  until 
the  expiration  of  twelve  months  after  either  party  shall  give 
notice  of  a  wish  to  terminate  the  same." 

The  effect  of  this  agreement  upon  American  fishermen 
was  almost  magical.  Their  disputes  were  immediately  for- 
gotten, and  harmony  reigned.  In  Canada,  where  formerly 
the  American  fishermen  had  been  regarded  as  enemies,  they 
were  now  welcomed  as  the  best  of  friends.  The  Canadians 
rejoiced  in  the  new  and  extensive  markets  opened  to  their 
produce,  and  their  trade  soon  quadrupled.  Nova  Scotia  and 
New  Brunswick  entered  upon  a  period  of  extraordinary  pros- 
perity, and  their  fisheries  leaped  at  a  bound  from  conditions 
of  adversity  to  those  of  great  prosperity.  But  such  delight- 
ful tranquillity  upon  the  fishing  grounds  was  not  destined 
to  last  many  years  ;  a  variety  of  causes  led  to  the  abrogation 
of  the  treaty  of  1854  by  the  United  States  at  the  end  of  the 
stipulated  ten  years.  The  first  note  of  alarm  was  sounded 
by  the  Maine  and  Massachusetts  fishermen  themselves,  who 
began  to  complain  that  the  free  admission  of  Canadian  fish 
into  the  United  States  crippled  their  own  industry.  Owing 
to  cheaper  labor,  and  their  greater  proximity  to  the  fisheries, 
the  Canadians  were  enabled  to  undersell  the  New  England 
fishermen  in  the  Boston  markets.  The  extent  of  the  free  list 
of  Canadian  products  was  so  great  that  it  largely  curtailed  the 
revenues  the  government  needed.  Senator  Sherman  estimated 
this  loss  upon  the  single  item  of  lumber  to  be  ^5,000,000  a 
year.  It  soon  became  evident  that  the  price  being  paid 
Canada  for  the  freedom  of  her  fisheries  was  too  great. 


THE   NORTHEAST  COAST  FISHERIES  511 

Notwithstanding  these  very  urgent  reasons  for  altering  the 
laws  at  the  end  of  the  stipulated  ten  years,  it  is  probable  that 
the  regulations  would  have  continued  in  force  for  a  longer 
period  had  it  not  been  for  the  Rebellion  in  the  United  States. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  Civil  war  trade  conditions  in  the 
United  States  materially  changed.  The  necessary  increase 
of  taxes,  together  with  radical  changes  in  currency  values, 
producing  increased  cost  of  labor,  enabled  the  Canadian 
farmer  to  supplant  the  American  in  his  own  markets.  The 
unfriendly  attitude  of  the  Canadians  toward  the  Government 
during  the  civil  conflict  furnished  an  additional  incentive 
to  withdraw  the  advantages  which  the  treaty  of  1854  con- 
cededly  gave  them.  The  Canadians  had  exhibited  a  marked 
disposition  to  profit  by  the  difficulties  of  the  United  States  ; 
Montreal  and  Quebec  harbored  the  most  virulent  enemies  of 
the  Northern  cause,  and  at  one  time  the  Provinces  were  sus- 
pected of  contemplating  the  seizure  and  annexation  of  Maine. 

Notice  was  given  in  March,  1865,  and  the  following  year 
the  treaty  was  terminated.  With  the  abrogation  of  the 
reciprocity  treaty,  the  provisions  of  the  agreement  of  1818 
again  came  into  force,  the  stipulations  contained  in  the  treaty 
of  1854  having  been  based  upon  and  declared  to  be  "in  addi- 
tion to  those  of  the  convention,  of  1818."  Therefore  the  old 
scheme  of  restricting  American  fishermen  to  certain  limited 
areas  of  inshore  waters  of  Newfoundland,  to  the  coastal 
waters  of  Labrador  and  to  the  southern  shores  of  the 
Magdalen  Islands,  together  with  contracted  landing  privi- 
leges, was  revived. 

The  Canadians  were  greatly  disappointed  by  the  reces- 
sion of  the  reciprocity  treaty.  The  largely  increased  vol- 
ume of  their  export  trade  and  the  gratifying  prosperity  of 
their  fisheries,  both  directly  resulting  from  the  freedom  of 
the  American  markets,  immediately  declined  and  withered. 
Referring  to  economic  conditions  in  Nova  Scotia,  the  editor 
of  the  Halifax  Chronicle  said  that  from  the  abrogation  of 
the  reciprocity  treaty,  "  we  have  retrograded  with  the  most 
frightful  rapidity."  Bitter  complaints  of  the  "selfish  pol- 
icy "  of  the  United  States  arose  from  every  side. 


612  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

With  the  return  to  those  conditions  which  had  existed 
prior  to  1854,  the  same  old  quarrels  and  encounters  among 
the  fishermen  reappeared.  Lord  Monck,  the  Canadian 
Governor  General,  promptly  issued  notice  to  Americans  that 
inasmuch  as  their  general  fishery  rights  had  ceased,  any 
infractions  of  the  laws  relating  to  them  would  forthwith  be 
severely  punished.  Trouble  began  to  threaten  even  before 
the  close  of  the  first  fishing  season.  The  Canadians  there- 
upon adopted  a  license  system  granting  full  fishery  privi 
leges  to  American  schooners  on  payment  of  an  annual  tax. 
New  England  skippers  generally  availed  themselves  of  this 
arrangement,  but  each  succeeding  year  the  price  of  licenses 
was  increased  (50  cents  a  ton  in  1866,  $^1.00  in  1867,  and 
$2.00  in  1868),  until  by  the  year  1869  the  duty  had  virtually 
become  prohibitive,  and  American  fishermen  refused  to  pay  it. 

The  various  provinces  of  Canada  having  consolidated  into 
the  Dominion  of  Canada,  the  Parliament  at  Ottawa,  in  l.siis, 
issued  in  reference  to  the  fisheries  a  new  code  of  laws  which 
was  thought  by  Americans  to  be  needlessly  severe.  Canadian 
maritime  officials  redoubled  their  vigilance  ;  as  a  result  a 
large  number  of  New  England  fishing  smacks  were  captured, 
and  they  generally  suffered  the  penalty  of  forfeiture.  Tlie 
fishermen's  quarrels  assumed  constantly  increasing  violence^ 
and  so  much  bitterness  was  aroused  in  the  New  England 
States  that  open  rupture  with  England  again  seemed  prob- 
able. In  evident  desperation  an  order  was  issued  in  1870 
by  the  Governor  General  of  Canada  to  the  effect  "that 
henceforth  all  foreign  fishermen  shall  be  prevented  from 
fishing  in  the  waters  of  Canada."  To  enforce  this  question- 
able edict,  the  Dominion  assumed  the  expense  of  fitting  out 
cruisers  to  patrol  the  waters  of  Nova  Scotia,  especially  those 
waters  in  and  about  the  Bay  of  Fundy,  where,  it  was  alleged, 
American  captains  purchased  bait  and  supplies  in  open  viola- 
tion of  the  law.  Four  hundred  American  vessels  were 
boarded,  and  of  these  fifteen  were  detained  and  afterward 
condemned.  When  the  situation  had  become  most  threaten- 
ing, the  fishery  question  was  once  more  set  at  rest  by  the 
treaty  of  Washington  (1871). 


THE  NORTHEAST  COAST  FISHERIES  613 

VIII 

In  1870,  a  number  of  Anglo-American  claims  growing  out 
of  depredations  committed  during  the  war  had  accumulated, 
and  were  pressing  for  adjudication.  These  claims  were 
gathered  together  and  by  the  agreement  of  a  joint  high 
commission  were  referred  to  various  boards  of  arbitration. 
It  was  an  opportune  moment  to  settle  the  fishery  dispute, 
vvhich,  true  to  its  old-time  traditions,  had  reawakened  and 
demanded  an  immediate  settlement.  It  therefore  fell  in 
with  the  other  issues  under  discussion  at  that  time  and  the 
subject  was  included  in  the  comprehensive  Anglo-American 
treaty  of  1871. 

The  eighteenth  article  of  this  latter  instrument  renewed 
the  provisions  of  Article  1  of  the  reciprocity  treaty  of  1854, 
it  being  further  stipulated  in  the  treaty  that  it  should  remain 
in  force  for  a  period  of  ten  years,  and  for  two  years  after 
notice  of  its  termination  by  either  party  ;  Article  19  ex- 
tended the  privileges  of  fishing  in  the  territorial  waters  of 
the  United  States  as  far  down  as  the  39th  degree  of  latitude  ; 
Article  21  provided  for  the  free  admission  into  American  and 
Canadian  ports  of  fish  and  fish  oil.  During  th£negotiation 
of  the  treaty,  the  United  States  commissioners  offered  to 
pay  to  Canada  the  sum  of  $1,000,000  in  return  for  full 
American  privileges  in  their  inshore  fisheries  in  perpetuity. 
This  sum  was  thought  by  the  commissioners  tendering  it  to 
be  greater  than  the  real  value  of  these  inshore  fisheries,  but 
the  amount  was  probably  not  too  great  for  a  positive  guar- 
antee of  freedom  from  further  molestation.  The  offer  was 
declined  by  the  English  commissioners  as  insufficient  in 
amount,  but  the  discussion  of  a  money  consideration  led  to 
the  insertion  in  the  instrument  of  the  following  article 
{22d):  — 

Inasmuch  as  it  is  asserted  by  the  Government  of  Her  Britannic 
Majesty  that  the  privileges  accorded  to  the  citizens  of  the  United 
States  under  Article  18  of  this  treaty  are  of  greater  value  than 
those  accorded  by  Articles  19  and  21  of  this  treaty  to  the  subjects 
of  Her  Britannic  Majesty,  and  this  assertion  is  not  admitted  by 
2l 


514  AMERICAN    DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

the  Government  of  the  United  States,  it  is  further  agreed  that 
commissioners  shall  be  appointed  to  determine,  having  regard  to 
the  privileges  accorded  by  the  United  States  to  the  subjects  of 
Her  Britannic  Majesty,  as  stated  in  Articles  19  and  21  of  this 
treaty,  the  amount  of  any  compensation  which,  in  their  opinion, 
ought  to  be  paid  by  the  Government  of  the  United  States  to  the 
Government  of  Her  Britannic  Majesty  in  return  for  the  privi- 
leges accorded  to  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  under  Article 
18  of  this  treaty ;  and  that  any  sum  of  money  which  the  said 
commissioners  may  so  award  shall  be  paid  by  the  United  States 
Government,  in  a  gross  sum,  within  twelve  months  after  such 
award  shall  have  been  given. 

Article  23  provided  that  the  three  commissioners  proposed 
in  the  previous  clause  should  be  appointed,  one  by  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States,  one  by  the  queen  of  England, 
and  the  third  conjointly  by  the  two  ;  though  in  case  they 
failed  to  agree  upon  some  one  within  three  months,  the 
choice  of  the  third  commissioner  should  then  fall  to  the 
Austrian  Ambassador  in  London. 

It  will  therefore  be  observed  that  by  this  treaty  the  Cana- 
dians secured  one  of  their  most  cherished  desiderata,  —  the 
abolition  of  all  United  States  customs  duties  upon  the 
products  of  their  fisheries.  The  American  fishermen  in 
return  gained  perfect  freedom  in  Canadian  inshore  waters, 
—  though  at  what  seemed  to  them  to  be  a  ruinous  cost,  i.e. 
free  Canadian  fish ;  they  had  already  realized  their  inability 
to  compete  successfully  upon  even  terms  with  Canadian 
fishermen. 

Believing  that  their  government  had  given  too  great  a 
price  for  a  free  Canadian  fishery,  the  New  England  fisher- 
men thought  it  simply  preposterous  that  the  United  States 
Government  should  be  willing  to  pay  in  addition,  a  money 
consideration. 

The  agreement  to  leave  to  an  Austrian  (under  certain 
conditions)  the  choice  of  a  member  of  this  proposed  board 
was  unfortunate.  It  might  reasonably  have  been  feared 
that  a  selection  from  Vienna  would  have  been  prejudiced,  as 
the  ambitions  of  the  house  of  Hapsburg  had  but  recently 
been  frustrated  by  the  United  States  in  the  threat  to  expel 


THE   NORTHEAST   COAST  FISHERIES  515 

Maximilian  and  his  French  army  from  the  Western  continent. 
The  United  States  Government  realized  the  blunder  too  late, 
and  in  the  attempt  to  free  itself  from  the  mistake  of  its  com- 
missioners, it  fell  into  even  greater  difficulties.  The  acting 
Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  J.  C.  Bancroft  Davis,  proposed  to 
the  British  Government  the  names  of  a  number  of  foreign 
ministers  in  Washington  whose  knowledge  of  the  English 
language  qualified  any  one  of  them  to  act  as  the  third  com- 
missioner in  question.  The  name  of  Mr.  Delfosse,  the  Belgian 
Minister,  had  been  purposely  omitted  from  the  list,  for  the 
reason  that  the  intimate  political  relations  between  England 
and  Belgium  (strengthened  by  the  ties  of  close  kinship  in 
their  royal  families)  seemed  to  disqualify  any  Belgian  from 
acting  in  such  a  diplomatic  capacity.  Lord  de  Grey,  one  of 
the  British  commissioners  who  had  signed  the  treaty  of 
Washington,  had  given  it  as  his  opinion  that  Belgium  and 
Portugal  need  not  be  considered  in  this  connection,  for  their 
treaty  arrangements  with  England  "  might  be  supposed  to 
incapacitate  "  their  representatives  from  acting  upon  such  a 
commission.  A  desire  became  evident  on  the  part  of  the 
British  Minister  in  Washington  to  delay  the  choice  of  a  third 
arbitrator  until  the  end  of  the  stipulated  period,  when  the 
selection  would  fall  into  Austrian  hands.  Finding  that 
the  United  States  entertained  objections  to  Mr.  Delfosse,  the 
English  Government  accordingly  offered  him  as  their  choice, 
no  doubt  anticipating  a  lengthy  discussion  which  would  waste 
time.  Upon  further  request  to  name  some  other  person  for 
neutral  member  of  the  board,  the  British  premier  suggested 
that  the  American  and  British  Ministers  at  The  Hague 
should  select  jointly  some  Dutch  subject,  but  the  recently 
appointed  American  Minister  to  that  capital  felt  his  inability, 
through  a  lack  of  acquaintance  with  the  people,  to  make  an 
intelligent  choice  ;  so  that  scheme  was  abandoned.  Mr. 
Thornton,  the  British  Minister  in  Washington,  wrote  that 
circumstances  seemed  to  point  either  to  the  selection  of 
Mr.  Delfosse  or  to  the  alternative  provided  for  in  the  treaty. 
The  three  months'  allotted  time  was  about  to  expire,  and 
there  appeared  to  be  no  escape  from  an  appointment  by  the 


516  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

Austrian.  An  extension  of  time,  however,  was  agreed  upon,, 
for  Canada,  still  anxious  for  reciprocity,  had  sent  proposals- 
to  Washington  for  a  new  treaty  of  commerce  and  fisheries- 
which  would  do  away  with  the  proposed  board  of  arbitra- 
tion, and  entirely  dispense  with  all  additional  compensa-^ 
tion  for  the  freedom  of  her  fisheries.  A  draft  of  treaty 
was  presented,  the  provisions  of  which  almost  totally 
removed  protective  duties  from  Canadian  products,  but 
guaranteed  in  return  perfect  freedom  to  American  fisher- 
men. The  proposition  was  submitted  to  the  Senate  in  1874,. 
and  met  with  an  unfavorable  report  the  following  year. 
The  matter  of  the  unselected  commissioner  accordingly 
revived. 

The  stipulated  time  as  extended  had  passed,  and  in  1875- 
the  British  premier  requested  an  identical  note  to  the 
Austrian  Ambassador  in  London,  asking  him  to  name  the 
third  commissioner.  For  various  reasons  the  correspon- 
dence dragged  on  for  over  a  year  without  results,  but 
at  length  the  Secretary  of  State,  finding  himself  between 
Scylla  and  Charybdis,  and  being  exceedingly  desirous  of 
closing  the  matter  as  quickly  as  possible,  decided  that 
Mr.  Delfosse's  selection  would  likely  prove  the  lesser  evil  of 
the  two  ;  he  accordingly  suggested  to  the  British  authori- 
ties, in  1877,  that  the  United  States  would  not  oppose  the- 
appointment  of  the  Belgian  if  the  British  Government  still 
desired  his  selection.  It  was  agreed,  however,  upon  a, 
request  from  London,  that  in  conformity  with  the  treaty 
stipulations.  Count  Beust,  the  Austrian  Ambassador  at  Lon- 
don, should  name  Mr.  Delfosse,  —  which  he  proceeded  to  do* 
at  once. 

Thus  the  United  States  was  placed  in  the  unfortunate  and 
wholly  false  attitude  of  having  requested  Mr.  Delfosse's  ap- 
pointment, and  was  therefore  all  the  more  hopelessly  estopped 
from  afterward  excepting  to  any  reward  he  might  see  fit  to- 
make.  Much  adverse  criticism  was  expressed  in  the  United 
States  when  all  the  correspondence  was  published,  which, 
brought  to  light  the  clever  diplomatic  tactics  of  Great  Britain 
in  taking  advantage  of  the  American  commissioners'  blunder 


THE   NORTHEAST  COAST  FISHERIES  517 

(1871)  in  thus  leaving  the  choice  of  the  third  arbitrator  to  one 
whose  feelings  toward  the  United  States  might  be  unfriendly. 

Both  Count  Beust  and  Mr.  Delfosse  were  probably  un- 
aware of  the  proceedings  that  had  taken  place  between  the 
English  premier  and  Mr.  Fish,  relative  to  the  selection  of 
a  third  commissioner.  The  former  would  doubtless  have 
evinced  some  delicacy  in  venturing  to  propose  Mr.  Delfosse  ; 
and  the  latter,  had  he  felt  that  he  was  persona  non  grata  in 
this  connection,  would  certainly  have  declined  to  serve. 

The  board  convened  at  Halifax,  June  15,  1877.  The 
commission  was  composed  of  Sir  Alexander  Gait  (British), 
E.  H.  Kellogg  (American),  and  Mr.  Delfosse  as  the  neutral 
member.  Secretaries,  official  reporters,  and  a  host  of  cleri- 
cal assistants,  together  with  an  array  of  counsel,  combined 
to  make  an  imposing  gathering. 

Newfoundland  at  once  presented  a  claim  for  compensation 
to  the  amount  of  $14,880,000,  for  privileges  enjoyed  by 
American  fishermen  in  her  waters  and  upon  her  shores 
during  the  past  twelve  years,  but  the  argument  in  support 
of  this  claim  was  met  by  the  answer  that  such  demands 
were  fully  covered  by  the  remission  of  American  tariff 
duties  upon  her  fish.  The  American  counsel  further 
insisted  that  the  jurisdiction  of  the  board  was  restricted  to 
the  duty  of  ascertaining  how  much  more  valuable,  if  more 
valuable  at  all,  free  Canadian  fisheries  were  to  the  United 
States  than  similar  privileges  in  American  waters  combined 
with  free  importation  of  Canadian  fish  into  the  United 
States  were  to  the  Canadians.  On  November  23  of  the 
same  year  the  award  was  found,  the  following  verdict  being 
rendered,  together  with  the  dissenting  opinion  of  the 
American  commissioner :  — 

The  commissioners  appointed,  etc.  .  .  .  Award  the  sum  of  five 
millions  five  hundred  thousand  dollars  in  gold  to  be  paid  by  the 
government  of  the  United  States  to  the  government  of  Her  Bri- 
tannic Majesty  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  said  treaty. 

Signed  at  Halifax,  etc.  .  .  . 
Maurice  Delfosse. 
A.  T.  Galt. 


518  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

The  United  States  Commissioner  is  of  opinion  that  the  advan- 
tages accruing  to  Great  Britain  under  the  treaty  of  Washington 
are  greater  than  the  advantages  conferred  on  the  United  States 
by  said  treaty,  and  he  cannot  therefore  concur  in  the  conclusions 
announced  by  his  colleagues. 

And  the  American  commissioner  deems  it  his  duty  to  state 
further  that  it  is  questionable  whether  it  is  competent  for  the 
board  to  make  an  award  under  the  treaty  except  with  the  unani- 
mous consent  of  its  members. 

E.  H.  Kellogg, 

Oommissioner. 


News  of  the  award  was  received  in  the  United  States  with 
astonishment,  the  feeling  being  general  that  the  country 
had  been  wronged.  The  sum  was  grossly  excessive.  It 
was  estimated  that  the  remission  of  duties  on  Canadian  fish 
cost  the  government  about  $350,000  yearly,  and  this  added 
to  the  sum  awarded  at  Halifax  made  the  total  cost  of  Cana- 
dian fisheries  for  twelve  years  about  $10,000,000.  The  true 
value  of  the  fisheries  of  Canada  was  computed  to  be  worth 
about  $25,000  a  year.  The  Senate  committee  on  foreign 
affairs  chafed  under  the  injustice  of  the  decision,  and  its 
members  began  to  consider  the  suggestion  in  Mr.  Kellogg's 
dissenting  opinion  that  a  majority  decision  alone  was  insuffi- 
cient to  bind  the  United  States.  A  disposition  was  quite 
manifest  to  evade,  if  possible,  the  payment  of  so  unreason- 
able a  sum.  However,  the  feeling  finally  prevailed  that  it 
was  a  debt  of  honor,  and  the  award  was  paid.  A  resolution 
was  immediately  taken  to  abrogate  the  treaty  at  the  "  earliest 
period  consistent  with  Article  33  "  of  that  instrument. 

The  treaty  of  Washington  had  gone  into  effect  July  1, 
1873  ;  notice  was  given  at  the  end  of  the  stipulated  ten 
years,  and  the  treaty  articles  referring  to  the  fisheries  were 
terminated  on  July  .1,  1885  —  two  years  later.  Thus  the 
status  of  the  fishery  question  reverted  for  the  third  time 
to  the  conditions  of  the  convention  of  1818. 

Before  the  abrogation  of  the  fishery  clauses  of  the  treaty 
of  Washington,  an  incident  occurred  in  Canadian  waters 
(January  6,   1878),  that   brought  to  the  attention  of  the 


THE   NORTHEAST   COAST  FISHERIES  619 

State  Department  a  new  difficulty  connected  with  the  sub- 
ject. One  Sunday  some  American  fishermen  were  hauling 
their  herring  seines  near  the  settlement  of  Long  Harbor  in 
Newfoundland.  It  appears  that  a  local  statute  was  in  force 
forbidding  such  desecration  of  the  Sabbath.  A  native  mob, 
whose  religious  scruples  had  been  offended,  set  upon  the 
luckless  Americans  and  drove  them  from  the  region.  This 
adventure  brought  to  light  the  variance  between  the  impe- 
rial law  and  local  regulations.  The  question  at  once  arose 
—  Which  are  paramount,  treaty  rights  or  local  ordinances  ? 
The  British  Foreign  Office  at  first  contended  that  the  treaty 
was  made  subject  to  all  local  laws  or  harbor  regulations  that 
affected  all  people  alike,  but  ultimately  acknowledged  the 
supremacy  of  treaty  rights,  and  consented  to  have  all  local 
laws  at  variance  with  them  suspended.  The  Secretary  of 
State,  Mr.  Evarts,  urged  that  "  this  government  conceives 
that  the  fishery  rights  of  the  United  States  conceded  by 
the  treaty  of  Washington,  are  to  be  exercised  wholly  free 
from  the  restraint  and  regulations  of  the  statutes  of  New- 
foundland." The  matter  was  closed  by  Great  Britain  paying 
the  sum  of  175,000  damages  to  the  outraged  American 
fishermen. 


IX 

With  the  abrogation  of  the  treaty  of  Washington  in  1885, 
and  the  consequent  revival  of  the  numerous  restrictions  im- 
posed by  the  convention  of  1818,  it  was  fully  expf3cted  that 
the  quarrels  of  the  fishermen  would  begin  anew.  To 
mitigate  the  losses  the  Americans  would  undoubtedly  suffer 
by  the  sudden  withdrawal  of  privileges  they  had  enjoyed  in 
the  midst  of  a  fishing  season,  an  agreement  was  made  with 
Canada  to  continue  in  operation  the  fishery  clauses  of  the 
Washington  treaty  during  the  remainder  of  the  season  of 
1885.  The  Dominion  cherished  the  hope  that  another  reci- 
procity treaty  would  soon  be  made,  and  negotiations  were  at 
once  entered  upon  with  that  object  in  view.  President  Cleve- 
land in  his  annual  message  of  December  8,  1885,  proposed  in 


520  .AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

the  interests  of  "  good  neighborhood,"  that  a  joint  high  com- 
mission should  be  appointed,  "  charged  with  the  consideration 
and  settlement  upon  a  just,  equitable,  and  honorable  basis,, 
of  the  entire  question  of  the  fishery  rights  of  the  two  gov- 
ernments and  their  respective  citizens  on  the  coasts  of  the 
United  States  and  British  North  America."  The  fishery 
interests,  he  insisted,  were  intimately  related  to  other  gen- 
eral questions  dependent  upon  contiguity  and  intercourse. 
This  of  course  pointed  directly  to  reciprocity,  but  the  New 
England  fishermen  protested  so  loudly  against  any  change 
of  arrangements,  that  the  President's  recommendations  to 
\  Congress  were  adversely  considered. 

To  understand  clearly  the  opposition  of  American  fisher- 
men in  1885  to  any  change  in  the  regulations  of  1818  that 
placed  upon  them  so  many  disabilities,  and  against  which 
they  had  so  steadily  clamored  for  years,  a  glance  at  the 
changing  character  of  the  fisheries  becomes  necessary.  In 
the  earlier  part  of  the  century,  American  fishermen  were 
almost  wholly  dependent  upon  their  shore  privileges,  both 
for  the  purpose  of  refitting,  obtaining  supplies  and  bait, 
and  for  drying  and  curing  their  catch.  The  fishing  grounds 
along  the  Maine  coast,  having  long  before  become  practically 
exhausted,  the  Canadian  inshore  waters  were  next  exploited, 
and  the  most  liberal  privileges  to  fish  in  such  waters  were 
sought  by  the  Americans.  Gradually,  however,  American 
cod  fishermen  withdrew  to  the  richer  fisheries  of  the  Banks, 
employing  larger  vessels  and  taking  with  them  the  necessary 
supplies  of  salted  or  iced  bait  to  last  the  entire  cruise. 
Thus  they  became  more  and  more  independent  of  the  shore 
privileges  they  had  formerly  sought.  The  drying  and 
curing  process  having  also  been  abandoned  for  better 
methods,  the  necessity  for  landing  on  Canadian  soil  was 
again  lessened. 

The  sudden  rise  of  the  mackerel  fishery  (about  1850), 
again  made  inshore  privileges  of  value  to  a  class  of  fisher- 
men that  followed  it  exclusively,  for,  as  already  observed, 
this  business  was  for  the  most  part  carried  on  within  British 
territorial  waters.     Even  before  this  time  (1885),  the  use 


THE   NORTHEAST   COAST  FISHERIES  521 

of  the  purse  seine  had  supplanted  the  old  method  of  "  chum- 
ming "  for  mackerel.  This  was  carried  on  in  deeper  water, 
and  without  the  use  of  bait.  Halibut  fishing  in  the  vicinity 
of  the  provincial  shores  was  at  one  time  profitable,  but  it, 
too,  was  found  to  yield  better  results  in  offshore  waters. 
Herring  alone  remained  in  1885  a  purely  inshore  fishery,  but 
its  importance  was  relatively  small ;  owing  to  constant 
disagreements  with  the  natives,  with  whom  this  occupation 
brought  our  men  in  close  contact,  the  practice  of  purchasing 
herring  from  the  provincial  fishermen  gradually  came  to  be 
adopted.  Thus  in  1885  the  shore  privileges,  for  which 
American  statesmen  had  so  strenuously  contended,  had 
become  of  comparatively  little  value  to  American  fishermen. 
But  the  privilege  of  entering  Canadian  ports  for  certain  pur- 
poses was  still  desirable,  for  all  the  contingencies  of  long 
voyages  and  lengthy  sojourn  upon  the  Banks  could  not 
always  be  provided  against  before  departure  from  home. 
Continued  boisterous  weather  often  prevailed,  and  oix 
account  of  the  delays  caused  thereby,  together  with  acci- 
dents that  are  likely  to  occur  in  such  exposed  stations,  the? 
right  to  enter  any  nearby  harbor  to  refit  or  purchase  fresh 
supplies  was  useful  though  not  perhaps  absolutely  necessary. 
These  privileges  were  already  provided  for  by  the  treaty 
of  1818,  except  the  one  privilege  of  buying  bait.  While 
this  single  privilege  was  less  important  in  some  respects 
than  the  others,  it  was  still  considered  to  be  worth  a  price, 
though  not  so  great  a  price  as  the  remission  of  duty  upon 
Canadian  fish.  Aside  from  the  quarrels  in  which  these 
fishermen  so  often  found  themselves  involved  when  they 
visited  Canadian  ports,  American  skippers  found  other  good 
reasons  for  abstaining,  as  far  as  possible,  from  the  necessity 
of  making  port  during  the  fishing  season.  A  run  ashore 
consumed  valuable  time,  and  invariably  demoralized  their 
crews ;  the  more  frequent  the  calls  in  port  the  less  efficient 
became  their  men.  Not  a  few  of  the  shrewder  captains  of 
''  bankers  "  would  have  quietly  welcomed  the  excuse  to  offer 
their  men  that  all  landing  on  Canadian  shores  was  prohibited. 
It  will  be  remembered  that  the  treaty  of  1818  gave  the 


522  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

right  to  American  fishermen  to  enter  any  of  the  harbors  of 
British  America  for  the  purposes  of  shelter,  repairing 
damages,  purchasing  wood  and  obtaining  water,  but  "  for  no 
other  purposes  whatever."  The  Dominion  Government  inter- 
preted this  phrase  technically  and  strictly.  The  seizure  of 
the  American  vessel  David  J.  Adams  in  Digby  Harbor,  May 
7,  1886,  for  landing  and  purchasing  bait  and  ice,  was  fol- 
lowed soon  after  by  several  other  seizures  upon  the  same 
charge.  The  trial  of  these  alleged  culprits  brought  to  the 
front  the  limitation  of  privileges  in  Canadian  ports  which 
was  imposed  upon  Americans  by  the  Dominion  laws  as  based 
upon  the  treaty  of  1818. 

The  United  States  contended  that  while  it  was  perfectly 
true  that  the  right  to  purchase  bait  in  Canadian  harbors,  and 
also  the  right  to  enter  such  harbors  for  any  other  purposes 
than  shelter,  repairs,  and  to  obtain  wood  and  water,  had  been 
expressly  denied  in  the  treaty  of  1818,  nevertheless,  subse- 
quent legislation  on  the  part  of  both  Canada  and  the  United 
States  had  so  far  modified  that  clause  of  the  treaty  that  a 
liberal  interpretation  of  the  phrase  in  question  would  give 
full  freedom  to  New  England  fishing  vessels  to  purchase 
all  needful  supplies  in  Canadian  ports,  and  in  general,  to 
perform,  without  let  or  hindrance,  all  acts  necessary  for 
refitting.  It  was  contended  that  in  1818,  when  the  treaty 
was  made,  commercial  vessels  of  the  United  States  were 
absolutely  prohibited  from  British  American  ports,  and  the 
privileges  granted  to  fishing  vessels  in  that  year  were  excep- 
tions to  the  rigid  navigation  laws  of  Great  Britain.  Since 
then,  and  notably  by  an  act  in  1830,  and  by  the  Imperial 
Shipping  and  Navigation  Act  of  1849,  these  restrictions 
upon  American  commercial  vessels  were  removed.  With 
the  removal  therefore  of  all  former  disabilities  upon  trading 
vessels,  were  not  the  few  remaining  disabilities  upon  fishing 
vessels  (imposed  by  the  treaty  of  1818)  also  removed  ? 
Great  Britain  replied  that  these  disabilities  had  not  been 
removed,  as  she  had  then  drawn,  and  did  now  draw,  a 
distinction  between  fishing  and  trading  vessels.  The  former, 
she  contended,  had  no  commercial  privileges  whatever ;  and 


THE   NORTHEAST  COAST  FISHERIES  623 

only  with  the  understanding  that  they  would  not  transport 
merchandise,  they  were  accorded,  by  most  civilized  nations, 
certain  special  immunities  from  harbor  and  port  regulations. 
They  carry  no  clearance  papers  or  manifests,  and  are  free 
to  come  and  go  at  will.  Trading  vessels,  on  the  other 
hand',  are  strictly  held  to  these  formalities.  For  the  protec- 
tion of  revenue  laws  and  to  prevent  illicit  trade,  all  commer- 
cial vessels  are  obliged  to  carry  ships  papers  that  indicate 
clearly  their  ports  of  departure  and  destination,  and  an 
inventory  of  cargo  as  well.  These  laws  are  very  stringent, 
and  therefore  if  American  fishing  vessels  desire  to  become 
merchant  vessels  also,  they  must  comply  with  the  usual 
regulations  imposed  upon  merchant  vessels. 

For  obvious  reasons  the  captains  of  fishing  schooners  were 
unwilling  to  be  burdened  with  ships'  papers.  The  nature  of 
their  calling  made  their  movements  more  or  less  uncertain, 
and  to  be  obliged  by  their  clearances  to  call  at  Halifax  when 
St.  John's  happened  to  be  the  more  convenient  port,  would 
be  an  intolerable  nuisance.  The  Druid  of  Gloucester,  in 
1886,  furnished  an  example.  With  supplies  for  the  Ameri- 
can mackerel  fleet  she  took  out  clearance  papers  for  Harbor 
de  Bar  in  the  Magdalen  Islands;  but  finding  later  that  the 
fleet  she  sought  was  off  Prince  Edward  Island,  she  proceeded 
to  that  point,  and  disposing  of  her  cargo  of  provisions,  put 
into  the  nearest  port,  —  which  happened  to  be  Malpeque,  — 
to  obtain  a  return  cargo  of  fish.  There  she  passed  an  unhappy 
week  in  the  toils  of  the  revenue  officials  of  that  port. 

As  already  mentioned  (page  487),  Congress  had  passed  an 
act  in  1793  authorizing  fishing  vessels  to  take  out  licenses 
to  "  touch  and  trade  "  at  any  foreign  port,  and  to  make  pur- 
chases necessary  for  their  own  use  without  being  subjected 
to  the  customs  regulations  of  the  United  States.  The  form 
of  this  permit  was  not  the  same  as  a  clearance,  but  was  a 
document  to  be  shown  to  customs  officers  of  home  ports,  in 
order  to  exempt  the  holder  from  certain  customs  dues. 
The  argument  that  the  "  touch  and  trade  "  licenses  were 
understood  as  "  conferring  upon  the  vessel  a  right  to  land 
and   receive  on  board  a  cargo  of  merchandise  in  the  same 


524  AMERICAN  DIPLOMATIC  QUESTIONS 

manner  as  if  she  were  not  engaged  in  the  fisheries "  was 
scarcely  sound. 

On  the  trial  of  the  David  J.  Adams^  charged  with  purchas- 
ing bait  and  ice  in  contravention  of  the  terms  of  the  treaty 
of  1818,  the  admiralty  court  in  Halifax  found  some  diffi- 
culty, because  the  Imperial  Act  of  1819,  enforcing  the 
provisions  of  the  treaty  of  1818,  prescribed  no  penalty  for 
such  purchases,  the  only  penalties  mentioned  being  for 
"fishing  and  preparing  to  take  fish"  within  the  prohibited 
waters.  To  hold  that  buying  bait  was  necessarily  for  the 
purpose  of  "  preparing  to  fish  "  within  prohibited  waters  was 
scarcely  logical. 

The  real  grievance  of  American  fishermen,  however,  was 
in  the  aggravating  and  needlessly  severe  port  regulations 
of  the  Dominion,  and  also  in  the  harsh  manner  of  their  exe- 
cution. One  of  these  statutes  was  so  framed  that  the 
captor  was  entitled  to  one-lialf  the  profits  of  confiscation, 
and  the  burden  of  proof  to  show  innocence  practically  fell 
upon  the  defendant  captains.  The  practice  of  purchasing 
bait  and  landing  to  transship  cargoes,  and  the  doing  of 
numerous  other  acts  necessarily  connected  with  the  refitting 
of  a  ship,  such  as  purchasing  new  water  casks,  material  for 
mending  nets  or  sails,  were  declared  illegal.  For  these 
reasons,  and  often  upon  very  slight  pretexts,  American 
vessels  were  detained  to  the  great  discomfiture  and  annoy- 
ance of  the  fishermen.  It  was  rather,  then,  to  the  strained 
and  unfriendly  spirit  manifested  in  the  interpretation  of  their 
laws  than  to  the  laws  themselves  that  the  Americans  directed 
their  complaints. 

The  Canadians,  on  the  other  hand,  charged  that  the  Ameri- 
cans sought,  contrary  to  law,  to  use  their  ports  as  a  base  for 
fishing  operations,  and  thus  to  exercise  and  enjoy  in  common, 
privileges  which  they  well  knew  had  not  been  conceded  to 
them.  Having  exhausted  their  own  fisheries  by  overexploita- 
tion,  replied  the  Canadians,  the  Americans  had  demanded  all 
the  privileges  of  British  subjects  in  Canadian  waters,  and 
furthermore  they  actually  assumed  and  used  them  in  defiance 
of  treaty  prohibitions,  and  in  perfect  contempt  of  all  local 


THE   NORTHEAST   COAST   FISHERIES  525 

regulations.  The  seizures  of  their  vessels  were  compara- 
tively few  and  far  between,  considering  the  persistency  with 
wliich  the  Americans  violated  their  laws.  For  all  privileges 
granted  them,  the  Americans  were  unwilling  to  make  any 
return.  The  Canadians  reiterated  their  willingness  to  remove 
at  any  time  the  regulations  so  obnoxious  to  the  American 
fishermen,  and  to  grant  them  the  fullest  liberties  in  their 
ports,  if  the  United  States  would  but  compensate  them  for 
such  concessions.  Their  price,  they  said,  was  free  Canadian 
fish  into  the  United  States,  but  this  the  Americans  who  sought 
favors  of  them  opposed  with  all  their  influence  in  Congress. 

A  treaty  with  England  was  signed  in  Washington,  Febru- 
ary 15,  1888,  providing  for  a  commission  to  designate  and 
describe  the  British  waters  in  which  the  United  States  should 
enjoy  full  right  to  fish,  and  in  like  manner  to  enumerate 
and  state  specifically  the  harbors  and  other  waters  in  which 
such  rights  would  thenceforth  be  denied.  One  article  recited 
that  whenever  the  United  States  Government  should  remove 
the  tariff  duty  upon  the  products  of  the  Canadian  fishery, 
then  the  privilege  of  entering  all  ports,  harbors,  etc.,  of  the 
Dominion  coasts  would  be  accorded  Americans  for  the  fol- 
lowing purposes,  namely :  — 

"  1.  The  purchase  of  provisions,  bait,  ice,  seines,  lines,  and 
all  other  supplies  and  outfits. 

"  2.  Transshipment  of  catch,  for  transport  by  any  means 
of  conveyance. 

"  3.    Shipping  of  crews." 

The  draft  of  treaty  went  to  the  Senate  strongly  recom- 
mended by  President  Cleveland,  but  failed  to  become  law. 
Pending  action  by  Congress,  the  following  Modus  Vivendi 
was  agreed  upon  in  February,  1888,  which  by  tacit  consent 
has  continued  to  remain  in  force  by  renewal  each  year  to 
the  present  time  :  — 

1.  For  a  period  not  exceeding  two  years  from  the  present  date, 
the  privilege  of  entering  the  bays  and  harbors  of  the  Atlantic 
coasts  of  Canada  and  Newfoundland  shall  be  granted  to  the 
United  States  fishing  vessels  by  annual  licenses  at  a  fee  of  ^1.50 
per  ton  —  for  the  following  purposes :  — 


526  AMERICAN   DIPLOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

The  purchase  of  bait,  ice,  seines,  lines,  and  all  other  supplies- 
and  outfits. 

Transshipment  of  catch  and  shipping  of  crews. 

2.  If,  during  the  continuance  of  this  arrangement,  the  United 
States  should  remove  the  duties  on  fish,  fish  oil,  whale  and  seal 
oil  (and  their  coverings,  packages,  etc.),  the  said  licenses  shall  be 
issued  free  of  charge. 

3.  United  States  fishing  vessels  entering  the  bays  and  harbors 
of  the  Atlantic  coasts  of  Canada  or  of  Newfoundland  for  any  of 
the  four  purposes  mentioned  in  Article  1  of  the  convention  of 
October  20,  1818,  and  not  remaining  therein  more  than  twenty- 
four  hours,  shall  not  be  required  to  enter  or  clear  at  the  custom 
house,  providing' they  do  not  communicate  with  the  shore. 

4.  Forfeiture  to  be  exacted  only  for  the  offences  of  fishing  or 
preparing  to  fish  in  territorial  waters. 

5.  This  arrangement  to  take  effect  as  soon  as  the  necessary 
measures  can  be  completed  by  the  Colonial  authorities. 

For  the  past  twelve  years,  therefore,  the  regulations  gov- 
erning the  Canadian  fisheries  are  those  of  the  convention  of 
1818,  as  modified  by  the  words  of  the  Modus  Vivendi  of 
1888.  The  arrangement  did  not  prove  altogether  satisfac- 
tory at  first  to  either  party,  and  the  continued  successful 
operation  of  the  plan  depended  largely  upon  the  good- will 
and  forbearance  of  both. 


Changing  conditions  in  the  methods  of  fishing  have  oper- 
ated more  largely  in  the  last  ten  years  to  do  away  with  the 
troublesome  "  fishery  question  "  than  have  a  century  of  diplo- 
matic skirmishes.  At  the  present  moment  those  chronic 
differences  of  the  fishermen  seem  to  be  almost  forgotten, 
and  until  new  and  unforeseen  complications  arise,  the  whole 
matter  will  probably  remain  at  rest.  The  liability  to  fur- 
ther rupture  with  Canada  concerning  these  rights  lies 
to-day  rather  in  associated  diplomatic  questions  still  unset- 
tled between  the  two  powers  and  in  the  adjustment  of  which 
the  fishery  regulations  are  likely  to  be  utilized  in  the  shift- 
ing game  of  international  politics.  The  fishermen  at  least 
are  satisfied  with  present  conditions.  Each  year  since  1888, 
and  including  the  last,  the  Modus  Vivendi  has  been  renewed ;. 


THE  NORTHEAST  COAST  FISHERIES  527 

and  under  its  provisions  American  captains  desiring  the  use  of 
Canadian  ports  for  purposes  of  procuring  bait,  transshipping 
cargoes,  purchasing  provisions,  refitting,  etc.,  may  purchase 
licenses  at  the  cost  of  il.50,  multiplied  by  the  registered 
tonnage  of  the  vessel.^ 

But  each  year  the  value  of  such  privileges  to  our  fishermen 
has  been  diminishing,  and  the  vast  majority  of  United  States 
fishing  vessels  do  not  care  to  avail  themselves  of  them.  In 
1898,  out  of  1427  New  England  schooners  engaged  in  fish- 
ing, only  79  took  out  licenses,  and  the  year  before  only  40 
bought  the  right  to  enter  Canadian  ports  for  the  purposes 
mentioned  in  the  Modus  Vivendi. 

The  inshore  cod  fishery  of  Canada,  though  still  prosecuted 
by  Canadians,  has  been  wholly  abandoned  by  Americans. 
The  entire  American  fleet,  which  is  equipped  for  cod  and 
other  "ground"  fish,  follows  the  Bank  fishery.  The  use 
of  larger,  faster  and  better  equipped  vessels,  the  carrying 
of  ice  to  pack  away  the  catch,  the  use  of  iced  or  salted  bait, 
has  almost  totally  obviated  the  necessity  of  touching  at 
Canadian  ports,  and  our  fishermen  declare  themselves  to  be 

1  The  form  of  license  is  as  follows  :  — 

(Name) (Master    or   Owner) of  the 

United  States  Fishing  vessel tons  register,  of , 

having  paid  to  the  undersigned,  Collector  of  Customs  at  the  port  of 

the  sum  of  $ ,  being  one  dollar  and  fifty  cents  per  registered 

ton,  the  privilege  is  hereby  granted  to  said  fishing  vessel  to  enter  the  bays, 
and  harbours  of  the  Atlantic  coasts  of  Canada,  for  the  purchase  of  bait,  ice, 
seines,  lines  and  all  other  supplies  and  outfits,  and  the  transshipment  of  catch, 
and  shipping  of  crews. 

This  license  shall  continue  in  force  for  the  year ,  and  is  issued  in  pur- 
suance of  the  Act  of  the  Parliament  of  Canada  of  1892,  entitled,  "An  Act 
respecting  Fishing  Vessels  of  the  United  States,"  55-56  Victoria,  chapter  3. 

This  license,  while  conferring  the  above-mentioned  privileges,  does  not 
dispense  with  a  due  observance  by  the  holder,  or  any  other  person,  of  the 
laws  of  Canada,  and  will  become  null  and  void,  and  forfeited  forthwith,  and 
the  vessel  will  become  ineligible  to  obtain  a  license  in  future,  if  any  goods  or 
supplies,  or  other  advantages  obtained  hereunder  are  sold  or  transferred  to^ 
any  United  States  fishing  vessel  that  has  not  obtained  a  license. 

Dated  this day  of a.d.  189 

Collector  of  Customs  at  the  Port  of 


For  Minister  of  Marine  and  Fisheries. 


528  AMERICAN  DU^LOMATIC   QUESTIONS 

entirely  independent  of  the  rights  or  privileges  which  the 
Canadians  have  to  offer. 

By  freezing  their  fares  they  are  enabled  to  bring  them 
home  and  to  cure  their  fish  upon  American  soil,  thus  doing 
away  with  one  of  the  most  aggravating  causes  of  dispute  in 
former  years.  Those  American  fishermen  who  resort  more 
particularly  to  the  Banks  adjacent  to  Newfoundland  admit 
the  convenience  of  a  license  for  using  Canadian  ports,  espe- 
cially in  the  contingency  of  prolonged  unfavorable  weather ; 
but  whatever  may  be  the  value  of  such  privileges  —  even  if 
made  general  and  open  to  all  — the  fishermen  are  unanimous 
in  the  belief  that  they  are  not  worth  the  price  of  free  Ameri- 
can markets  to  Canadian  fish  and  fish  products.  Rather 
than  suffer  the  great  injury  to  their  business,  which  they  say 
free  competition  with  tlie  Canadians  would  cause,  they 
would  cheerfully  forego  the  benefits  given  them  by  the 
Modus  Vivendi. 

As  heretofore  shown,  the  chief  difficulties  arising  out  of 
the  fisheries  hi  the  last  few  years  have  been  produced  by 
the  use  of  the  purse  seine.  This  method  of  fishing  for 
mackerel  was  extensivel}^  followed  by  American  skippers  in 
the  shallow  waters  of  the  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence,  but  the 
employment  of  these  large  nets  was  denounced  by  the  Cana- 
dians upon  the  supposition  that  it  tended  to  scatter  the 
schools  of  fish,  to  interfere  with  their  habits  of  breeding,  and 
to  cause  them  ultimately  to  abandon  those  waters.  They 
alleged,  therefore,  that  the  use  of  this  seine  constituted  an 
act  contra  honos  moreB.  Whether  the  Canadians  were  justi- 
fied in  those  apprehensions  or  not,  the  Americans  neverthe- 
less continued  the  practice,  basing  their  right  to  do  so 
(beyond  three  miles  from  shore)  upon  the  broad  rights  of 
mare  liherum. 

These  points  of  difference  offered  an  excellent  foundation 
for  future  diplomatic  disturbances,  but  two  causes  happily 
appeared  which  no  doubt  prevented  the  maturing  of  these 
seasonal  quarrels  into  a  more  serious  international  disagree- 
ment. The  American  fishermen  began  of  their  own  volition 
to  abandon  the  use  of  the  purse  seine,  and  to  return  to  the 


THE  NORTHEAST  COAST  FISHERIES  529 

more  primitive,  but  after  all  the  more  effective,  method  of 
*' chumming  " ;  secondly,  the  mackerel  began  to  disappear 
from  Canadian  waters,  in  consequence  of  which,  each  suc- 
ceeding year  has  found  fewer  American  vessels  in  the  Gulf 
of  St.  Lawrence.  Since  1886,  indeed,  the  mackerel  have 
almost  wholly  abandoned  their  former  haunts  in  the  Gulf  of 
St.  Lawrence,  although  reports  of  the  present  year  give  evi- 
dences that  they  are  renewing  their  annual  migrations  to 
the  more  northern  station.  However,  the  abandonment  of 
the  purse  seine  has  removed  the  prime  causes  of  discord,  and 
if  the  American  mackerel  fleet  should  resume  operations  in 
the  Gulf,  there  is  no  special  likelihood  of  conflict. 

The  northeast  coast  fisheries  are  in  a  most  prosperous  and 
flourishing  condition,  as  may  be  realized  from  the  fact  that 
in  1899  the  number  of  "  ground  fish  "  from  the  Banks  (cod, 
haddock,  hake,  etc.,  excluding  mackerel)  landed  at  Boston 
and  Gloucester,  amounted  to  155,367,808  pounds,  valued  at 
f  3,525,268.  A  substantial  increase  is  thus  shown  over  the 
business  of  the  previous  year,  which  amounted  to  128,088,295 
pounds,  with  estimated  value  of  12,585,010.  Reports  for  1900 
indicate  that  the  fisheries  are  steadily  increasing  in  value. ^ 

It  is  greatly  to  be  hoped  that  the  present  regulations  may 
continue  in  operation  undisturbed  by  the  intrusion  of  other 
diplomatic  issues.  Therein  lies  the  chief  danger  of  a  per- 
petuation of  this  stubborn  quarrel  of  a  century  between  the 
United  States  and  Canada. 

At  last  the  American  fisherman  seems  to  be  satisfied,  and 
the  Canadian  fisherman  is  equally  without  cause  of  complaint. 
Time  has  reconciled  disputes  which  the  wisdom  of  statesmen 
failed  to  adjust,  and  it  has  successfully  composed  those  ques- 
tions which  diplomacy  could  not  permanently  solve.  And 
thus  the  lesson  is  once  more  taught  that  war  postponed  is  the 
beginning  of  peace.  Let  it  be  hoped  that  the  cordial  relations 
between  the  two  great  nations  in  interest  thus  cemented 
by  time,  may  continue  as  long  as  time  itself  may  last. 


2m 


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